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Abstract 
Foreign direct investment has played an important role in the Australian economy 
yet despite frequent public controversy there is still no general study of the politics 
of inward FDI in Australia. This thesis seeks to explain why Australia turned away 
from a long-established 'open door' policy towards FDI in the late 1960s only to 
liberalise policy again from the mid-1980s and why policy openness vru:ied across 
sectors. In doing so the thesis tests the explanatory power of both private and public 
inte1"est theories of FDI policy. Both accounts are grounded in a theory of political 
markets characterised by information shortages and political entrepreneurialism. 
This thesis concludes that Australia's FDI policy during 1960-96 principally 
teflected government attempts to make politically optimal compromises between 
competing conceptions of the public interest in relation to FDI. Yet rent seeking 
was rife and, to some degree, influenced popular and elite perceptions of the public 
interest. Liberal bu.siness constituencies and the imperative of growth-oriented 
policy strategies usually outweighed private interest suppL'1:ers of restrictive FDI 
policy although periodically the latter did find some influence. Private interests 
seeking restrictive policy were helped by shortages of information about the real 
costs and benefits of FDI, in the case of the mining industry in particular, and by 
popular concern about the cultural consequences of FDI in the case of the mass 
media. The public interest politics of FDI policy also proved to be inseparable from 
the use of restrictions on FDI as a second best solution to poor regulatory design, 
tariff policy and mismanagement of national resources. These findings about the 
politics of FD! LTl Australia suggest that when confronted by a weak economy most 
governments will deliver quite liberal policy in practice for all but the most 
politically sensitive sectors. The economic costs of economic nationalism may 
engender their own political momentum for the liberalisation of FDI policy. Yet the 
Australian experience also suggests that governments will be very hesitant to give 
up discretionary controls on FDI, such as the Foreign Investment Review Board. 
This is because they provide a mechanism for managing politically resilient 
economic nationalist sentiment in the electorate and for providing the odd favour to 
an influential private interest. 
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.1 ' Issues 
Foreign direct investment has played an important role in the Australian economy 
throughout the postwar era and in certain earlier periods. Yet despite frequent public 
controversy over foreign direct investment there is still no general study of the 
politics of inward FDI in Australia. This thesis is an attempt to provide that study. It 
offers insights into the political forces for and against a liberal policy towards 
inward FDI in the period from 1960 to 1996. In doing so it contributes an 
. . 
understanding olf a neglected but significant dimension of Australia's national 
political economy. It also makes a modest contribution to the international business 
literature on the domestic determinants of FDI policy. It does so at a time of public 
debates over 'globalisation' mid when the failure of negotiations in the OECD of a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) have revealed the strength of domestic 
political resistance in many countries to open FDI policy regimes. The thesis tests 
the explanatory power of both private and public interest theories of FDI policy. 
Both accounts are grounded in a theory of political markets characterised by 
information shortages and political entrepreneurialism. Both interests and ideas, 
complexly interdependent, have determined Australian policy outcomes on FDI. 
The history of Australian polic,y towards foreign investment is, at first glance, 
astonishing. Australia maintained fill open door policy from its first European 
settlement until the late 1960s. In 1972 a formal administrative mechanism for 
regulating foreign takeovers of Australian businesses wm.l established, with 
restrictive guidelines issued to would-be direct investors. In 197 4 that mechanism 
was extended to all new FDI, and the investment guidelines established equal 
partnerships with local businesses as a formal object of policy. With certain 
exceptions this policy was maintained until 1986. Between then and 1992 there was 
substantial liberalisation of policy. This opening up, and active government efforts 
to attract and facilitate inward FDI, occurred despite a period of intense domestic 
controversy about Japanese investment in Australia. One concession was made to 
this public concern when new restrictions were imposed on foreign investnwnt in 
residential real estate. In both the restrictive and liberalising phases ~f FDI 
policymaking certain sectors were singled out for special treatment. By the mid-
1990s the media and certain privatised utilities were still the main industries where 
FDJ remained heavily restricted. In 1995 the Australian government formalised its 
approach to negotiations within the OECD over a multilateral investment 
agreement. It committed to seeking sufficient exemptions from the national 
treatment principle to preserve its existing FDI review process ruid all remaining 
sectoral restrictions.' This brief overview of the history of Australian FDI policy 
settings raises two basic analytical challenges. The first is to account for changes in 
the general directi~n of FDI policy over time. That is, why did Australia turn away 
from a longstanding open door policy only to later reverse course again? Secondly, 
how is the varying restrictiveness of FDI policy across industry sectors in the period 
from 1972 to be accounted for? 
In the next section of this chapter the importance of answering these questions is 
spelt out in greater detail. FollO'wing that, a brief overview of the literature on the 
determinants of FDI policies is provided and the need for a detailed study of the 
Australian case is revealed. That survey affirms the need to bring the theoretical 
tools of political science to an area of study that has generally been the preserve of 
international business scholars. In the following section it is argued that a theoretical 
framework producing 'generalisable' results is needed if maximum value is to be 
drawn from a single country study. A 'political markets' approach holds. the greatest 
promise. It is then shown that a qualitative research methodology is appropriate for 
study of the Australian case. The chapter concludes with an overview of the 
structure of the thesis. 
1 While a Coalition government was elected soon after, Australia's policy position on the MAI 
remained unaltered. Moderate further liberalisation in 1999 refleeted a clear continuity of direction 
from the Labor years and so it suffices to finish the analysis with the Keating government. 
2 
Rationales 
An understanding of the domestic political barriers to free inflow of foreign direct 
investment is important because of its actual and potential significance as an engine 
of economic growth. Although most national governments have recognised the 
economic contribution FDI can make to their economies, recent international 
negotiations over a binding agreement on FDI regulation have failed principally 
because of domestic political constraints. Given Australia's historical dependence 
on FDI it is surprising that there is no general study of the political determinants of 
FDI policy - a significant gap in the academic literature that this thesis seeks to 
address. In doing so it may provide a fuller understanding of an important 
dimension of Australia's national political economy. A study of the political forces 
for and against a liberal FDI policy will be not only of academic interest but may 
also help foreign firms to strategise their interaction with Australian policymakers 
and society. Each of these rationales will be briefly elaborated upon. 
The stock of global FDI has increased seven-fold since 1980, to some US$3500 
billion, and FDI flows in the period 1992-97 were double those of the previous five 
years (UNCTAD 1998; DFAT 1999:5). Global FDI flows increased 25 per cent in 
1999 on the previous year, to a record $US827 billion (AFR 11 February 2000). 
Scholars have provided strong evidence of the potential benefits to host economies 
of a liberal FDI regime; especially when domestic economic policy settings are 
adequate (Caves 1996; Dunning 1994, 1997). Most governments of the major 
trading and FDI exporting economies now appreciate the fundamental 
interdependence of foreign trade and investment (I·Iart and Prakash 1997:457). The 
competitive advantages that multinational enterprises have built for themselves 
through judicious development of intra-firm resources, distribution channels and 
extensive country and market specific knowledge, have made them major players in 
3 
cross border trade. 2 Governments wishing to enhance export performance must 
tread very carefully in regulating FDI, lest they forego access to such a major force 
for expanded international trade (Jansson, Saqib and Sharma 1995:3-4; Dwming 
1997, 1993a:600-16; Reich 1991).3 In recognition of the contribution to overall 
economic growth FDI can make, and to improving external balances in particular, 
many countries have unilaterally liberalised their foreign i:::ivestrnent policy settings 
over the last two decades (WTO 1998, 1999). In Australia's own region, the Asia 
Pacific, this has been well evidenced.4 However, Australia's Bureau of Industry 
Economics (BIE 1995: 1) noted that 
Despite these initiatives, substantial investment distorting policies remain in many APEC 
economies. These include measures that are specifically directed at foreign investment such 
as investment restrictions, investment incentives and inequitable standards of treatment for 
foreign investors. They also include measures associated with intellectual property rights, 
competition policy and trade policy that indirectly affect foreign investment flows. 
Why then are some restrictions on FDI so persistent when its economic benefits are 
recognised? The answer is far from clear because there are still few studies 
available on the determinants of FDI policy. What is clear is that domestic political 
considerations in many countries constrain the ability of governments to make 
binding international commitments to further liberalise FDI policy (Graham 2000; 
Warren and Findlay 2000:3). The failure of negotiations over the draft Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) revealed this forcefully. OECD member states 
2 For a good introduction to the literature on firms growing beyond national borders see Dunning 
(1993b). This work includes reprints of, or excerpts from, a number of the seminal articbs such as 
those by Hymer (1976), Vernon (1966), Caves (1971), Magee (1977), Graham (1978), Kojima 
(1982), and Dunning {1988a). Other works of importance in the development of the theory of 
transnational corporations include Penrose (195(i), Buckley and Casson (1985), Casson (1990), 
Dunning (1988b), Kojima (1977), Teese (1985), a\ld contributions in Buckley (1991). 
3 Both natural and artificial barriers to anns length trade can lead firms to directly invest in operations 
in the target market, despite the up front costs, risk and opportunity costs of foregone scale and scope 
efficiencies from concentrating operations in a limited number of locations. For the impact of 
government policies on this calculus see Murtha (1991, 1993) and Gomes-Casseres (1990) and for a 
case study of the food processing industry see (Hooker and Caswell 1996). 
4 
For discussion of developments in the Asia Pacific region, from a range of perspectives, see Bora 
and Findlay (1995), Chen (1992, 1993), Chow and Kellman (1993), Hatch and Yamamura (1996), 
Ramstetter (1991), Simon (1995) and Urata (1993). 
4 
debated the draft MAI for three years frotn late 1995.5 The draft MAI would have, 
for the first time, obligated signatories beyond a single re~\on to treat foreign firms 
in the same way as local ones and created an impetus for unwinding declared 
exceptions over time. 6 The facts of NGO criticism of aspects of the draft agreement, 
and the ultimate failure of those negotiations, are well known. Yet the main reason 
for the lack' of agreement was the heavily qualified offers that OECD member 
nations brought to the bargaining table (Graham 2000). There has been little 
scholarly attention given to the domestic political constraints that OECD 
governments faced when determining their bargaining positions in 1995. Despite the 
failure of the MAI negotiations in late 1998 international dialogue on investment 
issues did not cease. The locus of discussions shifted to the GATT/WTO and to how 
investment issues could be dealt with in the new round of multilateral negotiations 
that was to be launched in Seattle in late 1999 (WTO 1998).7 FDI issues have arisen 
in the multilateral services negotiations commenced in February 2000 (UNCTAD 
1998:70-71; AFR 18-19 March 2000). Australia's sectoral restrictions on FDI are 
generally concentrated in services industries (FIRB 1996:38-41).8 While divisions 
between and within nations are readily apparent, investment issues are now a 
prominent feature of the international trade negotiation agenda (WTO 1999: 16-
25). 9 This is likely to heighten ongoing public debate within Australia about FDI 
5 The practice of govennents making investment approvals conditional upon certain commitments on 
exports and the like was addressed in the Uruguay Round in the new Trade Related rnJestment 
Measures (TRIMS) agreement (Trebilcock and Howse 1999:351-65). 
6 There are already some 1500 bilateral and a number of regional investment agreements in place, 
although all but a handful are merely exhortatory rather than binding on members (DFAT 1999:15; 
WTO 1999:12-16). ','--
7 One national representative on the WTO's Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and 
Investment stated that ' ... competition-oriented reform of WTO rules with a view to increasing the 
synergies between trade, competition and investment policies was essential to ensure that WTO rules 
remained valid and credible in a technology-driven globalized economy.' (WTO 1999:12) 
8 Services firms endeavouring to internationalise generally require a commercial presence in a target 
market; making FDl controls a significant consideration in their ability to enter the market at all 
(Zeithaml and Bitner 1996:414-45; Trebilcock and Howse 1999:270-306; De·e and Hanslow 2000). 
9 Some observers, in fact, suspect that France and some other European nations are pushing the 
investment agenda for the next GA TT round precisely because it will be so contentious. The 
rationale is that those countries seek to delay conclusion of the round because the politically difficult 
issue of agricultural subsidies will figure prominently. This interpretation has some currency in 
official Australian policy circles (Ms Jane Madden, Director; New Trade Issues Section, DFAT, 
interview, Canberra 24 February 2000). The clear implication is that studies of the domestic politics 
of both trade and investment issues are crucial to understanding of the prospects for the next GATT 
round (Hutbauer 1999). 
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policy .. The historical reasons for that contention need to be understood given the 
importance ofFDI to the Australian economy. 
Australian public opinion polls reveal a continuing antipathy to FDI amongst a 
sizeable section of the Australian community.1° Criticisms of foreign takeovers of 
Australian enterprises still attract media attention and popular sympathy. Pauline 
Hanson's radical right wing One Nation party, along with the centrist Australian 
Democrats, have been vociferous critics of foreign takeovers and Australia's 
reliance on FDI in general. 11 At the same time Australian state and federal 
governments clearly perceive that there are political pay-offs from attracting 
prominent new direct investors. Australian popular opinion on FDI appears to be 
deeply schizophrenic. Recent debates about 1 globalisation', both in Australia and 
abroad, have breathed new life into older controversies about the costs and benefits 
of FDI. 12 (Dicken 1992; Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Bryan 
and Rafferty 1999:3-33, Ohmae 1990, 1995). In the United States this was 
evidenced in the disagreement between Reich (1990, 1991) and Tyson (1991) who 
both took up senior positions in the first Clinton Administration. 13 In examining 
how FDI issues have become politically salient in Australia in the past greater 
insight will be gained into why 'globalisation' has become contentious. 
Australia has long attracted considerable FDI inflow. Although the size of inward 
10 Public opinion data on FDI issues will be given close attention in subseqaent chapters. 
11 Pauline Hanson's One Nation party commits 'to restrict foreign ownership of Australia ... ' (One 
Nation, March 2000, www.onenation.com.au). The Australian Democrats (1998) commit to: 
' ... make sure foreign investment proposals are only approved if they are of net economic benefit to. 
Australia and if no comparable Australian bid is available' (Australian Democrats, 'Economic 
Independence', Issue sheet '98, www.democrats.org.au). 
12 Popular interest in critiques of globalisation in Australia has provoked responses by some 
government bodies and academics (Lowe and Dwyer 1994; EPAC 1995; Arndt 1998; Evans 1999). 
The concern with globalisation in Australia has coincided, and been somewhat confused, with a 
prolonged period of regulatory refonn and structural adjustment (Bell 1997, Bryan and Rafferty 
1999:221-22; Catley 1996; Fagan and Webber 1994). 
13 Reich (1991) made much of the internationalisation of production through MNEs but argued that 
the nationality of fmns mattered little. Tyson (1991), in response, argued that the location of highest 
value adding activities and much decision-making in the home country of many MNEs meant that 
nationality was still of considerable policy significance. For a general discussion of the issues see Hu 
(1992). 
6 
FDI flows to Australia has varied substantially throughout the 1990s they have 
averaged in excess of $7 billion per year; with the stock of FDI in Australia reaching 
$157 billion at the end of FY1997-98 (DFAT 1999:19-20).14 In 1995 Australia 
was the fourth largest recipient of global FDI flows (Bryan and Rafferty 1999:154; 
UNCTAD 1996:xvi). The important role of FDI in the Australian economy was 
established early in the postwar period. Arndt (1957:436, 439) found that in the 
·period 1947-48 to 1954-55 FDI contributed some 20 per cent of gross private 
investment in fixed equipment. High levels of FDI inflow resulted in foreign 
ownership being . a prominent feature of certain Australian industries. In the 
manufacturing sector, majority foreign-owned enterprises accounted for about one-
quarter of value-added in the. 1960s and one-third since the early 1970s. Foreign 
control in the mining sector was over 50 per cent of value-added in the early 1970s 
but has subsequently declined somewhat (Dyster and Meredith 1990:285). Some 
industries such as petroleum refining and motor vehicle manufacture have been 
almost completely foreign dominated. 
Businesses in Australia with majority foreign ownership currently employ more 
than half a million people. They account for some 20 per cent of all manufacturing 
sector employment, 25 per cent in the mining sef' .r.ir, . .md 33 p~r cent in coal 
processing and chemicals manufacture (DFAT · "·l9:25). From the mid-1960s 
studies revealed that foreign-controlled enterprises tended to grow more rapidly, be 
more profitable and deploy more advanced technologies than locally owned 
enterprises (Vernon Report 1965; Brash 1966; Parry 1982). Recent studies have also 
highlighted the greater export orient.q,tion, productivity and higher wages paid by 
firms with foreign ownership (Fisher, Stoekel and Borrell 1998; Bora 1995). 
Consistent with these are Makin's findings that FDI had boosted national per capita 
real incomes over time (1997, 1998). McKibbin (1996; DFAT 1999:45-46) 
modelled the effects of imposing capital controls and found that they would reduce 
14 Stock figures are rather problematic because they price investments at historical value, diminishing 
the apparent importance of FDl from the older sources of the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America. 
7 
GDP by some 1 per cent per annum, interest rates would rise and that some 100,000 
jobs would be lost in two years. 15 A significant change in the last two decades has 
been the increasing significance of Australia outward FDI; averaging over $5 billion 
a year for most of the 1990s (DFAT 1999:36). Australia nonetheless remains a 
significant net importer ofFDI. 
Throughout Australia's two hundred-odd years of white settlement affecting capital 
inflow has always been an objective of economic policy. A number of political 
economists have noted a strongly 'developmentalist' ethos that permeated the major 
political parties throughout the twentieth century; regardless of their differing 
redistributive inclinations (McCarty 1967; Hannan and Head 1982; Head 1983, 
1986; Murphy, Joyce and Hughes 1980). As Chapter 3 explores, developmentalism 
predispo&ed policymakers to overseas capital but not always in the form of direct 
investments. In fact government policies have been a significant factor in the 
foreign capital mix at certain points (Dyster and Meredith 1990:279-85). While the 
concern in this thesis is with policies applying to foreign direct investments, it can 
be difficult to separate the politics of FDI from the broader politics of foreign 
capital inflow, 16 Australian critics of FDI rarely argued for the exclusion of foreign 
capital but for its import in forms other than FDI: as portfolio investment, private or 
state borrowings and which did not entail the element of foreign control. 17 There is 
15 The macro effects were calculated assuming that capital controls raised the return in Australia that 
foreign investors require by 1 per cent per annum. The projected interest rate rise was in the order of 
0.5 per cent per annum. 
16 The establishment of operations by a foreign firm need not entail the transfer of any additional 
capital to the host country from abroad. The foreign investor may raise required capital locally. 
During the forty-odd years that are the main focus of this thesis, Australian governments periodically 
restricted the access of foreign direct investors to local capital markets so as to force capital inflow. 
17 Reliable measures of control have proven to be notoriously difficult to develop as it is a function of 
particular ownership structures that will be enterprise and time specific. For instance, a 30 per cent 
shareholding in a firm may give effective control in a situation of the share holdings are very 
fragmented. On the other hand, a 30 per cent holding may bring no influence if another party holds 
60 per cent. Although a 20 per cent shareholding is a common threshold for defming control the 
arbitrariness of such a figure is revealed by the fact that different thresholds can be found in current 
Australian statutes and regulations applying to foreign direct investment. On another matter; under a 
fixed exchange rate regime governments also resort~d to controls on capital inflow and outflow as a 
macroeconomic management tool. These may have a considerable impact on a foreign firm and so 
may become an object of contention with the host government. They will be addressed in this thesis 
only in so far as they impacted on the politics ofFDI policy. 
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effectively a matrix of policy options on foreign capital that governments can 
choose from and countries in the Asia Pacific region over recent decades offer 
examples of virtually the full range. 18 To understand the historical determinants of 
FDI policy for any country is to gain an important insight into its national political 
economy. 
An understanding of the past politics of FDI may also be of interest to foreign firms 
considering investment in Australia. It is a maxim of the international business 
literature that multinational firms often will have to compromise their organisational 
and operational goals in order to satisfy the preferences of host governments 
(Rugman and Verbeke 1998:122-23; Molz 1990; Georgantzas 1989; Osland and 
Bjorkman 1998). Those preferences are in turn often determined by domestic 
politics. International business scholars have examined, theoretically and 
empirically, how foreign firms might manage their interactions with host 
governments as part of broader corporate strategy (Encamation and Vachani 1985, 
Mahini and Wells 1986, Mahini 1988; Pral1alad and Doz 1987; Kim 1987).19 
Lenway and Murtha (1994:515) argue that international business scholars should 
provide ' ... MNCs' managers with a basis to forecast the feasibility, likelihood Md 
coherence of public policies, predict the relative consistency of these policies over 
time, and incorporate these expectations into the corporate strategy process.' Their 
research agenda is an extremely ambitious one, not least because the necessary 
theoretical tools are to be found in the political science discipline rather than 
amongst mainstream international business scholars. A more modest aspiration 
would be the production of good country studies of the political determinants of FDI 
policy that might in turn aid foreign firms in their interactions with host 
governments and communities. The existing literature, although rich in studies of 
FDI, still has little to offer in that respect. 
18 Urata (1993), Yue (1993) and Guisinger (1991) provide good overviews of historical patterns of 
FDI in East Asia. North Korea and, in the past the Peoples' Republic of China, excluded all foreign 
capital. Hong Kong has had a virtually 'open door' policy. South Korea showed a distinct preference 
for sovereign borrowings over private borrowings and direct investment (Amsden 1989). 
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Existing lite~ature 
While there has been some academic attention given to Australian FDI policy there ; 
are no general studies of the determinants of policy. Existing writings can be 
divided into narrowly-focused legal and public policy studies, of which there are 
only a few, arid radical political economy accounts, of which there are many more. 
The ma.m instances of the former are by Sexton and Adamovich (1981), Anderson 
(1983), Kasper (1984), Flint (1985) and Galligan (1987). Prominent radical works 
include the many by Wheelwright, alone and with collaborators, over a long period 
(Wheelwright 1984; Fitzpatrick and Wheelwright 1965; Crough and Wheelwright 
1982, 1983; David and Wheelwright 1989). None of this literature gives many clues 
as to what form a general study of the drivers of Australian FDI policy should take. 
The only exception to this is the comparative study by Safarian (1993) that gave 
some attention to the Australian policy experience. Safarian's study is set in the 
international business literature and it is to there that attenticn should be first 
directed for precedents in studying FDI policy. 
International business scholars have given much attention to the impact of FDI 
policies on foreign firms. Although home country governments may sometimes 
assist, in general finns abroad must rely on their own capacities and resources in 
dealing with host governments. A spate of nationalisations and expulsions of 
foreign businesses in the three decades following the end of World War II led 
scholars interested in the growing internationalisation of businesses to give attention 
to 'political risk'. There is now a very large literature on political risk issues, 
including some good overviews (Desta 1985; Brewer 1981; Merrill 1982; Roback 
1971; Simon 1982). The concerns of this literature go beyond direct investment to 
cover all modes of foreign market entry and much of the work looks at how conflict 
between nations can greatly increase home as well as host country political risk 
19 That is, a strategy of'political responsiveness' becomes part ofa broader 'local responsiveness' 
MNE strategy (Doz 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Hadjikhani and Haknnsson 1996; Jansson, 
Saqib and Shanna 1995). 
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(Kobrin 1979, 1982; Jacobson, Lenway and Ring 1993:460-73). Reflecting the 
operational focus of many international business scholars, management strategies 
for recognising and protecting firms from excessive political risk have been a major 
theme of the literature (Gladwin and Walter 1980; Doz and Prahalad 1980; Miller 
1992). Despite that, the domestic political determinants of FD! policies remain little 
theorised or empirically examined. 
The main line of inquiry within the international business literature on FDI policy 
centres on bargaining between multinational enterprises and host governments 
(Kobrin 1982, 1987; Encamation and Vachani 1985). Quantitative studies of 
bargaining outcomes have been carried out; with the dependent variable to be 
explained usually being the level of ownership in the subsidiary the parent retains 
- as a measure of its bargaining strength (Lecraw 1984; Fagre and Wells 1982). 
Such accounts did not adequately take into consideration the fact that MNCs might 
trade concessions on localisation of equity for other regulatory benefits (V achani 
1995: 174) and that they might not, for sound transaction costs reasons, desire full 
ownership anyway (Teese 1985; Anderson and Gatignon 1986). Gomes-Casseres 
(1990) simultaneously tested transaction costs and bargaining theories of subsidiary 
ownership patterns, finding the size of the planned investment and the attractiveness 
of the host market to be significant factors in influencing bargaining outcomes. 
Gomes~Casseres concluded that 
... a theory about multinational enterprise behaviour should consider not only the costs and 
benefits perceived by the firm, but also the impact of relations between finns and 
governments. Recognizing both these effects, managers should analyze the two aspects of 
global strategy, i.e., what is ideal for the firm, and what the firm can get (1990:20). 
An underst.'lrtding of the political pressures for restrictive FDl policies in: , }lost 
country is necessary if a firm is to maximise what it can get. It is somewhat 
surprising then that few international business scholars have sought to identify the 
domestic detenninants of host government FDI policy preferences (Caves 
1996:249). Jansson, Saqib and Sharma (1995:16) conclude of much of the existing 
iµternational business literature that 
11 
Policy making by host governments is considered to be independently established by 
sovereign states exogenous to finn behaviour. Host governments are seen to be sovereign 
states that fonnuiate independent policies. From these independently established positions, 
bargaining that is both sincere and honest results. There is no .room for either opportunism, 
misleading information or misuse of office. The effect of counter actions by domestic and 
foreign firms in influencing the decision makers either at the policy formulation stage or 
during its implementation is not considered. 
There are limited and important exceptions to neglect of the domesti9 drivers of 
host government policies (Boddewyn 1988; Jacobsop, Lenway and Ring 1993:454-
60).20 Some authors have moved beyond a state-centric approach to note that 
economic nationalism as a broad political phenomena can push governments to 
intervene more in the operations of MNEs; although they do not suggest how it 
becomes politically salient (Kim 1987 :7-8). Increasingly international business 
scholars, such as Kobrin (1993) and Brewer (1992) have been looking to the 
political science discipline for useful studies and methodologies. 
To date the political science discipline has been able to provide a range of general 
theoretical approaches to public policy processes but much less in the way of studies 
of FDI policy. That is. not to say that the growing importance of FDI over the last 
four decades has been completely neglected by political scientists. Much of the 
writing on the politics of FD! by political scientists does not focus directly on the 
domestic determinants of FDI policy. Instead many have been concerned with the 
autonomy of nation states and their capacities for public governance vis-a-vis MNEs 
(Boyer and Drache 1996; Rugman and Verbeke 1998:117; Biersteker 1980; Bailey, 
Harte and Sugden 1994; Sklair 1998). In doing so they could call on the works of 
some more radical IB scholarship of the 1970s (Moran 1974; Horst and, Moran 
20 Jacobson, Lenway and Ring (1993:455) sought to incorporate recognition of political and 
institutional issues in host governments into a transaction costs account of international business. 
They did so by utilising Granovetter's (1985) influential work stating that 'International contracts, 
and the transactions they enable, may be embedded within national contexts having diverse domestic, 
foreign and national security contexts. This embeddedness ... can give rise to production, 
administrative and transaction costs different from (and, perhaps, greater than) those associated with 
transactions embedded within a single national context.' 
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·1978; Hymer 1976; Vernon 1971). Th.tre is a large literature that addresses the issue 
of the degree of autonomy of the modem state from the imperatives of the 
international economy (Kenen 1994; Stopford and Strange 1991; Strange 1997). In 
Australia, there is a growing literature on the capacity of governments to shape the 
relationship between the Australian and international economies (Castles 1988, 
Bryan and Rafferty 1999; Parker 1996, 1997; Beilharz 1994; Stewart 1994). In an 
earlier period, dependency theory found influence in some political science circles 
(Amin 1976:198-226; Frank 1967, 1979) While it entailed some convictions about 
the political economy of FDI policies in developing economies, it ultimately saw 
policy settings as being determined by tl?-e structure of the international economic 
order. By contrast, Marxists and other scholars, while criticising the negative impact 
of MNEs on host societies and polities, tended to hold that host governments still 
had the potential to regulate multinational activity (Robinson 1979; R;oxborough 
1979; Riggott 1983). Radical writings on MNEs in Australia have tended to the 
latter perspective (Wheel wright 1984; Fitzpatrick and Wheelwright 1965 ;•Crough 
and Wheelwright 1982, 1983). 
The conflict between radical accounts that emphasise the international and the 
domestic determinants of FDI policy was paralleled in liberal political economy 
circles. Much international political economy (!PE) literature adopts a unitary state 
actor approach to the international politics of economic issues, such as FDI, that 
gives little clue as to the domestic determinants of policy preferences. In particular, 
writers of the neo-realist school associated with Gilpin (1975, 1987) and Krasner 
(1976, 1978, 1985), see the policy preferences of states as principally dete1111ined by 
the structure of the international order.21 A growing recognition, however, that these 
21 Krasner (1985:17S-77) himself concludes that 'Despite their international and dQmestic 
weaknesse:i, Third World states have been able to use their juridical sovereignty, ilie constitutive 
principle of the present international system, to establish national principle$ Jµld rules related to 
multinational corporations .. ' Some intematiQnal political economy scholars J:fave posited a mi!i;ler 
version of Krasrter's structural realism where there is a bias in the intematioitAI order towards liberal 
economic policy settings (Ruggie 1982; Higgott 1996). Jn a less detere'11nistlc vein, Katzenstein 
(1985), Gourevitch (1978) !Uld others note L'tc position of a nationl!h1conomy in the international 
economy, especially in terms of size and resource endowments;-~tnay be a substantial factor in 
patterning economic policy settings. 
•\ 
ii 
') 
13 
approaches have had little explanatory power has led to renewed focus on how 
domestic politics shape nations' foreign economic policy preferences (Kunkel 
1998:2; Haggard 1991; Odell 1990; Simmons 1994). Putnam (1988) has developed 
a useful conception of 'two level games' to capture the interaction between 
domestic and international bargaining by governments, which has been taken up by 
some Australia-based scholars (George and Rapkin 1993; Higgott 1991). This trend 
lends weight to the parallel trend within the international business discipline to 
explore the domestic drivers of FDI policy preferences in order to enhance the 
capacities of MNEs to strategise bargaining with host governments. Moreover, the 
conviction of many international business scholars that changing ideas about the 
costs and benefits of FDI have been a determinant of FDI policy change in many 
countries finds a parallel in recent international political economy literature. Writers 
such as Goldstein and Keohane (1993) are placing greater emphasis on the place of 
ideas, norms and ideology in shaping the policy preferences of states and how these 
influences are mediated through domestic political actors. In shp: ·,. · ,..,,1>nt work in 
the international political economy and international business ! ;i"'l:i<;~ ~.' ;1". '\Uggests 
that the determinants of FDI policies should be sought in the inte1v:~>. . ,:~·. j; 1.roestic 
interests and ideas. The next section identifies a promising theoretical ~pproach to 
these questions. 
A political market account of FDI policy 
Caves (1996) provides a tentative but challenging account of the domestic 
determinants of FPI policies in which the nationalist sensitivities of voters and the 
selfisll interests of economic actors shape policy outcomes.22 In relation to the latter, 
Caves (1996:249) wrote that 'interests groups of domestic entrepreneurs may seek 
22 Caves refers to his approach as a behavioral account, reflecting the. common usage of the term 
amongst economists to distinguish from stl!ndard welfare economics accounts. In this thesis the term 
political market approach or account Is favoured as it refers to the same theoretical and empirical 
literature but avoids confusion with an earlier behnvoria!ist tradition in political science. The 
terminology of political markets also more directly captures the essential features of the theoretical , ~' . 
construct being deployed. · 
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regulation or exclusion of MNEs as undesired competitors or, alternatively, may 
promote their expansion for rent-increasing effects on supply or demand in adjacent 
markets.' Safarian (1993: 18-23) identifies the scope for private interests to be 
active in seeking to shape FDI policy outcomes, and the trade-offs that governments 
might be tempted to make between sound policy and favours to domestic interests. 
However he did not develop the insight theoretically nor subject the interpretation to 
much empirical scrutiny in his multi-country study of FDI policy. Caves' approach, 
while a highly original .mterpretation of the detenninants of FDI policy, accords 
with a well-established approach to explaining trade policy outcomes. A large 
literature on the political economy of trade policy situates trade policy-making 
squarely in the domestic political market (Odell 1990; Ray 1981 ;. Milner and Y offie 
1989; Rogowski 1989). This work utilises concepts that had their origins with 
economists, notably in the Chicago School on. the economics of regulation, but 
which have subsequently been developed into a sophisticated body of theory by 
political scientists as well.23 Prominent studies that explain the demand for 
protectionism in terms of the rent-seeking behaviour of firms facing international 
competition include work by Krueger (1974), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Ray 
(1981), Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) and Rowley and Tollison (1986). More 
recently, scholars such as Pugel and Walter (1985), Milner (1987, 1988), Destler 
and Odell (1987), Rugman and Verbeke (1990) and Ostry (1990) focus upon those 
fim1s and industries that are internationally competitive and are politically-active 
against protectionism.24 
All of these studies share, explicitly or implicitly, a conception of policymaking 
processes characterised by a contested political market for policy outcomes. The 
starting premise of the political markets theoretical construct is that, in seeking to be 
23 Their work will be examined in Chapter 2. 
24 See also Odell (1990), Strange (1985) and Lipson (1982). In Milner and Yoffie (1989) a strategic 
1racfo·hased explanation is offered for why some multinational finns have soug.lit protectionism in 
!f.11-:th' h-11rne market. It is curious that none of these authors have extended their analysis to the political 
eci'l~(;,i~> pf ,FDI policy given its growing importance in international negotiations, This may be 
pa1;;Fr ,,. ~onsequence of the difficulties associated with applying to FDI policy the quantitative 
research methodologies that many use in 11tudying protectionism - and which will be examined 
below. 
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re~elected, governments produce a package of private and public goods in response 
to demands from voters and organised interest groups. It does not hold that political 
parties and independents will get the mix right each time, as elections have winners 
and losers, but that competition between them creates strong incentives to adjust 
their policy mix until they are successful. Much of the resistance to rational choice 
theoretical accounts of political markets stems from the rather pessimistic 
conception of actors' motivations in polities; reflecting the micro-theoretical 
foundations it shares with economics.25 However, the appeal of political markets 
approaches rests on two basic insights. Firstly, economic actors may cost-effectively 
secure protection from market forces by investing in political action. Secondly, 
information shortage and collective action problems may result in regulatory 
favours to rent-seekers rather than public interest goods predominating in the policy 
mix that governments adopt. An important qualification is that in a democracy 
governments have to build a winning coalition of supporters across all policy areas, 
making it an open question as to whether private interest imperatives predominate in 
any particular area of policy. Consequently there is a strong emphasis in the political 
markets literature on the empirical testing of theoretical constructs. 
Caves (1996:249-54) presents a double challenge to scholars of FDI policy by 
pointing out the potential analytical utility of the political market approach, while 
suggesting that it should be adapted to incorporate non-material preferences of 
voters - namely nationalist ideas. As noted above, there is still no general study of 
the politics of Australian FDI policy; let alone any deploying political markets 
theory. In fact there are only a limited number of works on Australian protectionism 
that explicitly test the scope for a private interest interpretation.26 These are by 
Anderson (1980), Anderson and Garnaut (1987), Garnaut and Findlay (1986) and 
Garnaut (1994). Anderson and Garnaut (1987:115) find that a private interest 
approach accounted well for the varying degree of protection across industries but 
25 For a good discussion of the issues entailed in the debate over rational choice theoretical 
approaches to Asian studies see Little (1991). For this author's views see Pokarlcr (2000). 
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less well for the overall level of protection in any given historical period. 
Consequently they develop a public interest account of the determinants of 
protectionism that centred on contending and changing ideas over the costs and 
benefits of tariffs to Australia. The private and public interest accow1ts were linked 
by the insight that popular ideas favouring protectionism reduced the political costs 
to governments in granting tariff favours to rent-seeking private interests (Anderson 
and Garnaut 1987:115-22). This analytical innovation is consistent with Caves' 
account of the determinants of FD! policy (1996:249-57), Safarian (1993:19-20) 
also recognises the analytical significance of ideas in host countries about the costs 
and benefits of FD!. 
Caves saw 'national preference' - referred to as economic nationalism in this 
thesis - as integral to the political calculations of elected policymakers confronted 
by FDI issues. To paraphrase Caves (1996:250-51) 
A nationalistic preference can clearly enter into the voters' calculations. It might take 
various forms. In one formulation, voters expect disutility from perceiving that resource 
allocations in the national economy are influenced by foreigners ... Freedom from perceived 
foreign influence then becomes a collective consumption good ... Second, disutility from 
forr.ign influence on decisions couid apply asymmetrically to the ones that impose losses on 
citizens, decisions that confer gains being ignored ... A different formulation of national 
preference holds that voters themselves prefer to deal with nationals and experience 
disutility from economic contact with foreigners. National preference in this version 
involves xenophobia, but not the aspect of collective goods invoked earlier. 
As Caves himself suggests, this is far from being an exclusive account of 
independent ideational variables and the manner in which they at least partially 
detemiine FDI policy outcomes. Chapter 2 furt.i.er develops the analysis - a 
challenging task because it entails development of a theory of agency in relation to 
ideas. This is done by conceptualising the dynamics of the development of policy 
26 The literature on the political economy of Australian trade policy is modest, with much of the work 
done by political scientists exuding some scepticism about the benefits of liberalisation. Major 
studies are by Glezer (1982), Capling and Galligan (1992) and Bell (1993). 
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ideas and interest-based politics through a unified theory of political 
entrepreneurship that is consistent with the micro-theoretical foundations of 
political markets theory. The recognition that ideas are central to the politics ofI'DI 
policy also has significant implications for the approach in this study. 
Scope and methodology 
It remains to identify the scope of the study and the methodology used. Although at 
first glance it might seem desirable to compare Australia directly with other 
countries, there are good grounds for thinking that such an approach would not do 
justice to the problems of analysis that were identified in the previous section. 
Safarian's large comparative study (1993) inevitably entailed an incomplete analysis 
of the determinants of FDI policy in any particular country. While he emphasises 
the explanatory importance of national histories and ideas in setting up his study, 
they ultimately were not given much theoretical ·Or empirical scrutiny. Moreover, in 
Safarian's work on the Australian case a range of valuable primary and secondary 
source material was passed over. His analysis finishes at the mid-1980s, precluding 
examination of several significant periods in the politics of Australian FDI policy. 
Anderson's earlier comparative study (1983) of Australia and Canadian FDI policy 
was limited to the resources sector but still presented little by way of analysis of the 
determinants of policy in either country. Given the limitations of these studies, an 
important place remains for a thorough study of the political determinants of 
Australian FDI policy. A good precedent for a single country study of FDI policies 
is provided by Mason's influential study of foreign investment in Japan (1992). As 
Mason's empirical and theoretical focus was on the strategies of foreign firms' 
response to the Japanc:Se government he did not deploy an explicit theory of policy 
determinants; although he did recognise the influence of domestic private interests 
in demanding restrictive FDI policy (1992:3). Mason's study lends weight to the 
view that factually and descriptively rich qualitative accounts of single cases can 
provide an invaluable tool to scholars seeking broader understandings of social 
phenomena (Dyer and Wilkins 1991; Eisenhardt 1991). 
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While the existing international literature on the determinants of FDI policy is still 
limited there are precedents for the use of a qualitative approach in a single country 
study. Safarian (1993:412-18), in the most comprehensive comparative study of 
FDI policies to date, addressed the problems inherent in quantitative analysis of the 
drivers of FDI policy outcomes. There are, for instance, considerable difficulties 
entailed in developing a single measure of openness. The Australian case is 
indicative of the broader problems in that regard. The Australian foreign investment 
review process both lacks transparency and deters formal applications that are 
unlikely to be acceptable to the government. Consequently formal rejection rates 
give little indication of the real degree of openness, as the current Secretary of the 
Treasury recently conceded (Evans 1999:4-5).27 Safarian (1993:415) mad~ an 
explicit decision not to attempt analysis of the varying restrictiveness of FDI policy 
across sectors. Indeed he eschews even a summary of the varying degrees of sectoral 
restrictions across countries on the grounds of ' ... their uneven definition in law, the 
many devices used to restrict FDI in such sectors, the varying degrees of restriction, 
and the uneven reporting.'(Safarian 1993:450). The OECD's (1987) audit of 
measures applying to FDI only mapped them by country and sector and did not 
entail a statistical measure of the degree of restrictiveness. Consequently there is no 
agreed mechanism for arriving at a measure akin to the effective rate of protection 
developed in analyses of the consequences and detenninants of tariff policies. The 
difficulty of developing an acceptable measure of the restrictiveness of FDI policy 
will continue. to bedevil quantitative analysis of the determinants of FDI policy. The 
qualitative methodology deployed in this thesis allows the presentation of a range of 
evidence on the openness of the FDI regulatory regime, within the context of the 
analysis of policy determinants. 
An even greater difficulty with adopting a quantitative methodology is the 
specification of independent variables that represent the hypothesised determinants 
27 Actual stock or flow measures of FD! into particular sectors of an economy are not, of themselves, 
a reliable indicator of the extent of policy openness. Many other factors impinge upon the 
attractiveness of an industry to foreign investors and so a low level of inward FD1 may reflect poor 
international competitiveness. 
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of FDI policy outcomes. Vachani (1995:163-64) noted the inordinate difficulty of 
specifying proxies for the political variables in the case of FDI policy; especially in 
separating the effects of evidently overlapping variables. As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the private interest-oriented FDI policy preferences of domestic 
businesses are not stable over time; changing with businesses' various roles of 
buyer and seller of assets and products. This is in contrast with business tariff policy 
preferences where more stable and straightforward private interests have been 
amenable to analysis using quantitative methods. Moreover, the apparent 
significance of public ideas as an independent variable determining FDI policy 
outcomes presents a formidable obstacle to a quantitative approach.28 To develop 
proxy variables for ideas would be an artifice and forego the rich analysis of how 
policy ideas evolve that a qualitative approach can provide. Anderson and Garnaut 
(1987), recognising the roles of public interest ideas in Australian trade policy 
outcomes, turned to a qualitative methodology. Likewise, Safarian (1993) responded 
to the limitations of his comparative quantitative analysis of the determinants ofFDI 
policy by developing a comparative quantitative study. Given the multiple drivers of 
FDI policies Safarian (1993:68) judges that 
Some of these can be quantified, others can only be assessed, Country studies are necessary,. 
in brief, both to yield infonnation for more accurate generalization across countries and also 
to penitit closer attention to countiy responses to MNEs than one is likely to get from a 
purely statistical assessment. 
Even if all the practical barriers to a quantitative analysis of the politics of FDI were 
overcome, there are still powerful arguments for a qualitative single country study. 
Huberman and Miles (1994:434) noted that 
... qualitative S~j1,Hes ... are especially well suited to finding casual relationships; they can 
look directly and longitudinally at the local processes underlying a temporal series of events 
28 The changing nature of such an independent variable is itself challenging for design of a 
quantitative study, although by no means fatal as the development of event history analysis shows 
(Yamaguchi 1991), The much greater difficulty presented by ideas as an independent variable is the 
extreme difficulty of specifying credible proxies. 
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and states, showing how these led to specific outcomes; and ruling out rival hypotheses. In 
effect, we get inside the black box ... 
Qualitative approaches nonetheless run the risk of defaulting into undisciplined 
descriptionism if not closely guided by an appropriate body of theory (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1994:435-40). A well-formulated theoretical framework is particularly 
important for single case/country studies as it helps to make the findings 
'generalisable' (Larsson 1993:1516-19; Perry and Coote 1994:13-16). The theory 
of political markets is attractive in this respect because it is explicitly universalistic 
in design and aspiration. In fact it has been criticised by some country and area 
studies specialists for that very reason (Johnson and Keehn 1994). Descriptionism is 
avoided in this thesis by deploying that theory in a fashion that essentially 
constitutes a strategic narrative approach. Stryker (1996:304) identifies the main 
strengths of the strategic narrative approach as being 'concurrent construction and 
mutual adjustment of history and theory' and 'selection and construction of history 
in response to a clearly developed abstract, general theoretical backdrop'. The 
conduct of this study was marked by both these attributes. The strategic dimension 
of narrative creation entails recognition that some historical narratives matter more 
than others, to current audiences at least. Why this study matters has already been 
established earlier in this chapter. Some sub-plots also matter more than others so 
the author needs to prioritise them. The theory of political markets provides a 
comprehensive theoretical backdrop as a necessary precursor to strategising the 
writing of narrative. The historical narrative form is particularly attractive for this 
study for three reasons. First and foremost is that the composition and .:.haracter of 
the core unit of analysis throughout the thesis, the federal government, changed 
periodically. Differing constituencies and philosophies produced differing policy 
mixes and it makes sense to order the thesis around those distinct historical periods. 
Secondly, the historical ordering of events contributed significantly to their 
particular patterning. Thirdly, the complex interdependence of the phenomena under 
investigation proved to be most easily managed in historical narrative form. 
In seeking to explain the drivers of Australian FDI policy since 1960 one is 
compelled tu address controversy about ideas and interests. A qualitative approach 
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allows the examination of the origins, form, and influence of economic nationalist 
ideas - an understanding that is central to all four rationales for this study that were 
identified earlier. The marriage ofrational actor theory, underpinning the idea of the 
political market, and a strategic narrative approach serves this end particularly well; 
complementing as it does the latter's emphasis on human agency.29 The importance 
of analysing the political dynamics of economic nationalist discourse has other 
methodological implications as well. Public discussions of the 1960-96 period need 
to be examined directly and the print media of the time constitute the means to do 
so. An extensive media search of Australian FDI politics from 1960 provided the 
starting point for this study, and an overwhelming volume of data.30 Newspapers 
present an enormously rich record of the public, and often private, debate about FDI 
policy settings that is the object of study in this thesis. In that sense they were 
invaluable secondary sources. At the same time, the mass media were endogenous 
- indeed central to - the politics ofFDI in Australia. Consequently media sources 
are, irt an important sense, primury sources.31 For many voters and even political 
actors their experience of FDI, and the political debate surrounding it, amounted to 
what they observed in the mass media. Their judgments of the costs and benefits of 
FDI, and the appropriateness of current policies towards it, could be deeply 
influenced by the media. The role of the media in agenda-setting is well understood 
(Asard and Bennett 1995). 
There is a basic tension then between the media as record of past events and the 
media as integral to them. The analyst, however, can simultaneously utilise media 
29 Stryker (1996:306) wrote that: 'narrativists highlight the role of human agency in explanatory 
accounts .. .Indeed, where many causal explanations that emerge from comparativists' emphasis on 
contextual time hi~Wight especially structural constraints and opportunities ... narrativist emphasis on 
eventful time higlilights especially how actors; creative use of the rules and resources that constitute 
structure reproduces or alters that structure.' 
30 An initial media search was conducted utilising the extensive microfiche-based newspaper 
clippings collection maintained at the Australian National University. This was a laborious task given 
the broad and rather arbitrary categories by which the material was sorted. The collection was also 
far from complete, reflecting the informal and discretionary approach to gathering material that had 
apparently prevailed at times. This material nonetheless provided a springboard for subsequent 
targeted media searches using the complete newspaper collection of the National Library of 
Australia. 
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sources as information source and analyse the media's role in the public and private 
policy debate. The large number and variety of newspaper sources utilised for this 
study, over such a long period, ameliorate many of the concerns about their 
collective reliability as a source. This is not merely because of the sample size. 
Confidence in the mass media as information source over a sufficient period is also 
to some degree a faith in competition. Individual journalists and, with several 
notable exceptions, the media outlets that employ them, have worked in a highly 
contested market for new facts and analysis. As an objective of the study is to 
illuminate the interdependency of ideas and interests as determinants of FD I-policy 
outcomes, apparent instrumental use vf the media bas been examined wherever 
possible. This is helped by the frequent eagerness of journalists to do the same. 
Essentially the motivations of key participants in puhlic dialogues on FDI are 
examined deductively from their positions in the economy and polity. Where 
additional information sources permit, hypothesised motivations are further tested. 
Where not, they are explicitly presented in the narrative as an open question. In fhe 
process the issue of data reliability is fully dealt with where it arises. 
A wide range of other primary and secondary sources has also been utilised. 
Hansard provided additional insight into the public debate over FDI policy by 
parliamentarians. Ministerial press releases and other documents archived in the 
parliamentary library, along with armual reports of the Foreign Investment Review 
Board (FIRB), were accessed for a full account of official views of FDI policy 
matters. Reports of parliamentary inquiries, copies of some submissions made to 
them, transcripts of proceedings, departmental documents, discussion papers and the 
like were all made use of. Statistics on FDI are reasonable and have been readily 
available from the ABS and the Treasury for at least part of the period under 
examination. Archived materials on FDI policy from political parties were secured 
from libraries or the parties themselves. Quality data from opinion polls on FDI 
conducted periodically since the early 1960s provides valuable insights into voter 
31 This accords with the centrality of text and other forms of recorded public discourse in 
postmodernist approaches. 
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attitudes. Interviews were secured where possible with those who had had 
significant roles to play in the politics of FDI policy or who could shed light on the 
actions and motives of those who did. 
At this point it should be made clear just what this thesis does not do. It does not 
directly examine the 'bureaucratic politics' of FD! in detailed fashion. This is not to 
suggest that the intra-bureaucratic dimension ofFDI ~.Jicymaking was unimportant. 
Rather, such systematic analysis is not attempted bec<:!!se the author's initial 
research in that direction was frustrated by profound data limitations. Many details 
of past administration of FDI policy through the FIRB mechanism were off limits 
on the grounds that they ostensibly involved either national interest or commercial-
in-confidence considerations. The lack of transparency was to become politically 
contentious during the last term of the Keating government; making this 
researcher's task that much harder.32 Controversy compounded the established 
tendency of the Treasury to guard confidences zealously. Galligan reports 
considerable frustration in trying to access Treasury sources while preparing his 
study on FDI policy for the resources sector (1987).33 Safarian (1993) was not able 
to identify a single official source in the Australian component of his comparative 
study. Treasurers are central to f Dl policymaking, and the ascendancy of two of the 
longest serving to the prime ministership - Paul Keating and John Howard -
during the time that this study was being conducted heightened the reticence of 
officials and political actors to divulge information. However, there were valuable 
exceptions and those sources are identified throughout the thesis. The negative 
impact of that controversy was felt acutely when endeavouring to secure interviews 
with Treasury officials involved in the FDI review process under the Fraser, Hawke 
and Keating governments. Access to the most senior staff in the Foreign Investment 
Division was ultimately secured late in the preparation of this study, but on strict 
32 In 1994-95, the then head of the Treasury's foreign investment division faced the threat of 
contempt of parliament proceedings for refusing, on the Keating Cabinet's instructions, to provide 
infonnation to a Senate inquiry into the conduct of FDI policy for the print media. The non-
transparent nature of FDI policymaking bec:!..'Ue politically contentious as a consequence; an 
environment not conducive to securing infonnatiori1ifrom policymakers. 
33 Prrsonal conversation with author, Canberra Au~ust 1995. 
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conditions including no discussion of past particular cases. It nonetheles& proved 
valuable in confirming the broad conclusions of this thesis. 
Despite not directly analysing the bureaucratic politics of FDI policymaking, the 
role of the bureaucracy still does figure prominently in the narrative. This is for 
three reasons. Some primary sources and a wide range of secondary sources did 
permit some tentative conclusions about the role of the bureaucracy in determining 
FDI policy outcomes. Secondly, the accounts of some private sector and state 
government primary sources shed some light on the interactions of their 
organisations with Treasury on FDI matters. Thit~dly, the role of the Treasury 
figured in docwnented public contention over FDI policy at a number of points. 
Nonetheless, it is readily conceded that a weakness of the study is the incomplete 
picture it presents of the role of the federal bureaucracy. The narrative addresses 
directly the consequent limitations in the analysis wherever they are evident. 
Another thing that the thesis does not do is examine systematically the political 
strategies of all the major organised private interest groups throughout the period 
under examination. The historical scope of the study is so large, and the private 
interests too many, to have made that tractable. Such an exercise would no doubt be 
illuminating but it would also amount to a large project in its own right. Sufficient 
diversity and volume of primary and secondary sources was nonetheless achieved in 
order to draw judgements about the extent of rent-seeking. Given the sheer volume 
and quality of information gained through the media searches, no archived materials 
of firms and industry associations were accessed. The detailed analysis of industry 
association documents by Tsokhas (1984, 1986) that covered the earlier p.;riods of 
this study substituted for such an exercise. For later periods media sources and some 
interviews generally sufficed to produce a sound narrative on the private interest 
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dimensions of FDI politics. However there were some data limitations and their 
implications for the analysis are noted as they~ arise.34 
At all times in the preparation of the thesis, efforts were made to diversify 
information s9urces to the fullest extent possible within the inevitable constraints, 
and extreme caution was exercised in checking the veracity of accounts from any 
source. Not surprisingly, this was easier for more recent events; with the important 
caveat mentioned above that political sensitivity reduced access to some sources. 
The sheer volume and variety of information sources - contemporary mass media 
reports, primary source documents, interviews, and secondary academic material -
·and the circumstances in which the study was conducted, precluded the use of 
formal verification protocols (Huberman and Miles 1994:438-40). Data collection 
and analysis has nonetheless been informed by knowledge of these practices and 
their rationales (Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Mason, McKenney and Copeland 
1997:31.0-16; Patton 1990; Reige and Nair 1996; Yin 1989). Where there are any 
doubts about the veracity of apparently analytically significant information they are 
dealt with explicitly in the narrative. 
The integrity of the narrative developed in subsequent chapters is boosted by having 
been able to call upon a number of secondary sources on the governments under 
examination. Although FDI policymaking has been generally neglected in the 
writing of Australian political history, a rich secondary literature has still proven 
invaluable in the preparation of this study. As FDI policy is but one of many aspects 
of policymaking, broader patterns across portfolios have been discerned and 
explored where appropriate. In concluding the discussion of methodological issues 
several points should be made. Firstly, the thesis has been deliberately designed as a 
broad survey of a complex issue over a long period of time. It is conceived as the 
34 Companies entailed particular difficulties. Staff changes presented the usual problems of a loss of 
corporate memory, especially in the case of Japanese firms. In the key area of the media the extreme 
political sensitivity of the FDI issue made it difficult to secure infonnation beyond what had already 
found its way into media outlets. This presented no great analytical difficulties because of the intense 
interest that journalists showed in: the FOi issue for their own industry - and own employers. Some 
valuable interviews and other primary sources Wet'e nonetheless secured in all significant areas. 
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foundation for a f!ieneral work on FDI policy that will complement Anderson and 
Gamaut's (1987) study of Australian trade protectionism. Secondly, it is 
consciously interpretative in style; influenced by North (1981) and Schorske 
(1981: 116-80). Thirdly, the politics of FDI policy present certain difficulties for the 
analyst because of the multidisciplinary nature afthe issues involved. FDI involves 
complex economic phenomena and equally complex corporat~ legal ~struments 
that present a challenge to the- political scientist. At the same ti.rae some of the 
ideational dimensions of FDI politics - namely nationalist discourses - are 
usually studied using theories and methodologies quite alien to scholars of law, 
economics and international business. Ultimately this is a thesis about politics, 
although with an eye to the contribution it might make as such to the international 
business discipline. 
Structure of the thesis 
The next chapter develops a theoretical approar,h to the politkal determinants of 
FDI policy along the lines discussed earlier. Chapter 3 briefly traces the political 
economy of overseas capital since the mid-nineteenth century to 1960. This 
provides an understanding of the fott.)es for an 'open door' policy on FDI and 
highlights the significance of the turn towards economic nationalism in the late 
1960s.35 Chapter 4 traces the public and private debate about FDI policy that led to 
increasing policy concessions to economic nationalism by Coalition governments in 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Chapter 5 explores how the Whitlam 
government's economic nationalist visions resulted in erratic policy. open conflict 
with domestic pri,v!lCe intere~ts and ultimate political disaster. The Coalition 
35 
Stryker (1996:310) notes that fruitful narrative often starts with the inductive identification of 
apparent anomalies - historical or theoretical - that demand explanation. This thesis arises in 
response to a seeming puzzle that is at once historical and theoretical in nature. The fom1er is the 
question of why Australia turned its back jn a long·established liberal policy towards. FPI. The 
apparent theoretical anomaly is why this tum to r<:strictive policy occurred despite confomporuzy 
theoretical economic analysis of FDI suggesting that national economic welfare would have been 
improved by mote liberlll policy. 
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opposition was nonetheless forced by the influence of economic nationalist ideas in 
"' the electorate, and Labor's policy position, to endorse more restrictive policy than it 
had presided over in office. Moreover, in its dying days in office the Whitlam 
govemment substantially moderated its economic nationalism in response to the 
effects of external economic shock and the Coalition's politfoal pragmatism on FDI 
p~licy. Chapter 6 traces the emergence of a virtual ~quilibrium on FDI policy; 
despite an intense debate throughout the period of 1975 to 1983. The Fraser 
Coalition govermn~nt settled upon a 50 per cent local equity guideline and FDI 
ieview as a compromise between the political imperatives for restrictive policy -
both private and public interest in nature - and conflicting broader political 
impulse to 'developmentalism'. The adoption of new 'naturalisation' provisions for 
foreign firms bn this period revealed the intensity of private interest politics over 
FDI policy, especially for the resources sector. It is also seen that the discretionary 
investment screening process under the Foreign Investment Review Board became a 
convenient instrument for managing conflicting political imperatives on FDI policy. 
The next three chapters deal with FDI policy under Labor's long rule from 1983 to 
1996 .. Chapter 7 first traces how the Hawke Labor government came to discard the 
more economic nationalist party platform that it brought to office, in favour of the 
status quo. It then explores the c~uses of Labor's conversion to more liberal policy 
on FDI in financial services; policy change it has strenuously criticised in 
opposition. The rest of Chapter 7 examines the historic liberalisation of FDI policy 
in response to extern.al economic shock. Chapter 8 traces the intense public 
controversy over FDI policy in the late 1980s assogiated with rapid increase in 
Japanese direct and portfolio investment in Australia. The Hawke government's 
pragmatic concession to popular concerns over foreign purchases of residential real 
estate is contrasted with its defence of liberal policy settings in other areas. 
Sandwiched between popular antipathy to Japanese and other FDI and an elite 
policy community converted to a liberal policy, the Hawke government generally 
favoured the latter for several reasons. Principal amongst them were that the 
government faced powerful political imperatives to deliver economic growth and 
the Coalition opposition generally did not take political advantage of anti~FDl 
28 
sentiment in the electorate at large. Federal Labor retained the option of politically 
pragmatic concessions to popular economic nationalism because the Coalition was 
committed to more liberal FDI policy. However, the Hawke government could 
• make only sparing use of that option for fear of damaging its hard-won and 
historically improbable reputation for sound economic management. Its 
championing of closer economic relations with East Asia would also be jeopardised 
by a wavering commitment to liberal FDI policy at a time of significant Japanese 
FDI inflow. 
Chapter 9 initially examines how the Keating Labor govenunent responded to deep 
recession and its loss of credibility as an economic manager by enacting further 
liberalisation of FDI policy and making a renewed commitment to the promotion of 
inward FDI. It notes the growing international moves for agreements on FDI and the 
seemingly contradictory policies that Australia adopted in relation to investment 
issues in APEC and in the OECD. The prospect of a binding MAI forced the 
Keating government to concede its determination to maintain a discretionary FDI-
screening mechanism and exceptions from liberal policy in certain 'sensitive' 
sectors (BIB 1995:135). Some of these sectors were newly opened up to private 
business via privatisations and foreign equity limits had been part of the domestic 
political price a pragmatic Labor government had to pay to realise reform. Principal 
among the restrictions was the mass media. Chapter 9 concludes with an 
examination of why that was the case; and how despite an archly pragmatic 
approach to FDI policy for the media it became such a political negative for the 
Keating government. FDI policymaking for the media was marked by intense rent-
seeking; made easy by the popular smokescreen of cultural nationalism. With the 
broader economic opportunity costs of foregoing FD! in the media being only 
limited~ ideas ani;l interests marched in tandem to deliver restrictive and 
idiosyncratic policy. Chapter 10 brings together the insights of each chapter and 
draws some general conclusions. 
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2 Theories of political markets 
Australian governments since the early 1960s have made political compromises 
between contending private and public interest demands in relation to FDlpolicy. 
Popular and elite conceptions of the public interest have evolved over time in 
response to changing economic circumstances and understandings of the costs and 
benefits of FDL The theory of political markets provides a framework for 
understanding these political dynamics. The starting point is to posit private 
interests for and against a liberal FDI policy on the basis of recent understandings of 
the impact of FDI on host economies. As contemporary political markets theories 
suggest governments will deliver a mix of private and public goods, this chapter 
will then explore possible public interest-driven FDI policy outcomes. The analysis 
to this point is consistent with a purely interest-based account. There is a growing 
recognition in the trade and investment policy literature that, along with interests, 
ideas also determine policy outcomes. In this light, the chapter then examines how 
ideas might come to matter through political entrepreneurialism. In particular, the 
chapter shows how nationalism as a non-material policy preference can be 
accommodated in a rational choice theoretical conception of political markets. 
Theories 
There has been a shift in thinking about the determinants of FDI, trade and other 
economic policies in terms of a political market. This coincides ·with a broader tum 
towards 'rational choice' theory in the. social sciences, principally in North America. 
The term rational choice has come to denote a general way of thinking about 
individual behaviour and social phenomena. Within the broad camp are to be found 
diverse approaches sharing similar theoretical micro-foundations and often 
informing each other's development. These include works referred to as rational 
actor political theory, public choice theory, the Chicago School on the economics of 
regulation, the 'economic approach to human behaviour', 'social choice' and 'rent-
seeking theory'. There is much overlap, with both followers and foes often 
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confusingly using the terms interchangeably. And there is a growing literature 
devoted to mapping the influence of rational choice ideas and delineating the 
boundaries of various schools (McLean 1987; Mueller 1979, 1989; Radnitzky and 
Bemholz 1987; Buchanan and Tollison 1984; Breton 1974). TI1ere is also a growing 
literature criticising the influence of rational choice (Hindess 1988, 1989) and, 
increasingly, responses to this criticism from rational choice proponents (Little 
1991; Dowding and Hindmoor 1997:462, nl). Even defined very broadly, rational 
choice theory still has few adherents in Australia. I 
The term 'political markets theory' is used in this study because it effectively 
captures t.lie common application of basic Chicago School and public choice 
concepts, shorn of any ideological presuppositions, to the politics of economic 
regulation. It gen<;1ally entails a parsimonious theoretical model of public 
competition for policy outcomes and underpins many empirical studies of, for 
example, the domestic determinants of trade policy. This is the basic model of 
politics Caves had in mind when he proposed his recent innovative account of the 
determinants of FDI policy (1996:250-55). As such studies are of direct interest to 
economists, and often carried out by them, the metaphor of the market has potent 
appeal. However, there is more than imagery involved. Economic actors are often 
seen to face a choice between acting entrepreneurially to promote their interests in 
free private markets or acting instead in a politically entrepreneurial fashion to 
secure government action defending them from the dictates of the market. Other 
private interests will contest regulatory favours and electoral competition between 
'political entrepreneurs' can be thought of in market terms. The basic micro-
foundations of the rational choice framework, namely methodological 
individualism, the stability of actors' preferences and the rational instrumental 
pursuit of those preferences, have been often addressed and need not be re-
examined here (Elster 1986:2-16). Adopting a theoretical approach to political 
I Interest in fonnal choice theoretic studies of aspects of political behavior, and issues of public 
goods and collective action, have been limited to several Australian economic theoreticians (Brennan 
and Lomasky 1993; Brennan and Walsh 1990; Pincus 1989). Even game theory, which has greatly 
contributed to an understanding of how the structure of choice situations can detennine outcomes, 
has attracted only limited interest in Australia and that has been largely confined to the international 
trade politics area (for example, Drysdale 1988:39-46). 
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phenomena with the same basic micro-foundations as most economics and 
international business studies allows for an extensive borrowing of analytical 
concepts and a direct synthesis of research findings. Lenway & Murtha (1994:530-
31) argue for the use of 'mutually consistent terminology and concepts' to make the 
political aspects of trade, investment and international competitiveness more 
accessible to international business scholars. Later in this chapter, and following 
Caves's lead (1996:250-55), a more nuanced model of FDI preferences will be 
introduced into the theoretical construct to allow for the influence of ideas.2 As will 
be seen, this has significant implications for an understanding of the dynamics of 
the political market, and for the methodology used in the empirical part of this 
study. At this stage the basic features of political markets approaches need to be 
further examined. 
In the political markets conception, regulatory interventions in markets are supplied 
by governments in return for electoral support and/or political resources that can be 
utilised to secure more support. Formal models of politicians giving mixes of 
regulatory favours to rent-seekers take their lead from the seminal works on the 
economics of politics by Downs (1957a, 1957b), on regulation by the Chicago 
School economists Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzrnan (1976, 1989), Becker 
(1983), and from public choic\~ scholars.3 The concept of rent-seeking has been 
subsequently developed into a sophisticated line of theoretical and empirical 
inquiry, with a number of valuable reviews now also at hand (Tullock 1967; 
K.reuger 1974; Buchanan Tollison and Tullock 1980; Tollison 1982, 1991; High 
1991). Although the political markets account of public policy processes is not a 
rosy one, at least in the healthier democracies the market to supply government 
interventions is heavily contested by opposition parties.4 Governments are seen to 
supply market interventions and subsidies in order to secure re-election while 
2 The self-interest assumption of homo economicus is best understood as a 'useful fiction' (Brennan 
and Buchanan 1985:65) that can be relaxed in light of the empirical evidence of actors' preferences 
(Dowding et al. 1995). 
~ For a good overview of the main economic theories ofregulatkm see Peltzman (1989) or Chapter 
10 ofViscusi et al. (1992), and for a general introduction to the public choice school see Mueller 
(1989). 
4 The continued contestability of the market, at low cost and risk to participants, is a function of the 
institutional settings in which the political market is embedded (North 1981). 
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opposition politicians will make counter bids for electoral support in an effort to 
win office. The competition to secure a winning coalition of supporters provides an 
ongoing incentive to political entrepreneurialism; the object for major parties being 
an optimum mix of private and public goods to secure majority parliamentary 
supports In order to assemble a winning majority of supporters a major political 
party must carefully choose policy positions across a wide array of issues, 
encompassing divexse stakeholders. The particular mix will depend upon a range of 
factors including the institutional structure of the electoral system, the demographics 
of the electorate, the structure and influence of organised private interests and the 
presence and strategic capabilities of rival candidates and parties (Dunleavy 
1992:83-144). Political markets approaches tend to see private goods, and market-
distorting regulatory favours in particular, as predominating in the overall policy 
mix. These go disproportionately to well-organised minority interests at the expense 
of overall community economic welfare (Mueller 1989; Olson 1982; Viscusi, 
Vernon and Harrington 1992). 
Political market studies typically depict politicians as indifferent to the policy mix 
they adopt as they are primarily interested in holding onto office for the private 
rewards it entails. A political markets approach certainly does not rule out the 
personal policy preferences of key government actors or the policy of their party 
being detenninants of a poiicy outcome. This can be either for private goods or the 
realisation of a particular conception of 'the public interest'. All the approach holds 
is that particular structures of interests entail certain political costs and benefits and 
that, ultimately, governments and oppositions are profoundly averse to bearing 
aggregate political costs that would see them fail to achieve a majority v.t election. 
Earlier political markets literature, informed by the economic theories of regulation 
of Stigler, Peltzman and Becker, reflected highly stylised models of a single 
government actor's political calculation in a single issue market. There soon 
5 Large political parties emerge principally because of the need for candidates to be able to make 
credible commitments to deliver both public and private goods (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). 
Peltzman's seminal 1976 article was founded on the argument that regulators would spread the rents 
from regulation across a number of constituencies to gain greater political support. This and 
subsequent theoretical and empirical studies showed that this would be likely to result in regulation 
being designed so as to not maximise rents accruing to producers but to leave some with consumers 
(Peltzman 1976; Mueller 1989: 236-37; Keeler 1984). 
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developed an extensive literature that examined political optimising across multiple 
issues going beyond a unitary actor approach (Dunleavy 1992:10). Any particular 
policy, such as that pertaining to FDI, may be lil function of bargaining with a wide 
array of interests ac~·oss a large policy space. Institutionalist rational choice accounts 
address the reality :\hat the organs of state are complex, have multiple actors present, 
and that institutional arrangements both deliver political resources to particular 
players and limit their uses (Grnftstein 1992; March and Olsen 1984; Vira 1997). 
The bureaucracy may, for instance, be self-perpetuating and/or 'captured' by the 
private interests it is supposed to regu!(ate (Bell and Wanna 1992). 6 
Interests 
Political markets theory usually generates purely materialist accounts of the 
determinants of particular public policy outcomes. That is, its micro-theoretical 
foundation is the homo economicus model of human behaviour. As Becker (1983) 
has showed, in a majoritarian democracy government::; are 1mlikely to be able to 
retain office by providing solely private goods to rent-seekers; although such private 
goods may nonetheless be prolific. Consequently there is a need to consider the 
circumstances in which a government would offer FDI policy in the public interest -
in a welfare economics sense. The private interests associated with FDI policy are 
first examined before materialist accounts of public interest FD! policy are 
developed. 
Materialism, FDI a11d private i11terests 
In order to test whether or not rent-seeking models can provide a sufficient 
explanation of foreign investment policy it is first necessary to identify the 
economic interests of major constituencies in relation to it. This is an inherently 
more difficult task than in the case of tariff politics because FDI can vary greatly in 
its strategic intent, as noted in Chapter 1. The political economy of FDI policy 
6 Niskanen (1971, 1973) pioneered the budget-maximising entrepreneur model of bureaucracies and 
his theory has subsequently been submitted to consider;iblc empirical and theoretical examination. 
See, for instance, McGuire (1981), Conybeare (1984) and Dunleavy (1992:210-248). 
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centres on the fact that, in general, FDI will lift the returns to factors of production it 
utilis.es in the host economy while entailing complex distributional aspects (Caves 
1971, 1982; Reuber 1973). Foreign direct investment will generally increase the 
financial return to labour and/or the overall employment level. Within the 
international business literature the presence of high levels of unemployment has 
been identified as a political driver of liberal FDI policy (Kotabe 1993; Globennan 
1988). Historically in open frontier economies iising returns to labour from capital 
inflow would attract migrants, resulting in the possibility of real wages being 
constrained below the level they would otherwise reach. However, a larger labour 
force would be supported (Parry 1978: 194-97). Consequently, political 
representatives of labouring interests historically had strong incentives to support 
higher levels of foreign capital inflow while opposing any policy settings that might 
result in labour inflow. 
As FDI entails issues of control by foreign managers it raises distinct issues that 
other forms of capital inflow do not. Foreign firms might bring certain human 
resource managem~nt practices that conflict with established local practice but 
which are an impO'l'tant part of the firm's ownership advantages. Foreign firms 
might also make more credible threats during wages negotiations to relocate 
business operations to another country (Huizinga 1990). Consequently there might 
be resistance to foreign. takeovers of existing enterprises by unionised workers in the 
target firm if they believe that job levels and entitlements can be roughly maintained 
in the absence of new foreign ownership (Rugman and Verbeke 1998:126). Trade 
unions also tend to favour the interests of existing employees rather than the 
creation of greater employment overall (Hirsch and Addison 1986:155-79). It is 
conceivable that trade unions might welcome the entry of a foreign firm with 
different human resource management practices if they believe them to be better 
than domestic employers. Unions may also perceive that they can extract greater 
rents from a profitable MNE than a domestic firm (Caves 1996:123). On the other 
hand, as Breton (1964:378-82) argues, a restrictive policy might serve the interests 
of middle-class managerial employees at the expense of blue-collar workers. He 
points to the Canadian experience of nationali~ed and restricted industries, such as 
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power generation and the media, which had a much higher propensity to employ 
local rather than foreign managers, concluding that 
... the occupations made available for a given group of nationals are mostly middle-class jobs 
since working-class jobs are either already held by nationals or are deemed 'unimportant' 
i,Tom a nationalist point of view. In other words, ownership of assets confers the power to 
combine capital with middle-class labour not by considering the marginal productivity of 
these factors alone but by considering the productivity of middle-class labor modified by the 
ethnic or national origin of the factors. Because of this some people will be paid more than 
they are worth because they are of the 'proper' national origin and/or more people will be 
employed than is economically optimal (1964:378). 
It should be noted the same result can be effected through immigration restrictions, 
or through registration of the professions, even when u liberal FDI policy is 
maintained (Shughart, Tollison and Kimenyi 1986). Breton's hypothesis is 
nonetheless one that demands testing in the Australian context. 
That a liberal FDI policy will be in the interests of labour as a whole suggests other 
domestic suppliers of business inputs should also have such a strong preference for 
it. However they are expected to want their own business sector to be exempted 
from such an open policy because of the competition for customers and inputs that 
foreign firms will represent. Whether oriented towards the domestic or export 
markets, a wide array of suppliers of physical inputs and ancillary business service 
providers, such as lawyers, merchant bankers and accountants, will be utilised by 
foreign firms. They will not only favour a liberal policy but also stability in other 
policy settings so as not to jeopardise such contracting with foreign firms. Murtha 
(1991, 1993) examines, theoretically and empirically, how an absence of host 
government policy credibility on commitments to subsidising local firms that supply 
direct investors would increase transaction costs and risk the exchange. 
Consequently both local and foreign firms have strong preferences for policy 
consistency .7 
7 This work neatly complements the increasingly popular transaction costs approach to the 
intemationalisation offirrnsj Ii good summary of the basic tenets is provided by Teese (1985). 
36 
Locally-based firms that have become significant direct investors abroad may be a 
strong constituency for a liberal policy if policy reciprocity with other nations 
becomes an issue (Rugman and Verbeke 1998:121). Any local business facing 
liquidity constraints, or wishing to share risk, will welcome the opportunity to enter 
into joint ventures with foreign firms. This also applies to an increase in the pool of 
potential direct or portfolio investors in the case of a share issue. This leads to the 
broader but important observation that sellers of assets have an interest in an open 
investment regime because it can increase the pool of bidders. The clear corollary of 
this is that local buyers of assets, in relatively fixed supply, would have an interest 
in a restrictive investment policy. In the absence of foreign buyers, local bidders 
might pay less for an asset, especially in a context of rather inefficient financial 
markets. Such logic extends to local equity requirements, one of the popular objects 
of foreign investment policy adopted by many governments. These can provide local 
firms with involvement in enterprises at below free market prices and therefore may 
create political constituencies for the establishment and perpetuation of such a 
regulatory requirement. 
Not only domestic buyers of assets, but any domestic firm foreseeing competition 
with a foreign investor for either customers or inputs would have an incentive to 
favour a restrictive FDI policy. When a foreign firm directly invests to secure 
market share in a host economy, taking advantage of its competitive advantages, 
local competitors (perhaps of foreign origin) will have the same incentives to lobby 
for protection, through barriers to investment that they would have if faced with 
competition from the rival firm's imported product (Pany 1978: 178-191). Indeed, 
the decision of the rival to invest directly in productive capacity might be a strategic 
response to the local finns1 successful lobbying for prot~~tive barriers against its 
goods. If this is the case the local firms will constitute an established political 
constituency for the Government and might be expected to be influential in calling 
for restrictions on market entry by foreign rivals through direct investment. 
However, it is generally more difficult for the local firm to make a case against 
allowing such market entry because of the evident economic benefits to the host 
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economy from the investment. Moreover, those economic benefits create the liberal 
constituencies just discussed. 
It is often stated in the international business literature that export-oriented foreign 
investment is likely to beget far less opposition and empirical studies of MNC-host 
government bargaining do offer some evidence to support this (Poynter 1986:57; 
Encarnation and Vachani 1985). Nonetheless, there will be domestic constituencies 
opposed to the entry of export-oriented firms. While export orientation implies there 
is not an immedia!e threat to the customer base of local domestically oriented firms, 
the latter may still fear product might be later directed to the domestic market. 
Furthermore, solely export-oriented FDI will still be in competition for inputs and, 
possibly, the established export markets of local firms in the host country. The latter 
will be particularly the case if the FDI is driven by recognition of the clear 
locational advantages the host country's firms have in a competition with the 
investor in international markets. When a foreign firm secures access to those 
locational advantages the domestic firm will have to rely on internalisation and 
ownership advantages it may not possess. In such circumstances they might lobby to 
have the government block access, through FDI regulation, to the locational 
advantages they possess_. If it is a well-established export trade with little perceived 
overall growth potential there might be particular resistance from established firms 
faced with the threat of a loss of market share. This is particularly relevant if the 
foreign market is characterised by import quotas, especially when effectively capped 
for any particular country of origin. 
The corollary of the local suppliers of business inputs being prima facie supporters 
of a liberal FDI policy regime is that local end users of those inputs would prefer 
new competitors were not able to enter the economy.s The ultimate FDI policy 
preference of the local firms having to compete with direct investors for inputs will 
depend upon their calculus of the costs associated with that competition versus the 
other benefits FDI might bring them. Foreign direct investment, like other forms of 
capital inflow, can help raise the limits on economic growth and so raises the 
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possibility for any business to also grow at a faster rate. A larger economy may 
allow firms to capture more economies of scale and scope (Caves 1996:251; 
Sinclair 1976:188). As FDI also entails spillover effects, such as a raising of the 
skills base of an economy, other businesses standing to benefit from such positive 
externalities, and not bearing counter-veiling direct costs from its presence, should 
favour a liberal policy (Caves 1996:251 ). Domestic firms, and other actors, in 
receipt of regular government largesse might also recognise that economic growth 
associated with FDI will also provide those governments with a larger revenue base 
from which they might benefit. Ideally, firms would like to have these benefits from 
FDI and yet have foreign firms excluded from their own industries. 
Consequently, domestic firms might argue for a discretionary FDI policy rather than· 
blanket restrictions because this would provide them with the opportunity to lobby 
for the specific restrictions they desire. Such diffused benefits of FDI, and 
concentrated costs, would tend to drive policy in a restrictive direction if it were not 
for the countervailing constituencies of input providers and domestic businesses 
facing liquidity and/or know how constraints. Unlike tariff politics, governments 
can resort to a highly discretionary regulatory regime that allows it to weight the 
significance of each constituency on an individual investment basis. Domestic 
businesses might favour such a regime for another reason. A degree of agency slack 
in corporate governance might see managements of firms supporting restrictions on 
foreign takeovers. As potential sellers, company shareholders have an interest in the 
pool of buyers being as large as possible. Management, on the other hand, will fear 
a change of owners because they may lose their positions. Management may then be 
tempted to utilise some of the firm's resources, including reputation, to lobby for a 
restrictive FDI policy that will be contrary to the interests of the owners of the finn. 
Such logic also leads to the hypothesis that managements facing a hostile foreign 
takeover bid will endeavour to empower government with discretionary authority 
over takeovers to block bids. 
8 Unless higher demand allowed for Reale economies that brought the costs of inputs down for all 
users. 
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While the likely FDI policy preferences of various domestic groups can be identified 
by reference to the places they occupy in an economy, it does not automatically 
follow these preferences will be enunciated to policymakers, let alone be 
accommodated, Certainly industry organisations that arise to make claims upon 
government are subjecte'tl to the same basic constraints ap~lying to all political and 
corporate entrepreneurial activity. The leaders of private interest groups face 
demands for performance by their constituent·members - who can exercise voice 
in the organisation, launch a coup, or exit (Hirschman 1970). On the other hand, the 
presence of established interest groups increases the costs to 'market entri for new 
ones, especially when in direct competition. This factor, as ~ell as the cost!/ and 
in~titutionalise~ nature of most organised private interest groups, means that if an 
issue arises that cuts across existing organisational lines there might be only very 
limited private interest representation (Olson 1965). This is potentially the case with 
FDI. 
As just seen, domestic divisions of interest on FDI policy tend to cut aoross those of 
other major issues. The FDI policy interests of firms may change fairly rapidly; 
depending upon whether they are currently a buyer or seller of assets, considering 
expansion but face capital or technologi~al constraints, or fending off new 
competitors. The inflow of FDI is also much 'lumpier' than traded goods so there 
are likely to be times of intense debates and other times when FDI policy is not a 
political issue at all. All these considerations make the development of FDI policy-
specific interest groups rather unlikely. This means the private interest politics of 
FDI will be complicated by the institutionalised pattern of interest groups.9 In such 
circumstances, direct lobbying of governments by individual firms and 
entrepreneurs is posited to be more likely than in many other areas of busines.s 
regulation. 
The private interest politics of FDI differs from other economic regulation issues in 
that the businesses being regulated are foreign, so their status and rights within the 
host polity are often ambiguous. As the people whoo!ultimately control'the business 
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are not citizens and generally do not have the right to vote, a basic issue arises of the 
legitimacy of political action such as lobbying (Jansson, Saqib and Shanna 
1995:40-45). Foreign firms may find access to both official information and people 
of influence restricted by virtue of their status (Lenway and Murtha 1994:524). 
Industry associations may exclude foreign firms, at least until 1}1-ey have become 
well established. However, it is at the point of :first entry that foreign firms most 
need information, contacts and erfective representation (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986; Hennart 1988). Caves (1996;250), theorising the political market for FDI 
policy, suggested that 'because foreigners do not vote in national elections, pure 
redistributions away from foreign equity holders cause no negative equity votes and 
thus should proceed further than redistributions adverse to the interests of 
enfranchised minorities,' However, the domestic partners, suppliers and employees 
of foreign firms will constitute a domestic political constituency against the 
imposition of excessive rent-extracting regulations. Foreign firms sometimes can 
also turn to the home government and its official agencies in the host for assistance 
in dealing with the host government (Krasner 1985:170--76). As shall be seen 
below, the strongest defence that the foreign firm has is the economic benefits to the 
host society that its presence often entails. 
Materialism, FD/ a11d tlte p11blic i11terest 
Developing a materialist account of public interest-oriented FDI policy entails two 
analytic;al challenges. The first is to identify when governments might maintain a 
restrictive policy towards FDI that can be w1derstood as being in the public interest 
- as understood in welfare economics terms. This is less difficult than the 
specification of private interests because much writing on the FDI policy has been in 
the vein of 'normative theory as a positive theory' (NPT) that the Chicago School 
and other proponents of political markets approaches were reacting against. 
Consequently the discussion is kept brief and focused upon restrictive FDI policy as 
an instance of second best policy outcomes. The second challenge is to hypothesise 
the drivers of PD! policy liberalisation. 
9 Even when an Issue Is not divisive, private interest groups will endeavour to weight their policy 
preferences as bargaining with government and opposition nctors will be across a range of issues. 
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Restrictive FD! policy and the public interest 
There is a large economics and international busfoess literature on the various 
economic objectives behind national policies to restrict FDI that is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to survey. For most contemporary scholars of the subject, however, 
restrictive FDI policies have economic justification on balance only where other 
domestic policy settings are wrong and for some reason cannot be changed. The 
exception to this is FDI in sensitive national security areas.JO International business 
scholars would nonetheless be more inclined than many security studies· scholars to 
emphasise the benefits of FDI for ecoriomic growth and hence national autonomy, 
and the ability of states to use domestic laws to check problems with foreign control 
of assets.11 Moreover, restrictions on FDI have typically extended far beyond what 
could be justified in terms of national security needs alone. Other considerations 
such as the cultural impact are beyond the purview of a straight materialist account 
and will be examined later. 
The general optimism of economists about the benefits to host countries of FDI is 
predicated on certain assumptions about markets being relatively free, and about the 
quality of the property rights system and basic state institutions that help to reduce 
transaction costs. When some of these assumptions do not hold then the costs and 
benefits of FDI become more complex. The first qualification to note is that under 
the postwar Bretton Woods system most countries fixed their exchange rates and 
were allowed to enact controls on capital inflow and outflow as a macro-economic 
management tool (Kasper 1984). FDI involves the entry of a foreign corporation 
10 Surveys of impediments to foreign direct invesiment carried out under the auspices of APEC the 
OECD (1987) and UNCTAD (1996) show that security-related restrictions are still common in 
otherwise liberal ne!lons. Despite the ultimate failure of the OECD negotiations over the MAI it was 
clear that member states were moving towards a mechanism that would have allowed general 
exceptions from the national treaiment principles for national security reasons (WTO 1999). 
11 Gilpin (1987) explicitly developed the theme of economic nationalism, which entails the legitimate 
subordination of private economic activities to the interests of the nation state. FDI potentially raises 
a dilemma from a security policy perspective: it can contribute to economic growth but entails 
foreign control of productive capacity, Foreign economic control might be problematic because of 
conflicts between the policy objectives of the host government and that of a foreign finn, the scope 
for transfer of sensitive technical or other infonnation abroad, and the possibility that the foreign 
investments themselves might become a source of international disputation. For these and other 
reasons, security studies scholars have been giving more attention to the tensions betiveen the goals 
of national wealth-building and national security (Gowa 1989). 
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into a host country, often through the creation of a subsidiary under local law, and 
need not entail the inflow of foreign capital at all if the foreign firm has access to 
local capital markets. This has led ~ome economists and international business 
scholars to posit that capital poor developing countries will favour labour intensive 
direct investments in order to preserve precious local capital (Vachani 1995:166). 
Underdeveloped local capital markets, and a fixed exchange rate system, make 
government regulation of foreign firms' access to local capital, and their import of 
foreign capital, more likely but by no means inevitable. 
If domestic policy settings give rise to substantial private rents and/or moral hazard 
problems at the expense of the community, and there is little scope for policy 
reform, then a public interest argument for a restrictive FDI policy may arise. It 
must be stressed that this would only be a second best solutiOn and that domestic 
reform would be the first best. If foreign firms are able to secure a share of 
consumer surplus owing to market-distorting regulations, and then repatriate it 
abroad, then there will be a welfare loss to the host economy (Corden 1974:221). 
The positive externalities that FDI can entail may be large enough to more than 
offset this loss, making a liberal FDI regime still desirable. If the rents lost are larger 
than the spillovers, and they cannot be clawed back through taxation, then 
restrictions on FDI, or at least profit repatriation, would become attractive.12 One 
scenario is of foreign firms earning large profits by 'tariff-hopping'' Into very 
protected and oligopolistic markets, at least until the high rates of profitability 
attract more firms into the market (Carden 1974:330-50). Fears of such costs are 
not limited to FDI in protected industries. Government favours to businesses that 
foreign firms cannot practically be excluded from, perhaps because of their local 
incorporation, may provoke such concerns. These may include generous business 
tax concessions, input rebates or subsidies and 'non-measures' such as the absence 
of competition policy applying to oligopolistic markets or the absence of an 
effective taxation regime. Citizens may see themselves as residual claimants to the 
12 If transfer pricing can't be chl'?cked through the taxation system at reasonable cost then 
governments might adopt indigenisation requirements, entailing the selling down of equity to locals 
(Falvey and Fried 1986). For a wide coverage of transfer pricing issues see Rugman and Eden 
(1985), 
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nation's resources. When there is a question mark over whether governments are 
adequately managing the process of selling property rights to public resources, such 
as in minerals, forestry, fishi:m~ or even the right to pollute, foreign investment 
policy is likely to become even more contentious. 
Restrictive FD! policies have in fact only rarely been justified as a second best 
response to problems with other regulation. On the other hand, critics of restrictive 
FDI policy in Australia and elsewhere have frequently made the point that if 
governments are genuinely motivated by public interest concerns theh there are 
better policy instruments for addressing concerns about FDI. The liberalisation of 
FDI policy in Australia has occurred in tandem with domestic policy reform and it is 
an open question as to whether the latter made the former more palatable. The next 
concern of this chapter is with a theoretical understanding of the drivers CJIT 
liberalisation. 
FD/ liberalisation 
The trend towards liberalisation of FDI policy in Australia and many other countries 
is unmistakeable (UNCTAD 1998:55-59). The unilateral nature of much of this 
policy change raises profound questions about the drivers of such policy change.13 
Dunning (1998:282) attributed the widespread liberalisation of FDI policy regimes, 
in some eighty countries in the decade from 1986, to the deceleration of economic 
growth and to FDI liberalisation itself. The latter gave transnational firms more 
locational options, increasing competition for inward FDI and increased the 
competitive pressures on home businesses as TNCs captured locational economies. 
Dunning (1998:283) saw these competitive pressures as not only impacting on FDI 
policy but upon economic regulation in general, concluding that 
13 In the case of trade policy, there have been multiple rounds of international trade negotiations 
where governments have traded concessions and been relatively confident that any compensating 
cross payments to domestic constituencies resisting reform would be offset by the national economic 
gains from liberalisation of export markets. 
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By adopting market-friendly policies which promote the efficient development of both 
foreign and domestically owned assets, governments are increasingly acting as partners 
with, rather than protagonists against, TNCs in their wealth-creating responsibilities. 
Other international business scholars have come to a similar conclusion, exuding 
faith in the public interest orientation of national governments. Rugman and 
Verbeke (1998:125) argued that governments have come to realise that the firm 
specific advantages of multinational enterprises cannot be simply unbundled or 
purchased as intermediate goods and so has led to policy change. These writers do 
not specify the domestic policy dynamics that make the growth objective politically 
salient over other private and public interest pressures for an illiberal policy. They 
generally assume that governments liberalised FDI policy because it was good for 
the national economy to do so. However, as the political markets literature and the 
long history of protectionism reveals, governments may adopt policy settings that 
are in their political interests rather than in the national economic interest. Dunning 
and international business scholars may indeed be correct about the triggers for 
liberalisation but the analytical challenge is to explain why. 
The analysis of private interests above revealed deep divisions amongst domestic 
businesses over FD!. This suggests that in a political competition amongst only 
private interests for either a liberal or restrictive policy, the outcome might be 'a 
close run thing'. Other factors may ultimately determine the policy outcome as a 
consequence. As just seen, a restrictive policy may be a second best solution for 
other poor policy. Ideas may be decisive, as will be examined below. Dunning's 
(1998:283-84) view that economic downturn was a major factor in driving FDI 
liberalisations implies that governments have a political imperative to deliver sound 
economic governance that is a counterweight to rent-seeking. It is an insight that 
needs developing. 
It has already been seen that domestic businesses will favour FDI inflow for its 
growth-enhancing effects while potentially demanding its exclusion from their own 
industries. There are other strong political imperatives for liberal FDI policy that 
would require powerful private interests or economic nationalist ideas to offset 
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them. Governments are likely to facilitate FDI inflows because the higher economic 
growth they can generate supports more public as well as private goods. 
Governments will be keenly aware that a prosperous economy delivers a growing 
revenue base that can then be directed at winning more electoral support. Moreover, 
a growing economy may also mask many of the costs that regulatory favours to rent-
seekers entails (Corden 1974:108; Pempel 1997). Those who seek to have various 
private or public interest visions realised throug,i1 state assistance should appreciate 
the FDI-growth-goods nexus and support a liberal policy. Not only such interest 
group dynamics but also electoral competition suggests that governments will be 
drawn to pro-FD! policies. While voters face heavy information constraints when 
they come to pass judgment upon a government at the ballot box, the general state 
of the economy should be roughly knowable to them.14 There are few voters or 
private interest constituencies who do not feel that their lot in life is made better by 
general economic growth; subject to the qualification that many actors judge the 
justice of their circumstances in relative rather than absolute terms (North 1981 :49-
50). Governments are therefore likely to heed an electoral imperative to good 
economic management, or at least the perception of it. 
The political benefits to incumbents of a strong economy have been recognised irt 
some empirical and theoretical studies (Jack.man and Marks 1994). Public choice 
scholars recognise that governments could be tempted to manipulate macro-
economic policy instruments to coincide with the electoral cycle; jeopardising 
longer-term economic health (Buchanan and Wagner 1977).15 It is logical to assume 
that governments would also be inclined to promote FDI and other foreign capital 
inflow in the absence of counter-veiling pressures for restrictive policies. In fact, 
Chapter 3 explores how Australian governments, especially at the state level, 
frequently resorted in the past to importing large volumes of overseas capital on its 
own account when private flows did not deliver sufficient ecOQ!;lmic growth to 
secure their political fortunes. With the scope for that checked by the creation of the 
14 albeit mediated through their own recent personal economic experiences. 
15 For public choice scholars, however, this earlier insight reinforced their pessimism about the 
prospects for governments delivering policy in the public interest. For that reason the vesting of 
discretionary authority over monetary and even fiscal policy in independent bodies i~. ~;;~eated 
(Buchanan and Wagner 1977). 
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Loans Council to control official borrowings, the state governments seem to have 
acquired a structural bias towards a liberal FDI policy. 
American experience lends weight to this interpretation (Eisenger 1988; Ventriss 
1994). A pressing need to expand a state's tax base (Bacchetta and Espinosa 1995) 
and high unemployment rates (Kotabe 1993:135-38) have been identified as major 
political drivers of pro-active measures to attract foreign direct investment. As a 
consequence American state governments have become an increasingly significant 
force for 'global ~crodiplomacy' (Duchacek 1984) in their efforts to re-engineer 
the terms of their interaction with the international economy (Kline 1984). 
Globerman (1988:41-49) found empirical evidence to support his theoretical 
proposition that short-nm economic conditions exercise a substantial influence on 
policies regarding foreign direct investment; leading him to raise the question of 
whether a healthy economy would diminish governments' enthusiasm for further 
liberalisation of foreign investment policy. 
Governments would seem to face a political calculus that sets political pay-offs 
from adopting or maintaining restricting policy measures towards FDI against the 
short-to-medium term economic and political costs of foregoing it. Those economic 
costs will vary with the broader health of the economy. Poynter (1986:56-58), in an 
early departure from the public interest inclination of international business scholars 
writing on FDI policy, suggested that the growth objective was always in political 
conflict with other imperatives, private and public, for a restrictive policy. He saw 
the latter dominating when the host nation had an • ... ability to replace the business 
resources normally suppled by the MNE ... '.Kim (1987:35-38) likewise found that 
multinational firms had to concede much more to host governments when they 
wished to invest in capacity that a host economy was already reasonably well 
endowed with. Poynter (1986:57) judged that ' .. .low [MNE] subsidiary bargaining 
power sets into motion actions by domestic entrepreneursf government officials, and 
the like, who actually bring about intervention.' Poynter's study was limited to the 
government intervention in the operating environments of MNEs already present in 
a country rather than the policies applying to the initial entry of firms. 
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Poynter's view shares much with the familiar 'obsolescing bargain' theory in the 
international business literature. This basically holds that as firms become 
established over time in a country their bargaining power with host governments 
diminishes; owing variously to sunk costs, the diffusion of their know-how through 
spillovers and increasing dependence on the local market, personnel and suppliers 
(Vernon 1971; Kobrin 1987; Encarnation and Wells 1985).16 There is some 
qualified empirical evidence, mainly from developing countries, to support the 
concept of the obsolescing bargain (Vachani 1995; Lecraw 1984; Moran 1974).17 At 
first glance the core idea that strong FDI inflow can, over time, make it easier for a 
government to switch to more restrictive policy accords with Australia's policy 
switch in the late 1960s. If the Australian government believed that foreign 
investors were effectively entrappe-:1 and/or that sufficient capital and know-how 
would be secured despite controls on FDI, then they might have sought to realise 
other political objectives through restrictive FDI policy. These might have been 
private-interested oriented, such as rewarding domestic political constituencies with 
rents, or public interested in the sense of using FDI controls as a second best 
solution to problems of domestic policy design. As shall be seen below, there may 
have also been non-material nationalistic objectives. 
Although there is an apparent fit between the theory of the obsolescing bargain and 
the Australian experience, it is proposed that there was also a countervailing 
tendency at work that has been neglected in applications of the concept. Following 
the theory of political markets, it is hypothesised that the presence of established 
foreign investors in Australia created domestic constituencies in favour of FDI that 
ameliorated in practice the extent of the turn to restrictive policies. Without a 
consistent account of domestic interests in this vein it is impossible to account for 
16 It was conseciuently argued that MNEs should avoid excessive localisation lest they fall victim to 
host government 'hostage taking' (Poynter 1986:57). 
17 Studies of the obsolescing bargain have. largely been quantitative in methodology and have used 
the percentage of ownership in the subsidiary retained by the parent lt$ a proxy measure for the level 
of bargaining power. This approach was rather flawed in that it failed to consider that foreign finns 
would trade equity localisation fol' other regulatory concessions and that they might not want full 
ownership anyway for sound transaction cost reasons. Gomes-Casseres has provided a valuable 
corrective to the second problem (1990). Moreover, many of the static bargaining models that took 
only two statistical historical 'snapshots' of ownership. Both the fonnation of host government policy 
preferences, and the bargaining process with foreign finns, remained a black box (Vachani 1995). 
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subsequent return to a more open policy from the mid-l 980s. Liberalisation implies 
either an increase in the opportunity costs of restrictive policy for governments 
and/or a change in the balance of domestic interests. The former account accords 
with the discussion above of why governments would favour liberal FDI policy for 
the economic growth it might deliver. The balance of domestic interests on FDI 
policy might evolve because of changes in the relative importance of certain sectors 
of the economy, or because of changes within influential sectors.1 s For instance, the 
growing internationalisation of some Australian businesses are hypothesised to have 
made the issue of FDI policy reciprocity more politically salient. · A hybrid 
explanation of liberalisation is inevitable because economic developments that 
change the opportunity costs of FDI restrictions are typically mediated through 
domestic constituencies. 
An important feature of FDI policy liberalisation in Australia is that it occurred in 
the context of broader liberalisation.19 Regulatory reform in many countries 
revealed that public choice theorists such as Olson (1982) had been excessively 
pessimistic about the continued triumph of private interests over the public 
interest.20 As a consequence there has been attention to some theoretical reflection 
on the meaning of this reform for private interest accounts of policymaking (Keeler 
1984; Tollison 1991 :61-63; Peltzman 1989). One of the early and important 
insights of the rent seeking literature was that th~ considerable welfare losses 
accrued not only from the costly competition for the rents but from the 
misallocation of resources that result from market-distorting regulation (Viscusi, 
Vernon and Harrington 1992). Explanation of the political impulse to regulatory 
reform can be drawn from that understanding. Becker (1983) provided an early and 
promising formal theoretical account of reform. Competition for rents generates 
18 The changing competitive advantages, or their absence, of businesses may reflect the 'natwal' 
development of an industry or be a consequence of other regulatory changes. That is, the FDI policy 
preferences of private interests will be nested in a broader policy context. 
!9 An important distinction is to be made between economic and social regulation (Viscusi, Vernon 
and Harrington 1992:295-329). While there has been substantial liberalisation of economic 
regulation in the last two decades in Australia and many other countries, the extent of social 
regulation has probably increased. Within the range of 'economic regulation', liberalisation has 
centred more upon structural rather than conduct regulation in Australia (OECD 1992: 13-15). 
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increasing deadweight costs that convince even many active rent-seekers that policy 
should be returned to more market-oriented foundations. It is hypothesised then that 
changes in the FDI policy preferences of Australian business associations was in 
part a consequence of their growing recognition of the costs of government 
regulation in general to the national economy, and ultimately themselves. On the 
other hand, auu ~ontrary to the Becker model, it is hypothesised that individual 
firms would still lobby for FDI policy restrictions in some circumstances. This is 
because the potential benefits to the firms would be greater than the indirect costs 
associated with perpetuating government interventionist practices. Iii essence, 
although business associations as a whole may agree that FDI policy settings should 
shift back towards what most economists understand as the public interest, firms 
may cheat on any rent-seeking moratorium. 
Ideas 
In practice any conception of 'the public interest' on FDI policy is contested within 
the business and broader community. Understandings of the costs and benefits of 
FDI have changed considerably over time, even amongst specialists. The current 
near unanimity amongst economists and international business scholars on the 
benefits of a liberal policy is of relatively recent origin. International business 
scholars have generally been in little doubt that ideas have been significant in 
shaping FDI policies (Rugman and Verbeke 1998:125; Dunning 1994; Vachani 
1995:162). Lenway and Murtha (1994:515-520) concluded that private interests and 
ideology - eco110mic nationalism but also state developmentalism more generally 
- were the two major, interdependent, explanatory variable~ determining variations 
in FDI policy. Although many public choice and Chicago school scholars have been 
reticent about a role for ideas, autonomous from the material interests that they 
might serve, there has been growing acknowledgment that information constraints 
can have a considerable influence on public policy outcomes (Machan 1992:161--
65). Dunleavy (1992) is at the forefront of developing more sophisticated and 
20 Olson's 1982 work held that some Western nations had 'paralysed states' that had been 
overwhelmed by the demands of interest groups. See Mueller (1989:277-317) for a summary of 
empirical tests of Olson's hypothesis. 
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analytically powerful rational choice theoretical constructs for application to aspects 
of public policymaking. His studies (1992:9) 
share a similar orientation by querying conventional public choice assumptions of perfect 
information, exogenously fi~ed preferences, unitary supply-side actors and decision-makers 
with single maximising courses of action ... They each explore political behaviour in an 
environment of limited information; where consumer preferences are malleable and 
reshaped by elite actions; and where political supply-side organizations have complex 
internal structures and confront choice dilemmas between alternative maximising strategies. 
J1iformation shortage 
The theoretical conception of the political market for FD! policy discussed up to this 
point gave only scant attention to the problem of limited information. It was noted 
that a growing economy can hide the costs of regulatory favours to rent-seekers, 
which essentially amounts to a recognition of imperfect knowledge. Information 
shortage provides the grounds for ideas to be a significant feature of the politics of 
FDI policy. Anderson and Gamaut (1987:115) found that this was certainly the case 
in the long history of Australian tariff protectionism, concluding that:. 
One of the clearest messages to emerge from this study is that neither the public nor the 
private interest theory alone can explain Australia's protection policy. Their relative 
importance in protection policy-making is difficult to assess because of their simultaneous 
and complex interactions. However, it would seem that the climate of opinion among 
leaders as to the effect of protection on the public or national interest has been more 
important in determining the average level of protection and its changes over time than in 
determining the inter-industry dispersion of protection rates. Private vested interest groups, 
on the other hand, have affected mainly the levels of protection in indivil:lual industries, 
although at times they have also influenced the perception of the public interest in protection 
to some extent (1987:115-16). 
J .. ~iit~d in:formation about the economic costs of restrictive FDI policy would make 
it easier for a govermp.ent to provide a favour to domestic finns seeking such a 
policy outcome. Given the enormous range and complexity of public policy issues 
that a government will deliberate upon during a term in office, voters will find it 
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impossible to be familiar with most policy settings. Formal rational choice models 
of voter behaviour hold that voters have little incentive to expend time and 
resources gathering information about candidates for election and their policies 
because the chance of their vote being decisive is extremely small. However, there 
is only a limited fit between these models and observed voter behaviour; which is by 
no means fatal to the broader rational choice approach.21 Citizens who are 
motivated, for whatever reason, to gain knowledge of policy settings have some 
sources ready at hand. The print and electronic media are crucial to the functioning 
of mass political markets because, as the principal secondary market for foformation 
and analysis, they provide this information at very low cost to a wide range of 
stakeholders (Bennett 1992; Asard and Bennett 1995; Patterson 1993). Competition 
in the media market may create incentives for media agencies to identify the 
motivations of various actors making policy demands upon the government of the 
day. 
All societal actors are as likely to be as constrained in their ability to absorb 
available information as they are by information shortage itself. The concept of 
'bounded rationality', developed by Simon (1955), admits cognitive limitations, that 
is, both information shortage and computational capacities, as a major component of 
the constraints within which people maximise their interests. Any actors with 
limited resources -· policy~makers, interest group agents or 3ndividuals - will be 
engaged in 'satisficing'. In this vein North (1981:49) concluded that 'ideology is an 
economizing device by which individuals come to terms with their environment and 
are provided with a 'world view' so that the decision~making process is simplified'. 
This is certainly not limited to voters, although the greater the economic stake an 
actor has in certain policy settings the greater incentive they have to invest time and 
resources in understanding their workings. Machan (1992: 160) argued that the most 
selfishly instrumental actors may have to learn what their own best interests are and 
how to realise them. Bates and Krueger judged that it was' ... difficult for particular 
groups to calculate where their interests lie. Ideological struggles therefore can 
21 For good surveys of the literature see Mueller (1987, 1989), Dunleavy (1992:79-111). 
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outweigh competition among organized interests as a determinant of policy change' 
(1993:456; quoted in Chai 1998:265). 
A number of political scientists have interpreted regulatory reform since the mid-
1980s as being a consequence of the ·capture of the agencies of stat~_ by an ideology 
. ·• ... ·-
of 'economic rationalism' (Pusey 1991; Maddox 1989; Muetzelfeldt 1992). Some 
authors posit the same phenomena across a range of countries (Bi~rstecker 1992; 
Hirst and Thompson 1996).22 A weakness of the Australian accounts at least is that 
they do not give sufficient analytical attention to the economic circumstances, partly 
. . 
mediated through interest groups, that attracted some policymakers to 'economic 
rationalism' (James, Jones and Norton 1993).23 The onset of a balanGe-of-payments 
crisis in the mid-1980s had dramatic and unforeseen implications for Australian FDI 
policymaking. At the best of times governments are confronted with a dizzying 
array of policy challenges and options and will have to 'satisfice' (Simon 1'955). 
This has been well recognised in the rational choice literature, especially in relation 
to the way the principal-agent relationship between legislators and bureaucrats can 
be plagued by infonnation asymmetry.24 
Within the broader public policy literature the consequences of information scarcity 
are central to theorising and empirical study. The policy networks approach has 
come to be the most popular approach to the study of public policy-making in Great 
22 A strong statement that links national policy choices to the influence of international institutions is 
made by Hoogvelt (1998;279): 'International business presents us with a hegemonic ideology that is 
now shared and propagated by the same multilateral institutions that previously embraced the 
ideology of national developmenlalism'. 
23 Those works that retain a direct focus on business-government relations, such as by Bell and 
Wanna (1992) and Forsyth (1992) tend not 1o succumb to the tendency to purely ideational accounts 
because of the clear recognition that certain business groups were strong advocates of regulatory 
refom1. The policy network approach will also identify this and it does provide a sW.rting point for 
theoretically exploring individual agency in agenda-setting (Gerritsen 1994). 
24 On bureaucratic politics and agenda-setting see Downs (1967), Bendor (1988), Aberbach, Putnam 
and Rockman (1981). For two of the seminal articles in the principal-agent literature, see Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). For a challenging application of principal-agent 
concepts to Japanese politics see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993). Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1995: 
59), Kaufinan, Majone and Ostrom (1986) and Mccubbin and Schwartz, amongst others, have shown 
that governments do also have a range of strategic options to minimise agency slack. Dunleavy 
(1992: 174-209) theorised that senior bureaucrats' self interest may be better served by becoming 
. 'bureau shapers' (Dunleavy 1992:174-209); refonn entrepreneurs in the servi.ce of legislators rather 
than merely bureau builders. 
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Britain and is very influential in Australia and Europe.2s It focuses on the linkages 
between government agency actors, interest group representatives and assorted 
specialists such as academics, and the consequences for the formulation of policy. 
The' term 'policy communities' im;.,f.k~ shared specialist knowledge, beliefs and 
values that cut across the divide implied in their formal roles.26 The policy 
community is certainly not limited to within national borders. Measures which have 
appeared to succeed in other countries can make sense to policymakers in simple 
cost of information terms, as well as possibly being more 'saleable' in the political 
market because of the body of international evidence as to their consequences 
(Biersteker 1992; Markoff and Montecinos 1993). This in tum may contribute to a 
'clustering' of countries around certain policy models (Castles 1993). Nonetheless, 
international policy trends will be filtered through the agencies of $tate, such as the 
bureaucracy, and .. sqciety, such as universities, the media and the private sector 
(Goldstein and Kei"ii,,<.~ 1993). It is hypothesised that the 'feasibility frontier' - to 
quote Dunleavy (19i1L: 109-10) - for FDI policy at any given point will be a 
function of a certain critical mass of views within a broad economic policy 
community. 
Ideas a11d e11trepre11eurs/1ip 
How then do ideas arise and find influence within the political market for FDI 
policy? This can be understood in terms of entrepreneurSil1p - corporate, academic 
and political. The role of competition in driving the mass media to present ideas of 
foterest - not necessarily well founded ideas - to consumers of media product has 
25 For a representative sample of this literature see the special issues of Governance, 2(1), 1989, and 
the European Journal of Political Research, 21(1), 1992. For an overview see Rhodes (1990) and 
Atkinson and Coleman (1992). 
26 The policy networks literature provides more nuanced descriptions of agency-client relations than 
the simple 'capture' view. On the other hand, it generally fails to theorise about these relations so as 
to give a sense of the universal amongst the particular. Situating the policy communities concept in a 
rational choice theoretic construct of political markets may help to overcome that problem. Dowding 
argues that excessive attention is given to the metaphor of the network itself, concluding that: 
'Attempts to provide a 'meso-level' theory, to.~nnnect networks with state autonomy approaches, or 
to drive network analysis by introducing 'ideas• in the fonn of 'epistemic communities' or 'advocacy 
coalitions' will all fail to produce fundamental theories of the policy process. They fail because the 
driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network characteristics per se but 
rather characteristics of component'! within the networks. These components explain both the nature 
ofthe network tindthe nature of the policy process.' (1995:137) · 
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already been noted. In its news-making function the mass media represents the 
intermedito1te demand for new views. In its dissemination of news and analysis it is 
supplying ideas to all participants in the political market for FDI policy. Academics 
and other members of the broad policy community have their own reward structures 
for developing and disseminating information and ideas on for~ign investment. 
The demand for new ideas is certainly not constant. There is an independent 
ideational variable helping to determine public policy outcomes only because of 
significant lags in ideas changing to accord with changes in interests. North 
(1981:50) noted as much. 
Inconsistencies between experience and ideologies must accumulate before individuals alter 
their ideology. The implications for neoclassical theory are important. A single change in a 
relative set of prices by itself may not alter an individual's perspective and therefore 
decision, but persistent changes that run counter to an individual's set of rationalizations or 
a change in fundamental consequences for his well.being will induce him to change his 
ideology. 
Governments and oppositions may take a long time to adjust their FDI policy 
settings despite changes in the economic and political environment. Times of policy 
crisis may decisively shift the feasibility frontier of policy action, privileging new 
ideas and their proponents. The latter may be understood as 'reform entrepreneurs', 
and may have taken the initiative to make information available to policymakers, 
voters or other actors on the real costs of particular policies.27 
In fact much political entrepreneurialism involves something far less noble than th.e 
dissemination of objective facts designed to promote the 'public good'. In a political 
environment characterised by imperfect information,. as in any normal market, there 
is plenty of scope for the instrumental use of ideas.2s Private interest groups may 
cloak their political pursuit of costly regulatory favours in the discourse of some 
27 I am indepted to Professor Ross Garnaut for an explanation of the issues entailed in the notion of a 
'reform entreprem;ur'. 
28 For an instrumentalist explanation of ideological phenomena see Dowding (1991: Chapter 7). 
Such an exercise will have similar empirical interests with post-modernist scholars concerned about 
the relationship between knowledge and power in society. 
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variant of 'the public interest', as Anderson and Gamaut revealed in Australian 
tariff politics (1987). Governmerti:s are likely to manipulate information in order to 
secure legitimacy and they are usually well endowed with resources, including the 
credibility of state authority itself (Dunleavy 1992:119-35).29 North (1984:39) 
argued that 'If ideology is not important, then economists must explain the 
enormous amount of resources that political units and other principals in political 
economic activity devote to attempting to convince participants of the justice or 
injustice of contractual arrangements' (cited also in Chai 1998 :265). 
Political entrepreneurs seek to understand voters' beliefs about their interests, and 
then respond to and shape them (Asard and Bennett 1995:645-48). Societal policy 
preferences, non-material as well as material, are made politically salient through 
entrepreneurial action. For the politically ambitious, the resilience of certain beliefs, 
aspirations or prejudices can provide considerable scope for the strategic expression 
of empathy in pursuit of a support base. That is, there are opportunities for political 
entrepreneurialism through offering oneself as an agent for any particular cause, in 
tum harnessing the energies of 'the true believers' ,30 The political entrepreneur need 
have no real affinity for the 'cause' but must be able to make, relative to other 
candidates at least, credible commitments to its advance (Williamson 1985). The 
strategic pursuit of 'reputation' then becomes vital.31 
29 Prominent public choice theorists Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue, for instance, that 
governments utilised Keynesian ideas instrumentally in order legitimate spending more than they 
truced. For a detailed study of the influence of Keynesian thought see Hall (1989). 
30 In Ekelund et al. (1996) the religious convictions of believers are taken seriously but an insightful 
instrumentalist and materialist account of the entrepreneurial actions of the Catholic church 
organisation, utilising concepts from the economic theory of the firm, is developed. 
31 The concept of reputation is one that has attracted enormous attention over the last decade in 
micro-economics but is yet to be widely applied to political phenomena. An exception to that is the 
work of Dowding et al. (1995:144, 269) in incorporating reputation as a bargaining resour<;e into 
Harsanyi's famous analysis (1976, 1986), alongside infonnation, legitimate authority, conditional 
and unconditional incentives. The key theme is how the concern for reputation in a competitive 
market can check the temptation to malfeasance by av,. economic actor, even in the absence of 
contracts and/or other enforceable statutory rights and obligations. (Klein and Leffier 1981) The 
attention to reputation effects came initially from empirical studies of firms in markets and 
subsequently an extensive and rigorous game theoretical and transactions C•"lSts economics literature 
appeared on the phenomena. See, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Rasmusen 1991; Raub 
and Weesie 1990; Kreps 1990; Sutton 1986; Axelrod 1984. The final work is a seminal one on the 
implications of incomplete information in both single-shot and repent games. A sociological literature 
on the 'embeddedness' of such reputational dynrunics in social relations has also emerged (for 
example,. Granovetter 1985), The potential application of such ideas to electoral politics, political 
coalition-building and internal party politics are obvious. 
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The political party is a mechanism for offering a policy package to voters. Large 
parties often stay that way because they can make credible commitments to deliver 
some particular mix of public and private goods (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). 
The party structure also allows political entrepreneurs to tap the political resource of 
people with intense policy preferences that align with the broad positioning of the 
party. 32 Yet party leaders are also potentially constrained by the ideological 
proclivities of the niembership unless subst"itute resources can be drawn from 
elsewhere. The party must have sufficient policy latitude to be able to 
simultaneously target the 'median voter' and core interest groups if government is to 
be won (Dunleavy 1992:71-72, 134-35). Designing such a policy mix can be a fine 
art, further complicated by the role of the policy community in lending legitimacy to 
some policy choices and not others. A stark divergence between 'elite' and 'mass' 
opinion nn FDI issues greatly complicated the politics of FDI policy for both the 
government and the main opposition in Australia. At the heart of this were differing 
conceptions of the national good that went far beyond the. direct economic costs and 
benefits of FDI. It is to a theoretical consideration of those essentially ideational 
dynamics that we now turn. 
Ideas 011d tlie politics of FDI 
The notion of 'the nation' is, historically at least, an ideational construct. The basic 
notion of nationhood is premised on certain ideas about shared interests with fellow 
national citizens, and c:Hve1::§ing ones with outsiders (Bryan and Rafferty 1999:34-
60; Breton 1964:376, F Jt.;)awn 1990). As Smith (1990:16) wrote: 'By defining the 
membership, th:s. :1our.:da14i;s and the resources, national identity provides the 
rationale for ideals of national autarchy.' Nationalism does not simply arise-it is 
promoted. Studies of new states have been particularly illuminative of this; offering 
many instances of the instrumental use of nationalist ideas by political entrepreneurs 
(Deutsch 1966; Lerner 1958).33 In colonies economic nationalist ideology was 
32 There is considerable evidence to suggest that. political parties have generally failed in Western 
countries to compete with a rruige of other organisation$ for members (Richardson 1995). 
33 Although studies do not use the tenn political entrepreneur there is a striking degree of fit between 
the political phenomena they describe and the concept. 
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inevitably part of a broader political mobilisation strategy and usually entailed a 
significant ideological legacy for FDI policy post-independence (Chai 1998). New 
states generally promulgated national ideologies amongst the populace as a part of 
'nation building'; endeavouring to legitimise new institutional arrangements and 
wielders of authority (Gluck 1985; Wyatt 1969; Anderson 1983; Minogue 1967). 
All 'old' states have also created and perpetuated nationalist identities and 
sensitivities in various ways (Gellner 1997; McCrone 1998).34 rt is certainly not 
only political actors who promote nationalism - as discussed above. Much 
intellectual history writing shows, implicitly or explicitly, the role of public 
intellectuals in defining national identities and interests.JS 
There is little academic work on agency and economic nationalism, because there is 
little academic work specifically on the phenomenon of economic nationalism itself. 
Notable exceptions are Johnson (1968) and Breton, the latter stating of economic 
nationalism that 
The non-monetary flow of rewards is not easy to measure. It is of a psychic order and is 
usually referred to as pride, sense of identity and the like. Its existence, however, ha5 a 
strong propaganda effect in stimulating the support of the working class in favor of policies 
which are not to their economic advantage (1964:379) 
Breton's view of economic nationalism is essentially that those private interests who 
would benefit from a restrictive FDI policy actively lobby for it. They know that the 
political costs for government in delivering restrictions on FDI are lower if they 
cultivate nationalist sentiment. Widespread shortages of information about the costs 
and benefits of FDI allow nationalist preferences to become more politically 
significant than the private economic interests of a significant proportion of the 
community (1964:379-81). The thesis directly examines the extent to which private 
interests actively promoted, or at least sought to take advantage of, economic 
nationalist r;i;;mtiment in the Australian community. 
34 The tragedy of twentieth Century European history has guaranteed that enonnous academic 
attention would be given to the phenomenon of nationalism, and the forces for its most pathological 
manifestations. 
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Economic nationalist preferences amongst voters and other actors raise complex 
theoretical issues about the nature of cognition and the psychological foundations of 
identity that are beyond the scope of thesis. This does not impair a political market 
account ofFDI policy. In reflecting on the utility of rational choice interpretations of 
policymaking, Wood and McLean (1995:706) concluded that 'it makes little sense 
to argue that voters are rational calculators; it makes a lot of sense to argue that 
legislators and lobbyists are'. A degree of 'irrationality' vis-a-vis FDI on the part of 
voters might, in fact, increase the scope for political entrepreneurialism on the issue. 
Caves (1996:250-51) did not attribute irrationality to voters but rather introduced 
nationalist ideas theoretically into voters' preference sets. This did not represent too 
significant a departure from standard rational choice conceptions because he held 
that at some point personal economic interests would override nationalist impulses. 
That position is also adopted in this study. Caves (1996:250-51) stated that voter 
support for control of FDI on nationalist grounds would be ' ... subject to the 
condition that real-income costs of the restriction do not outweigh the utility of the 
gain in perceived independence.' This is a pragmatic recognition that the utility 
gained from perceived independence will vary greatly amongst voters and of the 
sheer difficulty of assigning values a priori to non-material preferences.JG This 
study can be guided by hypothesised preferences on FDI policy; even if their 
orderings cannot be determined by deductive means with any certainty. This faesis 
starts with Caves' hypothesised preferences and adds to them - testing all against 
evidence of the Australian experience. 
Caves (1996:250-51) proposed two theoretical interpretations of politically 
significant economic nationalist sentiment amongst voters. One conception held 
'freedom from perceived foreign influence' to be a collective consumption good. 
Voters would experience 'disutility from perceiving that resource allocations in the 
35 See, for instance, Kohn for an intellectual histor; of nationalism in general (1965), and on France 
(1955), and Germany (1965) in particular. 
36 While not hypothesising the relative weights that people place on nationalism and material benefits 
may appear to forego predictive potential, in practice it would have been an arbitrary and 
unilluminating exercise. That is, there is still too little empirical understanding of the relationship 
between these distinct policy preferences to be able to develop hypotheses that promise a close 
degree of fit with observed cases. 
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national economy are influenced by foreigners' (1996:250). Citizens therefore 
conceptualise of themselves as stakeholders in the nation and therefore feel 
'nationalist' in the. truest sense of the word. Caves' second interpretation of 
economic nationalism did not have that element, holding that 'voters themselves 
prefer to deal with nationals and experience disutility from economic contact with 
foreigners. National preference in this version involves xenophobia, but not the 
aspect of collective goods' (1996:251). It is the simple tribalist impulse of 
individuals. The two accounts of individual preferences are certainly not mutually 
exclusive. Those nationalist or xenophobic preferences become politically 
significant when they are intensely felt by a substantial number of voters - or a 
small number of influential relevant policymakers. In additional to these two 
accounts of FDI policy preferences others can be posited. 
It is clear from studies by international business scholars that FD! in land and 
natural resources are more prone to political contention than many other fonns of 
FDI (Schmidt 1986:48). This suggests that central to national identities is a common 
territory that citizens share and which bestows resources upon them. Breton (1964: 
3 77) argued that the territorial fixation of economic nationalists was evidenced by 
the fact that that they seldom consider capital owned abroad by nationals as part of 
the national capital. Smith (1990:9-10) summarises the popular nationalist 
conception where 
The homeland becomes a repository of historic memories and associations ... The land's 
resources also become exclusive to the people; they are not for 'alien' use and exploitation. 
The national territory must become self-sufficient. Autarchy is as much defence of sacred 
homelands as of economic interests. 
It is hypothesised that a shift in the composition of inward FD! towards investments 
in real estate or natural resources would lead to an increase in societal demands for 
restrictive FDI policy. 
National consciousness of territory is historically inseparable from threats to 
ownership of it. In 'old' countries these threats were principally extemal but in 
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frontier societies like Australia and the United States they also entailed the 
traditional inhabitants. The broader lesson to be drawn from the historical 
interrelationship between a sense of territory and of threat is that nationalism is 
unlikely to be a significant political force ·without the latter being perceived. A high 
level of FDI inflow, especially if involving takeovers, makes it easier for political 
entrepreneurs to 'identify? a threat to national economic sovereignty. However, 
promoters of economic nationalism may, knowingly or otherwise, also tap existing 
veins of community antipathy towards foreigners that are not specifically FDI-
related.37 Although quite distinct issues, the politics of FDI policy and immigration 
policy may- -become enta.'1g!.ed-..as they can both be perceived ~ giving away 
economic opportunity due to locals. Chapter 8 shows strong evidence of that. 
Political entrepreneurship may lead citizens to sense more acutely supposed threats 
to national economic sovereignty than opportwtlties presented to the nation through 
inward or outward FDI. Caves (1996: 251) suggested as much, hypothesising that 
'disutility from foreign influence on decisions could apply asymmetrically to the 
ones that impose losses on citizens, decisions that confer gains being ignored'. The 
emotive force of th.e tenn 'foreign takeover' is proof enough of popular concern 
with foreign threat. 
In defining shared economic interests amongst citizens, economic nationalism may 
also define certain distributional aspirations. Concerns about equity have often 
figured prominently in debates over FDI policy (Rugman and Verbeke 1998:116-
17; Lenway and Murtha 1994:525). Corden posited the concept of a 'conservative 
social welfare function' as one common factor in protectionism, despite its 
economic inefficiency.38 As a restrictive FDI policy can serve protectionist ends the 
concept is directly relevant to an understanding of concerns about distributional 
equity. If FDI is seen as exacerbating social inequality- such as by displacing local 
' 37 Schorske's (1981) masterly study of the deliberate cultivation of anti-semitism in democratising 
Austria highlights how latent antipathies towards minorities with economic influence can deliberately 
be made politically salient. Incidentally, much of the history of nationalism in the twentieth century 
accords with Lord Acton's famous warning that nationalism would prove to be the enemy of liberty 
(1997). 
38 Corden (1974: 107) wrote that a 'conservative social welfare function' entails the policy preference 
that ' ... any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section of the community 
should be avoided.' 
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enterprises - then calls for restrictive policy might be expected. Likewise, there 
may be concerns felt about inter-generational equity. Although inter-generational 
equity also entails other-regarding individual preferences, it differs somewhat from 
Corden's notion of a conservative social welfare function. This is because future 
generations, by definition, are not already in receipt of revenues that will be affected 
by FDI. Instead the concern for inter-generational equity rests on the economic 
nationalist conviction that FDI, although promising economic benefits for the 
current generation, is not in the long-term national interest. Such a view is often 
associated with the conviction that foreign debt is preferable to foreign equity 
because of the fixed debt servicing costs; in contrast to open-ended repatriation of 
dividends. Such a view requires one to ignore the positive risk-sharing dimension of 
foreign equity and/or greatly exaggerate the lack of risk entailed with domestic 
investments. The inter-generational equity argument could conceivably be made to 
support FDI restrictions as a second best policy, discussed above, but its long-term 
orientation would suggest that people would argue for first best solutions. That 
requires full infonnation about the causes and solutions of economic problems, and 
the intergenerational equity argument for a restrictive FDI policy is a common one 
because this is often not the case. 
The inter-generational equity argument would have appeal to voters because it is 
easily associated with the belief that citizens are stakeholders in a nation, Citizens 
may draw psychic income from the prospect of future as well as present national 
prosperity, even if they do not reap other direct personal benefits. This is, in 
essence, Caves' account of economic nationalism. If recent academic 
understandings of the benefits of FDI were widely shared there should in fact be 
strong calls on inter-generational equity grounds for more liberal policy. It would be 
argued that the current generation was enjoying a mix of rents and psychic income 
from an economic nationalist policy but diminishing the future health of the national 
economy in the process. Anecdotal evidence from many countries suggests that this 
is will be unlikely; as was also implied in Caves's account of the asymmetric nature 
of concerns about national autonomy seen above. Nonetheless, Caves may have 
been a little too pessimistic about the asymmetric nature of community attention to 
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the losses and gains from FDI. This is because he did not give attention to political 
entrepreneurship in the market for FDI policy. As subsequent chapters will reveal, 
governments facing apparently strong economic nationalist preferences in the 
electorate have still judged that there are political benefits from associating with 
prestigious and/or large foreign investments in some industries. The political 
impulse to economic growth discussed above is clearly one factor in that. 
Simple nationalism may also be at work. New direct investments by prestigious 
foreign firms maY. foster a sense of national pride in the electorate, and a greater 
degree of optimism in the !'latiot'l's future economic prospects. A broader point 
arises from this observation. What a prominent foreign investment 'says about' the 
national economy will be open to interpretation; and may be heavily contested in 
public discourse. Political entrepreneurs may seek to bestow particular investments 
with symbolic significance to suit their own immediate political objectives. For 
governments, foreign takeovers may herald economic renewal; for oppositions, a 
shameful sign of national decline. Greenfields investments may reflect the nation's 
promise as a base for industries of the future, or an indictment of poor public policy 
settings that stifle domestic entrepreneurialism. 
A cultural variable explaining FDI policy might manifest itself in several ways. 
Foreign direct investors may bring with them a range of new cultural influences.39 
Attitudes to such social and cultural changes will in turn influence attitudes towards 
FDI policy; weighted against the perceived economic costs and benefits of FDI. 
Vachani (1995:164-65), in seeking the determinants of MNC-host government 
bargaining outcomes, found evidence to s pport his hypothesis that: 'multinationals 
with positive historical or cultural ties with the host country will enjoy a higher 
proportion of foreign ownership retained than those without such ties. •40 It is 
hypothesised then that the restrictiveness of Australian policy was partly a function 
39 The discussion of socio-cultural considerations in accounts of FDI policy preferences should not 
be mistaken for a rejection of the methodological individualism central to choice theoretical accounts 
of political behaviour. Socio-cultural phenomena have value because of the utility that is derived 
from them by individuals (Brennan and Walsh 1990). 
40 He also noted, however, that cultural familiarity might make foreign finns more receptive to 
localisation ofoperations (1995:164). 
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of the degree of psychic distance between Australian policymakers, and/or domestic 
constituencies, and the major sources of FDI at any particular time, It is further 
expected that popular opposition to foreign control will be strongest in culturally 
sensitive industries such as the mass media. Finally, material self-interest is forecast 
to remain as an important counterweight to such cultural nationalism. Restrictions 
on FDI to secure cultural goods will impose higher prices on some than on others, 
depending on their proximity to the economic activities that the foreign investment 
would have entailed. It is predicted that there will be more support for a restrictive 
policy amongst those bearing a lower economic price for their realisation. 
Conclusions 
This chapter examined the theoretical approach used in this study of the political 
determinants of Australian FDI policy. Its starting point was the recognition, 
discussed in Chapter I, that political markets theory provides the most promising 
way of conceptualising the domestic political contestation of FDI policy settings. It 
examined the main features of a political market.1 and its foundations in rational 
choice theory. Policy outcomes are understood as the consequence of governments 
tailoring a mix of private and public goods, in response to interest group and voter 
demands, which is calculated to maximise the chance of retaining office. Notice was 
taken of strong theoretical and empirical reasons f~)r giving greater analytical 
attention to public goods in the policy mix that usually is the case in political market 
approaches. Nonetheless, and drawing on current underntandings of the economic 
effects of FDI, possible private interest constituencies for and against restrictions on 
FDI were then identified. It was noted that the FDI policy preferences of domestic 
businesses vary greatly by comparison with interests in relation to tariff protection. 
This suggested that a stable and powerful private interest constituency for restrictive 
policy was unlikely, although firm-level rent-seeking would be prevalent. 
Public interest factors that may have reinforced and/or cloaked private interest calls 
for restrictive policy were then examined. Controls on FDI were seen as a possible 
second best approach to problems with other policy settings. In light of the 
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extensive liberalisation of FDI in many countries over the two decades, possible 
public interest drivers of that change were theorised. Many international business 
scholars have suggested that ideas were as important as interests in determining FDI 
policy outcomes. Theoretical consideration wag therefore given to the dynamics of 
information shortage, ideas and ideology in the political market construct. Ideas 
become politically salient through political, intellectual and media entrepreneurship. 
Economic nationalism is an essentially ideational phenomenon, with diverse 
manifestations in the FDI policy preferences of citizens. Concerns about inter-
generational and distributional equity are common. The former rests on fears of the 
long-term costs of FDI that were once far more widely shared by FDI policy 
specialists than they are today. Changing understandings in the FDI policy 
community are expected to influence the suite of FDI policy options available to 
governments. There is often a territorial fixation to economic nationalism; 
suggesting that FDI in land and natural resources will be most contentious. With a 
concern for a territory comes a deep fear of external threat to it; reflected in the 
potent emotionalism surrounding 'foreign takeovers' of almost any type of asset. 
Combined with concentrated distribution effects, foreign takeovers have 
considerable scope to be controversial. New investments are predicted to be less 
contentious, and may even inspire national pride if associated with prestigious 
foreign firms or new industries. A cultural variable is also likely to partially 
determine FDI policy outcomes, in two ways. FDI should be less contentious when 
it originates from countries with little 'psychic distance' from Australia. Secondly, 
more restrictive policy towards culturally sensitive industries is expected. In short, 
ideas and interests are both expected to determine FDI policy outcomes - in 
complexly interdependent ways. Only a detailed empirical study can shed light on 
just how. 
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3 Historical background 
For most of Australia's history of European settlement the inflow of private 
overseas capital was unhindered by governments. Overseas capital, both private 
direct investnient and loans, lifted the domestic limits on growth and raised the 
productivity of Australian natural and human resources. Australia's historic:al 
relationship with the United Kingdom limited debate about reliance on British 
capital, although some radical nationalist critics were present from the early 1890s. 
Up until the Great Depression, governments often imported overseas capital on their 
own account when private flows were insufficient. This reflected a recurrent 
political need to promote economic development. The burden of servicing sovereign 
overseas debt during the 1930s made both the post-war Chifley and Menzies 
governments wary of such state borrowing and investment. 'State 
developmentalism' nonetheless persisted in Left-wing circles and combined with 
the radical economic nationalism that grew in reaction to British financiers during 
the Depression. This ideological legacy was to have a significant impact on the 
politics of FDI policy in later periods. Yet in the period to 1960 mainstream opinion 
favoured an open door policy towards FDI, with only limited sectoral exceptions. 
FDI helped to underpin a large-scale post-war immigration program and a sizeable 
manufacturing sector behind high tariff barriers while being consistent with the 
Menzies Government's support for close relations with the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. 
Capital imports and colonial politics 
Australia was richly endowed with land and natural resources that promised wealth 
if transfers of capital, labour and technology were made to exploit them. In the early 
years of white settlement the British govemment played a leading role in the transfer 
of both capital and labour to the Australian colonies. Private capital inflows only 
overtook public transfers in the 1830s (Butlin 1994:224-26). The situation 
fluctuated and once again in the 1840s private capital flows to Australia were 
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smaller than public flows because of the British financial crisis and earlier poor 
returns on Australian investments (Butlin 1962; Shann 1930). The pastoral industry 
provided the initial magnet for private British capital inflows; much of it being 
portfolio investments. There was also some direct investment through the medium 
of large London-based pastoral companies that maintained operations in a number 
of colonies (Butlin 1994:182-84; Wood 1930:9-21). Economic downturn in 
Australia invariably brought greater demands from settlers for increased public 
investment by the British government to offset declines in private capital formation 
and lower demand for goods and labour. British governors and the Colonial Office 
were more immune to these requests than subsequent colonial legislative 
assemblies. 
Shann (1930:238) noted that 'self-government brought freedom to start a 'national 
debt'. .. ' In the early decades of colonial self-government there was no question of' 
rejecting British capital as 'foreign'. Although self~government promoted additional 
identities and loyalties, it did not undermine the overriding identification with 
Britain that charac.terised colonial life. On the contrary, electoral considerations 
caused colonial governments to be active borrowers in London and direct investors. 
Universal male suffrage heightened the sensitivity of governments to the level of 
economic activity in their colony with the Eastern colonies particularly facing 
difficulties keeping people in work during the l860s.1 The gold rushes brought large 
inflows of labour and in tum cemented the colonies' reliance on both private and 
official capital inflow from the United Kingdom. Between 1851 and 1861 the non-
irrJigenous population of the colonies grew from 405,000 to 1,168,000 (Shann 
1930: 183). While gold minin'g led to greater domestic capital formation, British 
direct and portfolio investment was crucial to the industry.2 With the quick 
depletion of alluvial gold, mining became capital intensive and led to pressure upon 
I Manhood suffrage was progressive by British standards, where property tests still disenfranchised 
a substantial proportion of the mart population. It was adopted in South Australia in 1855, Victoria 
in 1857 and New South Wales in 1858 (Shann 1930:183). 
2 Markey (1988:68) noted of the mining industry that: 'New finds entered the large-scale company 
stage immediately, Whereas previously, British capital had not directly entered Australian mining, a 
contraction of investment opportunities, improved communications allowing up-to-date infonnation 
on speculative ventures, and the Incredible. richness of new fields brought a strong response from 
British investors to underwrlce the new large-scale operations.' Blainey (1978) provides art excellent 
study of the development of the mining industry. 
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governments to boost labour-absorbing industries. Universal male suffrage 
increased the politieal salience of unemployment. 
Raising public loans in London became the main way Australian colonial 
governments addressed the policy dilemmas that unemployment posed in the 
1860s.3 Colonial governments provided some 38 per cent of total investment in the• 
period 1861-91, rising to a 60 per cent share of a much smaller figure during the 
depression of the early 1890s (McCarty 1967:14-15). The profligacy of the 
Australian goveffi!llents varied, with Queensland being the worst, but all were 
driven by the same motivation to borrow overseas. Without political parties to claim 
the loyalty and mutual self-interest of legislators, as they did in the United 
Kingdom, pork barrelling became rife in colonial politics (McCarty 1967:12-13). 
As stated in the previous chapter, the labour movement strongly supported 
government facilitation of capital inflow, whether through private or public 
channels. Without fts employment-creating effects many labourers faced the 
prospect of emigration or poverty. By the 1880s London financial markets were 
complaining about governments in Australia spending borrowed money to create 
jobs (Hall 1963;181-82). 
Most business interests welcomed the state boti'owing overseas for economic 
expansion. Macintyre (1989: 10) concluded that 
The colonial state had to negotiate a compromise betweent ort the one hand, the popular 
demand for fair opportunity and self-sufficiency (through such means as protection of local 
industry and opening the land to agricultural settlement) and, on the other, the need to 
maintain the existing property relations on which prosperity depended. It did so by raising 
foreign loans, using the funds for developmental projects and the provision of urban 
utilities. Such activity bolstered wage levels and living standard5 while preserving the 
market as the mechanism that distributed rewards. 
3 Much of the writing on Australian economic history accords with contemporary public choice 
writings, although it is only rarely directly informed by it (Butlin, Barnard and Pincus 1982). There 
has been little interest in the prominent rational choice historical political economy in the United 
States and the United Kingdom (eg. Marvel 1977; Anderson and Tollison 1985, 1986; Ekelund, 
Herbert and Toms~ 1989; Popkin 1979; McCarty 1967:12; Shaw 1980:83-90). 
68 
The form and location of state investments in infrastructure wel bbied for artd the 
democratic process rewarded interests that formed coalitions with organised labour 
and other community groups (McCarty 1970:19).4 The public construction of 
railways provides the best example (Shann 1930:305-6). Butlin (198.1:85) noted 
how private interests influenced the ideas and institutions behind o~rerseas 
borrowing. 
Specific business interests sought to limit their capital commitments in the generation of 
private growth by distributing widely, through public intervention, the costs of borrowing, 
of infrastructure and of immigration, and by minimising foreign interest obligations. A 
substantial price was paid in the creation of a powerful bureaucracy, and in private 
dependence on competing colonial govenunents introducing strong public oligopolistic 
elements into decision-making. 
Alth0tJgh the private sector was still understood as the main engine of economic 
development, a complementary ideology of what might be termed 'state 
developmentalism' took hold. 
Depression, nationalism :>,nd radicalism 
Economic prosperity in the 1880s contributed to a growing sense of Australian 
pride, which was strengthenecl by the centennial celebrations of white settlement in 
1888 (Alomes and Jones 1991:46-105; Clark 1955:790-96). Yet a growing sense of 
Australian identity remained consistent with an overarching British imperial identity 
for most residents of the Australian colonies (Henderson 1994:167-68; Alomes and 
Jones 1991:125-62). The depression of the early 1890s made the tc~~onships 
between Australian colonies and the United Kingdom more contentious. Even 
consc;-' ·;·•ative Australian politicians assigned a disproportionate share of the blame 
fo.-r tbe c:lepression to hasty British capital withdrawals.s This was despite the fact 
4 Business interest~ generally resisted small-scale labour-intensive urban public works projects 
be1.:auso they tightened the labour market (Markey 1988:111). Business interests had greater 
influence over governments until the late 1880s br;ause the labour movement maintained an 
industrial rather than political orientation at that point (Nairn 1973:32-35; Golian 1960). 
5 This included Chief Secretary ofNew South Wales, Sir George Dibbs (Clark, 1955:311-12). On 
the role of British investment in the speculative land and housing boo,ms in the late nineteenth 
century see Wood (1930:49-63) and Sinclair(1976:130-32). 
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" 
that many small British investors had been also caught in the collapse of land 
finance companies and that poor private and public financial governance had been 
rife in the Australian colonies (Clark 1955:311-12; Boehln 1971; Wood 1930). Yet 
local conservative elites remained supporters of British private investment and the 
British imperial connection. 
Strengthening Australian nationalism in the 1890s coincided with the development 
of class-based party politics following the bitter strikes in the early years of the 
decade (Clark 1955:444-62, 790-808; Alomes and Jones 1991:105-39).6 The 
industrial disputes of the early 1890s gave focus to trade union critics of British 
investors in Australia. Large English pastoral companies, important as both direct 
and indirect investors, were criticised for absentee landlordism and the management 
practices of firms in Australia. William Lane and other radical writers argued that 
British capital lay behind the shearers' strike over wage cuts, given the governance 
role banks played with debtor properties (Markey 1988:238). The Worker of 31 
March 1894, journal of the rural-based Australian Workers Union (A WU), 
denounced the 'financial sweaters' as the real taskmasters of Australian capitalism.? 
All society was seen to serve ' ... a few over-fed monopolists and a host of British 
bank shareholders, who draw their dividends from the produce of our labour' (cited 
in Markey 1988:208, 238). Populist anti-'money power' pamphleteering found a 
wider audience among small business interests as well (Ence! 1970:341-43; Love 
1984). Writers frequently criticised London financial exploiters and revealed the 
influence of American populist writers and activists such as Ignatius Donnelly 
(Love 1984:12-15; Markey 1988:239). 
6 Butlin distinguishes the nature of state intervention in the Australian economy in the late nineteenth 
from the early twentieth century by noting that formerly transfers of the factors of praduction of 
labour and capital t(• the colonies were primary, whereas, post-federation 'allocative interventions' 
also became important (Budin 1983:89). This is not to say that the pork-barrelling nature ofcolonial 
politics did not have a significant allocative dimension but rather that the defining feature of 
twentieth century Australian national politics was class-based party contestation. While Butlin's 
endeavour to draw a distinction between the nineteenth and twentieth century models is valuable, it 
downplays the continuities of the fonner into state politics post-federation. 
7 The A WU's publications appropriated the Eureka legend and glorified the image of the bushworker 
as the symbol of nationalism - excluding Australian urban and bourgeois images (Markey 
1988:208-9). The Eureka Rebellion involved the bloody suppressing of an uprising by prospectors 
protesting against mining license foes in Ballnrat, Victoria, in 1854. It was soon mythologised as a 
just struggle against British exploitation and repression but the reality was far more complex (Clark 
1955:52-63), 
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The close identification by Australian colonial elites with the values of the British 
upper classes served to link radical class ideology with radical nationalism (Gollan 
1960:119). Golian wrote that. 
The reaction against imperialism and the belief in the possibility of creating the good society 
came together in a composite of ideas and attitudes that we may call radical nationalism. In 
its negative aspect it was a rejection of the assumptions that lay at the roots of the class 
societies of the old world; in its positive aspect it was the assertion of the validity of values 
which were thought of as distinctly Australian (1960:112). 
The divide between English Protestant and Irish Catholic immigrants also 
compounded ideological schisms (Henderson 1994:167~8; Turner 1965:110-13).8 
Australian radical nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century, as 
exemplified by the journal The Bulletin, was schizophrenic. While polemicising 
against the decay and injustices of British society, many radical nationalists were 
also racist and antipathetic towards closer links with Australia's Asia Pacific 
neighbours. Their support for an exclusive immigration policy would, ironically, 
perpetuate the British tone of Australian life while fear of the surrounding region 
compelled continuing close security ties with the United Kingdom. Support for state 
developmentalism almost invariably required calling upon British loan capital. 
While not a dominant value, radical nationalism would influence attitudes in the 
Australian Labor Party towards FDI into the early 1980s. 
Federation, Empire and overseas capital 
Federation of the self-governing colonies into the Commonwealth of Australia in 
1901 fostered a local identity vis-a-vis Great Britain that the old colonies could not. 
The new layer of po!Uical dynamics over local colonial politics, which carried on 
within the constitutionally powerful states, provided a legal foundation for uniform 
regulation of overseas capital (Flint 1985). Yet there was not the political 
motivation to do so, despite Australian nationalism and xenophobia finding 
expression in several major policy developments in the first few years of the 
8 It would also later contribute to the dramatic split of the Australian Labor Party over conscription 
during World War I (Evatt 1954:300-14; Murphy 1975:303-42; McKinlay 1981:51-54). 
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federation.9 The White Australia Policy and protectionism, along with centralised 
wage fixing, became the defining features of the 'federation settlement'. It 
diminished, to quote Castles (1988:93), the 'economic vulnerability' of 
manufacturing interests and organised male labour, and later included compensating 
cross-payments to rural producers (Macintyre 1989:21; McCarty 1967; Kelly 1992). 
The policy settings of the federation settlement persisted until the late 1960s in 
tandem with, but not directly related to, a liberal FDI policy. Manufacturing 
protection would prove to be a drawcard for FDI. Despite the restrictive 
immigration policy, sufficient migration from the United Kingdom showed foreign 
investors a growing Australian consumer market. In the period between Federation 
in 190 l and the outbreak of World War I in 1914 thi.!re was a significant recovery in 
British capital flows to Australia. 
Australia's commitment to the British cause in the Great War reflected its Imperial 
identity and dominion status. Yet World War I had mixed consequences for 
Australian attitudes to the British Empire and, by extension, British direct 
investment in Australia. The conscription issue had been extremely divisive, 
splitting the ALP Government and confining it to opposition for a decade (Evatt 
1954:300-14; Murphy 1975;303-42; McKinlay 1981:51-54).JO At the end of the 
war the conservative and pro-British governments of Billy Hughes and Sir Stanley 
Bruce committed Australia to participation in a large-scale scheme to resettle British 
ex-soldiers, i;;reating a strong need for further British capital inflow. Butlin 
(1983:83) wrote that 'the acquisition of foreign capital through govenunent action 
was a c_orrelative of this population aim: to combine increasing inputs of overseas 
capital and migrant labour with domestic natural resources in order to establish the 
conditions for enlarged foreign trade and domestic activity.' Australian 
manufacturing tariff barriers were raised substantially after World War I. The aim 
was to secure work for Australian servicemen in industrial employment, and the 
financial interests of businessmen who had created substantial new manufacturing 
9 The Industries Preservation Act of 1906, although declared invalid by the High Court for unrelated 
reasons, would have preserved the distinction between British ruid other foreign capital inflow 
(Macintyre 1989:21). 
10 The Easter Uprising in Ireland during the war compounded the ideological and sectarian rancour 
within the labour movement and broader society. 
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capacity to serve war needs (Shann 1930:409-47). Protectionism and a growing 
population attracted more British capital - direct and portfolio investment as well 
as loans. Overseas direct investments also increased in response to investments 
made by state governments. 
In the 1920s a number of state governments, both Labor and conservative, were 
large-scale borrowers and builders. While investment in rural infrastructure to settle 
ex-soldiers and migrants was important, investment in urban infrastructure took the 
major share of foreign borrowing (Macintyre 1989:23; Arndt 1977:23; Wood 1930). 
Immigration, urban sprawl, and rapid industrialisation stemming from increased 
protection combined with the arrival of the motorcar, the demand for full 
electrification, and over a decade's infrastructure investment lag, made heavy 
demands on the: state.1 1 Yet many outlays were the result of state-level political 
contests, such as the Lang government's initiation of the Sydney Harbour Bridge 
and the metropolitan underground railway. Australian municipal borrowing in 
London was roughly twelve times larger between 1920 and 1928 than between 1905 
and 1914 (Cochrane 1980:37), In a climate of growing economic buoyancy all 
levels of government and all political parties subscribed to 'developmentalism'. In 
the 1920s Australian dependence on British capital was reaffirmed., despite the 
Australian economy becoming progressively less dependent on Britain as an export 
market.12 The Australian Loan Council was created in 1927 against concerns abo-i.it 
the public indebtedness of some states and the debt-servicing burden on the balance 
of payments, which had doubled during the 1920s (Gilbert 1973:95-97; Macintyre 
1989:22). Yet the political payoffs from public works caused state governments to 
be hesitant about winding back overseas borrowings (Gilbert 1973:97). 
11 Loan-funded expenditure on roads and bridges by the states between 1920 and 1928 was 24.4 
million pounds; as against 2.8 million pounds in the previous decade (Cochrane 1980:37). 
l2 Commonwealth borrowings overseas in the later 1920s were increasingly raised in New York, 
representing some 40 per cent of the total borrowed from 1925-26 to 1927-28 (Gilbert 1973:101). 
Yet, as Gilbert (1973:101) noted, London remained the source of Australian hopes for loanll with the 
onset of the depression. Cochrane (1980:40-41) n\'lted that an average of 74 per cent of Australian 
exports went to Britain between 1887 and 1891, some 51 per cent in 1920-21, and only 38 per cent 
in 1928-29. Western Europe, Japan and the United States were all emerging as important new export 
markets. Cochrane argued that the diversification of Australia's export markets was ' ... n precondition 
for the continuation of close association with and dependence on Britain' as it provided the capacity 
to absorb new British migrants, and draw nnd service British capital (1980:42). 
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The rise in economic activity associated with state projects in the 1920s, as in the 
1870s and 1880s, stimulated the inflow of overseas private direct and indirect 
investment. Butlin (1983:83) judged that 'public action ... supplemented rather than 
displaced private decision-making in leading sectors of the economy, 13 greatly 
amplifying capital and labour flows to Australia'. For the first time there was a 
small component of capital inflow that was not from Great Britain (Cochrane 
1980:42). Most was from the United States but some came from other parts of the 
British Empire and continental Europe. These capital inflows differed from earlier 
periods in that a substantial proportion flowed into industrial and other urban-based 
enterprises. This was a reflection both of large-scale state investment in urban areas 
and the poorer productivity of rural areas opened by state infrastructure investment 
in the 1920s (Sinclair 1976:164-91). Higher tariffs on manufactured goods drew 
more FDI into manufacturing and contributed to growth in the sector, despite its 
inefficiencies (Anderson 1987:170; Cain 1973). Forster (1964:230-32) reported that 
at least 67 British companies set up plants in Australia in the 1920s. British direct 
investment represented about 11.4 per cent of total net finance for manufacturing in 
the 1920s and the largest firm in a nwnber of industries was British-owned 
(Cochrane 1980:42). Ultimately foreign equity investment did little to ease the 
growing balance of payments problems. It was not export-oriented and, when 
intermediate imports were involved, could exacerbate external imbalances. In fact, 
compared with the 1930s, Australian colonial economies had been better cushioned 
in the 1890s depression by a greater proportion of overseas capital being held as 
Australian equities rather than loans and sovereign debt (Schedvin 1970:74). 
British nu1ding of state-led development was not always straightforward and one 
event in the 1920s caused bitterness throughout the labour movement in particular 
towards both the local privileged classes and the City of London. The 'Queensland 
loans embargo' crisis revealed that no matter how much Labor figures distrusted 
British financiers they feared a drying-up of overseas capital even more (Fitzgerald 
and Thornton 1989:95; Fitzgerald 1984:23-24; Cochrane 1989). In 1920 the 
Theodore Labor &overnment in Queensland passed a bill to increase rents on 
13 Emphasis in original. 
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pastoral leases to a level comparable with leases on crown land.14 The large pastoral 
companies and individuals affected by the bill, some being British, approached the 
financial agents in London handling loan raising for the Queensland government. 
The result was an embargo on all loans from the City to the Queensland government 
until it restored pastoral rents to their previous level and gave full compensation for 
losses. The role of local conservative identities in making the representation, and the 
refusal of the City agents to give in despite a trip by Theodore to London, provoked 
a coD;ilTiunit~1 backlash (Cochrane 1989: 118). The conservative opposition was 
forced, by electoral ~onsiderations, to denounce the embargo but it was not lifted 
until Theodore made nubstantial concessions during a second trip to Britain. The 
loans embargo crisis revealed the faith that many Labor figures had in the benefits 
of loan capital deployed by the state. The anger of the Theodore government was 
directed at those British financiers seen to be denying them the opportunity to carry 
out its 'developmentalist' policy agenda.ts While the loans embargo dampened the 
enthusiasm of Queensland governments for public borrowing and investment, it 
took the Great Depression to have the same effect in other states. 
Australia's overseas debt servicing burden in the late 1920s proved disastrous when 
depression struck (Gilbert 1973:95-97). The collapse of Australia's terms of trade 
and a shrinking tax base meant that a higher proportion of both export earnings and 
public revenues had to be directed to servicing overseas debt. British bankers and 
officials insisted on orthodox fiscal policy as a condition of loan renewals. A bitter 
feud between the Federal Scullin Labor government and the Labor premier of New 
South Wales, Jack Lang, split the ALP again and destroyed both governments. 
Scullin had reluctantly adopted the conservative policy recommendations of the 
Bank of England whereas Lang had been re-elected on a policy of 'repudiationism' 
14 Theodore was Federal Treasurer at the outbreak of the Great Depression and the experience of the 
loans embargo has been explored as a factor in forming his attitudes to the British bankers (Young 
1971). 
15 In an attempt to circumvent the embargo Theodore raised loans in New York but at higher rates of 
interest. than. usual (Fitzgerald and Thornton 1989:95). This was the first occasion in which any 
government had gone outside London for finance, the historical significance of which was 
acknowledged by f,,abor despite its continqing preference for raising money in London (Cochrane 
1989:118-19). An attempt to raise monies in Queensland had only limited success and Theodore 
openly expressed ccincem about the 'crowding out' effect it might have upon private investment 
(Cochrane 1989:118-19). 
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(McK.inlay 1981:67-68; Alomes and Jones 1991:206-15). The Australian economy 
was weighed down by external debt servicing right through the 1930s.16 There was 
little capital inflow to ease this burden and at the beginning of World War II 
Australia still had a current accollilt deficit of some 2.7 per cent of GDP and only 
modest domestic economic growth (Oyster and Meredith 1990:126). 
The depression had implications for the subsequent politics of FDI. It left a legacy 
of popular animosity towards overseas investors, especially in the labour movement 
. . 
(Arndt 1977:132). Antipathy was also felt for domestic financiers who were 
perceived as supporting the position of British bankers and officials during the 
Great Depression. For some on the Left, nationalism was allied with 'state 
developmentalism' despite the lesson of the depression about the dangers of 
governments borrowing overseas. They saw the diminishment of business 
opportunities for domestic financiers implied by this development model as a bonus. 
On the other hand, conservative and some moderate Labor politicians were wary of 
overseas borrowing by governments. As they remained committed to achieving 
strong economic growth they inclined to a liberal attitude towards private capital 
inflow, especially private direct investments involving risk sharing and no fixed 
servicing burden. 
Post-war Australia 
Butlin judged the depression to ultimately mark the switch from public to private 
capital formation (1983:84). Both the Chifley Labor government and its Coalition 
successor led by Robert Menzies maintained a liberal FD! policy. Foreign direct 
investment became increasingly important to Australian economic growth in the 
1950s and 1960s, reflecting both the worldwide increase in FDI flows and pull 
16 The international economic collapse saw Australia's tcnns of trade deteriorate in the order of3~ 
per cent over the period from 1928-29 to 1932-33, resulting in a balance of payments deficit equal 
to 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1929-30. Capital inflow virtually ceased, public debt servicing 
obligations overseas were maintained but there was little prospect for expanding exports. 
Consequently imports fell some 61 per cent over the two fina11cial years to 1931-32 (Dyster and 
Meredith 1990:124). Unemployment reached a high of 29 per cent, while state and federal 
governments were too hampered ~yc-tfie.debt burden to offer much support for its victims (Cochrane 
1980:46). 11 
76 
factors in Australia. Government commitments to a large immigration program and 
to manufacturing protectionism were significant drawcards to FDI. 
Peace and nation-bllildi11g, 1945-49 
The Chifley Labor Government was well aware that the severity of the depression 
had been compounded by the burden of servicing overseas sovereign debt. Although 
Australia's external balances were in a reasonable position following the war, th:.! 
Chifley government held the aspiration of 1920s governments to rapidly expand the 
Australian population (Dyster and Meredith 1990:179).17 This stemmed partly from 
the belief that Australian industries needed a larger domestic market but war with 
Japan in the Pacific had also heightened a sense of national vulnerability in 
Australia.IS Pent-up demand from the war period and strong exports diminished the 
resistance to immigration from organised labour and allowed the Chifley 
government to pursue its 'full employment' objective.19 The United Kingdom could 
not provide the scale of migration that the Government envisaged and so for the first 
time non-British European mit5rants were actively sought; with long-term 
implications for Australia's identity vis-a-vis the United Kingdom (Collins 1975).20 
Senior figures in the Chifley government, and their advisors such as economist D. 
B. Copland, understood that efforts to attract private overseas capital to Australia 
were an important corollary of their immigration program (Amdt 1977:132). 
World War II reinforced goodwill in Australia towards the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America, and so there was popular acceptance of investments from 
17 On the economic implications of Wat:' mobilisation and the workings of Canadian mutual aid and 
American Lend Lease see Butlin 1955 and Butlin and Schedvin 1977. The Chifley government kept 
many wartillle restrictions in place, including rationing of basic commodities such as tea and butter, 
aimed at helping the United Kingdom through its economic and currency crisis. 
IS The large-scale immigration program won general public support, subject to provisos that the 
White Australia Policy be preserved and that the Government pay heed to tl1e nvailabiHty of housing 
in particular. On public opinion see, for instance, the polls by Australian National Opinion Polls 
(ANOP, 498-510, 3-4/1948). 
19 That commitment was fonnalised by the Curtin and Chifley governments in the White Paper on 
Full Employment that was released in 1945 as part of its plan for post-war reconstmction. For 
extrncts and commentary see Crawford (1968:17-29). 
20 The White Australia Policy was officially stated in the 1954 Yearbook of the Commonwealth of 
Australia m;: 'In pursuance of the established policy, the general practice is not to permit Asiatics or 
other coloured persons to enter Australia for the purpose of settling permanently.' (No. 4():372; cited 
in Dyster and Meredith 1990:210). 
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both sources.21 This was reflected in the Australian Government's use of the 
innocuous term 'overseas investment' in all official publications until the early 
1970s rather than the later used 'foreign investment'. British direct investments 
were not subject to any foreign exchange controls, the Commonwealth's only 
mechanism for regulating FDI, owing to the provisions applying to the sterling 
area.22 The principal barrier to British investment in Australia in the immediate 
aftermath of the war was the parlous state of the United Kingdom's external 
balances and its strong domestic demand for investments in reconstruction and 
reorientation of industry to civilian purposes. Although the Australian Citizenship 
Act 1948 established a distinct Australian citizenship the move grew out of a 
London conference convened by the British government in an attempt to resolve 
differences among Commonwealth countries (DILGEA 1988:33).23 Australian 
citizens remained British subjects under the new Act although it provided a 
foundation for further strengthening an Australian identity. 
The private sector, bofr local borrowers and foreign investors, made the bulk of the 
overseas capital transfen; necessary to bridge the gap between Australia's savings 
and investment rates. The Government's formal commitment to a large migration 
program was itself a boost to private investor confidence, local and foreign (Dyster 
and Meredith 1990:194). Federal development projects such as the Snowy 
Mountains Scheme, which became an icon to 'state developmentalists' within the 
ALP, were actually funded out of domestic savings. The Labor government's 
nation-building vision, coupled with its fiscal caution, forced it to address 
prejudices within the labour movement against both domestic and foreign private 
21 Popular support for close relations with the United Kingdom and the United States was revealed 
by a number of Gallop polls during the period. Sec, for instance, ANOP polls (337-44, 4-5/1946: 
459-69, 10-ll/1947; 498-510, 3-4, 1948). There was majority support for restricting American 
imports to preserve dollar reserves; policy practice that incidentally created further incentives for 
United States direct investments in Australia (ANOP, 487-97, 2-3/1948). 
22 With the serious external imbalances for many countries at the end of World War II, and the 
system of fixed exchange rates reaffirmed, the Allies made provisions for resort to capital controls in 
th~ Bretton Woods agreement (Kasper 1984:4-6). 
23 The 1931 Statute of Westminster permitted dominions to establish their own citizenship although 
there was. no move made to do so in Australia before the British-sponsored conference, in contrast to 
the Canadian decision to create a separate citizenship in 1946. An ANOP poll oflate 1947 found that 
65 per cent of Australians favoured British citizenship over a new Australian citizenship; wil'1 only 
28 per ci;;~1t favouring the latter (ANOP, 470-77, 11-12/47), 
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capital that it bore from the 1890s and 1930s depressions. The Government's 
leadership recognised that FDI promised growth in aggi;egate employment and a 
stimulus to industrial development,24 The pragmatism of the Chifley government on 
the economic benefits of FDI is in stark contrast to its ideologically driven failed 
attempt to nationalise all the Australian trading banks (Myers 1959). Prime Minister 
Chifley, who was also Treasurer, nonetheless faced opposition from the Left wing 
of the ALP in relation to FDI. The Chifley Cabinet readily made air transport and 
broadcasting off-limits to foreign control but not minority overseas equity stakes 
(Arndt 1977:134; Sexton and Adamovich 1981). Left leader Eddie Ward was 
especially critical of the Government's deal with America's General Motors to 
establish a large-scale automobile manufacturing operation (Spratt 1965:152). The 
Government granted a range of capital equipment import and other concessions to 
General Motors in an attempt to develop a strategic industry (Dyster and Meredith 
1990: 189). The reaffirmation of tariff protection for manufacturing was a significant 
drawcard for American and British manufacturers (Arndt 1977; Brash 1966). This 
became clear during the Menzies years. 
Menzies government 
When Robert Menzies barely managed to form a government in December 1949 
few imagined that he would go on to wn six more general elections and dominate 
federal policymaking until his retirement in January 1966 (West 1967:275).25 
24 Chifley told the 1949 annual conference of the New South Wales Branch of the ALP that: 11 do not 
think that even the Australian people realise the enonnous expansion that is taking place in secondary 
industries, ... nor are they able to contemplate the confidence and faith which not only producers and 
manufacturers of this country but of other countrici.:.' 'lave in the potentialities o( this country. That is tntt: of 
American industrialists who want to bring factories or branches here. Indeed only last week we reacht:d an 
agreement which will bring a new type of manufacture here. Similar agreements in conjunction with American 
holders of patents and licenses are being made which should be of considerable value.' (cited in Arndt 
1977:133) 
25 The Menzies government won House of Representatives victories on 10 December 1949, 24 
March 1951, 29 may 1954, 10 December 1955,..22 November 1958, 9 December.1961-winning on 
that occasion by only two seats - and 30 'November 1963, when it returned to a sound majority. It 
also faced Senate only elections on 9 Mrty 1953 and 5 December 1964 .. West (1967:275) noted the 
'. .. the unifying and pacifying effect of so dominating a political figure as Sir Robert Menzies, who 
was Prime Minister without a break for more than sixteen years. In some ways, the Liberal Party had 
been synonymous with Menzies, who not only founded the party to his own spc;cifications. He also 
succeeded in controlling it- less finnly in state than in federal politics - by subordinating its extrn-
parliamentnry organisation to its federal parliamentary wing, its FMeral Parliamentary Party to the 
Liberal-Country Party Cabinet and the Federal Cabinet to its Liberal Prime Minister; 
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Policy towards FDI reflected the influence of Menzies over his governments. 
Menzies' international outlook and the patterns of capital inflow into Australia 
coincided to predispose him to a liberal policy and this was formally enunciated in a 
Treasury statement in 1952 (Copland and Barback 1957:252; Arndt 1977:133). 
Menzies was pro-British and antagonistic towards any policy that might impede the 
interdependence of Australia and Great Britain. During the cold war Menzies' 
antipathy towards communism predisposed him to a close relationship with the 
United States, which became a significant source of capital during his long perio.d in 
office. Menzies also keenly promoted Australian economic development although 
he identified this with protectionism (Henderson 1994).26 ·Menzies' 'open door' 
policy to FD1 contrasts with the heavy regulation of many other aspects of the 
economy and of financial markets in particular (Perkins 1977:2).27 
Import controls imposed by the Menzies Government in response to external 
imbalances in the early 1950s created further incentive for foreign firms to invest in 
Australian production facilities (Dyster and Meredith 1990:205). The high tariff 
barriers that replaced quantitative import controls in 1960s also created an incentive 
for FDI and removed a bias against US dollar-dominated impcrts that further drove 
American FDI (Anderson 1987:171). The principal drawcard for foreign investment 
was the Menzies government's commitment to the large migrant intake that the 
Chifley government had initiated, coupled with the pro-business policies and better 
economic management under the Coalition. In the period of 1947-48 to 1954-55 
overseas direct investment accounted for an average of some 20 per cent of gross 
26 Menzies would have been aware of the rent-seeking nature of Australian society. In a 1964 speech 
on the thirtieth anniversary of his entry into politics he remarked that: 'The sturdy individualists in 
the country who resent any political interference apply for it every week. The manufacturers ... what I 
will call the sturdy believers in private enterprise who think the Government ought to keep out of it 
are with us every week or with the Tariff Board every week or with something or other every week. 
There is hardly a section in the community today that doesn't in one breath protest its undying 
hostility to Government activity and in the next breath, pray for it.' (Menzies 1967:369) 
27 In 1977 J.O.N Perkins wrote that 'One dominant thread that appears to run through the past 
quarter-century of Australian macro-economic policy is a truly remarkable disinclination to use the 
market. This was true of import regulation, controls O';-er interest rates, Statutory Reserve Deposits 
(or special accounts), as a means of influencing the money supply, and the official fixing of the 
exchange rate. Most countries of a comparable economk size a11d importance learned these lessons 
much more quickly than Australia, which consequently suffered substantial misallocation of 
resources and unnecessary inflation before policymakers and advisers perceived the sheer 
inefficiency of relying upon non-market oriented macro-economic measures.' (1977: 1) 
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private investment in fixed equipment. According to Arndt, that total overseas 
investment, ' ... added an extra 10 per cent to domestic saving for the finance of 
capital development' (Arndt 1957:436, 439).28 The one significant restriction 
under Menzies was his government's Banking Act of 1959 that required any firm 
wanting to engage in banking business in Australia to obtain an authority from the 
Treasurer. This protectionist barrier for domestic trading banks saw applications for 
full banking licences from overseas applicants habitually refused until 1984. The 
Menzies Government did allow existing foreign banks to continue operations 
(Sexton and Adamovich 1981:13). 
Although the lowest proportion on record, in 1958-59 Great Britain still accounted 
for 52 per cent of total foreign investment. Arnerican investment accounted for 37.9 
per cent, which was a foretaste of its growing importance during the following 
decade. Already by the late 1950s a greater proportion of American than British 
investment was concentrated in growing sectors, and consequently was both more 
profitable and had higher rates of re-investment (Vernon 1965:278-79). Overall, in 
1960 about one-third of the manufacturing sector was foreign-owned. Foreign-
owned manufacturers generally appear to have been more efficient than local 
operations (Brash 1966; Johns 1967; Parry 1974). The gains associated with foreign 
investment were eroded by inefficient industry structures resulting largely from 
.,, 
policy distortions (Parry 1978:180).29 Trade barriers increasingly distorted industry 
structures and were a brake on improvements in national productivity (Anderson 
1987; Anderson and Garnaut 1987; Lloyd 1978; Cain 1973). While protectionism 
may have drawn direct investors to Australia in the first place, it and other 
regulation meant that the potential benefits of that investment were not to be fully 
28 The fixed equipment figures exclude housing and motor vehicles. Expressed as a percentage of 
cumulative national income, total overseas capital inflow accounted for some 3.4 per cent (Arndt 
1957:439). I 
29 On the role of foreign investment in influencing the size and structure of some Australian 
industries see Boehm (1979), Karmel nnd Brunt (1962). Studies of MNE investment and sourcing 
decisions need to be made with clear reference to length of presence in the host economy, as noted by 
Drysdale (1993). 
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realised.JO Arndt (1957:449) warned at the time that continuing ~nvestment inflow 
might even exacerbate the balance of payments problem because large sect!ons of 
the Australian economy lacked international orientation. In contrast to future 
periods, this view was not widely held by Australians at the beginning of the 
1960s.31 In 1958 Treasury stated that FDI had '. .. helped us invaluably during recent 
years by the support it has given to our balance of payments, by the addition it has to 
investible funds within Australia and by the accompanying flow of new techniques 
and know-how' (1958:23; cited also in Dyster and Meredith 1990:218). 
The combination of heavy protectionism and a liberal FDI policy remained 
orthodoxy at the beginning of the 1960s.32 This reflected a general faith in the 
policy settings that the Menzies government had presided over. In the late 1950s the 
Labor opposition criticised the profitability of some foreign investments, with the 
repatriation of sizeable earnings by General Motors attracting most criticism (Arndt 
1977:134).33 Ironically, protectionism was a factor in those profits yet the 
Opposition remained protectionist. In the late 1950s Trade Minister John McEwen 
emerged as an internal critic of the government's open door policy. McEwen, leader 
of the Country Party arid Deputy Prime Minister from 1958, defended protectionism 
despite the cost borne by his rural constituencies (Henderson 1994:148). McEwen's 
30 Arndt made the point that the proliferation of industry-specific regulation meant that foreign 
investments were scrutinised at several government levels (Arndt 1977:134). Yet there is no evidence 
to suggest that overseas investments were systematically subjected to tougher regulatory 
requirements than local ones. 
31 A 1963 ANOP poll found that 43 per cent judged 'foreign capital' to be 'ultimately much to our 
advantage' while 33 per cent said 'partly to our advantage', with the qualified response being largely 
determined by the long-term consequences for Australia's external balances (ANOP 1665-75, 3-
4/63). Coalition supporters were more likely to favour foreign capital. 
32 Strong support for protectionism was evidenced in opinion polls, such as the two-thirds of 
respondentS, in a 1961 ANOP poU who thought quantitative import controls should be reinstated to 
protect industries and full employment (ANOP 1515-30, 3-5/61), 
33 Australian tax law contributed to the large headline figures on bonus issues to a foreign parent 
company. A number of companies declared a bonus issue to be a revaluation of unspecified assets, 
avoiding both corporate tax and the 15 per cent withholding tax that applied to profits repatriated. 
This was clearly optimal because Australia had no capital gains tax regime (SM, 13 January 1963). 
American tax law made l.JS firms more reluctant to sell equity stakes in their Australian subsidiaries 
to locals while the Australian Gc·:<;iTiment refi1scd to allow foreign stock listings on Australian 
markets (Gott Aust. 9 March 1965). American finns faced a home taxation regime that taxed 
dividends earned overseas. Many firms sought to minimise dividend payments to the parent company 
but that was only possible if the. subsidiaries were wholly owned. Local investors demanded frequent 
dividend payments and therefor~ made tax minimisation strategies much more difficult. This was 
apparently a factor in the break-up of the joint venture between American retailer Sears Roebuck and 
Waltons (K. D. Gott, Aust. 9 March r965). 
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doubts about the costs and benefits of FD! were less ironic than the Opposition's 
because he was mirroring the protectionist impulse of small-scale Australian 
manufacturers who feared thr ;---i.try of foreign competitors through FDI. McEwen's 
· comments on foreign investment could be emotive, such as when in 1960 he said 
that while American management expertise was desirable ' ... we will not be taken 
over' (cited in Arndt 1977:135). McEwen was later quoted as saying Australia was 
'. .. selling a piece of our heritage each year' (cited in WA 28 March 1965) and, more 
' 
famously, ' ... we are selling off a bit of the farm each year .. .' (cited in Age 15 April 
1969). McEwen's position in the Country Party meant the Coalition governments' 
stance on FDI throughout the 1960s appeared ambivalent.34 Government division 
' 
over the costs and benefits of FDI was grist to the mill of nationalist critics and as 
the 1960s progressed they gained increasing influence over public opinion. 
Conclusions 
Overseas capital has played an important role in developing the Australian 
economy. Since European settlement began there has been widespread support for 
governments promoting private capital transfers to Australia. As up until the 1960s 
the major source was the 'mother cnuntry' of the United Kingdom, nationalist 
opposition was limited to a minority on the radical Left. Until the 1930s both 
federal and state governments also made capital transfers to Australia on their own 
account. Public overseas borrowing for domestic investment was a mechanism by 
which politicians, at the state level in particular, sought to maintain their hold on 
office. Yet public investment generally complemented and attracted overseas private 
direct investment rather than supplanted it. The heavy burden of servicing overseas 
sovereign loans during the Great Depression turned the post-war Chifley Labor and 
Menzies Coalition government away from state developmentalism. Nonetheless, 
disputes during the depression over the role of British financiers fuelled both 
nationalism and statism on the Australian Left. This remained a minority sentiment 
through the 1950s as FDI flowed into the heavily protected and labour-intensive 
34 On McEwen's influence as leader over the Country Party see Aitkin (1967:300). Deputy leader 
Doug Anthony also became an open critic of liberal FDI policy, as the next chapter notes (Aust. 15 
March 1965). 
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manufacturing sector. As FDI started to play a major role in the growth of the 
mining sector in the 1960s both nationalist and state developmentalist ideas 
gradually became more influential. The next chapter examines how and why. 
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4 Rising economic nationalism, 1960-72 
Menzies was to preside over an 'open door' FDI policy until his retirement in early 
1966, although in the last few years he informally encouraged foreign investors to 
take local partners in order to diminish public disquiet. Holt maintained that policy 
although his government was more divided by the issues of foreign ownership and 
national development than Menzies had allowed. A liberal FDI policy underpinned 
a large-scale European immigration program, was consistent with strpng support for 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America given their primacy as 
investment sources, and promised more rapid development of industries such as 
mining. The open door policy found considerable support within the Coalition's 
business constituencies, although manufacturing interests increasingly sought 
protection from foreign competition and hostile takeovers bids through new controls 
on FDI. The Labor Opposition had also inherited from the past a strongly 
developmentalist conception of the public interest but one that was more economic 
nationalist and statist in character. Labor was to consistently criticise existing FDI 
policy throughout the 1960s and until its election in late 1972, gradually finding 
support in the mass media and the electorate for a more restrictive policy. A 
government and policy community divideil over the costs and benefits of FDI, a 
strong economy, certain amenable private interests and rising nationalism in 
Australia all contributed to this. In the dying days of its last term in office the 
Coalition enacted a regulatory regime for foreign takeovers that repv:esented a 
compromise between its own conception of the public interest and the conflicting 
private interest demands it faced on FDI policy. Yet, Labor's more stridently 
economic nationalist vision of the public interest had greater popular appeal at that 
time. 
Menzies in the '60s 
Sir Robert Menzies' domination of the Coalition government assured continuation 
of the 'open door' policy until his retirement in January 1966. A close election 
result in 1961 owing to the 'credit squeeze' recession created a further electoral 
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imperative to maintain growth-oriented policy settings. Menzies welcomed 
extensive FDI in the growing export-oriented mining industry, although those 
investment flows were ultimately to become quite controversial. Menzies' 
conception of the public interest remained solidly developmentalist and therefore 
liberal towards FD.i. The Labor Opposition judged that FDI was an issue on which 
the Menzies government was politically vulnerable. Opposition leader Calwell 
appointed a shadow spokesman on foreign investment matters, E. W. Peters, and 
along with him and shadow treasurer Frank Crean, sought every pretext to challenge 
the government on the issue. Peters accused the Menzies government of being an 
' ... an instrument of predatory capitalist interests throughout the world' (CT I April 
1965). Urgency motions, questions without notice and press releases on foreign 
investment appeared during 1964 and 1965 with almost monotonous regularity (for 
example Aust, AFR, Mer 2 September 1965). In March 1965 the government was 
engaged in a prolonged debate in the Parliament over FDI (Aust, Age 15 March 
1965; Mer 18 March 1965). Labor called for compulsory Australian equity and a 
general vetting of both takeovers and all new investments (Aust 10 March 1965; 
SMH, Age WA 28 March 1965). 
Foreign investment policy was an attractive political target for the ALP in part 
because the government was clearly divided on it. Since assuming the leadership of 
the Country Party and the role of Deputy Prime Minister, John McEwen had 
periodically expressed antipathy towards the open door FDI policy. There was an 
ongotng tension between McEwen's developmentalism and his economic 
nationalism, and Menzies generally succeeded in keeping him focused on the 
former. I Labor and other critics could also point to policy developments in other 
countries that might provide a pretext for regulation. The New Zealand government 
used capital controls in the early 1960s to secure local equity participation and in 
July 1964 announced plans for further controls over takeover bids (Adv 5 October 
1964; Aust 10 March 1965). Rising economic nationalism in Canada attracted 
I In early 1966 he told an American business audience that Australia would still need huge amounts 
of American capital as 'we want a population not of 11 million as it is today but of25 million' (Aust, 
SMH 26 February 1966). Two weeks later he said on national television that foreign investment was 
just like cocaine: 'It might be a good thing ... but, by gosh, you don't want to become dependent on it' 
(Age 4 March 1966). 
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considerable attention in Australia given Canada's similar reliance on primary and 
resource industries and federal political system (Arndt 1977:135; Kasper 1984:40). 
The 1965 plans of nationalist Canadian Finance Minister Walter Gordon for Canada 
Development Corporation attracted particular attention from Australian critics of 
the 'open door' policy (Auld, CT22 June 1967). Even the relatively liberal United 
Kingdom provided precedents for government intervention in foreign takeovers, 
such as the imposition in 1964 of a limit on Chrysler's equity stake in Rootes 
Motors (Adv 5 Octobf~r 1964). Growing reactions to FDI in a number of developed 
economies was in stark contrast to the OECD's 1961 resolution, in its Code of 
Liberalisation of Capital Movements, to ' ... progressively abolish between one 
another ... restrictiorl.s on capital' (OECD 1961; Kasper 1984:8; Arndt 1977:135; 
Safarian 1993). 
By the mid-1960s Australian editorial opinion was increasingly supportive of a 
more restrictive FD! policy. Melbourne's The Age declared that ' ... the 
disadvantages, principally the overseas control of large sectors of our economy, are 
now becoming increasingly obvious' (Age 29 July 1965). The Sydney Morning 
Herald and The Australian Financial Review and The Advertiser began calling for 
legislated investment review and local equity requirements, despite being more 
resolutely liberal than many other papers. Sydney's tabloid Daily Telegraph 
remained quite liberal, although parochial (DT, 17 November 1965).2 The new 
national broadsheet The Australian championed economic nationalism, declaring 
'what is required to make a policy on capital flows work is the scrapping by the 
government of the old 'laissez-faire' doctrinal approach to foreign capital' (Aust 1 
December 1965, 19 May 1965; Aust 6 October 1964, 5 April 1965). Media in the 
states benefiting most from the investment inflow in the minerals sector, Western 
Australia and Queensland, tended to be qualified in their liberalism and advocate 
better policy coordination between the Federal and state governments (WA 8 March 
1965; 1 November 1965). 
2 Old-style Australian paranoia could work in favour of the liberal policy cause. The popular Sunday 
Telegraph, editorialising on the need for Treasurer Holt to handle discussions with the American 
administration over its capital outflow restrictions with 'aplomb', concluded: 'And, as a countzy 
living in an Asiatic sea, Australia NEEDS powerful friends' (ST2 May 1966). The emphasis was in 
the original. 
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The Prime Minister and Treasurer Harold Holt did repeatedly mount public 
defences of FDI, including the role it played in allowing a large migration program 
(SMH 29 July 1965). In addition he argued that as many of the foreign :firms were 
British, and most of the others were American, there was no problem as Australians 
had a close affinity with both countries (Age 29 July 1965). Treasurer Holt explicitly 
said that the government could revisit the need for restrictions if the composition of 
foreign investors was to change significantly or if new issues arose. Menzies 
responded to growing criticism of FDI policy in his last term by informally 
encouraging foreign firms to make equity stakes available to locals. Menzies made 
only a mild exhortation, saying for instance that the government ' ... would be much 
happier if all foreign investors that came to Australia were willing to admit 
Australians to some share in the equity in the business' (Aust, 5 October 1964).3 
This, he argued, would lessen community anxiety about FDI. The Prime Minister, 
editorialised The Australian, ' ... expressed the views of many thoughtful 
Australians' (Aust 6 October 1964). 
Vemon Committee 
Following its dismal performance at the 1961 election the Menzies government 
established a committee of inquiry into the economy. The Vernon Committee's 
report was completed in 1965 and then immediately rejected by Menzies as it ran 
contrary to established government policies. Its criticism of the effects of high tariff 
barriers on the Australian economy most earned the Prime Minister's ire but so too 
did, in the words of Arndt, the fact that the report ' ... conceded much to the critics of 
overseas investment' (1977:136). The Vernon report was critical of restrictive 
export franchises for diminishing the positive balance of payments effects of foreign 
investment, and raised concerns about the extent of local borrowings by foreign 
firms, transfer pricing and the independence of foreign firms from local economic 
policy (1965:285-89). The Committee supported substantial local equity 
requirements for mineral projects but not for other industries and warned against the 
futility of requiring minor local equity stakes (1965 :290-91 ). It also supported 
3 Trade Minister McEwen went further and an American busirtess audience that the government 
expected local equity participation (Aust, Adv 10 February 1965). 
88 
government control of foreign takeovers when the targeted enterprise was of 
'national interest', but cautioned that defining the term would be difficult. A register 
of all new and existing foreign investment was proposed, including a requirement to 
notify changes in share ownership between residents and non-residents, the latter 
including overseas-controlled Australian businesses (1965:294). The Vernon 
Committee was profoundly pessimistic about the long-term balance of payments 
effects of continued reliance on overseas capital. While noting that foreign 
investment had become increasingly important in offsetting current account deficits 
over the precedin$ decade, it claimed that a higher rate of investment inflow than 
the existing level would actually lead to worsening of the balance of payments 
within ten years. The Committee declared that. 
We can think of no better way of describing this situation that to say that, once an economy 
has a substantial body of overseas investment, it is in a sense 'on the tiger's back' unless the 
trade balance is improving sufficiently to meet the additional income payable overseas 
(1965:283-84). 
The Committee held that reforms in a range of areas were needed to lift Australia's 
trade performance and that if they were not forthcoming then an increase in foreign 
investment should be avoided. Otherwise, the report claimed, Australia would 
become trapped in a cycle of dependency upon uncertain foreign capital in±1ows.4 
Opposition leaders took up this point although the ALP remained resolutely 
protectionist (Age 28 April 1965). The Menzies government had no sympathy or 
energy for the reform agenda implied in the Vernon Report and senior ministers 
dismissed the Vernon Committee's pessimistic view. They trumpeted the 
submission on foreign investment that the Treasury had prepared for the Committee 
back in October 1963.s It, by contrast, argued that the rapid increase in income 
4 Tht. report (Vernon 1965:284) stated: 'However, it would be foolish to blame the overseas investor, 
if Australia became committed to this ~ourse. The reason would be, not that overseas investors were 
preying on the economy, but that Australia had exported too little, saved too little and imported too 
much. The solution to the problem lies in Australia's hands ... It would be a grave error to suggest that 
overseas investment should be restricted purely on balance of payments grounds. It is another matter 
to say that Australia should so order its affairs that it can become less dependent on capital inflow. 
We regard this as essential...' 
S The submission was later widely claimed to be aggressively 'anti-Vernon' as the Treasury resented 
the whole inquiry and wanted to produce a counterweight to any critical views of foreign investment 
that might btl placed before the Government and the public, The Australian Financial Review, for 
instance, argued this in a 1969 editorial (AFR 20 February 1969). 
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payable to overseas companies that had occurred throughout the 1950s had ceased, 
with the balance of payments burden essentially stable. Treasury forecast that with 
the continuance of 'annual new investment' at the then-current rate, the percentap;c 
of overall foreign ownership would rise from 25 per cent to 54 per cent by 1 SI i ~· 
(Aust 12 April 1966).6 Yet this figure itself was grist to the mill ofFDI critics. 
FD/ and supply side sltock 
Although the Vernon Report boosted the credibility of critics of FDI there was a 
countervailing force for liberal FDI policy arising at the same time. The last few 
Menzies years were marked by the great uncertainly about the prospects for private 
capital inflow from the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Under 
the Bretton Woods system the American dollar, convertible to gold at a fixed rate, 
played a central role as an international currency. While a sustained outflow of 
American dollars to the world throughout the 1950s and early 1960s served a 
growing international need for liquidity, it gradually diminished the confidence of 
those holding dollars on their convertibility to gold. For a long time American 
authorities treated this problem with 'benign neglect' (Sodersten 1980:457). In 1963 
the Kennedy Administration responded to a worsening American balance of 
payments outlook by moving to impose a levy on loans and certain investments 
abroad in some 22 countries by American institutions. In doing so it provoked deep 
unease in Australian government and business circles (SMH 20 July 1963). The 
Menzies government feared that it would impact negatively on investment in the 
rapidly growing resources sector in particular (r'4 3 October 1964). Australian 
businesses were disconcerted both because of the fear that the American mec.:sure 
would increase the cost of loan cr.mital and because of the lower economic growth 
that might result from a fall-off 11. ~:-erican direct investment (Tsokhas 1984:3). 
6 It also found that foreign finns in Australia were, on the whole, no longer significantly more 
profitable than local firms. However, critics pointed lo the substantial short-term losses of Ford and 
Alcoa as distorting the overall figures and the report did not do a great deal to appease critics of the 
liberal policy in place (CT 1 June 1965; Age 2 June 1965). The Treasury report also earned the ire of 
McEwen who did not trust its authors to deliver a folly honest assessment of foreign investment. 
Consequently he commissioned a directory of overseas control in manufacturing, as the Vernon 
Committee had called for, from his Department of Trade (Age 28 April 1965; Vernon 1965:290). It 
came up with the headline figure of 872 firms with some degree of foreign ownership, 506 b~h1g 
wholly owned (Adv 15 March 1966). 
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The Menzies government actively lobbied the American administration for an 
exemption, as Japan and Canada had secured, but was unsuccessful (SMH 21 
September 1963, 14 October 1963). In February 1965 President Johnson announced 
to the American Congress plans to expand and enforce restrictions on capital. The 
Administration explicitly urged American firms to repatriate as much profit as 
possible from overseas operations and to raise new capital within host countries 
(SMH 26 April 1965). The Menzies government again made formal representation 
to the American government (Aust 15 March 1965; DT 18 March 1965; Aust 31 
March 1965). In a letter to President Johnson, Menzies emphasised Australia's need 
for foreign capital to support its large-scale immigration program and effectively 
threatened to review the hitherto liberal policies on profit repatriation and local 
borrowings by American firms (SMH 2 April 1965; Fitzpatrick and Wheelwright 
1965:40-45). The Menzies government revealed its deep fears about a diminished 
inflow of American investment by linking the issue to the general standing of the 
Australia-America relationship. In particular, in talks with Secretary of State Rusk, 
Treasurer Holt made explicit mention of Australia's strong support for American 
intervention in Vietnam (Age 30 April 1965).7 While the Johnson Administration 
expressed empathy with Australia's circumstances and forecast little negative effect, 
it did not make any formal commitment to exempt Australia from any capital 
controls.s 
7 This entailed not only a statement to the effect that Australia was being a loyal ally but also that 
Australia planned to import some US$600-750 million of military hardware from the United States 
over the next few years to facilitate greater conflict readiness (Age 3 May 1965). 
8 Treasurer Holt, in an address to a large audience of prominent American bankers and industrialists, 
decried the restrictions on capital outflow, that some countries had received an exemption from them 
while Australia had not, and continuing American restrictions on Australian exports. Suggesting a 
surprising degree of indifference to the Australia-Japan relationship he remarked: 'We find it difficult 
to understand, why, when special arrangements have been made to meet the circumstances of Canada 
and Japan, Australia, ... should be denied the exemption ... Some of these countries may deserve the 
fate which awaits them.' (Age 28 April 1965). In fact Australia had little reason to feel harshly 
treated by with the American administration as Japan and Canada only received an exemption 
because they held the bulk cf their external reserves in New York. Au:~tralia, by contrast, held them 
in London (Perkins, Age 22 March 1967). The Australian government's argument that Australia had 
recently greatly increased its imports of American goods and so should be favoured, conveniently 
overlooked the fact that until recently the import licensing regime, and before it the foreign exchange 
regime, had been heavily biased against imports from US dollar countries. Indeed that bias had been 
a major factor why American direct investment in manufacturing capacity in Australia had been so 
high. 
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An Australian government survey of American firms in Australia bore out its 
concern that they might raise funds in the local financial market while importing 
capital goods (Age 14 April 1965, 24 July 1965). British policy measures to stem 
capital outflow soon followed and some of the controls expressly targeted 
investments destined for Australia9 (SMH 8 April 1965). The British Minister for 
Overseas Trade asked that Australia be prepared ' ... to help the mother country ... ' 
in a time of difficulty (Aust 24 April 1965). Prominent Coalition identities were 
happy to respond with similar hyperbole to advance Australian interests.IO 
Australia's High Commissioner in London, Alexander Downer Snr., who had until 
recently been Immigration Minister in the Menzies government, said publicly. 
All Australians hope that the traditional flow of investment to my country will not be 
curtailed. Quite frankly, we need it, for we cannot build up Australia quickly as a bastion of 
British and European civilisation in the southern hemisphere without the twin necessities of 
more money and more people ... Diminish this flow, or stop it, and another blow will be dealt 
to Commonwealth associations ... (SMH 14 May 1965). 
The British and American capital controls came at a time of decline in certain 
Australian export commodity prices (Aust 19 May 1965). Concern about Australia's 
balance of payments under the fixed exchange rate regime then led the Menzies 
government to enunciate its so-called 'guidelines policy' under which foreign firms 
planning to borrow in Australia were requested to consult with the Reserve Bank 
(Samuel, CT 7 April 1965; Age 29 April 1965). This had the potential to take the 
government's preference for local equity beyond mere suasion. The government's 
concern for the balance of payments also appeared to lend legitimacy to the Vernon 
9 The British government, like its American counterpart, requested Britis:t firms to repatriate more 
profits and raise more capital in host economies (SMH 24 April 1965). The United Kingdom had 
more latitude in its exchange rate policy than the United States under the Bretton Woods system but 
had suffered periodic serious external balance problems since the end of the Second World War. By 
the mid· l 960s these had again become acute. 
10 Holt's ascendancy did little to diminish the conservative tone of pleas for British capital that 
emanated from the Coalition's senior ministerial ranks. New Treasurer William McMahon declared 
that the British restrictions were particularly regretful as they might diminish the number of British 
executives living in Australia. Their presence had, McMahon declared, ' ... been a valuable factor in 
cementing the British character within the community' (Age 5 May 1966). Not all members of the 
Coalition's political constituencies refrained from strong criticism of the British measures. Some 
prominent figures in the manufacturing sector called for punitive import tariffs on British as well as 
American goods until the measures were revoked (SMH 8 April 1965). Needless to say, that would 
have served their interests nicely. 
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Committee's findings. Holt argued that the American and British restrictions would 
help to realise government's 'hope' that foreign firms sell more equity to Australian 
investors, obviating the need for formal local equity requirements (Age 17 April 
1965). The restrictions boosted the credibility of the go'. rnment's informal suasion 
approach to securing greater Australian equity participation. 
Yet the American and British capital restrictions were not an unambiguous plus in 
the defence of existing policy. Staunch critics of a liberal foreign investment policy 
argued that the British and American restrictions highlighted the dangers of excess 
reliance on private foreign capital flows. Deputy Opposition Leader Whitlam 
declared ' ... the American action was a clear warning that Australia should pay its 
own way and reduce its dependence on overseas investment' (Age 9 April 1965). 
The Opposition did not explain how public borrowing abroad, its preferred 
alternative, would pass unaffected by such developments. It was also argued that a 
major reason for the Menzies government rejecting these requirements in the past, 
namely the sensitivity of the British and American governments, no longer applied. 
Both governments might welcome such moves as consistent with their immediate 
policy objectives. Indeed in early 1966 the American Ambassador to Australia said 
publicly that he believed most American firms would accept a 50 per cent local 
equity requirement (Adv 15 March 1966). In the midst of this period of uncertainty 
about FDI inflow Prime Minister Menzies finally retired. 
Holt government, 1966-1967 
Holt ascended unchallenged to the prime ministership with Menzies' endorsement, 
having served as treasurer from 1958. Continuity in FDI policy was therefore 
unsurprising. Holt told the House of Representatives on 8 March 1966. 
This government retains the same broad economic objectives which, successfully pursued 
by governments led by Sir Robert Menzies, resulted in the greatest era of economic 
development in Australia's histol")'. Our .~iogan of 'growth with stability' will continue to 
guide us ... (cited in Tiver 1978:234) 
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A growth-oriented policy implied proactive measures to attract FDI as Treasury 
forecast a 45 per cent fall off in such investment during the Holt government's first 
year (Age 21 April 73). Yet the Holt government discovered that there was a 
dilemma in the public messages it transmitted in response to the American and 
British capital controls. It sought to maintain the confidence of domestic business 
and pro-growth voters by asserting that sufficient FDI was forthcoming while not 
lending weight to the critics of reliance on FDI (Ramsey, Aust 7 May 1966; CM 7 
May 1966). To overstate the former was to risk appearing indifferent to popular 
concerns over FJ?I. National Development Minister David Fairbairn provoked 
criticism from the Opposition and other FDI critics in April 1966 when he told 
l''arliament that most of the $500 million needed to capitalise new mineral 
development projects over the next two years would be supplied by foreigners 
(Lloyd, Aust 26 Aprii 1966). Ultimately the Holt government adopted a low-key 
position on the British restrictions and was only slightly more critical of the 
American moves (SMH 5 May i 966). 11 In addition to minimising domestic 
contention, it was in keeping with the primacy placed by the Holt government on 
those bilateral relationships. Treasury officials and some. media commentators 
nonetheless convinced the government to promote capital inflow from other sources 
such as Japan and continental Europe (SMH, CT 5 May 1966; Ramsey, Aust 7 May 
1966; CM7 May 1966). 12 After an impressive election victory in late 1966 the Holt 
government stepped up efforts to secure double taxation agreements with other 
countries beyond the ones in place with the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, Canada and New Zealand (Stubbs, Aust 27 March 1967). Contrary to the 
Menzies legacy, during the 1966 election campaign the Coalition promised an 
expanded role for the state in financing the development of Australian industries 
with foreign capital while preserving Australian control. In fact the implementation 
was to open up a bitter divide between the Coalition partners. 
11 New Treasurer William McMahon stated that the British measure of 1966 that explicitly targeted 
investments in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland, had been raised with the Australian 
government by British representatives before their implementation (Age 5 May 1966). 
12 Fears amongst policymakers that British entry into the common market might negatively impact 
on Australia's external balances strengthened the commitment to diversifying the sources of FDI 
(Age 5 May 1967). As the growing balance of payments surpluses of countries such as West 
Germany, France and Japan was a major threat to the stability oft11e Bretton Woods system it should 
have been only natural that capital-needy countries would look to t11em. 
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Interests vs the AJDC vision 
Soon after Holt's ascendancy to the prime ministership John M~Fwen unveiled a 
policy vision aimed at reconciling his developmentalism, econ-: 1·;,,lionalism and 
the antipathies of his Country Party constituency towards domestic banking 
interests. His proposed national investment corporation was eventually to become 
the Australian lm1ustry Development Corporation (AIDC) but only after a protracted 
political battle (Age 2 April 1966; Tsokhas 1984:21).13 McEwen's proposed AIDC 
would have the dual objectives of fosterink the development of industries while 
promoting Australian ownership and control. As a publicly owned investment 
corporation it would raise capital, mainly from overseas, and invest in promising 
ventures. McEwen' s model had several political advantages as a means for boosting 
Australian ownership and control. Principally, it avoided the resort to direct controls 
on FDI; unacceptable to Holt and Treasurer McM~ilion (Aust 20 April 1966). It 
could also direct investments into rural industries that were McEwen's core 
constituency and otherwise not significant stakeholders in the FDI debate. Its one 
major political drawback was the thteat it presented to financial sector interests who 
were an influential Liberal Party constituency with the support of Treasurer 
McMahon. 
Against the opposition of McMahon, Mt.L•,en convinced Holt to commit to the 
investment corporation concept during the 1967 election campaign (SMH, Aust 25 
October 1966; Forsyth, Aust 8 November 1966). The Australian Bankers' 
Association (ABA) developed a rival model that would preserve their interests and 
convinced McMal1on to champion it in the government (CT 19 November 1966).14 
The tentatively named Australian Bankers' Deve!opment Refinance Corporation 
was to be a consortium solely owned by established Australian trading banks but 
13 Professor Heinz W. Arndt, in July 1960 first proposed a public finance corporation 
(Commonwealth Investment Bank) and attracted widespread media attention (McFariane, Aust 3 
May 1966). 
14 The ABA's acting chainnan R. W. Nonnan openly advertised the fact that Treasurer's proposal 
was the based upon what his organisation had put to the government (Aust, Exam 28 March 1967). 
McMahon and his officials also met repeatedly with finance industry l·i!presentatives to work out 
details (Newton, Age 19 April 1967). 
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pennitted by federal legislation to draw upon Reserve Bank funds. Is It was 
supposed to address coordination problems that diminished the propensity of the 
banks to fund long-tenn resource projects (Tsokhas 1984:100-01, 105). In heading 
off McEwen' s plan· it would also cement the dominance of the trading banks over 
commercial loan-raising and the brokerage of foreign borrowing (Mcfarlane, Aust 3 
May 1966; CM 21 March 1967).16 Treasury resisted McEwen's AIDC concept 
because the Commonwealth would be fully undenvriting it, because it had the 
support of the rival Trade department, and because of the Treasurer's _antipathy to it 
under ABA influence (Mer 12 May 1966; Age 29 May 1967).17 
McEwen and McMahon openly feuded and Prime Minister Holt failed to exercise 
leadership on the issue.is Cabinet yndorsed McMahon's proposal. and Holt gave an 
informal undertaking to McEwen that his would also be considered (Age, Aust, CT 
28 March 1967; Aust 15 May 1967; Carlyon, Age 24 November 1967).19 The 
Treasurer and his department, along with the ABA, then campaigned actively 
against the AIDC model. Partly owing to that, media support was less forthcoming 
for McEwen's more statist vision than for the ABA/McMahon model - although 
there were notable exceptions such as The Australian (CT 28 March 1967; Age, 
Adv; CM, SMH, Mer, Exam, Aust 29 March 1967).20 When McMahon's legislation 
for the retitled Australian Resources Development Bank (ARDB) came to 
IS The Corporation could borrow directly from other banks but only accept deposits directly from the 
public if they were for periods of greater than three years (AFR, Aust, SMH 28 March 1967; Adv 29 
March 1967), 
16 For instance, the major trading banks were together granted a lucrative monopoly over foreign 
exchange transactions and colluded openly to maintain fixed commissions (Perkins 1987). 
17 Cabinet submissions from the respective departments on the two proposals apparently made no 
reference to the other concept (Age 17 April 1967). Treasury had become increasingly critical of the 
Department of Trade's stance on tariffs and so argued that the problems with FDI largely stemmed 
from that. At the same time senior figures in the Department of Trade were annoyed at Treasury's 
resistance to regulation ofFDI (Long, CT3 l May 1967). 
18 The resulting feud between McMahon and McEwen was made more intense by a simultaneous 
dispute over Australia's exchange rate; the Country Party favouring devaluation while Treasury was 
opposed (Henderson 1994: 199). 
19 Cabinet endorsement of the McMahon plan provoked a new round of lobbying by various industry 
bodies to have their 'd;:veloprnent prospects' recognised and supported. The Real Estate Institute, for 
instance, lobbied for the hotly to be able to be involved in financing the development of hotels and 
tourism resorts (SMH I April 1967). 
20 Those media outlets more sympathetic to economic nationalism injected an additional tone of 
indignation into their criticism of the feud within the government. The Age, for example, declared 
that twe can ill-afford a dispute within the government which threatens to deny Australia the best 
formula for countering overseas control of natural resources' (Age 28 November 1967). 
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Parliament, McEwen denounced it as doing almost nothing to preserve Australian 
ownership and effectively accused the Treasurer of having conspired to minimise 
the policy space for the AIDC (Aust, Age 28 September 1967).21 The Opposition 
criticised the ARDB because it would do little to boost Australian ownership by 
only raising funds domestically and could, not take equity stakes in projects (Age, 
SM!{, Aust 29 March 1967). McEwen's vision of modest state developmentalism 
was temporarily frustrated by the combined forces of an orthodox Treasury, banking 
sector interests and the Liberal Party Cabinet members influenced by them. In the 
process a degree of legitimacy had been lent to the Opposition's vision of 
government taking a leading role in the realisation of greater Australian ownership 
and control. 
Gorton government 
The Gorton government was a watershed in the politics of FDI in Australia. In 1992 
John Gorton identified his opposition to urihindered overseas investment in 
Australia as the greatest achievement in office; distinguishing him from Menzies 
and Holt (Henderson 1994:207). Gorton was successful in the leadership contest 
following Holt's death principally because he promised a refreshing populist style, 
portraying ' ... a lively nationalism along with a quintessentially Australian sense of 
irreverence' (Henderson 1994:202).22 In early 1968 he seemed the logical choice to 
meet the challenge presented by a resurgent Opposition under the leadership of 
Gough Whitlam.23 Looking back over the first year of the Gorton government, 
21 McEwen declared of the AIDC plan: 'What I had in mind has been so misrepresented to many 
important people that I feel the best thing I could do is to abandon what I had in mind' (Age 28 
September 1967). 
22 McEwen had vetoed McMahon's candidacy for the prime ministership; saying that he would not 
serve him as Deputy Prime Minister and would withdraw the Country Party from the Coalition 
(Henderson 1994: 199-200). McMahon retained the treasurer's job and the deputy leadership of the 
Liberal Party. Gorton's relaxed, non-establishment manner made him a seemingly attractive 
opponent to the articulate but rather aloof Whitlam, and his celebrated service during. World War II 
as a fighter pilot, gave him widespread appeal. 
2
3 The ALP had fallen only two seats short of having defeated the Menzies government in 1961, 
experienced a larger loss in 1963 and then handed the new Holt government a record majority in 
1966. Whitlarn's elevation to the leadership in February 1967 provided a foundation for improving 
the ALP's electoral standing. The Opposition's spirits started to pick up through 1967 as Whitlam 
repeatedly bested 
Prime Minister Holt in parliamentary debates (Henderson 1994:191-97). A scandal, the so-called 
VIP flights affait, and several other issues gave the Opposition much to work with. 
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journalist David Love was to write that 'the fires of a new, and somewhat smoky, 
nationalism dominated the Australian economic landscape in 1968' (AFR 8 January 
1969). Gorton experimented tentatively with FDI controls and allowed McEwen to 
realise his AIDC vision. However both his economic nationalist rhetoric and 
impulsive policy interventions in relation to FDI deeply disconcerted certain 
business constituencies, media commentators and state governments. As FDI policy 
became actively contested, a range of private and public interest forces were clearly 
in evidence both for and against the longstanding 'open door' polic~. Controversy 
was magnified by the increasing political savvy of the Opposition and a growing 
divide in the economic policy community about the costs and benefits of FDI. 
Public i11terest co11tested 
In the late 1960s Australian opinion was quite divided over what the public interest 
was in relation to FDI. There were divergences of opinion on the extent to which the 
Australian economy needed FDI, and could secure it given source country 
constraints, and specifically over the role of FDI in the mining sector. The 
Australian economy was extremely robust during the Gorton years; with mixed 
implications for the politics of FDI. Unemployment was at only 1.6 per cent in 
1968-69, falling to 1.4 per cent in 1970-71, despite record net migration of over 
140,000 in 1969 and a similar figure in 1970. Underpinning this was GDP growth of 
8.9 per cent in 1968-69, 6.3 per cent in 1969-70 and 4.6 per cent in 1970-71 
(Dyster and Meredith 1990:245). Unemployment, a historically significant driver of 
policies favouring overseas capital inflow, was not an issue. However, the large 
migrant intake implied an ongoing need for capital inflow if the labour market was 
to remain tight. The growing Australian market was a drawcard to FDI, as was the 
promising resources sector. FDI inflow grew rapidly from 1967-68 (Dyster and 
Meredith 1990:234-38). Although to many critics it appeared that Australia could 
afford concessions to economic nationalism, the good health of the Australian 
economy was in no small part a function of strong FDI inflow (Dyster and Meredith 
1990:234-38). This was despite the fact that Gorton was immediately confronted 
when coming to office by new American restrictions on loans and direct 
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investments abroad, aimed at strengthening the flagging American dollar and 
maintaining the gold standard. 
In early 1968 the Johnson Administration capped American investment in most 
foreign countries to 65 per cent of 1965-66 levels.24 New British restrictions and 
devaluation of the pound sterling soon followed (Age 18 March 1968). The 
American and British capital controls heightened concerns within the Australian 
business community about the crowding-out effects of increased capital raising in 
Australia by foreign firms. Controversy was provoked by Essa's decision to fund 
exploration with an Australian loan (Aust 10 April 1968). In response Treasurer 
McMahon said long established foreign firms borrowing locally in accordance with 
their past financial practice would be regarded as complying with the government's 
'guidelines' policy (Sexton and Adamovich 1981:11). However, this was 
' ... prnvicled that their past practice did not involve undue reliance on Australian 
borrowings' and no definition of 'undue reliance' was provided (SMH 13 April 
1968). In September 1969 the Gorton government issued a formula for firms with 
more than 25 per cent foreign equity seeking to raise fixed-interest capital within 
Australia. The new guidelines rewarded foreign firms for length of presence in 
Australia and the extent of local equity holdings by proportionately lifting the limit 
on domestic borrowing (Solomon, Aust 17 September 1969). 
ForeiE'.,n investors played a significant role in the rapid growth of the mining sector 
in the 1960s owing to Australia's then small skills base and the sizeable capital 
involved,25 The rate of foreign ownership and control therefore grew rapidly 
throughout the 1960s. Energy fuels, notably coal, saw the greatest growth with the 
overall level of foreign ownership growing from 11.5 per cent of the industry in 
1963 to 51.I per cent in 1971-72. By 1974-75 it was to reach 59.6 per cent. 
24 In recognition of the Australian government's continuing resentment at the earlier restrictions a 
presidential envoy briefed a Cabinet subcommittee and emphasised that Australia could still attract 
more investment if at the expense of other countries (Aust, SMH, Age 6, 7 and 8 January 1968). The 
envoy was Eugene V. Rostow, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The American 
restrictions were welcomed by some Australian critics of foreign investment (Adv 3 January 1968; 
SMH 6 January 1968). 
2s Opportunities for foreign investors were enhanced also by domestic financial market regulation 
favouring public deficit financing and lending to sectors such as housing rather than large-scale long 
term lending, such as is needed in mining (Johnson 1978:314-22). 
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Metallic minerals also saw some growth in the share of foreign ownership with a 10 
per cent rise over a decade from the 39.8 per cent of 1963 (Anderson 1983:76). 
Overall, the level of foreign control was higher than ownership levels; reaching 
some 60 per cent of all the industry in 1974-75 compared to an ownership figure of 
51.8 per cent. Until the mid-1960s British mining firms accounted for some half of 
all foreign interests in mining, reflecting their long presence in Australia (Dyster 
and Meredith 1990:247). The late 1960s saw American firms accounted for an 
increasing proportion of total FDI through their interests in iron 9re, coal and 
alumina.26 Critics claimed of the mining industry in general that the Australian 
public was not capturing a sufficient share of the wealth being generated from 
publicly owned resources (Fitzgerald 1984:304-87). Any lack of faith in 
governments to act as competent agents of the Australian people in the 
appropriation of returns on public resources could lead to opposition to foreign 
investors in mining as they became some of the largest players. State governments, 
especially Western Australia and Queensland, were increasingly criticised for being 
too generous with mining firms.27 The mining industry became the main focus of 
the Opposition's economic nationalism under Whitlam's more dynamic 
leadership.28 This reflected the economic promise of the sector and a concern with 
large~scale state-funded projects stretching back to the Chifley government's 
promotion of the Snowy Mountains hydroelectric scheme. Whitiam's dual 
proclivities for economic nationalism and state developmentalism came together in 
Labor's commitment to direct government investment in new mineral resources 
projects, at both the exploration and development stages, through statutory 
corporations. 29 
26 The dramatic growth in minerals exports quickened the pace of diversification of Australian 
exports away from their traditional destination, Great Britain. The enormous growth in the 
importance of the trading relationship with Japan stands out as a major feature of the 1960s 
(Drysdale 1981 ;419-26; Tweedi, 1994:160-77). 
27 States lacking their resource base had grounds to hope for greater national control over mining 
revenues. On these issues see Cook and Porter (1984), Drysdale and Shibata (1985), Fitzgerald 
(1984:304-87), Hannan and Head {1982), Head (1983), Galligan (1982), Galligan, Kellow and 
O'Faircheallaigh (1988), Lloyd (1984), Snape (1977) and Stevenson (1977). 
28 Under Whitlam Labor's rhetoric, if anything, became more colourful and condemnatory of FDI. 
Senate Opposition Leader Lionel Murphy, for instance, declared that 'Australians are beggars at the 
feast as overseas companies gain control of our national wealth' (Aust 23 Febmary 1967). 
29 Precedents for ~mch actions were claimed in Italy, France, South Africa, and Canada and a good 
model of public corporations working through consortiums with private enterprise was supposedly 
presented by Japan (SMH, CT 18 September 1968). 
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Radical nationalism and internationalism 
The irony of the ALP and the broader Left in the late 1960s is that it simultaneously 
championed social liberalism, progressive internationalism, cultural and economic 
nationalism and state developmentalism. This curious mix of policy proclivities 
arose as a general oppositional ideology against the conservative pro-British and 
pro-American orientation of Coalition governments, although it shared some of the 
idiosyncrasies of Left wing movements in other countries. There had been a 
growing sense of nationalism among Australia's small intellectual and artistic 
communities throughout the 1950s and early 1960s that found influence in the ALP 
(Alomes and Jones 1991:319-29). This tapped long-established radical nationalist 
proclivities within the old Left but its xenophobic elements were being supplanted 
by the cosmopolitanism and internationalism of the so-called New Left (Jupp 
1963:48-55). This was symbolised by the ALP's rejection of the White Australia 
Policy; contributing to the Holt government's decision to end it. The new breed of 
Labor leaders such as Whitlam, Cai.ms and Hawke were more attuned to changing 
Australian social values and in tum had greater scope for influencing the direction 
of public opinion. Growing nationalist sentiment in the Australian electorate offered 
the opportunity for political entrepreneurship by Labor, a fact recognised by many 
Coalition parlian1entarians when they supported John Gorton for the prime 
ministers hip. 
On the Australian Left economic nationalism became bundled up with support for 
other causes. The Left faulted the conservative Australian elites for not having 
developed a greater sense of military, economic and cultural independence. As the 
1960s progressed, the intellectual and political Left in Australia, as in many other 
countries, evinced increasing hostility towards American multinationals. This partly 
reflected the inevitable wariness towards large firms from the pre-eminent capitalist 
economy. It also reflected concerns on the Left that Australia was substituting 
cultural dependence on the United Kingdom for the United States of America. 
Holt's 'outwardly obsequious attitude to the United States', to quote Tiver 
(1978:235),. helped to spread this concern in broader intellectual circles, although 
the relationship with the United States of America remained popular in the wider 
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electorate (Henderson 1994:192). Fitzpatrick and Wheelwright (1965:152), and 
subsequent publications by Wheelwright and his proteges, raised concerns about 
perceived cultural and political consequences of FDI in Australia as well as the 
familiar economic fears. 30 
... foreign capital and its ramifications in manufacturing, distribution, exchange and mass 
communications, have a cultural and social import with profound effects on our society, for 
better or for worse, and that for those who wish to limit the 'denationalizing' process and 
preserve what is left of Australian 'identity' there is a case for the control and limitation of 
further capital injections, on other than economic grt1Unds (Fitzpatrick and Wheelwright, 
1965:152). 
The authors expressed the concern that once established, large multinationals would 
become powerful constituencies for the continuation of an open door foreign 
investment policy contrary to the wishes of the Australian people (1965: 160). 
There was no shortage of international academic literature testifying to the 
ostensibly exploitative nature of FDI (Frank 1967).31 There were also widespread 
fears about environmental degradation and resource depletion tangled up with 
attitudes to FDI among the international Left that found influence in Australia 
(Arndt 1977:138). Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, which the Gorton 
goverrunent fully supported, became intensely contentious and further coloured 
views on the Left towards American multinationals. Critics depicted an open door 
foreign investment policy as symptomatic of a deeper cultural malaise that was a 
30 Arndt noted that the Fitzpatrick and Wheelwright (1965) work was a significant development in 
linking the established enmities of the Old Left towards international capital with the concerns of the 
rising New Left in Australia (1977: 135). For an array of radical essays on Australia's economic and 
social development that variously take hegemonic, classical class or a mixture of these approaches, 
see Playford and Kirsner (1972), Crough, Wheelwright and Wilshire (1980), Crough and 
Wheelwright (1982), Abe and Wheelwright (1989), McQueen (1982), James (1990), Wheelwright 
and Buckley (1975, 1980, 1982), Connell and Irving (1980), Connell (1977), Fitzpatrick {1969), 
Pusey (1991), Simms (1982) and Wheelwright (1984). 
31 For a concise survey of Marxist and dependency theory accounts of the exploitative nature of 
international capitalism see Riggott (1983), 
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consequence of the colonial experience.32 By the late 1960s the mainstream media 
was giving increased attention to both domestic and foreign critics of FDI, 
contributing to the popularisation of economic nationalist ideas. The Australian in 
1968, a year of political tumult in many western countries, followed French reaction 
against American FDI and serialised Servan Schreiber's (1968) influential critique 
of the American business challenge (Aust 2-6 September 1968).33 J3y the start of the 
1970s even elite opinion was quite divided on what a public interest oriented FDI 
policy would look like and the Opposition's economic nationalisgi manifesto 
appeared to have considerable electoral appeal. The Gorton government had both to 
reconcile those forces for restrictive policy with the broader political imperative to 
maintain a strong economy, and manage the contending FDI policy preferences of 
the Coalition's business constituencies that were being articulated with increasing 
force throughout the second half of the 1960s. 
Contending private interests 
Although Australia's growing domestic market was drawcard to foreign firms, the 
proliferation of producers behind tariff walls saw increasing numbers of mergers 
and acquisitions from the mid-1960s (Kasper 1984:41). For domestic manufacturing 
interests used to securing tariff protection, lobbying the Coalition government for 
protection from a foreign competitor entering the market through FDI came 
naturally (Age 17 November 1967; SMH 18. February 1965). So too did seeking 
32 Moderate scholar Ence) wrote in a popular academic work of 1967 that • ... Australia, retains, to a 
considerable extent, the characteristics of a colony, dependent upon larger centres of power and 
influence. Its culture is Anglo-American, and its fashions are largely a reflection of happenings 
overseas. Its industry depends to a large extent on overseas investment and on imported technology. ' 
(1967:60) 
33 Ironic then was the presence of a French trade and investment mission in Australia in late 1968 
that warned against succumbing to economic nationalism (CMS November 1968). The Australian, in 
editorialising against a plan by the Esso oil company to fund new exploration through a loan-raising 
in Australia wrote that: 'The Esso sch!)me is, to a large extent, a repetition of a pattern all too familiar 
to General de Gaulle, and indeed every other leader in a Europe where the accuracy of his initial 
warnings has slowly dawned ... There is no reason why we should have to purchase foreign brains to 
tell us how to make the best use of our capital and our resources. To continue doing so much longer 
is to take the quick route to technological subservience to the USA.' (Aust 10 April 1968) 
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protection from a hostile foreign takeover bid (Tsokhas 1984:1-31).34 The 
Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers under the leadership of Victor Gibson 
exemplified these protectionist instincts. Under Gibson's influence the Australian 
Chamber of Manufacturers (ACM) in Australia qualified its support for FDI 
(Tsokhas 1984:3-5). Gibson became president of the Committee for the Economic 
Development of Austrafo1. in 1968 and president of the Victorian branch of the 
Australian Institute of Management in 1969. His economic nationalist views gained 
more influence and credibility, although other business representati':'es contested 
them. Most business representatives demonstrated a keen appreciation of the 
contribution to overall economic growth that FDI made and the broader positive 
implications for businesses.JS Conversely, rural interests who were otherwise 
insignificant players in the FDI debate, came to suspect in the late 1960s that a high 
level of FD! kept the Australian currency higher, at their expense. Later they also 
feared FDI was contributing to inflationary pressures, further negating their 
international competitiveness (Tsokhas 1984:40). Business peak bodies reacted to 
diverging FDI policy preferences within their own memberships by calling for more 
information, through an independent study or government inquiry. This kept the 
peak bodies such as the Associated Chambers of Commeri;.; (ACC) in the public 
debate even if they struggled to resolve internal divisior · \.t\tf~ r 18 Mar~h 1965; Age 
27 April 1965). 
The mining industry was more united on FDI policy but was hampered in other 
ways. Unlike manufacturing, the mining sector did not generate significant electoral 
constituencies for continuation of a liberal policy. Mining was geographically 
remote from most Australians and made only a small direct contribution to 
employment.36 Most voters had to rely upon state governments to secure 
34 McEwen gave expression to this aspiration on a number of occasions, as when speaking to a NSW 
Institute of Directors conference in 1965. No director, he said, ' ... can be inditforent to the continued 
large sale of equity shares on the open market, lest they wake one morning to discover that control of 
the company has changed hands' (CT l I June 1965). 
35 This was reflected in disquiet within the ACC and other business organisations at growing 
community support for restrictions on FDI despite the continuing spectre of British and American 
controls on capital outflow (Age 27 April 1965). 
36 Tsokhas (1984:85) noted that this handicapped mining industry interests when lobbying 
governments for tariff reform; policy reform that could have substantial short-tenn negative 
employment effects. 
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appropriate public returns through granting private exploitation rights to public 
resources. The mining industry was therefore particularly vulnerable to federal 
policy-making that was contrary to its interests. Neither had it been politically well 
organised at a national level. In 1967 major mining interests established the 
Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC) to address this weakness. It quickly 
foWld some influence because of the sheer dynamism of the mining industry at the 
time and because it was well served by its executive director, G. Paul Phillips, 
former deputy secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry._ The AMIC 
brought local and foreign mining industry interests together in the one peak body, 
and supported the maintenance of a liberal FDI policy (Tsokhas 1984:66-68). 
The relative unity of the mining industry on support for a liberal FDI policy 
reflected the limited knowledge and capital base of domestic miners and their 
subsequent need for foreign partners (Fitzgerald 1984:304-87). For foreign mining 
firms domestic partners represented an opportunity to share the risk involved in 
large capital-intensive projects and brought valuable political knowledge and 
connections (Dyster and Meredith 1990:248). Despite the AMIC's pro-FDI stance 
there were some Australian finns in the mining indu&try that might support 
moderate restrictions on FDI. Firms such as BHP and CSR had a long-standing 
record of successful rent seeking as manufacturers and, in the latter instance, as a 
sugar processor (Tsokhas 1984:84). Local equity requirements might facilitate their 
further expansion into mining although in the late 1960s they were in a growth 
phase across most aspects of their business anyway.37 
Foreign investors in th~ minerals sector did not passively face the criticism of 
current policy. A number of senior local executives of those firms defended them 
publicly and within local business organisations. They carried considerable 
influence within the government as many had been long associated with the 
Coalition. Sir Maurice Mawby, the chairman of Conzinc Riotinto of Australia and 
Hammersley Holdings strenuously defended the role of foreign firms. As critics 
increasingly singled out the minerals sector, Mawby argued there should be no 
37 The strong support offered by the Vernon Committee for local equity requirements in the mining 
sector may have had something to do with James Vernon's role as general manager of CSR. 
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doubt about the gains from FDI in the sector because of its export orientation (Adv 
15 November 1968).38 Sir George Fisher, head of Mount Isa Mining (MIM), pointed 
to firms such as North Broken Hill and Western Mining Corporation which had 
become predominantly Australian-owned over their long history. MIM itself was 35 
per cent Australian-owned by comparison with only 5 per cent some two decades 
previously (DT 1 May 1968; CM 11 October 1968). It was more difficult for 
American firms recently arrived in Australia to criticise economic nationalist 
sentiment without fuelling it further.39 The American Chamber of Gommerce in 
Australia adopted a policy to recommend American firms investing in Australia to 
involve locals as shareholders. Although consistent with the policy aspiration 
behind American controls on capital outflow, the pre-eminent reason seems to have 
been a belief that widespread minority local equity stakes would dampen demands 
to regulate for 50 per cent or higher Australian equity.40 
The influence of domestic financial interests had already been seen in their 
successful frustration of McEwen's plans for creation of the AIDC during the Holt 
period. The ABA remained resolutely in favour of an open FDI regime, except in 
relation to the trading bank sector - where it remained resolutely econom!n 
nationalist (Tsokhas 1984:88-92). Representatives of the major domestic banks, 
some of British origin, could speak out against the imposition of a regulatory regime 
on FDI sec:ure in the knowledge that they were protected from new foreign 
competition in their 0\\11 sector by the controls in the 1959 Banking Act. Successive 
Coalition governments had refused to issue a banking license to a foreign banking 
interest (Pauly 1987). Stockbroking was also effectively off limits to new foreign 
38 An incidental implication of such an argument was that there could be real reason for concern 
about the balance-of-payments implications of foreign investment in the domestically oriented 
manufacturing sector. 
39 The criticism of the Gorton government's mild economic nationalism by London financier Evelyn 
R. A. de Rothschild attracted considerable media but did little to advance the cause ofa liberal policy 
owing to his family name being virtually synonymous with enormous wealth (Stubbs, SMH 21 
December 1968). 
40 The then Chamber president, E. T. Hamilton, did not hesitate on occasions to concur publicly with 
criticism of certain practices of American firms that had attracted much media attention. General-
Motors Holden's decision to not reserve preference shares issued for Australian investors was singled 
for setting back the cause ofa liberal investment regime (Aust 18 September 1968). 
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competitors and in the mid- and Iate-1960s a number of prominent financial sector 
identities lent public support to enacting controls on FDJ.41 
MLCajfair 
The Gorton's government's actions in relation to MLC have been noted as a turning 
point in FDI policy although the private interest dimension has previously escaped 
academic attention (Sexton and Adamovich 1981:12; Arndt 1977:136): The Board 
of the MLC life insurance company asked the Gorton government to protect it from 
an expected hostile takeover bid. An undisclosed foreign finn had been buying 
MLC shares through nominee companies for some two years.42 As MLC was 
influential in the Life Offices' Association of Australia that organization supported 
the call for intervention to stop the bid (Aust 24 September 1968). The Federal 
government could only intervene in the MLC case at that stage because it happened 
to be incorporated in the ACT. Gorton stunned observers when he announced the 
government would enact an ordinance to limit foreign ownership of insurance firms 
incorporated in the ACT to 15 per cent for a single foreign investor and 40 per cent 
for foreign shareholders in total. This secured the incumbent board, given there was 
no local rival bid for the company.43 Prime Minister Gorton defended his move, 
stating: 'It was to protect Australian capital so that it was not used by overseas 
companies for their purposes that the government took the action that it did' (SMH 
25 September 1968). 
41 Prominent Melbourne financier Staniforth Ricketson, stockbroker Sir Ian Potter (Age 16 February 
1965), and the chainnan of the giant Australian Mutual Provident Society (AMP) (Aust 15 May 
1965), all called for legislated Australian equity requirements. Influential investment banker J.H.D. 
Marks went so far as to call for the limiting of foreign investment in established Australian firms to 
portfolio status (Age 10 December 1968). 
42 The issue of purchasing shares through nominee companies greatly clouded the debate over the 
government's actions because it allowed the cultivation of n perception of clandestine, thief-like, 
raids upon unsuspecting well-run Australian companies. Several newspapers succumbed to this 
imagery in their editorial support for the government's move, The Age actually headlining its 
comment 'Caught in the act' (Age 23 September 1968). 
43 It also immediately provoked a plunge in the share price ofMLC, from $9.60 to $7.80 (SMH24 
September 1968). 
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The ACM welcomed the decision but other business representatives were shocked 
by the arbitrary and impulsive nature of the decision (Aust 24 September 1968). 44 
This was especially so after it became clear that the foreign firm making a play for 
the insurer was the British Sun Alliance group, which had been doing business in 
Australia for some 135 years (AFR 9 October 1968). The action was taken against 
the advice of the Treasury and the permanent head of the Prime Minister's 
Department (Aust 24 September 1968; 1 January 1969). Major newspapers were 
critical of the ad hoc way the decision was taken but were not generally censorious 
of the shift towards restrictive po'licy.45 Well designed rules, informed by 
consultation and analysis, were sought. The Age 's response was a measure of how 
illiberal some editorial opinion on FDI policy had become, praising the Gorton 
government for being 
... not prepared to allow overseas interests virtually uncontrolled access to Australia's 
resources when most of the profits are to be shipped abroad. This suggests that the 
government is accepting its responsibilities to future generations of Australians; it suggests 
also an admirable development in Australia's sense of nationhood, (Age 23 September 
1968) 
An editorial in The Australian identified the core FDI policy challenge facing the 
Prime Minister, saying that ' ... Gorton has recognised that the foreign takeover of a 
company like MLC would be politically unacceptable in Australia. In this his 
judgment is sound. What he needs next is the means of balancing the political 
considerations with those of economic efficiency and growth' (Aust 24 September 
1968). Labor's response was to again demand government regulation of both 
foreign takeovers in general and new investments in the resources sector; saying that 
such interventions should not depend on the representations of company boa-is 
44 ACM Federal President W. W. Pettingell said that it was ' .. intolerable that this pool of savings 
should be permitted to fall under the control of a foreign interest" but tlmt his organisation had also 
been reassured the government was not ' ... reversing its long-standing policy on foreign investment.' 
(Aust 24 September 1968). 
45 The Sydney Morning Herald was critical of the Prime Minister's 'shoot from the hip' decision· 
making while the Australian Financial Review said that ' ... if the government is to make sound laws 
and regulations, they should be based on broad principles rather than individual cases' (SMH 24 
September 1968; AFR 24 September 1968). The same editorial judged that: 'The threat of a bushfire 
nationalism getting out of hand today is all the greater as popular sentiment over-compensates for the 
pale and impassive policies of the Menzies-Holt era.' 
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(SMH24 September 1968).46 The govemment had legitimated the Opposition's call 
for foreign investment regulation while failing to act in a way that could be 
considered to follow 'due process' (Fitchett, SMH 14 March 1968). It deeply 
disconcerted business constituencies used to being consulted on major policy 
developments and led to the widespread expectation that general controls on FDI 
were forthcoming. 
Suasion, tlireat and i11actio11 
Treasurer McMahon insisted within the Gorton government on maintaining a policy 
of suasion in relation to local equity rather than formal controls as the Opposition 
demanded. The government stepped up its exhortations to foreign firms to take on 
local equity partners where possible (Aust 31 May 1968).47 Shipping and Transport 
Minister Ian Sinclair told potential foreign investors that the government did not 
want to ' ... force legislation onto investors. We just asl( that you don't just take, but 
that you will share in our hopes and plans' (Aust 4 March 1969). As Gorton's own 
economic nationalist proclivities were widely known there was increasing 
speculation that the government might resort to regulation if foreign firms did not 
heed its call for local equity. National Development Minister D. E. Fairbairn fuelled 
such views when he told an American Chamber of Commerce audience that the 
government believed ' ... there is the least chance of misunderstandings when there 
is an Australian participation in share-holding and management. [Many companies] 
are apparently ignoring the Australian government's clearly stated aims in this 
matter' (SMH 17 September 1968; Age, SMH, Aust 18 September 1968). To Labor 
and other critics, Fairbaim's remarks were evidence that the government had to 
regulate for Australian equity participation. 
46 Labor frontbencher Dr Jim Cairns understood the political economy angle to take on the 
government's MLC decision when he asked the Prime Minister in the Parliament: 'What method did 
the government use to discover this takeover? Did it rely on directors' pleas for assistance or did it 
use its own independent means to know what was going on?' (SMH 25 September 1968). 
47 Treasury's 1968 explanatory pamphlet on Australia's foreign investment policy state that 'Whilst 
there are no legislative provisions requiring local participation in the capital or management of 
companies set up in Australia by overseas interests we. want some locl'll participation both in 
ownership and management ... Although no mies are laid down, the government feels that foars and 
misunderstandings are least when this course is followed.' (cited in Sexton and Adamovicq_l98l :11). 
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The Gorton government then exhorted the Australian stock exchanges to allow 
Australian companies to disenfranchise foreign shareholders. That is, it asked the 
exchanges to drop listing rules that prohibited discriminating among shareholders 
(of the same class of shares), allowing the incorporation of provisions into firms' 
articles of association preventing foreign holders of shares from exercising the 
attendant voting rights. The change did not entail Commonwealth legislation and 
left the decision up to individual firms whether they wanted to discriminate against 
foreigners or not.48 The exchanges reluctantly accepted the government's proposal 
but argued in private correspondence that if the government felt strongly about 
foreign control then general measures shon!d be legislated.49 The response of· 
business groups was generally in keeping with their interests (AFR 7 January 1969). 
The Australian Shareholders' Association was critical of any moves to restrict 
foreign shareholdings as it would diminish the demand for its' members assets (AFR 
2 January 1969). The state institutes of directors were internally divided over the 
government's call, with several resolving to support and others to oppose it (SMH, 
WA 9 December 1968). The Victorian Employers' Federation (VEF) feared the 
move would diminish the preparedness of foreign investors to take minority stakes 
in new ventures. Indeed, the VEF argued, it sent a strong signal to investors that a 
majority-owned subsidiary was the only safe investment strategy in the current 
political climate (Age 18 January 1969). Business groups such as the ACM were as 
much disconcerted by the government's failure to consult them; as they had long 
come to expect from a Coalition government (Tiver 1978:237-42). Media comment 
was generally critical of the apparently impulsive nature of the decision, and the fact 
that the government was leaving decision-making on the crucial issue of foreign 
control to individual companies (Sun Tel 8 December 1968). 
48 Gorton and McMahon, in a letter to the president of the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges 
that was released to the public, said that: 'The general view strongly held by the gove!"!l!!!.~nt is that 
the shareholders of an Australi!m company should have the right to amend the company's articles "f 
association for the purpose of ensuring that control of the company, exercind through the voting 
power of the shareholderst remains in Australian hands' (Joint press rel{lase, SMH 6 December 
1968). 
49 The exchanges made the ratification rule for finns ch.!!t.ging i~elr articles of association to 
preclude foreign control quite toui;th at 75' ~:: cent <if any shareho~,j,1·1'.:J at a special meeting (Aust, 
SMH 6 January 1969). 
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In early 1969 the expectation of new regulation was raised, and the credibility of 
FD! critics boosted, by an infamous speech by Gorton to an Australia Club 
gathering in London. 
Up until very recently it has seemed to be that the posture of Australia selling [itself to] 
overseas capital has been the posture of a puppy lying on its back with all its legs in the air 
and its stomach exposed and saying, 'Please, please, please give us capital. Tickle my 
tummy on any conditions.' This is being re-examined ... We do not want, in 20 or 30 years, 
to have Americans, or French, or Swiss, or British owning the major companies in Australia, 
for a variety of reasons I do not need now to go into. But I had promised I would say 
something on this subj<Jct tonight. I know it's dull. I know it's dry. (AFR 20 Ja'nt:::iry 1969) 
Most controversial was the Prime Minister's statement that' ... companies, W(tll run, 
well managed, sometimes undervalued on exchanges ... ' were subject to foreign 
bids that were not fair to them (AFR 20 January 1969). The ACC demanded a 
fonnaI foreign investment policy statement, and liaison with Austrar: .. n l:msine.sses 
prior to its preparation (Aust, AFR 24 January 1969). Similar calk ~-i;;;~h.. 'rom the 
governments of Western Australia and Queensland, the Americe:.:·' '""'.: t;:. -,,,:r of 
Commerce and senior managers of several stock exchanges and the ,: ~·~· Jtralian 
Mining Industry Council.SO 
Gorton brought a submission to Cabinet in May 1969 from his owa department that 
proposed a range of restrictive measures on FDI but detennined opposition from 
Treasurer McMahon saw them rejected (Aust 29 May 1969).51 To his great 
embarrassment, this forced Gorton to cancel a foreshadowed policy statement to the 
Parliament. Gorton's subsequent statement on FDI policy, two months before the 
1969 election, was therefore limited to revised borrowing guidelines for foreign 
firms that rewarded an established presence in Australia and a voluntary 'code of 
so These calls attracted considerable media coverage (Aust, 25 January 1969; WA I February 1969; 
CM 8 February 1%9; SMH24 February 1969; AFR 25 February 1969; Richardson, Age 14 April 
1969), 
SI Not everybody in the Coalition was convinced by McMahon's defence of existing policy. The 
Young Liberals proceeded to adopt a call for stiff control of foreign investment immediately after the 
Treasurer had spoken to them on the virtues of current policy settings (Age 15 April 1969). And 
despite Gorton's Cabinet loss he still advised Governor General Sir Paul Hasluck to say, when 
opening the giant Mount Newman mining project, that the government favoured a 'significant 
Australian quota' in equity investment in development projects (Age27 June 1969). 
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good corporate behaviour' (AFR, Aust 17 September 1969).52 Although the Prime 
Minister said that the government did 'not believe that we can or should try to 
legislate in such a complex field' he did little to reassure businesses that there 
would not be further arbitrary interventions in foreign investments. Gorton said that 
the government reserved the right to do all in its power to prevent particular 
takeovers when ' ... we would consider it to be bad in the national interest' (Aust 17 
September 1969). The absence of any definition of the national interest caused 
consternation among business constituencies and media commentators.(AFR, Aust, 
SMH 18September1969). 
The Coalition's poor showing at the October 1969 election led Gorton to adopt a 
more orthodox leadership style in an attempt to shore up internal party support for 
his leadership (Tiver 1978:214-41; Reid 1971:348-65).53 Gorton's alienation from 
the Coalition's own constituencies and the conservative state governments 
contributed to a loss of public confidence in his government (Reid 1971 :319-45).54 
Gorton judged nonetheless that, in the face of the Opposition's populist economic 
nationalism, certain measures could be enacted in relation to FDI.55 McEwen was 
permitted to establish the AIDC and a stringent set of investment guidelines for the 
52 The three elements were, firstly, a high degree of Australian autonomy, entailing Australian 
citizens participating in management and sitting on boards. Secondly, financial structures should 
provide opportunities for equity participation by Australians. Thirdly, sensitivity to the 'reasonable 
national aspirations" of Australia was required, which ' .•. while somewhat indefinable in detail, is 
known quite well by anybody who is at all sensitive to these aspirations' (A11st 17 September 1969). 
53 The Liberal Party's national primary vote fell from its 1966 high of 40.1 per cent to 34.fs per ,~ent 
and the Country Party went from 9.9 per cent to 8.6 per cent. Labor picked up considerable support, 
lifting its vote to 46.9 per cent from the disastrous 40 per cent it secured in 1966. The 1969 result put 
the parties' shares of the national vote between their 1961 imd 1963 totals and the set the stage for 
the narrow Labor victory of i 972. (Aitkin, Hall and Morgan 1973 :265). 
54 To quote Reid (1971:320) on Gorton nt the 1969 election: 'The impression undoubtedly was ofa 
Liberal Party which itself had doubts about Gorton's leadership qualities, and ofa govemment which 
was unsure of where it was going, or where it wanted to go, on defence, foreign investment, 
relationships with the states ... And to strengthen this impression of questionable leadership, 
indecision, and irresolution, the major criticisms were coming not from the ALP, the formal 
opposi.if.ion, but from within the government ranks and from within the Liberal Party.' 
~.i C:vtli~n stopped his ministers from accepting a preferential offer of shares from foreign-owned 
min)).'·iti ~~!~:i.t:t Comalco, which was to take a political toll on several state Coalition governments. 
Com.-fo$, .! attempt to curry favour with governments had turned into a public relations disaster (CM 
9-12 June 1970; AFR, Aust, Age IO June 1970). A number of Coalition ministers in Queensland, 
Western Australia and Victoria accepted the opportunity to buy the heavily discounted shares, which 
had been offered to them despite the fact that they were not established Comalco shareholders. The 
Bjelke-Petersen government in Queensland was most brazen in its insistence that there was nothing 
urttoward in accepting the offer. That the Gorton government had taken a principled stance further 
undem1ined the credibility of the state governments who had not. 
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emerging uranium mining industry was adopted (Arndt 1977:137). An impending 
Senate election prompted the imposition of strict limits on foreigrt equity in the 
promising Nabarlek uranium project (AFR 18 September 1970). Foreign holdings in 
total were to be limited to 15 per cent, compared with 40 per cent for MLC and the 
20 per cent limit in the Broadcasting Act. The individual foreign holding was to be 
capped at 5 per cent.56 The Senate election result was nonetheless poor for the 
Coalition and in March 1971 Gorton ceded the prime ministership to William 
McMahon.s7 Gorton had leant legitimacy to the Opposition's economic nationalist 
platform without offering a coherent policy response. He gave blatant favours to 
several firms and ignored the concerns of business as a whole.58 The prime 
ministership passed to McMahon because many government members hoped that he 
would adopt a more orthodox government style, better manage the relationship with 
Coalition constituencies and repair the government's decaying electoral prospects. 
On FDI policy at least there were profound tensions between those objectives. 
McMahon government 
McMahon desperately sought to maintain an orthodox Coalition approach to FDI 
policy; namely a liberal policy tempered only by informal government exhortations 
to foreign firms to allow some Australian equity where practicable. This reflected 
the longstanding developmentalism of the Coalition and the fear that any economic 
downturn would make the government's re~election less likely. At the same time 
McMahon sought to mend fences with business constituencies after the 'Gorton 
56 Not only was that inconsistency surprising but so again was the haste in which the decision was 
taken, and almost admitted as much by the Prime Minister: 'It is a matter of record that in recent days 
there has been a heaV'; turnover in the shares of both companies [involved in the project], and 
although there is no indication that this heavy turnover is as a result of overseas buying, nevertheless 
the government would not wish a situation to arise where it could be discovered that control of these 
companies had passed out of Australian hands. The government feels that if Australia is reap the full 
benefit of these discoveries, full control of this development should remain in the hands of Australian 
companies for the benefit of Australian shareholders and Australia generally.' (AFR 18 September 
1970). 
57 Inflation was rising but the government's response was inconsistent and unimaginative. During a 
national television address the Prime Minister blamed inflationary pressures. in the building industry 
on foreign investors and foreshadowed a requirement for them to have to liaise with Treasury on their 
plans. No further details were forthcoming (Reid 1971 :405). 
58 By contrast, West judged that a secure Liberal leader was one who was ' ... able to guard against 
being too closely identified in the electorate's mind with specific - as opposed to the whole range of 
- business interests' (West 1967:272). 
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experiment', to quote Reid (Reid 1971). Yet Australian businesses were divided 
over FDL The now important mining industry demanded a continuation of liberal 
policy. Manufacturing interests sought protection from hostile foreign takeover bids 
and foreign competitors entering the protected domestic market through FDI.59 Any 
FDI policy initiative would have to reconcile those contending imperatives. 
Compounding the Coalition's political difficulties on FDI was the popularity of a 
resurgent Opposition's economic nationalism. Labor not only promised controls on 
foreign takeovers and new investment across the economy but also a.more active 
role for governm~nt in the financing and development of Australir:m.-owned mining 
operations. The McMahon government faced a profound electoral thrf1at from Labor 
but it could not match its economic nationalism without abandoning its ideological 
attachment to 'private developmentalism' and alienating key business 
constituencies. Through 1971 and 1972 the McMahon government struggled with 
this political dilemma. 
Economic circumstances in the early 1970s made the political defence nfliberal FDI 
policy more difficult. The Australian economy was booming and concern over 
insufficient foreign capital inflow had subsided (Oyster and Meredith 1990:236-
38). International capital flowed into non-American dollar instruments at an 
increasing rate because further depreciation of the American dollar was widely 
expected. 60 Short-term funds poured into Australia attracted by the prospect of a 
capital gain through revaluation while the minerals boom and a buoyant domestic 
economy drew FDL61 To critics of foreign investment it appeared that Australia 
could afford to be choosy about what FDI it wanted. Deputy Prime Minister Doug 
Anthony expressed this view publicly in mid-1972, to the embarrassment of 
59 The ACM in Australia told Prime Minister McMahon in July 1971 that the wanted • ... some 
greater measure of selectivity in accepting certain forms of investment which at present lead either to 
a transfer of ownership of resources to foreign hands or to unwelcome fragmentation of the already 
small Australian market.' (cited in Tsokhas 1984:7). 
60 Sentiment was even more negative about the prospect of the Australian authorities being able (that 
is, prepared to pay the domestic price) of maintaining a clearly undervalued Australian dollar, The 
government had earlier decided. to let the Australian dollar appreciate only some 6.32 per cent 
against the US. dollar (Perkins 197'1:7). 
61 In a dramatic turnaround from its external position in the mid-1960s, Australia accumulated an 
embarrassing volume of foreign reserves. These amounted to some $2,700 million when conservative 
estimates of a safe volume were around the $1500-1800 million mark (Walsh, AFR 26 November 
1971). 
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McMahon. 62 Anthony was reflecting the concern of his Country Party constituency 
about the inflationary effects ofFDI (Tsokhas 1984:40). 
Since late 1967 the Opposition had championed a parliamentary inquiry into foreign 
investment, knowing the government's refusal allowed claims that the facts about 
foreign ownership were being withheld from the Australian people (Age 23 
November 1967). Labor failed to win Democratic Labor Party (DLP) support for the 
creation of a Senate standing committee on foreign investment in 1969 (Age 15 
April 1969). In late 1971 the DLP finally agreed, and parallels were widely drawn 
with the Canadian foreign investment policy taskforce established in 1970 by the 
Pierre Trudeau's government (Walsh, AFR 26 November 1971; Barnes, Age 11 
December 1971).63 Labor's recruitment of its old DLP nemesis was a coup. 
Although the DLP wm~ strongly pro-American because of its profound hostility to 
communism it was still much influenced by old labourist .::conomic ideas (Duffy 
1967, 1969). Editorial opinion was generally in favo1.!r of the committee of inquiry 
to give some focus and reason to the increasingly shrill public debate. The Age 
judged that: 'whether or not the government likes the idea, foreign investment now 
seems certain to be an election issue' (Age 13 December 1971). This was borne out 
by the proceedings of the select committee, which commenced hearings in June 
1972, being plagued by the overriding political imperative of the various party 
62 Anthony told a Country Party conference that '. .. today money is flooding in from overseas in 
embarrassing proportions', despite the fact that Country Party opposition to a higher Australian 
dollar was a major factor in the inflow of foreign capital (Aust 20 June 1972; Henderson 1994: 199). 
Anthony argued that Australia could ~ ... afford to be selective and to set reasonable conditions'. The 
McMahon government would not consider a revaluation, under intense pressure from the Country 
Party. Rural export constituencies wanted a lower exchange rate to sustain exports and tariff reform 
to reduce the cost of inputs (Tsokhas 1984:39-40). The Treasury, Reserve Bank and academic 
economists were highly critical of the government's decision to not mirror the general revaluation 
against the US dollar (Walsh, AFR 21December1971; Perkins 1977:7). 
63 The Opposition had offered the government a chance to establish a joint inquiry, answerable to 
both houses of parliament. This was firmly rejected, despite the government having been able to 
secure a bare majority on such a committee that it could not as a Senate committee. It is probable that 
the Prime Minister reasoned that the additional status of a joint committee would increase the 
political costs associated with the inevitable attack on existing policy settings that would be 
conducted in the forums convened by it. The government might not have been able to control the 
final form of a Senate committee report but that v:as not likely tll be forthcoming before the next 
election anyway. 
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members to score political points.64 The imminent Senate Inquiry led the McMahon 
government to commission a study from Treasury on foreign investment policy 
issues, which the Prime Minister carelessly described as a white paper; implying 
new policy options (Walsh, AFR 26 November 1971; Sorby, AFR 8 December 
1971).65 The Treasury resisted putting up policy options for restricting foreign 
investment and produced merely a general analysis of the costs and benefits of 
foreign investment.66 The media lambasted the government for supposed weakness 
in the face of bureaucratic intransigence and there was much editorial comment in 
favour of some restrictions on FDI (CM 17 May 1972; AFR 20 May 1972; Walsh, 
AFR 21 May 1972). While the Treasury report did not canvas options for regulating 
FDI it did lend weight to criticism of the states' haphazard minerals royalty policies 
(Treasury 1972).67 This implied that Australia may not have been fully capturing the 
expected benefits of FDI in the resources sector. Frustration with the lack of tariff 
reform and of vigorous trade practices legislation, making for excess profits at the 
expense of consumers, also permeated the Treasury paper.68 Thi,) implied that 
additional rents might be lost from the Australian economy via FDI. The report 
noted that foreign ownership of companies operating in Australia had risen to 35 
per cent of the total from 20 per cent in 1950. When Treasurer Snedden released the 
paper in May 1972 he empathised with FDI critics, fuelling speculation of a 
64 Many business bodies and other prominent interest groups declined to make submissions to the 
Committee. The chair of the committee was Senator Reg 'toecutter' Withers, who was widely feared 
and respected within the Coalition as a political operator. His background as a barrister, combined 
with that of Labor's senior committee member, Senator Lionel Murphy, made for a thoroughly 
combative and legalistic style at hearings (Walsh, AFR 2 May 1972; Kemp, AFR 2 July 1977). 
65 McMahon was tempted to the White Paper remark following an embarrassing call from fiercely 
independent government member Harry Turner in Parliament for one on FDI policy options. Turner 
had attracted widespread support on both sides of the house (Walsh, AFR 26 November 1971). 
66 This bore little resemblance to a white paper so the Treasury labelled the clocument Economic 
Paper No I (McGuiness, AFR 17 May 1972; Treasury 1972). 
67 Controversial was the implicit criticism in the Treasury paper of the government's resistance to a 
further revaluation of the dollar, an analysis that media observers had widely agreed with (SMH, CT, 
Aust 17 May 1972). 
68 Th? Australian's Ken Davidson commented that: 'All too often the strongest economic nationalists 
in the Australian Parliament are also the advocates of policies designed to make foreign investors fat 
at the expense oflhe Australian community' (Aust 2 June 1972). In hindsight the report appears as a 
cogent statement of the view that most of the costs claimed to be associated with foreign direct 
investment are a function of poor domestic policy rather than any being an intrinsic function ofFDI. 
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restrictive policy initiative before the federal election due soon (Age 17 May 
1972).69 
Politicisati011 of takeovers 
Opinion polls taken during 1972 highlight the extent to which public opinion had 
already swung toward restraining foreign takeovers. A Gallup poll of June 1972 
found nearly 90 per cent of respondents would place some limits . on foreign 
purchases of shares in Australian companies and 63 per cent would limit them to 
less than 50 per cent holdings. 70 The extent of community support for restrictions on 
FDI was certainly understood by business interests. The AMIC recogni.,ed that the 
Coalition government was 'in the firing line' and mining interests would have to act 
to influence public opinion directly about the benefits of FDI, as well as the mining 
industry in general. 11 Manufacturing interests and much of the mass media, on the 
other hand, contributed to sentiment within both the electorate and government 
ranks becoming less liberal towards FDI. The June 1972 Gallop FDI was prompted 
by the great Chiko Roll crisis, the most prominent of several controversial foreign 
69 Snedden remarked that: 'Unlike the case of Canada, foreign control in Australia has not rested 
predominantly With a single country ... Even so, a high and rising degree of foreign control could 
conflict with national aspirations ... Increasingly emphasis is being laid on the social and other aspects 
of economic change and growth. To the extent that values change in these ways so too does the basis 
for assessment of foreign investment also change in some degree.' (Age 17 May 1972). 
10 The poll result was also notable because the question explicitly referred to • ... British, American 
and other foreign investors .. ' and because almost exactly the same results emerged when the poll was 
replicated in September 1972 (Australian Gallop Polls, June 1972, no. 2340, 2342-3). The main 
question was worded: 'l~ your opinion, should British, American and other foreign investors be 
allowed to buy any number of shares in Australian companies, and gain control of them - or should 
there be a limit?' The sa'.'~ile was a national one of2299 and the second question asked was: 'Of the 
shares in an Australian company, what's the biggest percentage you'd allow non-Australians to 
own?' Some 7 per cent said less than 20 per cent, 20 per cent said 20-29 per cent, 11 per cent for 
30-39 per cent and 25 per cent would allow 40-49 per cent. The September 1972 results were 
Australian. Gallop Polls, November-December 1972 (no. 2359, 2368 and 2371-2, 
71 In a report prepared by a public relations firm for the AMIC it had been judged that what was 
needed was a campaign to convince Australians that: 'Without massive foreign investment, the 
mining industry in Australia will be unable to make an adequate contribution to national development 
and a higher living standard. The time has since passed when thG industry could seek behind the 
scenes government support for these objectives. What must be done is to mount a national publicity 
programme through the media, Parliament, the education system and the trade union movement.' 
(quoted in Tsokhas 1984:80-81; From G. K. Kerr, Outline of Pub/fc Relations Programme far the 
Australian Mining Industry Council, International Public Relations, 16 May 1972). 
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takeover bids. 72 The large American firm ITT launched a bid for the Australian 
producer of Chiko Rolls and other pror:essed foods, Frozen Food Industries Ltd, 
which attracted enormous media attention. The controversy was compounded when 
the Australian media fixed upon two scandals that had recen~.ly beset thei IIT group 
in the United States of America. These entailed alleged ir.terforence in Chilean 
politics and a supposed attempt to bribe the Nixon administration (Walsh, AFR 2 
May 1972). Both Labor and DLP leader Senator J. T. Kane called for the bid to be 
blocked and for a complete review of foreign investment policy (Aust 2 May 
1972).73 While the government did not move to prevent the takeover it was 
sufficiently concerned by the strength of negative public opinion to deliberate on the 
matter in Cabinet (CT, Aust 3 May 1972). 
Media controversy over the takeover of another 'Australian icon' was soon at hand. 
The company producing Kiwi shoe polish, rare among Australian manufacturers in 
having developed export markets, was targeted for takeover by the Californian firm 
Clorox Co. Whitlam immediately declared that: ' ... this kind of takeover is clearly 
against Australia's national interest' (AFR 28 July 1972). Prime Minister McMahon 
in tum said on national television that he did not like the bid but would not directly 
block it. However, when Clorox withdrew the bid it identified the PM's 
unwelcoming remarks as a consideration (SMH 5 September 1972). McMahon later 
claimed credit for dissuading Clorox from taking over Kiwi as well as Monier's 
hostile bid for Rocla Industries Ltd (AFR 6 September 1972). The Australian 
editorialised that: 
The government's cautious approach to foreign investment policy has worked rather like the 
precautions of a man who does not want flies in the house but who will not put up 
flyscreens: only the flies which are noticed get swatted, after they have already landed. 
Operating on this system, the government has been able to extemporise only patchwork 
defences in occasional cases of strategic importance. (Aust 4 September 1972). 
72 For the benefit of those readers unfamiliar with the culinary delight that is a Chiko Roll, it is a 
mass-produced and deep-fried pastry roll with a non-descript filling of cabbage and meat; being 
widely sold through takeaway food shops. 
73 Senator Kane and Labor's Senator Murphy threatened to have the Senate select committee on 
foreign investment that they had earlier established, investigate the ITT bid when the government 
ruled out action to block it (Walsh,. AFR 2 May 1972). 
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The Rocla Board beat off Monier by resorting to a public campaign appealing to 
economic nationalism (Walsh, AFR 2 May 1972). During 1972 sections of the 
quality press raised critical voices against the increasingly nationalistic tone of the 
foreign investment debate, with the Australian Financial Review running three 
editorials on the issue over a one month period alone (AFR 28 July, 3 August, 25 
August 1972). Yet, even it had conceded much to the critics of a liberal policy. In 
July 1972 elements of the media clearly pandered to popular prejudice when dealing 
with claims that mafia money was pouring into Australia to take .over poker 
machine makers ar;id a number of entertainment firms (Age 13 July 1972).74 
McMahon could no longer readily claim that his informal suasion approach to 
securing Australian ownership and control was working when his own Cabinet 
splintered publicly on FDI policy. hi June 1972 Country Party leader Doug Anthony 
had backed his criticism of existing FDI policy with a public call for a screening 
process and certain sectoral limits (Aust 20 June 1972). In early September Anthony 
said on national television that the government would have to review existing policy 
(Age 4 September 1972). Treasurer Snedden compounded the government's 
problems when he complained publicly that foreign investors had been ignoring the 
restrictive guidelines on investment in the uranium industry put in place by the 
Gorton government (Aust 29 August 1972). The Opposition in turn demanded that 
the regulatory regime be tightened; a response McMahon continued to rule out (Sun 
Her 3 September 1972). Labor quickly followed up with an FDI policy release, 
promising a special secretariat to review foreign investment proposals for their 
consistency with 'the national interest' (Aust 4 September1972).7S The generally 
positive media reaction to Labor's plans substantially increased the political risk to 
the Coalition of not making a policy concession to economic nationalism. 
74 Some observers recognised the mafia story for the red herring in the foreign investment debate that 
it was. Prominent journalist McGuiness, for example, remarked that:' .. .it would be absurd to suggest 
that the current allegations about investment by the Mafia ... amount to an argument against the 
capital inflow. After all, we have plenty of native·bom criminals already. This last group might, of 
course, consider applying to the Tariff Board for protection against imported crime ... (AFR 14 July 
1972). 
75 The detail of the proposal was then developed by the parliamentary party's economic and trade 
committee and endorsed by the full parliamentary caucus (CT 21 September 1972). Foreign bidders 
for existing Australian enterprises would be required to make the case that it promised economic 
benefits and did not entail a lessening of competition or employment. 
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The McMahon government had already revealed considerable pragmatism in 
relation to foreign takeovers when influential domestic business interests favoured 
government intervention. In August 1972 Civil Aviation Minister Senator Robert 
Cotton threatened to terminate the 'two-airline policy' that entrenched a duopoly in 
most areas of domestic commercial aviation if foreign ownership of the private 
airline, Ansett Transport Industries, rose above a certain, unspecified level (AFR 3 
August 1972). In return Ansett bosses Sir Reginald Ansett and Sir Peter Abeles 
publicly applauded the governrnent'3 FDI policymaking (Aust 27 Septe~ber 1972). 
When the McMahon government dJ<l design a regulatory regime for FDI it was 
informed by a clear understanding of the varied FDI policy preferences of its 
business constituencies. The Cabinet gave in-principle support to the regulation of 
foreign takeovers, although not new foreign investments, in mid-September 1972 
(Walsh, AFR 15 September 1972).76 The discretionary regulation of foreign 
takeovers addressed the concerns of manufacturing interests while posing no threat 
to domestic mining interests who continued to favour a liberal regime. The 
motivation of the McMahon government to protect Australian boards from hostile 
takeover rather than to preserve overall levels of Australian control was reflected in 
the subsequent legislation. It only addressed takeovers through share acquisition and 
did not extend to issues connected with the disposal of assets or goodwill; the latter 
arising through the cooperation of the existing board.77 The legislation also did not 
provide for compulsory notification of foreign takeovers to the committee, meaning 
that foreign takeovers might come to the attention of the government through the 
76 The details were announced along with new capital controls to address the consequences of a 
misaligned exchange rate while avoiding a politically difficult revaluation. Prime Minister McMahon 
announced to the Parliament on 26 September 1972 that short-tenn overseas borrowing of more than 
$100,000 was no longer to be permitted and the foreign investment 'guidelines' of 1969 were 
abolished (Sexton and Adamovich, 1981:14). The Sydney Moming Herald had foreseen the 
introduction of such foreign borrowing controls and had editorialised against them, saying that 'they 
are no more than a substitute, and a very poor and inefficient substitute; for a sensible exchange rate 
policy' (SMH 4 May 1972). The circumstances of McMahon's statement were unusual as Treasurer 
Snedden was abroad and the Governor of the Reserve Bank was not involved in the announcement of 
measures that it would be administering. This was despite the government having earlier forecast a 
statement by the governor on the issue of exchange controls (Nat Rev 7 October 1972). 
77 Determined foreign bidders for Australian businesses might therefore avoid the provisions of the 
FTA with the cooperation of the vendor. Some journalists at the time noted the scope it present for 
non-compliance but not the private interest dimension (Walsh, AFR 26 October 1972). 
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political process rather than through regular monitoring.78 Moreover, the highly 
discretionary nature of the review process suggested that the regulation of foreign 
takeovers could be an arbitrary or politically driven process. 
It was on that basis some liberal editorialists queried the govemment's FDI policy 
initiative. The Sydney Morning Herald was most critical of the government giving 
itself ' ... carte blanche powers of veto' (SMH 27 September 1972). Those concerns 
were exacerbated by the fact that the decision to enact controls was .announced 
before the guidelines that would inform their administration were finalised and 
because all foreign takeovers already under way were to be subject to the re· 1iew 
provisions (SMH, Age, AFR 27 September 1972; Ramsey, Aust 27 September 
1972). 79 The government rushed a bill through Parliament as one of its last acts 
before going to election.so The bill was explicitly an interim measure designed to 
underpin the operations of the interdepartmental committee on foreign takeovers 
being setting up. It compelled the executive to complete preliminary investigation of 
a takeover bid within a month of notification - approving, rejecting or issuing a 
temporary injunction to allow further deliberation (Sexton and Adamovich 1981).Bl 
The discretionary nature oftl;~ controls was central to their appeal to the McMahon 
government. They promised a mechanism for claiming vigilance on foreign 
takeovers while in practice maintaining a quite open policy regime - as McMahon 
personally favoured. They also solved the dilemma presented by the FDI policy 
78 The govemment claimed that its provisions allowing for the compulsory reversal of non-notified 
takeovers if judged contrary to the national interest would lead to a very high notification rate (SMH, 
AFR 26 October 1972). That implied that the government would be attentive to politically 
contentious takeovers. 
79 On the other .hand business reaction to the capital controls was generally indifferent to positive as 
there was growing concern that the level of capital inflow might lead to a significant inflation 
problem and pragmatic realisation that a revaluation was not likely to be forthcoming (SMH, Age, 
AFR, Aust 27 September 1972). 
80 Journalist Maxwell Kemp wrote ofthe hasty preparation of the bill that: 'When I say 'ink still wet' 
that is precisely what is meant. The parliamentary counsel was seated in the House of Representatives 
while the bill was being debated in detail - pen at the ready, smile on his face, helping the hapless 
Billy Snedden out of the more obvious pitfalls it contained by simply redrafting the offending clause. 
God only knows how many loopholes they missed!' (Nat Rev 28 October-3 November 1972) For a 
detailed discussion of the constitutional issues entailed in the legislation raised see Flint (1985:14-
53) and Sexton and Adamovich (1981). 
81 The bill incorporated enforcement provisions, empowering a government to request a state 
supreme court to issue orders. restraining the exercise of voting rights, directing payments to be 
withheld, directing the sale of shares and making other desirable ancillary orders. Fines for breaches 
of orders were specified, although rather modest. 
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preferences of domestic firms: namely, businesses understood the contribution that 
FDI could make to economic growth as a whole while they hoped for protection 
from a hostile foreign takeover. This was as true of domestic mining as 
manufacturing firms. 
While the media evinced wariness about the highly discretionary element, there was 
general support for some regulatory mechanism. The Australian editorialised that. 
The Prime Minister's announcement yesterday on the vexed and often emotional subject of 
foreign investment showed all the signs of haste with which it was thrown together. Even so, 
it did not come a day too soon for the state of mind of both the nation and the government. 
(Aust 27 September 1972). 
Yet McMahon had been associated with liberal FDI policy for so long that few in 
the electorate believed his government was committed to more restrictive policy. 
Although the McMahon government designed its FDI initiative with a close eye to 
private interest politics it did not address the wider community concern about 
foreign ownership of the resources sector. In short, it failed to compromise its 
liberal proclivities sufficiently to accommodate contending public interest ideas as 
well private interests. It could have done so without losing business support as 
Labor was promising more radical economic nationalism (Aust, SMH27 September 
1972). As part of the famous 1972 '~!'s Time' campaign speech Whitlam declared . 
... the strongest and richest of our own industries have been bought up from overseas. It's 
time to stop the great takeover of Australia. But more important, it's time <: .' start buying 
Australia back. A Labor government will enable Australia and ordinary Australians to take 
part in the ownership, development and use of Australian industries and resources. (Whitlam 
1985:229). 
The government could do little more than engage in a containment strategy, as 
characterised so much of its election campaign (Oakes and Solomon 1973:315).82 
82 The Sun Herald noted during the 1972 campaign that: 'All of a sudden, the tnovement against 
excessive foreign ownership of Australian assets and resources is becoming a fashionable cause, like 
the outcries over pollution and the destruction of the environment. For years only lone voices were 
raised in protest, as Australian companies and whole industries were swallowed up. Now something 
like a crusade is developing and the political parties are responding with anti-takeover election 
assurances.' (Sun Her 12 November 1972). 
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The ALP allocated considerable resources in an effective campaign to widely 
circulate pamphlets on the FDI issue, including one reproducing an American 
marketing brochure on land for sale in Australia (Clark 1973:9-10). Treasurer 
Snedden issued interim orders :freezing five planned foreign takeovers for 
subsequent review. This proved politically costly when one bid, by Cadbury 
Schweppes of the United Kingdom for the Tarax soft drinks group in Melbourne, 
was revealed to be at the stage where the former had already posted cheques to 
shareholders accepting their offer price (AFR 21 November 1972). Fo~ at least a 
week claims and counterclaims about previous understandings between the 
government and Cadbury Schweppes were in the press, contributing to a perception 
of incompetence and hastiness. The government's attempt to reclaim the initiative 
on foreign investment, by ordering an extensive study of foreign investment in 
Australia from the Commonwealth Statistician, merely raised the question of why it 
had not done so long before (Age 20 November 1972). Pressure also came from 
unexpected quarters.·The Returned Servicemen's Lea~ue (RSL), holding its national 
congress during the election campaign, expressed 'deep concern' that ' ... many 
millions of acres, many millions of dollars of real estate, and much of Australia's 
mineral and natural resources are in the hands of foreign interests' (Sun Her 12 
November 1972). The RSL's intervention is a good example of a conservative, pro-
Coalition organisation expressing an economic nationalism that served the short-
term political interests of the Australian Labor Party.83 Labor's greatest mistake in 
office in relation to FDI policy would be to under-estimate the capacity of business 
and other constituencies to influence public confidence in a government's policy 
settings. In December 1972, however, the ALP was the electoral beneficiary of 
popular economic nationalism.s4 
83 The RSL's intervention in the debate no doubt madi:. government leaders glad they had requested a 
planned Japanese real estate investment mission p(Jstpone its trip until .after the election (AFR 29 
November 1972). 
84 That is certainly not ta suggest that foreign investme:tt wn~ the decisive issue in the 1972. 
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Conclusions 
During the 1960s and early 1970s Cmdition governments faced increasing public 
~d p~·essun;s to abandon the established 'open door' FDI policy. Those pressures 
came from domestic private interests who could benefit from discretionary controls 
on FDI, media and other p•;IJ!ic actors, the electorate and opposition parties. The 
Menzies and Holt governments maintained liberal policy in the face of those 
pressures for a number of reasons, The strength of their developmentalist 
convictions, including Sli_;"!90rt for a large European immigration program, 
predisposed them· to a liberal FDI policy. So too did their commitment to the 
relationships with the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the main 
sources of investment. FDI contributed to strong economic growth throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s, with electoral benefits for the incumbent government. In the 
mid-1960s American and British controls on outward capital ~ows. pro.v.oke.d-
concems among Australian policymakers and businesses that Australia's economic 
growth might be curtailed as a consequence, This temporarily weakened the ca&e for 
FDI controls while also highlighting the interests of many domestic business 
interests in liberal~policy. The political influence of Australian banking interests was 
evidenced in resistance to state involvement in raising foreign capital for the 
development of industries under Australian control. 
The Gorton government marked a turning point in Australian FDI policy. The Prime 
Minister's own proclivity for economic nationalism led the government to block 
foreign control of the MLC life insurance company, a uranium project and make 
access to loc~! capital markets dependent upon localising equity or length of 
commitrnont to Australian operations, This lent credibility to a resurgent Labor 
Opposition's economic nationalism and a strong economy suggested to an 
increasing number of Australians that the risks entailed in Labor's vision were 
affordable. Australian business interests favouring discretionary FDI controls to 
shield them from foreign competition and hostile takeover bids incre.ased their 
lobbying. At the same time a coalition of domestic and foreign mining interests 
resisted regulation of FDI in that sector, despite pronounced public concerns about 
foreign ownership and control of resources. Treasurer William McMahon frustrated 
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moves within the Gorton government to impose a regulatory regime on FDI but had 
to confront the political reality of popular economic nationalism when he became 
Prime Minister. 
McMahon's government enacted controls on foreign takeovers just before the 1972 
election. Although aimed at neutralising FDI policy as an electoral negative for the 
Coalition, the regulation reflected a compromise between the contending private 
\1terests of the government's business constituencies. Discretionary controls on 
takeovers would allow McMahon to maintain a relatively liberal FDI policy in 
practice; which he had always held to be in the public interest. They also promised 
the protection from hostile takeovers that some Australian businesses sought while 
not threatening the rapidly growing mining industry. Yet McMahon had been too 
long associated with an open door FDI policy for the initiative to placate critics of 
FDI~ who were also generally more concerned about new FDI in the resources 
sector. The McMahon government's FDI controls were a good compromise between 
its conception of the public interest and contending private interest demands. 
However, Labor's more stridently economic nationalist conception of the public 
interest was in wider favour. Yet Labor was to discover in office that the statist 
element of its economic nationalist and developmentalist vision provoked intense 
resistance from domestic private interests. Labor had little understanding of how 
much influence those interests could have on popular perceptions of the public 
interest. The next chapter examines how Labor learnt that painful lesson. 
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5 Chasing visions, 1972-75 
Labor's economic nationalism proved to be to its political advantage in the run-up 
to the 1972 election. Had the Whitlam government enacted moderate and well-
designed additional controls on FDI then its economic nationalism may have 
continued to be an electoral positive for Labor. Instead it fumbled the extension of 
the McMahon government's controls on foreign takeovers to new investments and 
failed to issue investment guidelines during its first term, while simultaneously 
scaring both foreign and domestic businesses in the resources sector with wildly 
nationalistic rhetoric. Leaders of the Whitlam government were blinded to the 
public interest imperatives for a predictable and moderate FDI policy by their vision 
of Australian ownership and control. Labor's state developmentalism also presented 
a direct threat to organised Australian interests. The Whitlam government chased its 
vision for several years in spite of institutional constraints, bureaucratic resistance, 
opposition from major private interests, protests from major foreign allies and 
intense criticism from state governments and the Federal Opposition. The Whitlam 
government eventually produced more predictable and moderate FDI policy but not 
before its gross mismanagement of a limited mandate from the electorate for 
economic nationalism had proven to be very politically costly. 
Mismanaging a limited mandate 
Unlike the Gorton and McMahon governments, the Whitlam government showed 
little interest in the manufacturing sector and the FDI issues specific to it. 1 Labor 
had made clear before the December 1972 election that its main objective in relation 
to FDI policy would be to promote Australian ownership and control in the booming 
mining sector. Whitlam has continued to defend that vision and decry those he holds 
---:s 
1 
Its lack of concern for the policy preferences of manufacturing interests, domestic or foreign, was 
reflected in the adoption of an across-the-board tariff cut as a macro-economic policy measure (Jolley 
1978:39). This, coupled with the effects of revaluation and a more uncertain economic outlook, saw a 
significant decline in inward FOi into manufacturing (Oyster and Meredith 1990:264). 
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to have hindered its realisation.2 Although Labor's election provoked trepidation in 
both domestic and foreign business circles, the mass media was initially quite 
positive about Labor's promise of a more restrictive FDI policy. Most newspaper 
editorials leant support to a vetting mechanism for all FDI of substantial size but 
called for more detail on how Labor's vision was to be realised without great cost 
(Aust 23 February 1973; Adv 30 July 1973). The West Australian, for instance, 
declared thCil.t. 
All thinking Australians will agree unhesitatingly with the principle that there should be 
majority Australian interest in our land and in the exploitation of natural resources, and most 
would find it refreshing that the government is pursuing those objectives with such vigour. 
But it remains to be seen how the policies will work in practice (WA 22 March 1973). 
Similarly the Sydney Morning Herald welcomed ' ... direct policy intervention to 
control and direct foreign investment. .. ' but called for a White Paper to address all 
the issues in policy design (SMH 22 March l 973). Editorialists generally showed 
much less sympathy for a more active direct role for the state in national 
development than for an extension of FDI. The mass media, like business, expected 
a moderation of Labor's pre-election nationalist rhetoric but some formal initiatives 
to tighten FDI policy. In its first six months the Whitlam government delivered the 
reverse. 
The economic nationalist rhetoric of the government leadership was sc!rrcely 
moderated by the demands of office. The Minister for Labour, Mr Clyde Cameron 
spoke overseas of his concerns about the 'international conspiracies' of 'giant 
corporations' and called for closer international cooperation between trade unions as 
a counterweight to them (AFR 16 June 1973; Adv 30 June 1973). The Minister for 
Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor, was scathing in his criticism of both domestic 
and foreign mining firms and foreshadowed state intervention in the contracting of 
2 
In 1985 Whitlam wrote: 'If Australia was to gain any long-tenn benefit from mining, then the 
decisions on investment and production had to be made in Australia and in Australia's interests. If 
foreign investment was to be allowed to be turned on and off like a tap by alien hands, causing severe 
disruption in the domestic economy, if Australia and the developing economies were forced to grovel 
and beg for international capital to come and to stay, then we would be inviting disaster upon 
ourselves.' (Whitlam 1985:249). 
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export prices and investment decisions. Connor's ymmg parliamentary protege Paul 
Keating told an American Chamber of Commerce audience 'the hackneyed 
argument that foreign capital was needed to develop our mineral and energy 
resources is visibly defective (SMH 24 March 1973). Yet no fonnal initiatives to 
extend FDI controls to new projects or even tighter guidelines for foreign takeovers 
were forthcoming. 
In mid-1973 the Whitlam government did impose tough new restrictions on the 
purchase of real estate by non-residents. These had been foreshadowed while in 
opposition and leant legitimacy by a Treasury study commissioned by Treasurer 
Frank Crean upon coming to office (Barnes, Age 21 March 1973; Brenchley, NT 4-
9 June 1973). As the restrictions were not given a legislative foundation they had to 
be enforced through the foreign exchange controls maintained by the Reserve Bank; 
effectively leaving locally financed acquisitions unregulated (Barnes, Age 21 March 
1973; Scott) AFR I 7 October 1974). On the other hand, Crean scared domestic and 
foreign firms alike with the simultaneous announcement that compliance with the 
new restrictions would be enhanced by amendments to the Companies Act to 
heavily circumscribe the use of nominee holdings (NT 4-9 June 1973). A potentially 
popular restriction on FDI alienated domestic as well as foreign businesses from the 
Whitlam government while not effectively realising its policy objectives. In 
hindsight it symbolised the basic political flaw with the Whitlam governrnent's 
conduct of FDI policy. 
Given the government's rhetoric most observers expected an early move to 
circumscribe FDI in the mineral resources sector. In March 1973 the Prime Minister 
told the annual dinner of the Australian Mining Industry Council (At\iflC) that the 
government. would not allow the level of foreign control in their sector to rise any 
higher than the current level of ostensibly 62 per cent (Age 20 March 1973). 
Whitlam's speech was in stark contrast to the benign view of FDI in the resources 
sector that then Prime Minister McMahon had expressed at the AMIC dinner a year 
earlier (Tsokhas 1984:66-.-69, 165 fnl9). 3 It came as no surprise to the leaders of 
3 
Foreign owned mining firms were members of the AMlC, as were local firms who were in joint 
ventures with foreign firms {Tsokhas 1984:66-71). 
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the AMIC that a Labor government favoured the promotion of greater Australian 
ownership. They were taken aback by the Whitlam government's failure to reveal 
concrete plans for a tighter FDI policy regime given the intensity of its rhetoric. 
In October 1973 the Prime Minister again stated the government's preference for a 
highly restrictive FDI policy, this time during ministerial talks in Tokyo (Byrne, 
AFR 31 October 1973). Whitlam shocked both his Japanese audience and Australian 
mining interests by declaring ' ... we have an objective of full Australian ownership 
in development projects involving uranium. We also regard this as a desirable 
objective in oil, natural gas and black coal' (SMH, CT 30 October 1973). In other 
sectors the government sought ' ... the highest possible level of Australian 
ownership'. The Prime Minister did qualify his remarks with an acknowledgment of 
the need to deal with the equity structure on a 'project by project' basis. Labor had 
given no indication before the 1972 election that it would seek to freeze out entirely 
foreign equity from oil, natural gas and black coal projects. The Prime Minister's 
remarks caused ongoing consternation in Japanese official and business circles as 
they stmggled to come to grips with the implications of the first OPEC oil shock for 
a national economy heavily dependent on imported resources (Mcllwraith, AFR l 0 
June 1974).4 In response to Japanese disquiet, an industry outcry and media 
criticism Whitlam subsequently moderated his stance in relation to black coal and 
natural gas (Age 9 November 1973).5 
Formal FDI policy changes were not forthcoming for some two years after the initial 
4 The Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor compounded Japanese concerns with the use of 
controls over export licenses to force price rises from Japanese steel mills for both coking coal and 
iron ore, against the wishes of Australian producers (AFR 13 August 1974). For a broader discussion 
of the issues related to resources diplomacy and the particular context of Australia-Japan relations, 
see Myer (1978: 117-34). On the other hand the W11itlam government was more amenable advancing 
discussions with Japan about a basic treaty of friendship and cooperation than its Coalition 
predecessor had been (Clark, Aust 29 September 1973; Tweedie 1994: 160-75). It was also active in 
promoting cultural exchange between the two countries through the establishment of the Australia· 
Japan Foundation (Rix 1999:61-66, 78). 
5 The Japanese government would not easily be convinced that the new policy concern in the early 
1970s with securing Australian control of projects in the minerals sector was purely coincidental to 
the concurrent growth in importance of Japanese direct investm!lnt to Australia (Solomon, CT 30 
October 1973). Early in the tenn of the new Labor government several Japanese investment missions 
had visited Australia and put the case for a continuation of relatively liberal policy (Aust 23 January 
1973; CT14 February 1973; AFR 13 March 1973). 
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election of the Whitlam government. Labor had inherited from the Coalition merely 
a temporary piece of legislation that empowered the Commonwealth to vet only 
takeovers of existing Australian businesses. It nonetheless persevered with the 
administrative architecture that was created under that temporary act, and the 
interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Takeovers (COFT), and urged all foreign 
investors in the resou.rces sector to submit proposals for consideration. While the 
Commonwealth's foreign exchange and export controls might be deployed to force 
foreign investors to involve more local input into projects, it was a clumsy way to 
realise Labor's economic nationalist vision (Flint 1985). In fact Labor went on to 
renew the McMahon legislation in both late 1973 and 1974 because it did not get 
drafted the more restrictive legislation it envisaged. 
Businesses were sufficiently disconcerted by the discretionary controls the 
government could wield against FDI to call publicly for explicit guidelines even if 
the new legislation was not ready. Neither was forthcoming through 1973 and 1974 
although rumours abounded of investments being frustrated from soon after Labor's 
election (Ackland, AFR 21 March 1973).6 Domestic mining firms, reflecting their 
continuing need for foreign partners, were as frustrated with the uncertain 
investment environment as foreign firms (Scott, AFR 17 October 1974). Information 
was unavailable about what kinds of proposals were being rejected, and indeed even 
the overall rate of rejections or the processes and members of the COFT (AFR 14 
June 1974). Business disquiet was soon amplified by media reportage and criticism 
of the government's conduct of FDI policy. Total inward FDI fell in 1972-73 to 
$399 million, less than half the previous financial year, but recovered to $616 
million in 1973-74. Although some of the decline was structural, the Whitlam 
government was a factor (Dyster and Meredith 1990:23 7). 7 
6 This was despite the fact that the 301h Federal Conference of the ALP, held at Surfers Paradise in 
1973, adopted a policy platfonn that stated in part the Labor government would ' ... establish clearer 
guidelines for overseas investors, for the benefit both of these investors and of the Australian 
community' (cited in AFR 14 June 1974). 
7 Dyster and Meredith (1990:262-63) noted that many new resources projects initiated in the late 
1960s had come on stream by 1973, leading to less new investment as well as increased capacity of 
foreign firms to fund investment through retained earnings. The rntio of Gross Fixed Capital 
Fonnation to GDP has been declining gradually since 1968. 
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The circumstances that had given rise to adoption of the capital controls were a 
factor in the Whitlam government's failure to provide clear FDI guidelines to 
business. A high volume of capital outflow, despite br.ing principally short term in 
nature, appears to have fostered complacency both about the availability of foreign 
capital and the prospects for Australia's external balances.8 Although Treasury 
urged a cautious FDI policy on the government, Treasurer Frank Crean was 
normally lukewarm in advocating its advice to Cabinet (Whitlam 1985:207-11; 
Stubbs 1989:116-23). Institutional features unique to the Whitlam government 
compounded the marginalisation of Treasury advice.9 In its place the 27 Cabinet 
ministers, many true believers in Labor's long-enunciated economic nationalist 
vision, were easily swayed by the forceful personalities of Cairns and Connor. 
Whitlam provided no check on the forces for restrictive FDI policy; combining as 
he did a disinterest in economics with considerable enthusiasm for economic 
nationalism and state developmentalism. 10 Treasury, wanting no further tightening 
of FDI policy, responded by endeavouring to keep FDI issues off the Cabinet 
agenda. The Labor leadership showed scant regard for its rapidly deteriorating 
relationship with Treasury, as it did for other major stakeholders in FDI policy. 
Business disquiet contributed to the increasing conflict between the Federal and 
state governments on FDI issues. Public disagreement between the Whitlam 
government and the conservative Bjelke-Petersen government in Queensland was 
bitter and ranged across a number of portfolio areas in addition to FDI and resources 
policies (Fitzgerald 1984:253-57). Relations with State Labor governments in South 
Australia and Western Australia may have been less overtly acrimonious but deep 
tensions still existed over FDL The Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor, 
8 In 1972-73 Australia realised a historically rare current account surplus, although it returned to a 
deficit equal to 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1973-74. A dramatic but short-lived improvement in 
Australia's tenns of trade played a significant part in this (Oyster and Meredith 1990:252, 261). 
9 The whole ministry made up the Cabinet, making it both unwieldy and prone to ideological 
enthusiasms swamping the considered advice of relevant departments (Kelly 1976:62-67). 
Moreover, Cabinet members were not compelled to support a Cabinet position if it was challenged in 
Caucus. In July 1974 Crean failed to even mount a defence of the Treasury mini-budget submission 
in Cabinet. Whitlam failed to fend off Cabinet's rejection but did save the modified mini-budget from 
rejection by Caucus minutes before it was due to be presented in Pa.rliament (Kelly 1976:64-65). 
10 Whitlam wrote later: 'From its first Cabinet meeting my government had been intent on developing 
Australia's immense mineral and energy resources without letting them pass into foreign hands' 
(1979:44). 
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interfered in the Dunstan government's administration of plans for a new 
petrochemical complex to secure 51 per cent Australian equity in the project 
(Eltham, AFR 9 November 1973). Most damaging to the ALP as a whole was the 
ri~ between the Federal government and the Tonkin Labor government in Western 
Australia (WA 3 December 1973). A month before a closely contested state election, 
the Tonkin Labor government sought an undertaking that necessary Commonwealth 
approvals would be forthcoming for the proposed Alwest alumina plant and a BHP-
brokered steel mill project. Both proposals were to be majority foreign.controlled 
and also sought exemptions from the Commonwealth's foreign borrowing controls 
(Toohey, AFR 26 February 1974). 11 Federal Cabinet rejected each project on both 
counts (Age 27 February 1974). Connor and the Minister for Overseas Trade, Jim 
Cairns, instead tried to involve the Australian Industries Development Corporation 
(AIDC) in the project. To the annoyance of private sector leaders, the government 
was prepared to give an exemption from the capital controls to the AIDC for the 
project but not private firms (AFR IO March 1974). The Whitlam government's 
actions were widely seen as a factor in the electoral defeat of the Tonkin 
governmer1t soon after (Mcilwraith, AFR 5 May 1974 ). 12 
If the Whitlam government cared at all for minimising industry antagonism it had a 
greater need to issue clear FDI policy guidelines than a Coalition government 
because, unlike the McMahon government, Labor's ideological raison d'etre was 
perceived as being inimical to business interests. While the Treasurer periodically 
sort to placate domestic and foreign businesses annoyed with the conduct ofFDI 
11 The Variable Deposit Requirement (VDR) scheme stipulated that a portion of loans raised abroad 
be deposited interest free with the Reserve Bank. The initial proportion was. 25 per cent, later rising 
to 30 per cent before being cut back to zero in 1974 as an unforeseen credit crunch took hold (Jolley 
1978;35; Sexton and Adamovich 1981:17; Age 2-8 August 1974). While principally a macro-
economic management strategy, and one proposed by the Treasury, the capital controls were in 
keeping with the antipathy of most Labor ministers to free flows of foreign capital (Bell 1976:48-9). 
12 The Prime Minister took a real gamble during the Federal Election campaign by announcing a 
tough new foreign investment policy in Perth, only five weeks after the defeat of the Tonkin 
government. He directly attacked new Premier Sir Charles Court, who had been very pro-active in 
pursuing foreign direct investment during the previous period of Coalition rule, declaring 'Court sells 
you short' (AFR 5 May 1974). 
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policy, other senior ministers generally evinced indifference.'3 Cairns, Connor and 
even Whitlam were convinced that the business community was inevitably pro-
Coalition and so did not see a strategic advantage in minimising their concerns. 14 
Such a conception did not take account of the business community's ability to 
considerably influence community perceptions of a government's competence. 
Connor's brazen contempt for certain mining interests soon became legendary 
(Tsokhas 1984:66-9; Kelly 1976:155). Yet the private interests of domestic mining 
firms were by no means inimical to the Whitlam government's economic nationalist 
vision. Well-designed local equity requirements could have benefited certain 
domestic firn1s without presenting a great threat to existing practice in the 
structuring of ownership consortia. Labor's heavy-handed attempts to intervene in 
other aspects of the mining industry, such an export prices and financing, alienated 
domestic interests from the government and highlighted their shared interests with 
foreign mining firms (Tsokhas 1984:69-70).15 
Supplanting FDI with state developmentalism 
Old state developmentalist ideology evinced by prewar state labour governments 
and the Chifley government had continued influence over the Whitlam Cabinet. 
Kelly (1976:180-81) noted that despite the youthful imagery of Laborfs 1972 It's 
Time election campaign, labourist veterans dominated the Labor frontbench. The 
Chifley governnlent had been haunted by memories of the great depression and the 
Labor split over how to manage the heavy servicing burden of sovereign debt raised 
overseas. It had also been constrained in its capacity to borrow abroad for grand 
development projects by the scarcity of capital in the immediate postwar era. 
However, by 1972 memories of the risks of state borrowing abroad for national 
13 Rather remarkably, some Left-wing scholars criticised the Whitlam government at the time for 
giving too much consideration to business interests. The most influential statement of this view was 
by Catley and McFarlane (1974:45-53), which included strong criticism of Labor for not being 
economic nationalist enough. 
14 This is evidenced in a range of subsequent works on the Whitlam government. See Kelly (1915), 
Oakes (1976), Blazey and Campbell (1974), Sexton (1979) and Freudenberg (1977). 
15 Connell (1977:75) argued that the Whitlam government's nationalist stance on foreign investment 
was ill-received by Australian business interests because: 'However nationalist, the Labor 
government necessarily offended class-conscious sections of business, to whom it was simply an 
interloper - boorish, undisciplined, and dangerous.' 
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development had subsided, while foreign capital seemed readily available. In 
Opposition Labor had foreshadowed new policy initiatives to give. the state a greater 
role in financing the development ofresources projects. Domestic business interests 
were nonetheless taken aback by the speed with which the Whitlam government 
moved to implement these policies, with little or no reference to themselves. 
Australian banking interests had fought a successful campaign against the moderate 
state developmentalism of John McEwen in the mid-1960s, although they had been 
unable to head off the AIDC initiative during Gorton's prime-ministership. Labor 
could have learnt much from how Gorton's alienation of domestic business interests 
in the pursuit of economic nationalism led a general loss of faith in his capacity to 
manage the national economy. The Whitlam government did not appreciate that 
Gorton's experience would be by no means limited to a pro-business Coalition 
government. Labor was blinded to the political risks of state developmentalisrn by a 
misplaced faith in its supposed electoral mandate to realise greater Australian 
ownership and control of industry (Toohey; AFR 10 December 1973). The historical 
significance of Labor's election to office distracted from the modest size of its 
victory and the need to reassu.re the electorate that its reform program did not 
jeopardise the strong economy that been a major factor in the political longevity of 
the Coalition. 
Labor committed itself in opposition to a developmental model where the state 
would facilitate the import of foreign loans in order to supplant FDI. The particular 
organisational architecture that was envisaged was an expanded AIDC, a new 
National Investment Fund (NIP) to raise funds for it, and a Pipeline Authority and a 
Petroleum and Minerals Authority (PMA). The latter, in Whitlam's own words$ was 
designed ' ... to explore for and develop Australia's petroleum and minerals resources 
on Australia's behalf and to promote Australian ownership and control of those 
resources through co-operative ventures with private companies' (1985:250). In 
March the Minister for Minerals and Energy, Rex Connor, stated that the 
government's package of an expanded AIDC, NIP and PMA would mean the 
' ... title deeds will reUiain in Australian hands' and that '. .. we will be governing 
Australia in the Australian way' (SMH24 March 1973). 
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Foreign investors clearly understood that the vision of at least Connor and Cairns 
was to supplant FDI with government interventions. The Japanese government 
pressed for an explanation of what the AIDC plans entailed for the future of 
Japanese direct investment at the 1973 ministerial meeting in Tokyo (Toohey, AFR 
11 October 1973).16 Affirmation of the AIDC plan sparked a sharply negative 
reaction on the London stock market and highlighted the sensitivity of overseas 
investors to an unfamiliar Labor government propounding economic nationalism 
(Aust 31 August 1973). Foreign investors would have not taken much consolation 
from Cairns' remark that the goal of the government was ' ... not to keep foreign 
investors out, but to bring them in under proper conditions' (AFR 10 April 1974). 
Although the expanded powers of the AIDC could bt~ deployed in many sectors of 
the economy the resources sector was clearly foremost in the government's mind. 17 
Cairns raised the possibility of making both the granting of export permits and 
foreign investment approval conditional upon the AIDC being involved in projects 
(AFR 10 April 1974).18 The government resolved in March 1974 that COFT would 
refer all cases to the AIDC as a matter of standard procedure, giving the latter the 
opportunity to make a proposal to take up an equity stake in place of the foreign 
firm (AFR 10 April 1974). At that point the Whitlam government had still not 
produced a formal statement of FDI policy guidelines that foreign investors could 
follow. 
Labor's PMA model jeopardised the profitable business interests of specialist firms 
and individua:s, serving domestic and foreign investors, working in minerals 
16 The government later endeavoured to argue that Japanese concern for the security of resources 
supply issues could be addressed through the AIDC. Connor suggested that Japanese intere$ts could 
be coaxed into investing through the AIDC, that is, in consortiums arranged by it, in return for 
explicit security of supply agreements (Age 9 November 1973), 
17 To quote Overseas Trade Minister Cairns: 'What we have done is to widen its national 
development powers under the 'national interest' provisions, which are aimed primarily at the 
minerals and energy area, particularly fossil fuels and uranium. We have a tremendous responsibility 
to see that our resources are not all dragged out in n few years by people who have no responsibility 
to Australia for how they are used or at what cost or price.' (AFR 17 September 1973). 
18 Cairns even argued that ifthe AIDC took a long term share in the development of mineral reserves 
it could direct some output as foreign aid to • ... a Third World country at a fair price' (AFR I I 
October 1973). He apparently developed this idea afier discussion with .President Park of South 
Korea (B. Toohey, AFR t 1October1973). 
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exploration and development.l9 The greatest ..-:hallenge to Labor's vision of 
supplanting FDI with state borrowings came from domestic businesses threatened 
by the planned mechanisms. Banking, insurance and other financial intermediaries 
became strong critics of the Whitlam government's proposed NIF and an extended 
role for the AIDC (AFR 19 March 1974). The general manager of the Bank of New 
South Wales, Sir Robert Norman, was nt the forefront of banking industry 
opposition to Labor's plans.2° Controversy over the Bank of NS W's position in the 
public debate over the AIDC plans grew with the resignation of one of its 
longstanding board members, Sir John Dunlop. Sir John was also a director of the 
AIDC and had been critkised within the Bank of NSW Board after he had defended 
the Whitlam government's plans before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Ownership and Control of Australian Resources (CT, Age 23 February 1974),21 
While Sir John was tight-lipped about what had transpired, the resignation attracted 
considerable media attention. Senior government members presented the resignation 
as the persecution of a widely respected business identity by a reactionary financial 
sector elite opposed to realising greater Australian ownership of promising 
industries (Age 24 February 1974). 
The media was not entirely uncritical of financial sector claims about the dangers of 
the. government's plans. Although The Australian Financiq/ Review cast serious 
doubts upon the desirability of the AIDC and NIF plans it nonetheless declared that 
the 1fear campaign' being run by the banking sector was self~serving and ' ... an 
insult to the strength and viability of Australian democracy' (AFR 19 March 1974). 
The government nonetheless under-estimated the capacity of the banking and 
insurance industries to influence media, and ultimately voter perceptions, of the 
19 Whitlnm (1985:251) wrote later on the successful opposition to the PMA legislation: 'Yet the 
Opposition Liberal and Country Parties, in control of the Senate, and a number of State governments, 
delinquently but deliberately obstructed our initiatives all the way. They set out to protect the foreign 
interests that had been living like parasites off the Australian people, whose activities no patriot, no 
person with any sense of justice could support.' 
The PMA legislation was struck down through a High Court challenge on a technical issue of 
Parliamentary procedure (Whitlam 1985:251-2). 
20 He earned the ire of the government, and the public condemnation of Cairns, when he wrote to 
branch managers saying that the proposed changes to the AIDC could make it a vehicle for the 
socialisation of Australian industries, later repeating the claim in the mass media (Aust 19 March 
1974). 
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government's performance. The Whitlam government was to struggle with a 
confluence of difficult macroeconomic challenges from 1974, the most serious 
being a recession-inducin~ credit crunch. The Australian Bankers Association 
played on this, arguing that interest rates would rise further if the NIF was allowed 
to operate as proposed (AFR 8 February 1974). The Whitlam government's vision 
of large-scale public borrowing and investment through the AIDC and NIF 
conflicted with the reality of the massiv~ blow out in federal public debt that the 
ALP government presided over (Walsh, AFR 18 June 1973).22 
The pro-business credentials of the existing AIDC board initially helped to 
ameliorate business unease about Labor's plans for the body (Walsh, AFR 20 
October 1973). Although Australian banking interests were implacably opposed to 
the AIDC, chairman Sir Alan Westerman sought to reassure other Australian 
business groups that the Whitlam government's plans did not present a threat to 
their interests (AFR 28 June 1973). He was also active in telling foreign business 
communities that there would still be plenty of scope for investing alongside, and 
through the AIDC, in promising Australian projects (AFR 17 September 1973). Yet 
the bills that were introduced to the Parliament to amend the AIDC and create the 
NIP caused widespread apprehension in business circles. The amendments would 
have had the effect of lifting many of the restrictions on the AIDC, such as those 
limiting it to holding stakes in enterprises for only short periods of time. Project 
choice was also to be more directly influenced by the government of the day. The 
draft legislation would have allowed the AIDC to acquire shares in any firm, local 
or foreign, without the agreement of the company (AFR, Adv 19 March 1974). 
The Whitlam government's major mechanism for securing more development with 
Australian ownership came to be feared as a Trojan horse for a general expansion of 
21 The Opposition-dominated Senate had referred the government's AIDC and NIF bills to the 
committee to delay having to make a decision (Aust 9 February 1974). 
22 Treasury cautioned that the proposed bond issue by the NIF would undennine the regular raising of 
Commonwealth Bonds because of the generous tax concessions entailed (Kelly; Aust 28 August 
1973; Edwards, Aust 9 February 1974). Those concessions were comparable to the very favourable 
tax treatment given to certain insurance and superannuation products, helping to explain the deep 
hostility of that industry to the Whitlam government's plans (Ackland, AFR 14 August 1974). 
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the public sector at the expense of the private.23 Consequently business submissions 
to the Senate Inquiry into the AIDC and NIF bills were all sharply critical (Edwards, 
Aust 9 February 1974). The submission of the Associated Chambers of 
Manufactures in Australia (ACMA) to the Senate Committee on For..•Jn Ownership 
and Control became controversial in its own right. The submission charged the 
government's motive with the change to the AIDC bill was to '. . .lay the 
groundwork for gradual socialisation through promoting corporate socialism' (Aust 
9 February 1974).24 The ACMA submission did make the important point that if the 
AIDC spent ' ... a substantial proportion of its funds and efforts on buying out 
foreign shareholdings, it may get bogged down in a massive operation of 
transferring ownership titles without raising or channelling new capital resources 
into the national economy' (Aust 9 February 1974). 
Government ministers attempted to depict the Australian business critics as 
complicit in the despoiling of Australia's long~term economic potential and made 
appeal to class-based ideology.25 Cairns linked the supposed loss of national 
economic sovereignty with an avaricious Australian financial elite, declaring that 
the AIDC's ' ... appeal will increase rapidly as it helps restore the Australian to his 
rightful place in his own country' (Age 9 April 1974). As business disquiet grew, 
the government found increasing solace in its ostensible mandate from the 
Australian people to pursue its economic nationalist and state developmentalist 
vision (Toohey, AFR IO December 1973). As debate over the AIDC intensified 
Cairns declared, for instance, that. 
This legislation must be made effective. Not only have we a mandate from the people but 
that mandate is from n people who know that their self-realisation as a nation and as 
individuals depends upon strengthening the say Australians have in their own affairs (Age 9 
April 1974). 
;j Private sector criticism along these lines was somewhat exaggerated The obligation placed upon 
the AIDC to maximise Australian shareholdings would have ruled out most holdings in local 
companies, unless they were being offered for sale to foreign finns (Wood, SMH26 March 1974). 24 
Such an argument was perhaps aimed at the staunchly anti-communist Democratic Labor Party 
senators, who held the balance of power in the upper house and could defeat the bill. Yet such 
denunciations of ALP policy had long IJeen common in ACMA newsletters (Tsokhas 1984: I 0-17). 
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Initially Labor could call upon certain favourable m(:dia coverage to buttress its 
claim of a mandate for reform.26 While The Australian raised some concerns it 
declared that the Parliament should' ... give both the AIDC and National Investment 
Fund NIF bills a lusty launching' (Aust 16 February 1974). Media commentary grew 
more critical as domestic business interests more forcefully resisted the 
government's plans.27 In the lead-up to the 1974 election the Coalition reluctantly 
agreed to support passage of the AIDC and NIF bills when the government accepted 
certain amendments it proposed to both. The Opposition sensed that the Whitlam 
government's economic nationalist policy agenda remained rather popular in the 
electorate at that point. Moreover, as the election was brought on by the Coalition's 
frustration of Labor's legislative agenda in the Senate it did not want to be perceived 
as against the promotion of Australian ownership and control of industry (Blazey 
and Campbell 1974). The Government had shown a certain political savvy in 
winning the Coalition around to that pragmatic position. It had promoted the AIDC 
as not only promising to enhance Australia's economic sovereignty but also offering 
help to rural and small businesses.28 
25 Overseas Trade Minister Cairns said: 'It is significant that those who are most persistent in their 
attacks on the new AIDC are themselves spokesmen of the massive financial organisations of 
Australia' (Age 9 April 1974). 
26 An editorial in The Australian on the negative London stock market reaction to the AIDC gave 
strength to the government's mandate notion by remarking: 'It is exaggeration for British 
commentators to call this a loss ofconfi:lence in the Whitlam government: It is more an expression of 
confidence that the government does mean what it says about putting Australian interests first and 
those of the overseas investor a distinct second. This is a policy which the Australian electorate has 
endorsed, The fact that the domestic share market rallied back yesterday is a demonstration that 
Australians have not really changed their minds' (Aust 3 l August 1973). 
27 The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian Financial Review were quite critical, along with 
the newspapers of Queensland and Western Austrnlia. The Sunday Independent in Western Australia 
denounced '. .. creeping bureaucracy which strangles initiative and over-rides government' (Sunday 
Ind 17 February 1974). The Age vacillated. The Australian most consistently editorialised in favour 
of the government's policy objectives. The Sydney Morning Herald increasingly argued, in a position 
rather udvanced for its time, that FDI should not cause problems for Australia if other policy settings 
were corre.ct (SMH29 August 1973). 
28 Cairns declared that ' •.• the AIDC will be used to strengthen small private enterprises against big 
enterprises. There are many farmers who would like to establish co-operatives, and many co-
operatives are already established as successful, viable enterprises. But they need funds which private 
banks and other lenders may not advance because they are not top-drawer business prospects, or 
because private lenders may be too closely associated with big competitors of the co-operatives. The 
AIDC can piny an important part in encouraging the development of sound enterprises like these' 
(Age 9 April 1974). In fact, under the government's proposals the AIDC would not have been in a 
position to favour particular types of Australian businesses over others. 
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Much was made of the fact that former Country Party leader John McEwen had 
been the architect of the AIDC; opening up again the old schism within the 
Coalition parties between rural and urban banking interests (Ackland, AFR 14 
August 1974). Once the election was behind it, the narrowly defeated Coalition 
promptly reversed its position on the AIDC and NIF bills and had them rejected in 
the Senate (Age 4 August 1974; AFR 14 August 1974).29 The government's formal 
mechanism for a more extensive role for the state in foreign borrowing and 
investment in the resources sector was never to be realised. The media was 
generally very critical of the Coalition for its about-face and it was a foretaste of the 
Opposition's later strategy to force the Labor government from office (SMH, Age, 
Aust 15 August 1974; Sun Her 18 August 1974). 
The Whitlam government drew two distinct and quite divergent conclusions from 
the rejection of their legislation. On the one hand, FDI would continue to be 
important to the development of the resources sector and therefore there was a 
greater imperative to put in place moderate and well-designed new legislation on 
FDI controls. On the other hand, Cairns, Connor and Whitlam started to consider 
alternative channels for realising their vision of the state as foreign borrower and 
investor. This was to lead to the political disaster of the 'loans affair'. The paradox 
of the six month period from mid-November 1974 was that as formal FDI policy 
was put on a sounder legislative and administrative footing, the governmen~ also 
dabbled with a huge foreign fund rai~ing through unorthodox channels that smacked 
of gross impropriety. 
Extending FDI controls 
Labor made a commitment to a comprehensive FDI review mechanism central to its 
29 Independent Senator Steele Ha.II, who had been a Liberal member, described the Opposition's 
actions as ' ... the worst fom1 of bloody-minded obstructionism that the Senate could indulge in .. ,' 
although the intensity of his annoyance was no doubt greatly amplified by personal support for the 
policy goal of the government (AFR 14 August 1974). 
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1974 election campaign.30 In making the announcement Whitlam called on the 
findings of a report it commissioned from former financial journalist Tom . 
Fitzgerald that concluded the Aust:clian community was earning insufficient return 
on mineral resources given the level of government support for the mining industry 
(Fitzgerald 1974; AFR 5 May 1974).31 Ironically, the Whitlam government had also 
just received statistics that suggested the overall proportion of Australian mining 
under ownership and control had stabilised.32 Labor promised to formally extend the 
existing review process for foreign takeovers to all new foreign investments above a 
minimum threshold that it had not yet decided (AFR 5 May 1974). It was 
immediately clear that the government had not formulated a clear set of guidelines 
for reviewing foreign investments despite having been in office for eighteen months. 
Whitlam stated simply that he was not yet sure what the local equity and other 
requirements would be, but that existing foreign investors would ultimately have to 
comply with them. 
Over a period of time guidelines will become more definite as our experjimce grows. 
Foreign companies already operating in Australia will be expected to conform with these 
guidelines progressively. In this way we will ensure that the foreign investment that has 
already been allowed will confonn to the Australian national interest as well as any new 
foreign investment that is allowed. (AFR 5 May 1974) 
No attempt was made to articulate the government's understanding of what 
constituted the 'national interest'. Whitlam nonetheless said that in addition to the 
level of Australian equity involved in proposals, the government would also 
examine export franchises, tax avoidance, purchasing policies, technology licensing 
30 The Prime Minister declared: 'I came to Western Australia because it is here that in recent years 
the choice I have described has been most acute. I came here particularly to challenge the most 
insidious of all propaganda imposed in this debate. Our opponents have swallowed the multinational 
lie that without unrestricted foreign investment, our dev:~lopment is restricted. I don't accept this 
proposition and I don't believe Australia could afford to accept it' (AFR 5 May 1974). 
31 In announcing a tougher foreign investment policy during the 1974 Federal election, Whitlam 
declared: 'The message of the Fitzgerald report is clear. We have sold ourselves short in our recent 
mineral developments' (AFR 5 May 1974). 
32 The Commonwealth Statistician found that there had been no significant expansion in foreign 
control of the mining sector during the last two years of the Coalition government (AFR 11 April 
1974). Foreign control remained at 54.3 per cent of the industry in total value-added terms, while the 
figure for actual ownership was 47.8 per cent. The latter broke down into 35.8 per cent through direct 
foreign investment and 12 per cent through other fonns of foreign ownership. 
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practices and research & development expenditure (AFR 5 May 1974). The Prime 
Minister cited Canada as offering an important precedent. 
Following Labor's narrow electoral victory a new administrative architecture was 
quickly erected, although again without legislative foundation, to implement this 
expanded vision of FDI regulation. Rather than merely expand the role of the 
existing COFT, a second cross-departmental committee was created to vet all new 
investments. In September 1974 the government announced plans to introduce a 
new piece of legislation into Parliament to put its FDI policy on a firm legal 
foundation but this did not, in fact, occur for another year.33 Instead, in December 
1974, the government had to sc:mre the renewal of the McMahon government's 
temporary Companies (Foreign Takeovers) Act for another year. The government 
also did not issue a formal set of guidelines until November 1974, and then only 
because Prime Minister Whitlam was heading for a diplomatic embarrassment. 
Japanese Prime Minister Kak.uei Tanaka was due to visit Australia and during pre-
travel diplomatic and media briefings he had expressed a strong interest in securing 
detailed FDI policy guidelines from the Australian government.34 The Whitlam 
government's first formal statement of foreign investment guidelines to be publicly 
released took the form of a copy of a briefing paper handed to the Japanese Prime 
Minister at a pre-dinner meeting the night before (Toohey, AFR 14 November 
1974). The language was still strongly economically nationalist in tone, with 
33 As well as extending regulation to new investments, the government foreshadowed close regulation 
of differentiated voting rights that could be used to avoid restrictions on foreign control through 
simple shareholding limits, a legislative foundation for the broader review proc~ss previously 
announced, and broader .asset acquisition provisions (AFR 24 September 1974). The latter were only 
aimed at asset acquisitions that effectively allowed the takeover of a business but still amounted to a 
significant expansion of the scope of regulation. The other major goal was to. bring foreigner-to-
foreigner transactions involving Australian interests legally under the purview of the review process, 
as was not the case under the existing act (Ackland, AFR 15 October 19.74). They were to be largely 
frustrated in that aspiration. 
34 The need for policy cooperation between the Federal government and the Western Australian 
government on the development of the Pilbara region was pressing. The discovery of very 11.1,rge iron 
ore and other mineral deposits in the region, coupled with the possibility of piping natural gas from 
the huge North West Shelf field led to many proposals for the establishment of processing and other 
value-adding industries on the Pilbara coastline. The OPEC oil shock led to intense interest in Japan 
in investment possibilities (Mcllwraith, AFR 10 June 1974). 
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explicit reference to use of a wide range of administrative mechanisms to secure 
foreign investment and broader trade goals. To quote Whitlam, 
If the objectives of maximising benefits to the Australian people from our mineral resources 
are to be achieved ultimate responsibility for the exploration, development and processing 
of minerals must rest with Australians: all enterprises whether Australian or foreign-owned, 
engaged in exploration, development or processing rn"st conform with the national interest. 
The government will use all of its powers, including its export and exchange control powers, 
to achieve this aim (AFR 14 November 1974). 
That brought little immediate comfort to the Japanese customers of Australian 
mines, nor to Japanese or any other investors in them. There were two modest 
positives in the policy statement. There was no reference to a desire for 100 per cent 
Australian equity in the four mineral sectors that the Prime Minister had 
foreshadowed in Tokyo the year before. Secondly, a higher overall level of 
Australian ownership of the resources was said to be a longer-term objective. 
The statement was still far too short on detail for businesses to be put .at ease. 
Treasurer Crean effectively acknowledged the costs of investor confusion, but 
offered no immediate solution, when he said, 
The stage has been set for a resumption of net capital inflow at moderate and digestible 
levels ... You may well ask what is a satisfactory level of Australian participation. This is a 
question to which, in the nature of things, there is no simple answer. It depends in part on 
our own capacity to save and invest. (cited in Ackland, AFR 3 March 1975). 
That was little help to businesses trying to put together investment proposals. 
Nonetheless, the Tanaka visit did mark a turning point in the Whitlam government's 
FDI policy. FD! review practice for the minerals sector evolved haltingly over the 
coming year towards a policy of equal equity partnerships between t,-~reign and 
Australian investors deemed foreign and Australian (Bracken, CT 25 September 
1975). This was despite the replacement of Crean as treasurer by Cairns two weeks 
after the Tanaka visit (Kelly 1976:67-75). Cairns became preoccupied with the goal 
of raising a large loan overseas for national development purposes and did not pay 
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great attention to much of the minutiae of the Treasurer's role. Cairn's relationship 
·with Treasury steadily deteriorated, frustrating formal policy development but 
giving Treasury some latitude to deliver more moderate FDI policy in practice.35 
Cairn's short period as Treasurer contributed to the additional six-month delay in 
getting the bill to create the Foreign Takeovers Act (FTA) to Parliament. His 
replacement in mid-1975, moderate Bill Hayden, introduced the bill. Hayden 
worked hard to impose both order and pragmatism on the government's economic 
policym~ng (Stu~bs 1989:125-38; Bell 1976:52; Gruen 1976:28). The substance 
of the draft FTA was little different from the statement of November 1974 but it 
gave legislative force to the review process and allowed for prosecution and 
penalties for non-compliance. Hayden directly addressed the absence of any explicit 
criteria in the bill for judging whether or not a proposal was in accordance with 'the 
national interest', saying, 
The criteria have not been incorporated into the bill. This is because the criteria must be 
flexible in their interpretation and application and it has been found that it would be 
impracticable, consistent with the need for such flexibility, to express the criteria with the 
precision required by legislative form (AFR 23 May 1975). 
The Bill was ultimately passed on August 21 1975.36 Hayden sought to reassure 
local and foreign firms that FDI regulation, although giving the government 
considerable discretion, would be deployed in a cautious way. Before an audience of 
the Australian-American Association, Hayden declared himself to be an 'economic 
internationalist' and said that 'the living standards we have, the consumption the 
35 Treasury was responsible for Australia's formal response to the preliminary report of the new 
United Nations' Commission into Transnational Corporations and reflected the general moderation 
of its position rather than the more strident remarks of some senior Cabinet ministers (Toohey, AFR 
17 April 1975). 
36 At the time of the dismissal the government's new FTA had still not been promulgated, the delay 
having been the result of the need to draft accompanying regulations on the mandatory notification of 
share offers (AFR 11 November 1975). Between l January 1974 and 25 August 1975 46 interim 
orders were issued by the Treasurer which gave the government three months in which to make a 
decision on a project. Some 18 proposals were ultimately accepted without objection, two were 
stopped, eight could not be blocked because no right of action existed under the old act, and 17 were 
'voluntarily' withdrawn (Ackland 29 August 1975). As noted in Chapter 2, this is not a good measure 
of the liberality of a policy because it does not capture the large discouragement effect that might 
have been occurring. 
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average person has, are only allowable because of the level of foreign investment in 
this country' (Age 11 October 1975). In September 1975 the government released a 
new set of foreign investment guidelines that formalised practice as it had evolved 
over the previous year (Treasurer, Press Release 24 September 1975; Aust, AFR, CT 
25 September 1975). 
The guidelines confirmed a policy of capping foreign equity at 50 per cent in any 
mining venture - finally holding some promise of policy certainty if not 
liberality.37 The guidelines did not distinguish between different types of minerals, 
except uranium, for which a policy objective of 100 per cent Australian equity was 
retained. The government took the logical step of merging the two existing 
interdepartmental foreign investment ,.. , . .imittees to form the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Committee. All foreign investment over the rather low $1 million 
threshold would come under its purvey, regardless of how they were financed. This 
had the potential to create a massive logjam, as even modest investments funded out 
of retained earnings would be caught up in the review process and this disconcerted 
the executives of some foreign firms already established in Australia (AFR 26 
September 1975). There remained explicit scope for the government to treat any 
case as a special one and deal with it on particular terms. Even small investments, if 
they somehow became politically salient, could become subject to Federal 
intervention. The September 1975 guidelines placed emphasis upon Australian 
nationals having a significant role to play in the management, technical operations 
and broader control of any investment. 
37 The Australian media's handling of the story of the government's new complete foreign investment 
guidelines in September 1975 was extraordinarily inconsistent. The Australian and The Australian 
Financial Review recognised it involved considerable liberalisation, but the Age, Sydney Morning 
Herald and the Courier Mail (25 September 1975) believed industry claims that it jeopardised 
mining projects which otherwise would have gone ahead. In fact the backers of the particular projects 
had merely been hopeful for exemption from the government's majority Australian ownership 
aspirations and were disappointed that a transparent set of guidelines would make that more difficult. 
These included the Northwest Shelf project, three iron ore mines in Western Australia and four coal 
mine ventures in Queensland (Age 25 September 1975). 
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Scandal and compromise 
New Treasurer Bill Hayden brought moderation and legislative coherence to the 
administration of FDI controls in mid-1975. The Whitlam government's reckless 
attempts to raise loans abroad through informal channels for the purpose of 'buying 
back the farm' brought Hayden to the Treasurer's job. Dr Jim Cairns and Rex 
Connor both lost their senior ministerial portfolios because of the 'loans affair' and 
the Whitlam government lost much of its credibility with the public at large. The 
loans affair marked the last occasion in a long history of Australian state 
developmentalism where a government would seek to borrow extensively abroad on 
its own accow1t in order to quicken the pace of national investment. The 'loans 
affair' stands out not only for the unorthodox and incompetent approach to securing 
such loans but the specific identification of them as being directed at enhancing 
Australian control of promising domestic industries. 
When the Whitlam government first came to office its main macro-economic policy 
challenge was to manage massive capital inflows - loan, portfolio and direct 
investments - that contributed to an overheating of the economy (Gruen 1976: 15-
22; Jolley 1978:31-57). By late 1974 the government was struggling with a credit 
squeeze, domestic recession, and chaos in international financial markets brought 
about by the first oil shock. Despite Labor's narrow electoral victory in May 1974, a 
subsequent slump in the government's standing in the opinion polls, and frustration 
by the Senate of its AIDC and NIF initiatives, senior ministers continued to presume 
a mandate to pursue their vision for the resources sector. Minerals and Energy 
Minister Rex Connor was determined to realise his extensive wish list of mineral 
processing and mining infrastructure projects despite the Parliament having denied 
the government the institutional infrastructure to realise them.38 Connor brushed 
aside those setbacks and fixated upon the raising of foreign loans. The debacle of 
38 Following the striking down of the PMA legislation by the High Court in June 1975, the Treasury 
also mounted open resistance to a government effort to transfer funds from the Treasurer's advance, 
the Contingency Fund, to a corporate vehicle called the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Pty Ltd. It 
had been created by Connor, with the two nominal shareholders being the head of the Department of 
Minerals and Energy and the head of the PMA, in case the High Court ruled as it did. Whitlam later 
conceded the attempt to transfer monies to it was most unusual, although not illegal (1985:252). 
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the loans affair was merely the final consequence of the extraordinary role of 
Connor in the Whitlam government. Kelly (1976: 155) wrote that 
For two and a half years he was virtually a law unto himself within the government. Few 
ministers in Australian peacetime history have exercised so much power with so little check, 
so singularly, so secretly, for so long. The springboard of Connor's strength was his 
intimidation of the Labor Party caucus and his special relationship with the prime minister. 
Relatively unknown when the ALP was elected to office in 1972, Connor had 
become a Labor hero through his tireless and blustering promotion of economic 
nationalism for the resources sector. In early 1975 the ALP national conference gave 
a ringing endorsement of Connor's policy objectives and ministerial style (AFR 3 
March 1975; Whitlam 1985:254).39 With Whitlam's backing and the agreement of 
Treasurer Cairns, Connor embarked on a politically perilous experiment. 
The Whitlam government initially sought to access petrodollar loans through 
established financial channels. In November 1974 a petrodollar loan was raised for 
the AIDC in New York and the government made further overtures to New York 
and Europ;ean financial institutions that were likely to play a large role in recycling 
windfall Middle Eastern oil profits (Aust 13 November 1974; AFR, Aust 14 
November 1974).4° Connor and Cairns, in stark contrast to the Treasury, came to the 
view that petrodollar loans might be secured on better terms through tapping 
networks of Middle Eastern business and political identities.41 In December 1974 
the Whitlam Cabinet took the unprecedented step of authorising Connor, rather than 
39 The 1975 ALP national conference endorsed, without opposition and with considerable 
enthusiasm, ' ... the minerals and energy policy embodied in the 1972 and 1974 Labor policy speeches 
and now being implemented so ably by Rex Connor, and urges that no departure from the said policy 
be tolerated' (cited in Whitiam 1985:254). 
40 In its first flush of success, OPEC reinforced the conviction of economic nationalists in resource-
rich economies that the free play of international market forces did not maximise economic returns to 
the nation. 
41 This view was not without some broader support, The Australian editorialising that 'It would be far 
simpler, of course, if Dr Cairns could go direct to our new-found friend, the Shah of Jran, and 
persuade him to take up a multi-million dollar investment in Australia. With the international 
monetary system in such chaos it might eventually come to that. But for the time being the Arabs, 
still placing their trust in the expertise of Western investment capitalists, are using the creaky system 
we all know' (13 November 1974). In September 1974 the Shah of Iran fiad visited Australia and 
discussions had taken place on cooperating in the trade and development of their respective energy, 
minerals and agricultural resources. In March 1975 Treasurer Cairns and agriculture minister Senator 
Ken Wreidt visited Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain for similar talks (Whitlam 1979:46). 
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the Treasurer, to raise a large petrodollar loan up to the astonishing sum of $4 
billion - later reduced to $2 billion.42 At the same time Connor and Cairns came to 
an understanding with little known Pakistani businessman Mr Tirath Khemlani that 
he should seek a loan on Australia's behalf.43 The precise timing of the 
authorisations, the sums involved, and the reasons for the failure of the loan raising 
were matters of great contention and many aspects still remain unclear {Kelly 
1976:155-77; Whitlam 1979:45-53). In March 1975 Treasurer Cairns also issued 
instrnctions to another businessman to seek loans on Australia's behalf, also against 
the explicit advice of Treasury (Kelly 1976:169-77). The Whitlam government did 
not consult the states through the Loan Council mechanism, as was established 
precedent, although it did get formal executive council approval for Connor's 
arrangement.44 Ultimately neither contact was able to arrange the loans at the 
promised terms, as Treasury had predicted but revelations of the government's 
unorthodox actions were to be politically devastating for it (Kelly 1976:170-71). 
Connor, Cairns and Whitlam had shrouded the loan raising efforts in secrecy, only 
reluctantly conceding them in Parliament under intense scrutiny from the 
Opposition (Age 14 February 1975; Aust 24 April 1975).45 Shadow Treasurer Phillip 
Lynch benefited from a number of leaks by Treasury officers horrified at the 
government's actions and generally disaffected by the complete marginalisation of 
the Department (Age 14 Febmary 1975). Whitlam was later scathing of supposed 
treachery on the part of Treasury and claimed this to be a major reason why 
unorthodox borrowing channels had to be explored in the first place (Whitlam 
1979:46; Grnen 1976:27; Whitwell 1986:214-15). The government's refusal to 
42 In hindsight the Whitlam government's pursuit of huge foreign loans appears consistent with the 
sentiments expressed by Whitlam in the famous I 972 It's Time campaign speech. He declared that 
'It's time to stop the great takeover of Australia. But more important, it's time to start buying 
Ai1stralia back. A Labor govenu11ent will enable ordinary Australia and ordinary Australians to take 
part in the ownership, development and use of Australian industries and resources.' ( 1985 :229) 
4l According to Whitlam's own account, Adelaide businessman Jerry Karidis approached then Clyde 
Cameron, about an associate of Middle Eastern oil interests who could supply a large loan to the 
government at 8 per cent interest (Whitlam 1979:47). Cairns, Connor and the Secretary of the 
Department of Mines and Energy, Sir Lenox Hewitt, met with Karidis who then put the government 
in contact with Mr Tirath Khemlani. 
44 Governor General Sir John Kerr was to later suggest that the Prime Minister had misled him. In 
reply Whitlam claimed Sir John had been an enthusiastic supporter of the loan raising effort and its 
objectives (1979:48-53). 
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make details of its plans and loan raising mechanism public contributed to a 
perception of malfeasance; allowing Opposition leader Malcolm Fraser to allege 
' ... the most serious possibility of a deliberate conspiracy to deceive and to 
defraud .. .' (cited in Whitlam 1979:58). Cairns and Connor were both ultimately 
forced from their senior portfolios by Whitlam but only because they both deceived 
him and the Parliament when they vowed that loan raising efforts had been ceased 
(Kelly 1976:175-77; Whitlam 1979, 38).46 
Given the stature ?f both ministers in the Labor government their fall was· a body 
blow to both Labor's already poor electoral prospects and ALP morale (Kelly 
1976:168). The irony of the loans affair is that it represented one of the most 
profound divergences from accepted good government in federal political history, 
and yet the protagonists were driven by a vision of the public interest. That vision 
was certainly ill conceived, it may almost have entailed conspiracy, but it was never 
a mask for private interest politics. Yet the loans affair allowed thfl Opposition, 
revitalised under Malcolm Fraser's leadership, to claim a certain moral authority in 
endeavouring to force the government to another election through deferring supply 
in the Senate.47 The Whitlam government had brought state developmentalism as a 
means to supplanting FDI into complete ill repute. However the aspiration for 
greater Australian ownership and control of industries remained a popular one in the 
electorate. The clearest proof of this was the Opposition's further embrace of 
economic nationalism as it sensed an election looming. 
In October 1975, just a month before the dismissal of the Whitlam government, the 
Coalition released a new foreign investment policy document. It bore a close 
resembhmce to the more moderate policy statement that Labor had issued several 
45 Lynch had spoken close to the truth when he said, 'Mr Connor has a manic and obsessive pre-
occupation with secrecy in all that he does' (Age 14 February 1975). 
46 In an editorial The Australian Financial Review concluded in April 1976, too simplistically, that: 
'The Whitlam government was brought down through its folly in trying to raise $4,000 million 
overseas for energy development projects in Australia to be financed by the public sector' (AFR 5 
April 1976). 
47 The political fallout from the loans affair continued for two years because of a private prosecution 
of senior Whitlam ministers that was launched by a Liberal Party supporter. However that ultimately 
led to the resignation of Fraser government Attorney-General Robert Ellicott because he disagreed 
with Fraser's desire to put an end to the issue. For Whitlam 's account of these events see Whitlam 
(1979: 137-52). 
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weeks before (Aust, AFR 14 October 1975). It criticised the Whitlam government's 
gross mismanagement of FDI policy and the resulting business uncertainly and 
decline in investment activity. Yet it did not promise a return to the more liberal 
policy settings of even the closing days of the McMahon government. Instead the 
Coalition promised a continuation of the recent guidelines promoting an equal 
partnership between domestic and foreign capital. The existing advisory committee 
would be revamped into a Foreign Investment Review Board, constitutt:d by 
esteemed private sector figures and served by the bureaucracy, and a Coalition 
government would, according to the document, publish its deliberations (Aust 14 
October 1975). A notable area of difference from the government was in the 
Coalition's plan to enact a requirement that a majority of company directors be 
Australians - a requirement appealing to its business community constituency (Age 
14 October 1975). The Opposition also promised to promote greater information 
disclosure by foreign firms and better monitoring of transfer pricing and MNE 
practices of concern. The Australian judged that the Coalition's new FDI document 
showed: 
... a clearly expressed commitment to Australian nationalism and independence, and an 
implied criticism of the policies of past Liberal-Country Party governments. This is all to the 
good; it shows that the Opposition has used its time in opposition to do some real thinking 
instead of simply fretting for the power that some of them seemed to believe was theirs by 
r.ight. In the long run, the Australian economy can only benefit from such a period of 
fundamental re-examination of policies and priorities (AFR 14 October 1975). 
The politics of FD I policy was reaching a point of near equilibrium. 
Conclusions 
Had the Whitlam government managed the implementation of economic nationalist 
policies better, J.nd had they been limited to imposing local equity and performance 
requirements on investors, then FDI policy might well have become a political 
strength for them. However, the govemment's endeavours to replace FDI with state 
developmentalism alienated influential financial sector interests. The government's 
plan to utilise a revamped AIDC for expanding the role of the state in the economy 
also deeply disconcerted local businesses in other sectors that, until then, might 
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have been indifferent to the government's economic nationalism. An ironic 
consequence of the government's clumsy pursuit of its public interest economic 
nationalist vision was the fostering of closer links between domestic and foreign 
firms in t~sponse. While public opiniori ;\!mained rather economic nationalist 
throughout Labor's time in office, doubts grew about whether the economic cost of 
Labor's vision might be too great. Private· interests and neutral observers alike 
promoted these concerns. The potential costs appeared all the greater because of the 
poor implementation by the government of its economic nationalist policies. When 
the Coalition returned to office in December 1975 it would concentrate on better 
managing the machinery of economic nationalism that it inherited from the Whitlam 
government rather than seeking to return to the open door policy it had maintained 
in the past. The following chapter examines why. 
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6 Equal partners, 1975-82 
On return to office the Coalition m&de a decisive break with Labor's state 
developmentalism, but not its economic nationalism. The Fraser government's FDI 
policy was defined by an aspiration for equal partnership between foreign and 
domestic capital centred on ownership rather than control. The Fraser period saw 
the consolidation of a distinct model of FDI regulation that entailed a review 
mechanism with formal guidelines on the percentage of foreign equity to be held in 
ventures. Unlike many countries, little effort was made to impose performance 
requirements on foreign investors. The implementation of local equity guidelines 
was always tempered by the Coalition's 'private developmentalism'; the resources 
sector providing the main hope for strong economic growth. Foreign equity 
guidelines were flexibly administered until 1980 because the national economy 
remained weak. From 1980 a promised resources boom was associated with a 
stricter implementation of existing policy. 
The Fraser government's preference for enforcing an equal partnership on foreign 
direct investors was a function of several interdependent factors. Many voters 
doubted the nation was maximising returns on its mineral resources. This view was 
also held within :sections of the policy community, the media, and the government 
itself, This and the political entrepreneurialism of the economic nationalist Labor 
opposition reinforced community concerns. The Federal government could not 
directly intervene in the states' administration of resources property rights, and 
declined to enact a federa! resource rent tax. Restrictions on foreign ownership, 
then, represented a second best solution to a perceived loss of national rents abroad. 
Although seemingly a public interest policy, domestic mining interests were also 
active in demanding such an approach from the government rather than the first best 
solution of a resource rent tax. Such rent-seeking was clearly evidenced in the 
dispute over a naturalisation mechanism for foreign finns in 1978. The Fraser 
government's policy of an equal partnership between foreign and domestic capital 
was borne of resources sector politics, but applied across most sectors of the 
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economy, albeit in a pragmatic fashfoli. The discretionary administrative instrument 
of the Foreign Investment Review Board provided the needed flexibility, and would 
prove to be a valuable mechanism for managing the complex politics ofFDI. 
This chapter first examines how the Fraser government reaffirmed the basic FDI 
' 
policy settings inb~rited from the Whitlam government, actually tightening policy in 
' 
several areas. It then notes the tension between this politically pragmatic position 
and the government's impulse to private developmentaUsm. The rnajor FDI policy 
initiative taken during the life of the Fraser government, the naturalisation 
provisions for foreign firms, is then examined. This decision reveals the 
government's struggle to strike a balance between economic nationalism and 
developmentalism, and the extent to which it was subjected to private interest 
lobbying on FDI policy. The chapter then looks at how growing inflow of FDI into 
mining, helping to drive a 'resources boom', saw policy implemented in a more 
restrictive manner. Finally, the tentative liberalisation of foreign investment in 
banking in the last term of the Fraser government is noted for what it says about the 
ideas and interests that determined the feasibility frontier of FbI policy. 
Affirming restrictive policy 
At the election of the Fraser government, Bell (1976:44) wrote, 
Present Australian government attitudes to foreign investment, indeed present Australian 
political attitudes to foreign investment, are essentially a compromise between two 
traditionally divergent pressures, which have for the time being at least converged to 
produce a state of near equilibrium. From a bipartisan start a quarter of a century ago, the 
policies on foreign investment of the conservative right and the socialist left have gone their 
~cparate ways only to come back full circle to bipartisanship, or virtually so. 
This is unsurprising for an election period, being consistent with theoretical 
understandings of the nature of policy positioning in two party competitions 
(Tullock 1967:50-61). Labor had recognised belatedly in office that its policy mix 
was too heavily weighted in favour of economic nationalism at the expense of 
economic growth. In seeking to win office the Coalition acknowledged the 
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continued strength of economic nationalism in the electorate. As a pragmatic move 
it was similar to the McMahon government's creation of the Foreign Takeovers Act 
in the run-up to the 1972 election, although much more restrictive. Foreign investors 
hoped that more lib~ral policy would be forthcoming once the Coalition was settled 
back into office. They were to be disappointed. 
Treasurer Phillip Lynch made an extensive FDI policy statement to Parliament on 
April 1 1976 that provided the foundation for FDI policy throughout the seven years 
of the Coalition's r:ule (Lynch 1976).I While chastising the Whitlam govemnient for 
having scared off valuable FDI, he also broke decisively with the Menzies legacy. 
In past decades of high immigration, and rapid industrial development, there was a general 
presumption that all foreign investment should be welcomed. This is no longer the case. The 
Australian community quite properly demands that government today take a more 
discriminating and mature attitude towards foreign investment ... Foreign capital is a means 
to material advancement, but material advancement is not our only aim. The government 
recognises that pursuit of policies on ownership and control involves trading some measure 
of material advancement for a more satisfactory overall arrangement (Lynch 1976:5) 
While a profound concession to economic nationalism, the Fraser government did 
offer a forthright rejection of Labor's state developmentalism.2 The main changes to 
the Whitlam government's 1975 FDI guidelines were more restrictive. The 50 per 
cent Australian equity rule that applied to the mining sector was extended to the 
pastoral, agricultural, forestr;r a:.d fishing sectors. The only aspect of FDI policy 
more liberal than the Wl't• 1~.:, government's was a 75 per cent local equity 
requirement for new m-..mium '._"lrojects rather than the old 100 per cent,3 This 
nonetheless reflected a back-down from the commitment whilst in opposition to 
treat uranium like any other mining resource and impose a 50 per cent rule. While 
I The seriousness with which the Fraser government took the politics of FDI in its early period of 
government is evidenced by the Prime Minister's insistence upon being apprised of foreign 
investment decisions (Kelly, NT25-30 October 1976). 
2 Lynch said that the government would ' •.. welcome proposals to increase the level of Australian 
participation in existing foreign-owned companies but we will avoid the costly option of 
repurchasing such companies' (Lynch 1976:5). The government left the AIDC alone, its legislative 
foundation being unchanged from its establishment by the previous Coalition government. 
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an equal partnership between domestic and foreign firms was the central object of 
policy, the government indicated it did not want investments to falter for want of a 
local partner and so would implement the 50 per cent rule flexibly. Media responses 
to the government's policy statement were generally quite favourable.4 Although 
foreign business interests would have liked to see a more liberal policy they were 
generally relieved by the presence of the Coalition government.5 There was, 
however, some consternation amongst domestic mining interests reliant upon 
foreign partners for expertise and financing, especially for uranium and oil 
exploratiC'n.6 
Having won a landslide victory, why did the Fraser government affirm an FDI 
policy so at odds with the open door regime the Coalition had presided over for so 
long? The logic of median voter models certainly suggests that, unless the policy 
preferences of voters and interest groups change, compromise policy positions will 
not be readily abanrloned. Economic nationalist sentiment in the electorate remained 
strong and Labor took up a slightly more illiberal policy position than it had under 
Hayden's treasurership. Secondly, as shall be seen below, private interest demands 
for local equity requirements continued. Both of these factors made affirmation lf\f a 
somewhat restrictive policy more politically attractive to the Fraser govemment.7 At 
3 In order to allow free market transactions of small share parcels in uranium mining ventures, 
portfolio shareholdings of up to I 0 per cent were made exempt from review (Treasurer, Press 
Release, 28 May 1976). 
4 Those newspapers more inclined to liberalism, such as the Sydney Morning Herald and those in the 
resource rich states, welcomed the possibility for approval of projects with less than 50 per cent 
Australian equity if no local partner could be found and that FIRB's advice would be infonned by 
Treasury and private sector figures (WA 6 April 1976). Perhaps the most surprising media response 
was. that of The Australian Financial Review. While its editorialist welcomed the Fraser 
government's policy statement, it urged the Coalition to back away from its 1975 commitment that 
the AIDC would not be allowed to initiate projects or be a long-term investor. The newspaper argued 
that a degree of public sector involvement was necessary to help realise the valid goal of maximising 
Australian ownership and control of mineral projects (AFR 5 April 1976). 
s The senior managing director of Nippon Steel, for instl,lllce, publicly applauded the FDI guidelines, 
(Aust, 26 May 1976), 
6 The chief of the Australian Petroleum Exploration Association (APEA) said that the industry 
needed \ .. a massive influx of overseas funds, regardless of what share that money buys of search 
operations ... We should skin the Yanks for every dollar they are willing to provide' (Aust 5 April 
1976). The AMIC was particulnrly critical of the Coalition's back-flip on uranium liberalisation (CT 
2 April 1976). 
7 Many observers have attributed the policy caution of the Fraser govemltlent to the personality of 
the Prime Minister and the controversial manner of its election to office {Ayres 1987:303-27). Much 
less attention has been given to the complex private interest constituencies that the Fraser 
government had to manage. 
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the same time, the Fraser government was only too aware of a counter-imperative 
for a liberal FDI policy. Unlike the booming economy that the McMahon 
government presided over when it gave into public and private interest calls for 
controls on foreign takeovers, the Fraser government was confronted by a stagnant 
economy, Conscious of this, senior ministers again emphasised, at home and 
abroad, that policy would be flexibly administered. 
However, this soon led to growing contention over whether the government was 
really committed to its stated FDI policy. Deputy Prime Minister Doug Anthony 
first provoked media and Opposition criticism when he suggested that up to I 00 per 
cent foreign ownership for minerals projects wm!ld be allowed in some cases (Sun 
Tel 6 May 1976). While in Japan in June 1976, Fraser emphasised the flexibility of 
the FDI regime and likewise was criticised (Sun Tel, Age 20 June 1976). A similar 
response followed from Treasurer Lynch's statements in Britain (Aust 25 June 
1976), and from Primary Industries Minister Ian Sinclair's suggestion that foreign 
investors ought to get in fast while the economy was still in recession. The 
government, he said, would not always be so willing to apply foreign investment 
policy so flexibly (AFR 28 June 1976). The government's formal accession to the 
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises was 
also at odds with its formal FDI policy. While the Australian government notified a 
range of exemptions to the national interest principle, it was certainly not flagging 
future liberalisation of FDI policy - as the Declaration implied (Treasurer, Press 
Release no.114; Flint 1985:147-48; MaidenAFR 23 June 1976).B By late July 1976 
there was so much confusion on how committed the government was to local equity 
guidelines that it was required to issue a formal clarifying statement (Aust, AFR, DT 
1 August 1976).9 
8 Legally enforceable rights and duties were not created by the Treasurer's statement of June 1976. 
To make them so international treaties require legislating in the Commonwealth parliament, and not 
merely ofa declaration (Flint 1985:146-47). 
9 Nonetheless soon after Deputy Prime Minister Doug Anthony boasted before a group of European 
business representatives that 'already some projects have been approved where there is less than 50 
per cent Australian equity. One substantial case of development recently approved is a new nickel 
project with 22 per cent Australian equity' (Aust l 7 August 1976). · 
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The administrative architecture of FDI controls that the Fraser government created 
in accordance with its policy commitment of October 1975, while an improvement 
upon those that existed under the Whitlam government, inevitably contributed to 
uncertainty about policy settings. The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 
was merely advisory in nature; discretionary authority over FDI proposals ultimately 
resting with the Treasurer. Soon after coming to office Treasurer. Lynch flagged 
amendments to the Foreign Takeovers Act to specify clearly the 'national interest' 
criteria against which investment proposals would be judged, the creation of a 
public register of all notified investments, and greater transparency in the ·review 
process (Ackland, AFR 18 December 1975). The government ultimately did none 
of those things, ostensibly having been convinced by Treasury that the national 
interest defied simple definition and that commercial-in-confidence considerations 
prevented more openness (McGuiness, NT 7-12 June 1976; AFR 23 August 1988). 
In fact the lack of openness was quite consistent with the 'culture' of Federal 
Treasury (Whitwell 1986). Non-transparency soon resulted in widespread 
speculation about how FDI policy was really being implemented. Constituencies for 
a liberal policy were easily alarmed by anecdotal accounts of inconsistent policy 
implementation, and by suggestions that many investments were being rejected at 
the 'informal dialogue' stage cond•Jcted: by Treasury officials serving on the FIRB 
(Ackland, AFR 23 July 1976; Kelly, NT25-30 October 1976). Constituencies for a 
restrictive policy, on the other hand, worried about the low official rate of rejections 
and about the Treasurer's boast that the government had deliberately given the FIRB 
a 'free enterprise flavour' (Lynch 1976:6).JD The government was ultimately 
prepared to bear the inevitable contention issuing from the non-transparent and 
discretionary FDI review process. This was because it might provide a mechanism 
for reconciling the conflicting political imperatives on FDI policy. Formal 
guidelines that required foreign investors to find local partners might appease 
nationalist sentiment in the community, while also serving the private interests of 
certain domestic Coalition constituencies. On the other hand, the discretionary 
ID The Fraser government also found that while appointing prominent business identities ta the FIRB 
gave the process more credibility in business circles, they were more apt to make public remarks on 
the conduct of FDI policy. On a nu.-nber of occasions Sir Bede Callaghan and Sir William Pettingell 
flagged more liberal policy than the government was formally committed to (AFR, 5 11 August 1976; 
Age 7 August 1980). This inevitably made FDI policy more contentious. 
157 
aspect of FDI regulation allowed the government to pursue a more liberal policy if it 
wished to do so. 
Private developmentalism 
Much of the public confusion about FDI policy stemmed from the government's 
deliberate strategy of varying its message in accordance with the policy preferences 
of particular audiences and its use of non-transparent discretionary controls. Yet the 
Fraser government's uncertainty about its own FDI policy preferences was· also a 
factor. This was an endemic problem rather than an FDI-specific one. Former Fraser 
government staffer Gerard Henderson (1994:263) judges that: 'The essential 
problem with the Fraser government in its first two terms (extending over five 
years) is that it did not really know what its purpose was - apart from turning away 
from the excesses of its predecessor.' The Prime Minister and his senior ministers 
were most certainly opposed to the clumsy state developmentalism of the Whitlam 
government. They were inclined instead to a private developmentalism that, for the 
Prime Minister at least, was tinged with economic n3tionalism (Loveday 1977, 
1982). This was a function of two interrelated fore.es: the personal ideological 
proclivities of Fraser (and many of his senior ministers) and the private interests of 
core Coalition business constituencies. In a sympathetic analysis of Fraser's views 
on economic policy, Jolley (1977:233) noted that the Prime Minister had 'never 
followed a rigid laissez-faire line on government intervention in the economy', 
supporting 'the use of direct controls to achieve the goal of development'. 
Moreover, Jolley saw in Fraser a belief that: 'The mainspring of national 
development, the key to the development of wealth, lies in the development of the 
primary, manufacturing and mining industries' (1977:235).ll The heavy burden of 
tariff protection on the Australian economy went largely unchallenged by the Fraser 
government, as did much other inefficient economic regulation (Glezer 1982; 
Anderson and Garnaut 1987; Pomfret 1985). Changes in the structure of private 
interests close to the Liberal Party strengthened the economic nationalist element. A 
domestic mining industry constituency that benefited from some FDI controls had 
11 Fraser's personal background helps to account for this conviction, and for his close relationship 
with senior National Party leaders (Ayres 1987). 
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emerged alongside the domestic manufacturing interests who hoped that FDI 
regulation would shield them from new competition or hostile foreign takeover.12 
At the same time the Fraser government faced strong political pressures to deliver 
economy recovery, both from its immediate business constituencies and from the 
broader electorate. In the first three years of office the Fraser government was 
confronted by the continuing international and domestic legacy of the Whitlam 
government's response to the first oil shock.13 In late 1977 government strategists 
feared the economy might deteriorate further and so decided to go to an early 
election, taking a~vantage of Gough Whitlam's continued leadership of the· Labor 
Opposition (Ayres 1987:326-27). During the campaign the Coalition had made 
much of an ostensibly imminent minerals boom; one newspaper's headlines 
declaring 'Coalition's El Dorado' (AFR 29 November 1977). Recognising the 
resilience of perceptions in the electorate that Australia did not reap the full benefits 
of FDI, the Fraser government announced a new 'branch profits tax' that was really 
the closing up of a loophole in the withholding tax system (AFR, CT 2 November 
1977). Having won a handsome victory, the Fraser goverrunent then placed great 
store on the realisation of an investment-led boom in the minerals sector as an 
engine of economic growth (AFR 26 June 1978).14 
The Fraser government's increasing preoccupation with the resources sector as a 
potential engine of economic growth had three direct consequences for FDI policy: 
12 The management and employees of Provincial Traders, for instance, lobbied Liberal MPs in an 
effort to stave off a takeover by George Weston Foods Ltd (Robins, AFR I September 1977). They 
feared job losses und~r Weston's proposed capital program (AFR 6 September 1977). Domestic 
bidders for the tea and coffee merchant Bushells called upon the Federal government to block a 
highly priced bid by the Brooke Bond group, of the United Kingdom, for the fmn (Short, AFR 22 
November 1978; Thomas, Age 7 September 1978). In response to such demands, the interests of 
vendors in a liberal FDI policy were repeatedly advocated by the Australian Shareholders' 
Association - as in the Bushells case (Age 7 September 1978). Instances of private interest demands 
in the mining industry will be examined below. 
13 The balance of payments deficit blew-out from 1.9 per cent of GDP in 1975-76 to 3.6 per cent in 
1978-79 because of a weak terms of trade, unemployment rose to a then unprecedented 6.2 per cent 
in 1977-78, the economic growth rate fell to less than I per cent in the same financial year, while 
inflation remained high (Dyster and Meredith 1990:270-72). 
14 Although the Fraser government was to be later mocked for its repeated claims about a resources 
boom, and criticised for the inflationary impact that such pronouncements had on centralised wage 
negotiations, the government appeared to be vindicated by events In late 1978 and 1979 (Ayres 
1987:354). A strong tum around in Australia's terms of trade for both minerals and farm produce, 
with export values increasing 32 per cent, saw the balance of payments deficit drop to only 1.7 per 
cent of GDP in 1979-80 (Dyster and Meredith 1990:270, 272). 
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increased marketing of Australia as an investment destination, an embarrassing back 
down from plans for a resources rent tax, and a cautious liberalisation of FDI policy. 
The Fraser government's initial international investment promotion efforts had been 
aimed at reassuring established investors following the uncertainties of the Whitlam 
period (AFR 18 June 1976; Aust 25 June 1976). After its re-election at the 1977 
election the Fraser government redoubled its inward investment promotion efforts, 
concentrating almost entirely upon the resources sector (Toohey, AFR 20 July 1979; 
Anderson 1998:2-3). Particular attention was given to attracting further Japanese 
FDI into minerals processing and upgrading facilities, and to the promotion of long-
term contracts for new proje~t;; (Myer 1978). The biennial Australia-Japan 
Ministerial Committee meetings provided a ready mechanism for high-level 
dissemination of Australia's FDI policy message to Japan, but the government also 
reinforced this with additional official visits (CT 24 March 1978; AFR, Aust 23 June 
1978).15 The government's desire to grow inward FDI was nonetheless hampered by 
the absence of a supportive bureaucratic infrastrncture.16 
The government's fixation with the immediate growth prospects of the minerals 
sector, its concern about negative foreign investor sentiment, and its susceptibility to 
lobbying by mining interests and Coalition state governments, were all starkly 
revealed by its resource rents tax decision. The resource rent tax concept found 
considerable support in academic circles and within the Federal bureaucracy as it 
was perceived to be a more efficient tax instrument than those used by the state 
15 Rix (1999:83) noted that the January 1977 Australia-Japan Ministerial Conference was 
characterised by tough demands from the Australian side on a range of trade issues, and a certain 
atmosphere of mistrust. However, this changed significantly during the next meeting in 1978. 
16 Australian trade commissioners abroad, for instance, were actively discouraged from dealing with 
potential foreign investors following a 'turf war' between the Department of Overseas Trade and the 
Treasury. An operations circular from the Department of Overseas Trade to the trade commissioners 
(dated 24 January 1977) stated that: 'All inquiries should be dealt with directly by the Foreign 
Investment Review Board, c/o the Treasury. Trade commissioners should not act as intermediaries 
between the potential investor and the FIRB. It is not appropriate for a trade commissioner to play a 
prominent part in actively seeking out investment inquiries'. (Cited in Phillips, Aust 14 December 
1979). 
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governments.17 Several senior ministers, including Fraser, had leant public support 
to the resource rents concept and the government had flagged the introduction of 
such a tax for the oil and uranium sectors in its 1977 budget. With the Federal 
Election behind it, and confronted by intense resistance from the state governments 
and mining interests, the Fraser government backed away from a resources rent tax. 
In doing so it played squarely into the hands of critics of FDI in the resources sector, 
in several ways. 
Firstly, the Prime Minister explicitly said that the tax had been abandoned because 
of the need to be sensitive to foreign investor opinion (Aust, AFR 4 July 1978; 
Drysdale, Garnaut and Smith 1980: 19). Secondly, initial government support for a 
resources tax had bestowed credibility upon critics' claims that the Australian 
community was not receiving a fair return from public mineral resources. Thirdly, 
the explicit raising of foreign investor confidence as a rationale for the back down 
implicated foreign firms in the 'rip-off and made the government look as if it was 
not able to 'stand up to' powerful multinational firms. Media responses to the back 
down were generally scathing. The Australian Financial Review, for instance, 
editorialised that: 'By abandoning its resource tax plan, the government is signalling 
that it is prepared to pay any price at all for foreign investment' (AFR 4 July 1978). 
Ironically, the most fundamental problem with the resource rent tax decision was 
that FDI restrictions were left only as a 'second best' solution if the Federal 
government perceived that the state governments were not maximising the return on 
Australian natural resources (Anderson 1983:146-47),18 It was a bad position from 
which to politically sell a new initiative that substantially liberalised FDI policy for 
select foreign firms. 
l? Treasury had long harboured concerns iibout the efficacy of state taxation of mineral resource 
industries (Treasury 1972). Support across departments for a resource rent tax (RRT) was evidenced 
in a 1980 report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Strategy (H. .R. Hansard 25 
February 1982:696). For a sample of academic and other opinion for and against the RRT concept 
see Anderson (1983:144-48), Flint (1977), Gamaut and Clunies Ross (1979), Hawke (1980:176), 
Smith (1984) and Ball and Bowers (1984). On state government measures see Barnett (1979:309-11) 
and Stevenson (1977). State governments in the resource rich states strongly resisted a RRT as they 
feared losing mining revenues to the Commonwealth, as they also resisted controls on FDI (Drysdale 
1977: 14-17). See, for instance, the statement by Queensland Mines and Energy Minister, Camm. 
(1980:14-15). 
l8 This was precisely the argument of the opposition resources spokesman, Paul Keating (SMH 15 
April 1981). 
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Naturalisatio11 provisio11s 
The single most notable FDI policy initiative of the Fraser years was the 
implementation of new 'naturalisation provisions' for foreign investors in mid-1978 
(Bryan 1989:2; Sexton and Adamovich 1983:134-35; Anderson 1983:133-37). The 
government was drawn to the naturalisation provisions by its hope that a strong 
investment-driven activity in the resources sector might lift the Australian economy 
out the doldrums. This required it to contend with the conflicting interests within 
the mining industry that existing FDI policy promoted. The policy preferen9es of 
firms on the naturalisation provisions were a direct function of the likely financial 
impact of the changes on them. The issue also revealed that although local equity 
requirements in the mining industry were only a few years old, they had already 
generated a constituency that fought for their preservation. This was because the 
50150 local equity guideline was, as Anderson (1983: 149) stated, 'essentially a tax 
levied on foreign investors' because it required them to sell a half share in a project 
to local investors in a heavily constrained market. That 'tax' did not flow to the 
Australian community at large, as it would in the case of resource rent tax, but 
instead to the local partners and its shareholders. 
Throughout 1977 the Federal government's FDI policy had frustrated the expansion 
plans of mining giant Conzinc Riotinto Australia (CRA). Although established in 
Australia since the turn of the century, CRA remained controlled by the British firm 
Rio Tinto-Zinc (RTZ) (Harvey 1981 ). CRA maintained close links with the 
Coalition, having advised it on the Whitlam government's draft legislation for the 
resources sector and assisted in the drafting of Coalition policy while still in 
Opposition (W: Aust 3-4 June 1978). Nevertheless, CRA faced stiff resistance to its 
proposals to take over Australian miner Coal and Allied Industries (CAIL)l9 and to 
take a controlling stake in the huge Hail Creek colliery in Queensland. The Federal 
Opposition was critical of CRA's bid for Coal and Allied Industries. The Wran 
Labor government in New South Wales1 still influenced by strongly economic 
19 The bid was actually ajoint-venture one with the firm Howard Smith. 
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nationalist ideas, threatened to do everything in its power to frustrate the takeover 
and the company.20 
Although the Wran government's position was troubling for CRA, of even greater 
immediate concern was the emergence of an influential business constituency 
pressuring the Federal government to block CRA's bid for CAIL. Australian mining 
group Peko-Wallsend sensed a bargain national sentiment could be sufficiently 
played upon to secure a blocking of the CRA bid (Short, AFR 4 October 1977).21 
CRA ultimately secured Federal government approval for the CAIL bid only by 
promising to conduct a full share swap for CAIL; effectively 'Australianising' its 
own share register by some 3 per cent (Byrnes, AFR 4 September 1977). The issue 
came before Cabinet, reflecting the government's recognition both of the intensity 
of feeling that CRA had provoked, and of CRA':; own political clout. CRA's 
experience with CAIL focused it upon limited localisation of its share register as a 
strategy for lifting the constraints of FDI policy. 
CRA was confronted by an even stronger local business rival in its efforts to lobby 
the government for permission to take a dominant share of the giant Hail Creek coal 
project. CRA's general policy objective was an ambitious one: an exemption from 
the government's recently affirmed 50 per cent local equity requirement, and for the 
largest planned colliery in the country. CRA's vehicle for securing control of the 
Hail Creek project would be a takeover of the Australi~.Il mining firm AAR, for 
which it sought approval under the Foreign Takeovers Act. In O·:":tober 1977 the 
government refused CRA's application, despite CRA's proposal to 'naturalise' the 
firm over time. if granted approval. The government's ostensible concern was that 
CRA had not proposed a clear timetable for naturalisation (Short, AFR 24 March 
20 The NSW Minister for Mines and Energy at the time, Pat Hills, was much influenced by Rex 
Connor's economic nationalism and resolved to use the State's control ofmiP.ing rights to enforce a 
51 per cent Australian equity requirement (AFR l, 30 August 1977, 4 September 1977). This 
amounted to the first instance of a state endeavouring to maintain its fJWil restrictions on FDI. 
Complex constitutional questions arose that were never ultimately te~ted. Although the Wran 
government produced its own FDI guidelines the Cabinet eventually rdgned in Hills and foreign 
investors were ultimately not hampered (Frith, Aust I June 1978; AFR 15 July 1978). 
21 ihe government's position was not macle an easier by CRA 's brazen move to buy large parcels of 
CAIL shares in the market before commen~ing discussions with regulators (Short, AFR 4 October 
77). 
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1978). CRA executives, and many industry observers, doubted this was the whole 
story. CSR, a large localised fim1 of British origins, had actively lobbied the Federal 
government to reject CRA's bid for AAR. When the government did so, CSR 
successfully bid for AAR itself (Frith, Aust 1 June 1978). An established rivalry 
between CRA and CSR was gravely exacerbated and came to exemplify the private 
interest battle over the. government's subsequent plans for new naturalisation 
provisions. 
In part through t~s experience, CRA adopted the view that the government would 
not take the political risk of substantial general liberalisation of local equity 
requirements for mining. CRA then started lobbying the government for a more 
flexible regime that would allow the company to be declared 'Australian' while the 
50/50 guidelines remained intact. Although its naturalisation proposals to the 
government had had only mixed results, this remained the most promising way of 
lifting the regulatory limits on CRA's growth. The firm certainly stood to benefit 
immediately from securing naturalised status as it held a 52.2 per cent stake in the 
Ashton Downs diamond discovery in Western Australia. The only Australian equity 
holder had a paltry 5 per cent and CRA would have had to cooperate in raising total 
Australian equity to 50 per cent under the existing policy (Aust 6 June 1978). In 
early 1978 CRA made another formal promise to the Federal government to 
naturalise its shareholding, the document being handed to the Prime Minister 
directly by the chairman of its British parent (Short, AFR 24 March 1978). CRA was 
not alone in calling for more generous naturalisation provisions. Other prominent 
foreign re~ources firms, such as MIM and Consolidated Gold Fields, also had 
substantial minority Australian equity shareholders and good connections with both 
the Coalition and the Treasury (Chanticleer, AFR 1 June 1978). The argument for 
new naturalisation provisions was also strengthened by the government's 
established administration of the FDI guidelines. The FIRB was permitting foreign 
firms to make investments on the 1•nderstanding that equity would later be sold 
down to local investors.22 On this basis, there was strong support for the 
22 A good example was provided by Tokyo Corp., which was allowed to take I 00 per cent equity in 
the Yanchep Sun City resort development in Western Australia on condition it sold down to at least 
SO per cent as soon as practicable (CT 15 June 1978). 
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naturalisation provisions within the foreign investment section of Treasury. At the 
same time, officials were apparently antagonised by CRA's repeated use of political, 
rather than administrative, channels to communicate their policy preferences 
(Beeby, Aust 6 June 1978; W. Aust 3-4 June 1978).23 
When Treasurer Howard ultimately announced the government's plan for new 
naturalisation provisions he was open about the fact that the idea had emanated 
from industry players (AFR 1 June 1978). While his candid remark gave the 
impression that the government was doing CRA a favour, the politics of the private 
interests were, in fact, rather messy for the Coalition. The motivation for the 
naturalisation provisions was principally public interested, even if mending fences 
with CRA was to the government's benefit. The major driver of the naturalisation 
decision was the Prime Minister's hope that more FDI might kick-start a stalled 
economy.24 In March 1978 Fraser had taken the unusual step of initiaiing a hasty 
review of barriers to further foreign investment, in the resources sector in particular, 
rather than leaving the task to Treasurer Howard who was the responsible minister. 
This was widely understood within the government as being driven by Fraser's 
determination to have good news for potential foreign investors on an upcoming 
overseas trip (Short, AFR 24 March 1978). 2s Strong resistance from mining interests 
with local status was to frustrate that plan but not the realisation of the 
naturalisation provisions. 
Treasurer Howard brought the major domestic and foreign mining, and some 
manufacturing, interests together at several meetings, where the divergence of 
interests was stark.26 CSR chief Gordon Jackson led the opposition to the proposed 
23 There was also strong support within Treasury for leaving naturalisation timetables to be worked 
out on a case-by-case basis between the applicant and the FIRB (Beeby, Aust 6 June 1978). 
24 The naturalisation provisions were coupled with further liberalisation of access to foreign debt, 
benefiting both domestic and foreign finns. The Fraser government hoped this would bring a 
substantial increase in investment to the resources sector (AFR 9 June 1978). 
ZS Discussions about the naturalisation provisions with key industry figures, and within the 
government, were continuing frantically the day before the Prime Minister left Australia for London 
and New York (Short, AFR 21 May 1978). While abroad he could only hint at policy changes, and 
Treasurer Howard was able to take control of the issue in his absence. 
26 While Treasurer Howard refused to reveal publicly who attended the meetings, and wns criticised 
by the Opposition as n cons!!quence, details of the meetings soon leaked to the media. The most 
controversial meeting, held Iii Canberra, was attended by senior executives from lns11rance and 
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naturalisation provisions, with the strong support of BHP, Westt.. Mining 
Corporation (WMC) and Pek.o-Wallsend. Media reports suggested that a heated 
exchange occurred between Jackson and CRA boss Sir Roderick Carnegie at a 
Canberra meeting with the Treasurer and Deputy Prime Minister (W. Aust 3-4 June 
1978).27 Jackson argued to the government that the proposed change would r-un 
counter to community sentiment on foreign investment policy, risking a backlash 
that could directly scare off foreign investors and lead to pressures for less rather 
than more liberal policy (Chanticleer, AFR 1June1978).28 
Jackon's concern lay not with defending against foreign investors from an economic 
nationalist perspective so much as with the rents that his finn secured from the 
existing 50/50 equity policy. As a prominent business analyst noted at the time, 
Naturalised foreigners will be spared the bureaucratic entanglement of the Foreign 
Investment Review Board and fully Australian companies such as CSR, BHP and Peko-
Wallsend will lose the specific advantage of sighting virtually all proposed resource 
developments simply because they were the only avenues of attaining Australian equity 
under the existing rules. (McCrann, Age I June 1978). 
CRA, Consolidated Goldfields and MIM stood to benefit greatly from naturalisation 
and so fought both for easy access tu the status and wide-ranging entitlements. 
Stockbroking firms were in favour of the naturalisation provisions as they promised 
to inc~ease the number and volume of share offerings to local investors. Life 
stockbroking firms as well as from BHP, CRA, CSR, Amatil, Peko-Wallsend, Western Mining 
Corporation and ACI, amongst others (Frith, Aust I June 1978). Doug Anthony, Deputy F 'i.: 
Minister and Trade, Minerals and Energy Minister also attended (AFR 21, 22 May 1978; Frith, Aust 
l June 1978; AFR l June 1978). 
?.7 Ironically, on~,,. 'CRA had secured naturalised status, Chainnan Sir Roderick Carnegie was not 
avers<:· t.o warning UJ$ainst the long-tenn balance of payments problems associated with foreign 
invt:51J.r1eot. f. Ntat,'.e instance was in relation to the role of petroleum giants in Australian resources 
proj<;ct~ • ~ wht.:e ~RA had an incentive to exclude them to its gain (NT 8-14 June 1980). 
28 Following the government's decision on the naturalisation provisions Jackson remained publicly 
critical for some titrte, ultimately earning a surprising rebuke from FIRB Chainnan Sir Bede 
Callaghan (AFR 21 June 19'/8). CSR maintained its lobbying efforts against a substantial 
liberalisation of FDI policy throughout the years of the Fraser government. In 1981, when it was 
rumoured that the government might liberalise FDI policy settings, the company forwarded material 
advocating its polir.y prefer{lnces to all government MPs (AFR 15 May 1981). In 1982 Jackson wrote 
that ' ... the larger Australian companies have the capacity to take the leading position in major 
projects .. ' and '. .. ready availability of loan money makes it more possible than before for 
governments to act so as to ensure Australian ownership of major projects. And for ilie large foreign 
investment which will be needed, loan funds should be preferred to equity.' (1982:54). 
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insurance firms welcomed the provisions for the additional investment opportunities 
for themselves (Frith, Aust 1 June 19?'8).29 
Although domestic mining interests soon recognised that the government was 
committed to a naturalisation scheme they contested certain asp~cts of its design. 
These were the local equity target to be set for naturalising status, the timeframe 
allowed to achieve it, the core issue of compliance as firms were to secure 
naturalising status up :front, and the particular entitlements that the status bestowed. 
The ultimate policy outcome was not quite as liberal as some local mining interests 
feared30. Foreign firms could qualify for naturalising status by having 25 per cent 
Australian equity and liaising with the FIRB to realise 51 per cent over time, when it 
would then be designated as 'naturalised'. It was expected that naturalisation would 
occur through new share issues rather than through acquisition of domestic 
businesses, although the government retained the discretion to approve such a 
course (Treasurer, Press Release 8 June 1978; AFR 9 June .1978). Treasurer 
Howard's public statement announcing the new provisions stated that a naturalising 
or nateralised company, 
... would be able to proceed with new projects in its own right, in partnership with an 
Australian company, a nattiralised company or a naturalising company, within the 
government's guidelines for new projects. However, a naturalised company would, in the 
absence of special circumstances, be precluded from undertaking a project as a joint venture 
with a wholly overseas owned company, as this would involve a departure from the 50 per 
cent guideline. {Treasurer, Press Release 8 June 1978). 
29 The political influence of the stockbroking industry over Coalition governments was borne out in a 
number of instances - such a3 their protection from foreign takeovers by the guidelines but also in 
the requirement that the new national takeovers legislation worked out with the states greatly 
privileged stockbrokers. This imposition of great costs on investors was staunchly criticised by the 
Australian Tndustries Development Association (Aust 12 May 1980). 
30 CSR's Jackson and other r.ritics had raised scenarios where naturalising Status would make a 
mockery of the government's ostensible commitment to 50 per cent local equity. These scenarios 
centred on the possibility of ventures being nm on a basis where the 51 per cent shareholder was a 
company that was technically Australian by virtue of having itself 51 per cent Australian ownership 
and the other partn~r being fully foreign-owned (AFR I. June 1978). In such a situation the venture 
would be considered to be Australian-controUed, despite the equity indirectly held in the project by 
Australians being little more than a quarter. Critics argued that as the government's proposal was to 
grant naturalising status firms with 25 per cent J(l?,\al equity, and a credible schedule for raising it to 
51 per cent, interim situations of even greater foreign control were possible (AFR I June 1978). 
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A partnership between two naturalising firms would entail complete foreign control 
in the interim. The only stricture in this respect was the requirement that a 
naturalising firm amend its articles of association to ensure that a majority of 
directors were always Australians. This no doubt pleased the local directors of 
foreign subsidiaries and the Coalition's business constituencies in general. 
Unless one presumed that the corporate governance of foreign subsidiaries was 
characterised by considerable agency slack, the foreign control issue remained. The 
government did little to reassure critics that the interim period of foreign control 
" 'v1ld be a short one, or that it was serious about enforcing firms' cr,mmitment to a 
naturalisation schedule.JI Senior Labor Opposition figures attac~~ed the lack of a 
requirement for a clear timetable to apply to naturalising firms, although leader Bill 
Hayden was receptive to the basic principle of a naturalisation scheme (SMH 9, 10 
June 1978).32 While media commentary was generally receptive to the idea of a 
naturalisation process, there was strong criticism of the government's refusal to 
specify a timeframe or how non-compliance wo0ld be dealt with (Aust 31 May 
1978, 9 June 1978; AFR, Age, SMH, CM, WA 9 June 1978). Only The Advertiser in 
South Australia was prepared to give the government the benefit of the doubt (Adv 
10 June 1978). 
In the first three years of office the Fraser government had to contend with balance-
of-payments uncertainties comparable to those with which Coalition governments in 
31 The government's policy statement on the subject held that companies were expected to make: 'A 
public commitment to increase Australian equity to 51 per cent subject to agreed understandings 
between the company, major shareholder interests and the government, and regular discussions with 
the Foreign Investment Review Board on progress' (Treasurer, Press Release, AFR 9 June 1978). 
However, it also stated: 'The government docs not believe that it would be realistic to impose a strict 
timetable because of commercial considerations outside the company's control.' 
32 The Labor Opposition soon diminished its credibility with mining industry figures by suggesting 
that the shares required to be sold to Australians to take the local holdings to 51 per cent could be 
allocated in one lump to the AIDC, which would then releasing them to the market (AFR 13 June 
197&). Such a notion was untenable ru; the AIDC would have had to either interpose its own balance 
sheets on the transactions or be susceptible to lobbying from the naturatisi:ng finn on the timing of 
share sales. 
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the early and mid-1960s had been faced.33 This had predisposed Treasurers Holt 
and McMahon to the defence of liberal FDI policy against a growing number of 
critics. Likewise, Treasurer Howard remarked to Parliament in November 1978 that 
he would be reticent to block large foreign investment proposals because of the 
balance of payments situation (AFR 22 November 1978). That more liberal FDI 
policy was not forthcoming was testimony to the powerful mix of electoral, 
ideational and private interest forces behind the 50/50 policy. The naturalisation 
provisions raised some hope of greater foreign investment flows but they were to be 
relevant for only. a small number of firms. The only additional liberalisation 
measure adopted was the reduction of the local equity requirement for uranium 
projects to the 50 per cent that applied to other resources developments. Even then, 
the government initially did so for one project as ostensibly a special case (CT 16 
June 1979).34 The goal of an equal partnership between foreign and domestic 
capital remained the bedrock of FDI policy under the Fraser government; its 
rigorous enforcement only temporarily tempered by the economic growth 
imperative. 
Resources boom. and more restrictive policy 
Through 19'/9 and 1980 Australia's terms of trade improved strongly, bringing a 
substantial increase in the balance of payments and attracting strong capital inflow 
into the resurgent resources sector. This foreign capital came both in the form of 
33 The current account deficit as a per cent of GDP was 2.9 per cent in 1976-77, 3.3 per cent in 
1977-78, and 3.6 per cent in 1978-79, dropping dramatically to only 1.7 per cent in 1979-80 before 
blowing out to 4. I per cent in 1980-81 and a disturoing 6 per cent in 1981-82 (ABS, Balance of 
Payments, Australia 1986-87; Oyster and Meredith 1990:270). On the parallels with the 1960s see 
Jolley (1978: 195). 
34 The decision involved granting an exemption from the 75 per cent to Esso I:- r the Yeelirric 
project, being developed with Western Mining Corporation. The associated press release stated that a 
50 per cent Australian equity level in other uranium projects 'in special circumstances' could be 
applied (Age 11 June 1979). Treasurer Howard's successful submission to Cabinet represented a 
belated victory for the Treasury over the Department of Trade and Resources. Treasury had failed 
back in early 1976 to overcome the latter's influential opposition to treating all mining projects the 
same way (AFR 20 April 1979). 
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finance for foreign equity investment and of overseas borrowing by local interests35. 
By mid 1981 capital inflow was so strong that the government removed many 
constraints on outward portfolio investment (AFR 9 July 1981).36 Strong capital 
inflow made a tightening ofFDI policy easier. The 50 per cent local equity rule was 
more strictly enforced; the government refusing to accept that Australian investors 
were not at hand and being much less receptive to open-ended 'localisation' 
promises. The government did not announce a more restrictive implementation of 
existing policy but it became apparent in the detail of a number of decisions (NT 8-
14 February 1981; McCrann, Age 22 April, 24 April 1981). The Coalition premiers 
of Western Australia and Queensland were in no doubt that the Fraser government 
was more rigidly enforcing the 50 per cent local equity rule than it had previously, 
and were strongly critical (Grattan, Age 13 February 1981). Treasury officials 
certainly denied that the government was using foreign investment controls as a 
deliberate counter-cyclical macro policy instrument.37 The government's FDI 
policy-making was nonetheless influenced by the confluence of the economic and 
political cycles. 
The question remains of why the Fraser government was inclined to tighten FDI 
policy. The answer is threefold. The impulse to more restrictive policy grew from 
the personal policy preferences (of a 'public interest' kind) of the Prime Minister 
and some senior ministers, and from the electoral appeal of the Labor Opposition's 
economic nationalism. Reinforcing these factors was the influence of domestic 
private interest constituencies favouring local equity rules. The government could 
not afford to ignore Labor's attacks on FDI policy because of the centrality of the 
35 New investment in resources projects in •mticipation of stronger international demand saw the 
aggregate figure for FDI across all sectors rise 30.5 per cent in 1978-79, then only 13.3 per cent for 
1979-80 before rising 55. l per cent in 1980-81. Total inward foreign portfolio investment and Joans 
rose steadily throughout the 1970s ]Jut surged on the back of the resources boom and stricter local 
equity requirements. It rose 51.6 per cent in 1979-80, 61.1 per cent in 1980-81, 76.2 per cent in 
1981-82 and a'notable 90.2 per cent in 1982-83 (ABS Cat. No. 5305.0; F!RB, various years). 
36 Under the old rules individuals were limited to $40,000 per year, substantial private companies 
$250,000 and public companies $2,S million (Jacques, AFR 9 July 1981). 
37 Senior Treasury officials tried to mollify annoyed mining industry figures who had been told by 
bureaucrats from the Department of Trade and Resources and the Department of National 
Development that the foreign investment review process would be used as an instrument of 
macroeconomic policy -- namely to promote the orderly development of mineral resources to 
minimise inflationary and currency appreciation effects. Trcas<1ry officials insisted that the 
government would not resort to such crude measures (Age 10 November 1980). 
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'resources boom' to its own political strategy. The p~rvasive influence of Fraser 
over the policymaking of his government, and his statements both before and while 
holding office, leave little for doubt that he was personally inclined to force foreign 
investors into equal partnerships with local firms.JS Kelly (1984:89) noted as much, 
judging that, 
Fraser was an aristocratic but repressed version of Rex Connor~ the Labor Minister whose 
destruction he used as a trigger to assume office. Beneath his rhetoric and action to promote 
private enterprise and liberate market forces Malcolm Fraser harboured a secret dream - to 
pioneer Australia's great resource developments. When his chance came Fraser seized it, 
not just as a welcome departure from the long negative grind of beating inflation but as the 
realisation of the development-nationalist within him. (Kelly 1984:89). 
As Kelly implie§, Fraser's overriding objective was the development of the 
resources per se, and he had been prepared to make modest concessions on the 
secondary objective of local equity participation to secure investments. With strong 
domestic and foreign investor interest from 1979 the choice between the two 
objectives seemed less stark. 
The government was not alone in holding· such a view. Editorial comment by a 
number of the major newspapers, such as The Australian Financial Review, The Age 
and The Australian all supported stricter enforcement of local equity requirements 
(Age 5 September 1980; Aust 5 September 1980; AFR 29 April 1980; 31 October 
1980). Underpinning these views was usually the perception that national mineral 
resources were not being well administered by the states and rents due to the nation 
coulci be lost as a consequence. In no small part this was a consequence of the 
growing negative r8putations of the Court government in Western Australia and the 
Bjelke-Petersen government in Queensland. FDI had become particularly 
contentious in Queensland, as had the government's authoritarian) developmentalist 
38 On the development of Fraser;s personal philosophy see Ayres (1987) and on his dominance of 
Cabinet see Grattan and Weller {1981). Fraser's economic nationalism became more strident after 
losing office, especially in response to the Hawke government's FDI policy for the media and the 
growing controversy over Japanese investment in the late 1980s. 
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and even corrupt style of government (Fitzgerald 1984:304-79; Charlton 1987:148-
91; Coaldrake 1989).39 
The Fraser government's rejection of a resources rent tax (RRT) in 1978 on the 
grounds that it might damage foreign investor confidence in Australia contributed to 
the RRT being an ongoing political issue for the Coalition. This was compounded 
by public evidence of ongoing support within the Federal bureaucracy for such a 
tax40. As Drysdale, Garnaut and Smith (1980: 19) judged, 
... it is somewhat paradoxical that the only reason ever given by the government for rejecting 
such a tax ... was that it would deter foreign investment. Not only is this unlikely, but the 
very absence of a resource rent tax leads to deliberate policy ostensibly aimed at restricting 
foreign ownership of the industry. 
The Opposition responded to the Fraser government's claims of an impending 
resources boom with the twin calls for a RRT and stricter FDI policy. Shadow 
resources spokesman Paul Keating, along with some mining industry figures, 
understood that the absence of the RRT made calls for more restrictive FDI policy 
more credible (SMH 15 April 1981).41 
The ascendancy of economic moderate Bill Hayden to the leadership of the Labor 
Opposition diminished the political risk for the ALP in adopting a critical stance on 
39 Perceptions that the Queensland Premier was indifferent to foreign exploitation of the state were 
compounded when he forced his cabinet to reverse a decision, taken in his absence, creating a 
register of foreign ownership of land (Fitzgerald 1984:433; W. Aust 24-25 July 1982; Aust 28 
October 1982). Galligan, Kellow a'.~d O'Faircheallaigh (1988:243-45) noted, however, that the 
Queensland government had been more savvy in designing resources policies than some other states. 
They also noted that this was not widely understood because views on state government management 
of resources reflected the ' ... widespread acceptance of Left political economy notions of core· 
periphery states, multinational domination, and comprador complicity of public officials in the 
periphery states' (1988:244). 
40 Treasury's ongoing support for the RRT concept was evidenced in a submission to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Natural Resources, See its report (Senate 1981:32) and Treasury (1981). 
Treasury Secretary John Stone was publicly rebuked by Treasurer John Howard for appearing to 
support an RRT before the Committee after the Fraser government had formally rejected the concept 
(AFR 9 March 1981; Kelly 1984:253). The Opposition was to make much of that and of the 
government's refusal to implement a RRT in general. See, for instance, P. Keating, MHR (H. R. 
Hansard 10 March 1981:563) ·and Senator M. C. Tate (Senate Hansard25 February 1982:538). 
41 The chainnan of MIM Holdings Ltd. Sir James Foots, while opposing the introduction of a 
resources rent tax, admitted publicly that such a tax would make the case for a liberalisation of 
foreign investment policy that much stronger (AFR 20 November 1980). 
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FDI in the resources sector (Ayres 1987:358; Kelly 1984:15--18; Henderson 
1994:263; Stubbs 1989:179-95),42 Shadow resources spokesman Paul Keating had 
the political skills necessary to make the FDI issue an electoral plus for the 
Opposition. Keating predicated his argwnent that Australia could afford a more 
restrictive FDI policy for resources sector on the assertion that there was no longer a 
technology transfer imperative for allowing substantial foreign investment in the 
minerals sector.43 This was a message that he drew from those domestic mining 
interests, such as CSR and BHP, that benefited from the existing local equity 
requirements and which had broader nationalistic appeal (Jackson 1982). Keating's 
rhetorical flourishes, however, were all his own: describing the Fraser government, 
for instance, as a '. .. a cringing crawling bunch of sellouts' for having approved 
Consolidated Gold:fields' sale of a large stake in the Bellan1bi coal company to Shell 
(NT 19-24November1979). 
The politics of FDI policy, for the resources sector in particular, became more 
intense in the lead-up to the October 1980 Federal election. Through 1980 Fraser 
used strikingly similar rhetoric on the economic promise of minerals exports to that 
of his successful 1977 campaign; declaring in July that Australia stood on the cusp 
of a resources boom which would deliver 'wealth and work to our country' (Age 10 
July 1980). The hype of a resources boom went hand-in-hand with stricter 
implementatbn of the 50/50 mle; clearly seen in two decisions on large colliery 
projects. Both the Blair Athol and Oakey Creek cases involved foreign equity stakes 
in excess of 50 per cent as the main partners wanted to give minority equity stakes 
to buyers of the output without losing control. The Fraser government appreciated 
that minority equity stakes could underpin long-term contracts that helped secure 
the commercial viability of the project but ultimately refused to compromise the 
integrity of its policy of an equal partnership between domestic and foreign capital. 
The Oakey Creek case involved MIM and minority stakes for European users (AFR 
42 In his first address to the Federal parliamentary caucus as leader, Bill Hayden stressed: 'Economic 
growth is necessary for us to be able to do all the things we wish ... The community considers us as a 
party with compassionate concern for people, but not good economic managers.' (cited in Stubbs 
1989:182). 
43 Keating argued that: 'We have passed this stage now. We don't need to be shown twice, three 
times or four times. We have learned the le~:>ons. We can do it ourselves. Our mining technology is 
the envy of the world' (NT 17-24 Novembe1r 1979). 
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25 September 1980; Tsokhas 1986:130-32). The Fraser government formally 
approved the participants on the proviso the main participants sold down equity to 
Australian investors. 
The Blair Athol case divided the Fraser Cabinet because it involved Japan's Electric 
Power Development Consortium (EPDC), 70 per cent state-owned and 30 per cent 
owned by private Japanese power companies. The Fraser government had been pro-
active in deepening ties with Japan at a range of levels, and in calHng for Japanese 
investment in the _resources sector in particular.44 Japanese Prime Minister"Ohira, 
while in Australia, put the Fraser government in an awkward position by requesting 
that Japanese investors be treated flexibly under the FDI guidelines because they 
were latecomers compared with established British and American firms (Age 18 
January 1980; Goodall, Aust 16 April 1980). EPDC made long-term contracts for 
the output of the Blair Athol colliery conditional upon securing an equity stake; 
major owners CRA and Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) agreeing to sell them 19 per 
cent (AFR 16 April 1980; SMH 14 April 1980).45 Despite support from Minerals 
and Energy Minister Doug Anthony, Treasurer Howard refused the EPDC stake. He 
did this on FIRB advice that CRA and ARCO had not made sufficient effo1ts to 
localise equity as earlier promised (Grattan, Age 15 April 1980; Frith, Aust l 6 April 
1980; Korporaal, AFR 21 April 80).46 EPDC ultimately received a stake following a 
44 The Fraser government commissioned a report into the state of the relationship with Japan by the 
Myer Ad Hoc Working Committee (Myer 1978). See also Drysdale and Kitaoji (1981) and on the 
broader context of Australia's foreign relations during this period see Boyce and Angel (1983). 
45 CRA, having by the time of the second application by EPDC signed up for naturalisation, could 
have held all the equity in Blair Athol in its own right as it was considered to be 51 per cent 
Australian,owned. However, when a foreign i;:ntity held shares as well, the actual equity holding of 
CRA was multiplied by 51 per cent to arrive at a percentage figure for Australian equity in the 
project. Under the EPDC plan the figure fell to 25 per cent as CRA would have held 50.22 per cent, 
ARCO 30.78 per i:ent and EPDC 19 per cent. 
46 In fact the eal"lier approvals had been very contentious because CRA had sought to block ARCO's 
acquisition of a stake in the project from an American vendor. CRA proposed to buy the stake itself 
and on-sell it to EPDC, which would have made localisation of equity easier. Treasurer Howard, on 
FIRB advice, judged that the government should not pick and choose between investors and so 
approved both bids subject to subsequent sell-down of equity to Australian interests (NT 27 April - 3 
May 1980). ARCO secured the stake because it held first right of refusal with the American vendor 
of the stake in Blair Athol. 
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sell-down of equity by CRA and ARCQ47. 
In announcing the 1980 election Fraser made it clear that a forecast, although highly 
questionable, $29 billion of planned new investment in the resources sector would 
feature prominently in the campaign (Ayres 1987:357-58).48 As the Fraser 
government made the economic promise of the minerals sector central to its 
marketing message the ALP was compelled to fault the government's management 
of the sector. Confidential ALP research suggested that attacks on the government 
did not have to be particularly sophisticated. In the formal ALP campaign planning 
document produced by senior strategists for leader Bill Hayden in October 1979 the 
blunt assessment was offered that, 
... the next election will be decided solely on the votes of the 15 per cent of'swingers' who 
show any willingness to change ... They are not discerning upper middle-class professionals 
who carefully reason through their vote. They are basically ignorant and indifferent about 
politics. They vote on instinct for superficial, ill-infonned and generally selfish reasons. 
(cited in Kelly 1984:86). 
In repeatedly criticising the government's FDI policy Labor's message was simple 
and emotive. As Shadow Treasurer Ralph Willis claimed in the Parliament on 
March 31 1980: 'The Fraser government has arranged an unprecedented sell-out of 
Australian enterprises and resources to foreign interests' (NT 8-14 June 1980). 
The ALP committed during the 1980 election campaign to a 51 per cent Australian 
equity requirement for all industries, except where there was a pressing national 
interest. In such cases a formalised timetable for the localisation of equity would be 
47 Shadow resources spokesman Paul Keating was strongly critical of the government for npt, 
favouring the CRNEPDC bid through rejection of ARCO. Indeed it was reported that he advised 
EPDC on who to lobby in Treasury (AFR 21 April 1980). This support for the Japanese bid by the 
Labor shadow minister was in stark contrast to an earlier case where he accused the government of 
'collapsing under pressure from Japan' (AFR 25 March 1980). The particular case involved n request 
by a Mitsubishi Group company to lift its shareholding 'in a joint venture behind the planned Ulan 
Steaming coal project in New South Wales (Frith, Aust 16 April 1980). Approval effectively 
frustrated an aggressive bid by Australian entrepreneur Alan Bond for control (Frith, Aust 16 April 
1980). 
4B The parallels with the 1977 campaign did not end there. Again the Fraser government promisf.ld 
tax cuts; the only problem being that the it had reneged on its promise after the previous election and 
so suffered a credibility problem (Ayres 1987:357-59). 
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imposed, with stiff penalties for non-compliance (ALP 1980). Reminiscent of the;: 
Whitlam government, the AIDC would also be actively involved in helping foreign 
investors to satisfy the local equity requirements (Aust, Age, AFR 29 September 
1980). The FIRB's secretariat would be greatly expanded to accommodate an 
ongoing MNC monitoring role and there was to be tougher regulation of transfer 
pricing. The government's cause was not helped by CRA's refusal, during the 
election campaign, to use a preferential share issue to help realise its naturalisation 
commitment.49 In the lead up to the 1980s the implications ofFIRB rejection figures 
were debated. While Shadow Treasurer Ralph Willis asserted that the low rejection 
rate showed the FDI review process to be 'just a meaningless charade', the 
Treasurer in tum insisted that the roughly one third of proposals approved with 
conditions attached showed that needed investment was being accepted on 
Australia's terms (NT 8-14 June 1980; Age 30 June 1980; Aust 29 September 
1980). 
The Fraser government had directed the Australian Bureau of Statistics to cease 
collecting information on FDI, for budgetary reasons, around the same time as its 
decision on the naturalisation provisions. Critics alleged the government was hiding 
the real extent of foreign investment (Crough and Wheelwright 1982:2; Anderson 
1983:137-38). If the government's intention was in fact to minimise political 
contention over FDI it was counter-productive.so As Galligan (1987:36) noted, 
'Unfortunately this information gap provided fertile ground for exaggerated 
speculation and theorising. The prophets of foreign domination and the client state, 
writing in the early 1980s, simply extended the rising trends of foreign O\mership 
and control from a decade before.' Information shortage presented opportunities for 
political entrepreneurialism to tap latent economic nationalist sympathies in the 
community. Liberal editorialists and critics increasingly recognised this negative 
49 CRA's parent committed to tai<ing up its full 61.1 per cent entitlement in the float, at the 
preferential price of$3.50 when the market value was then $6.10. Any subsequent 'Australianisation' 
ofCRA's shares would net it a healthy profit (Aust 5 September 1980). 
so Moreover, without a recent overview of the proportion of foreign-owned assets the statistics from 
FIRB on FDI approvals were liable to be misused. When, for example, n FIRB report showed a 
three-fold increase in FDI in urban land over the previous three years Opposition and other critics 
made quite exaggerated claims about what it entailed for the affordability of property (Age 17 
November 1981). 
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dynamic and called for more de1tailed infonnation about the extent and nature of 
FDI (WA 8 September 1980). Labor's call for the resumption of ABS statistics on 
FDI had as much to do with attacking the government for a 'cover up' as with a 
desir(! for a more informed public debate about FDI. In January 1982 the Fraser 
government directed the ABS to recommence collection of data on FDI, no doubt 
confident that the level of Australian ownership had risen modestly after six years of 
its 50/50 policy (Aust 20January1982; Anderson 1983:138). 
The information void, the governm.e~t~s continuing insistence that an investment-
driven resources boom was unfo1ding, and internal dynamics within the labour 
movement all led the ALP to maintain its attacks on FDI policy during the Fraser 
government's third tem1. There was no moderation of the critical discourse. Moving 
an urgency motion in the Parliament in March 1981, Opposition leader Bill Hayden 
asserted 'the government had adopted a new colonial cringe - it is a submissive 
economic colony to overseas board rooms ... Australia will be a clapped-out quarry 
in the south-west Pacific by the end of the century' (CT 12 March 1981). An 
elaborated version of the ALP's FDI policy for the 1980 election was incorporated 
into the party platform at the 1982 national conference and taken to the next election 
(ALP 1982:45).st In 1980 the ACTU national congress, reflecting the triumph of 
economic nationalist ideology and a fear of foreign labour management, had 
adopted a critical policy on foreign capital flows (Crough and Wheelwright 
1982:210). This reflected the influence of the left, especially the powerful 
Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) that was a vocal 
advocate of a restrictive FDI policy regime.s2 In practice the ACTU and its 
51 The 1982 policy stated that a Labor government would: 'In obtaining the required amount of 
capital from overseas, encourage an increasing portion of capital inflow on the basis of loan capital 
rather than equity capital' (ALP 1982:45). It also committed the Party to expanded functions for the 
Foreign Investment Review Board that would include enforcii1g a code of conduct for foreign finns 
and reserve key areas of the economy for Australians. The latter could be for either economic goals 
or for '. .. preservation of the national identity and culture' (ALP 198;£:44). The policy also envisaged 
a fully transparent FIRB that not only had a union representatf,ve but also supplied details on all 
proposals to unions and other interested local parties. The 1982 conference also re-endorsed the 1977 
policy of seeking United Nations monitoring of multinational finn5 (ALP 1982:45). 
52 In 1977 it sponsored a lecture tour by British TNC critic Stuart Holland and published a speech by 
its assistant national secretary Laurie Carmichael under the title A Co11nter•Strategy to Transnational 
Corporation Domination and a Translllona/ Programme to Socialism (Crougt1 and Wheelwright, 
1982:208-09). FDI critic Ted Wilshire was employed at the time as a researcher by the union and 
engaged in active pamphleteering. 
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constituent unions could be very pragmatic about the employment creation effects of 
FDI.53 
Although government ministers continued to make efforts to 'sell' existing policy, 
its policy-making mode was increasingly reactive. Several editorialists detected this 
at the time, and cautioned the government that it was lending undue legitimacy to 
the Opposition's critique ofFDI (AFR 30September1981, 2October1981;Age 16 
October 1981; SMH3 November 1981). At a much broader level, the October 1980 
election can be understood as marking the beginning of the end of the Fraser 
government (Kelly 1984:120-21). Henderson (1994:264) judged that from then on 
' .. .it was unrealistic to expect any significant reform from the Fraser government... 
it was then in its third term, had lost its Senate majority and was facing a revived 
Labor Opposition together with the Democrats in the Senate led by former Liberal 
Don Chipp.' Chipp would also prove to be a rather nationalistic critic of the Fraser 
governn1ent's FDI policy (Age 28 May 1981). The Government's increasing 
defensiveness led to further tightening of FDI policy under pressure from the 
Opposition (Mills, Age 23 June 1981 ) .. This was so even when it was clear that the 
Australian economy was sliding into a deep recession.54 
Treasurer Howard did his reputation some damage with an ill-conceived public 
exhortation to Shell to discuss options for releasing 25 per cent of its shares to 
Australian investors if it wanted future investment approvals (Aust 13 August 1981; 
AFR, SMH, Age 14 August 1981). However, Shell's resistance and industry outrage 
at the ad hoc nature of the request forced a humiliating back down upon the 
Treasurer (S.MH, AFR 21 September 1981). Media commentary was merciless in its 
criticism o'l Howard. Far more carefully considered were the new restrictions that 
53 Interview with Tim Harcourt, National Research Officer, ACTU1 Melbourne, 3 May 1995. The 
ACTU had first held a conference on TNCs in 1974 nt which Ted Wheelwright was a keynote 
speaker~ At the 1980 national congress the ACTU demanded a rigorous monitoring mechanism, trade 
union involvement, international cooperation for controls on FDI, a UN monitoring age;icy to 
monitor MN Cs and the imposition of an Australian code of conduct on all foreign firn1s. The i 980 
ACTU congress had also expressed a clear preference for capital inflow to take the form of loans 
rather than equlty (Crough and Wheelwright 1982:21 O). 
54 Fraser's sympathetic biographer Ayres (1987:354) described that 'resources boom' as having been 
e 'dangerous mirage'. Internal divisions in the third term were also politically costly, as were the 
revelations of the Costigan Royal Commission about widespread tax evasion (Kelly 1984:267-301). 
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the Fraser government annowiced in ,Tanuary 1982. Most notable was the exied~ion . 
of strict 50 per. cent local equity guidelines to the minerals pro~essing sector 
(Treasurer, Press Release 20 January 1982). This represented a significant 
tightening of policy as the government had always been flexible towards processing 
operations because of its desire to see greater value-adding to resources exports.SS In 
January 1982 the government also announced a more restrictive policy on the 
foreign acquisition of rural land. Although the Opposition and the Wran government 
had been repeatedly raising the issue, observers judged pressures from within the 
Coalition's own ~al constitUency to be the real driver of that decision. ·There had 
been complaints from graziers for some time that they were being confronted with 
counter bids from foreign investors for pastoral leases and freehold properties (CT 
11 February 1981; Davis and Sides, Age 20 August 1981; Keats, NT 23-29 August 
1981; SMH 10 November 1981; Age, AFR 20 January 1982). 
There was one significant decision to liberalise entry for foreign firms in the last 
term of the Fraser government that stands out from a generally more restrictive in 
policy. The Fraser government had commissioned a wide-ranging inquiry into the 
Australian financial system (Ayres 1987:410-13; Pauly 1987; Perkins 1989:1-7; 
Harper 1866). When the Campbell Inquiry delivered its report in 1981 the Fraser 
government was confronted with a reform agenda it had little enthusiasm for selling 
politically (Ayres 1987:412). One controversial recommendation of the Inquiry was 
that foreign banks be given full licenses. In doing so the Campbell Inquiry chose to 
ignore the Fraser government's explicit reaffirmation of an exclusionary poucy 
around the same time the Inquiry was first established. In May 1979 the government 
had announced its intention to use the provisions of the Banking Act of 1959 to veto 
the establishment of full banking operations by foreign interests (S~xton and 
5s The Opposition had previously strongly attacked several processing proposals that had only 
modest Australian equity participation. The billion dollar Worsely bauxite-alumina project in 
Western Australia was to have only 20 per cent Australian equity (Aust 3 December 1980; NT 5-1 J 
October 1980). The Alcoa-led~JlrQPosal for an aluminium smelter in Porthmd, Victoria, was 
contrnversial not only for the iinlitedAustralian equity participation but also because of its potential 
envil'ol1!llental impact and the state's provision of infrastructure and subsidised electricity (Gruligan1 
Kellow and O'Faircheallaigh 1988:231-43). Fraser's desire to bolster the sagging political fortunes 
of the Hamer Liberal government in Victoria was considered to have been a factor (Bowden, Aust 20 
January 1982). 
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Adamovich 1981:13). The issue had arisen following speculation that several 
foreign banks were interested in acquiring the failed Bank of Adelaide. 
Although on balance the major . -,~, 1stralian banks saw opportunities in the Campbell 
Inquiry's proposed deregulation package, they still endeavoured to have particular 
reforms that were not in their interest excluded from government considcrations6. 
While domestic banks in the past had a common preference for excluding foreign 
competitors, that unity was breaking down as several ·of the majors aspired to 
expanding internationally. Some foreign governments, of the United -States and 
Japan in particular, insisted upon strict reciprocity in the issuance of licenses to 
foreign banks (Pauly 1987:27, 1988:69; Perkins 1989:1). Many foreign banks 
already had a limited presence in Australia through merchant banking operations 
th&t had been treated more leniently by the Fraser government owing to their 
important role in trade and investment facilitation. The major domestic banks feared 
competition from foreign banks in their home market but also recognised that 
liber!llisation might also lift existing regulatory barriers to the expansion of their 
domestic activities (Starkie 1989:112-14; Harper 1985:1-6, 1986). That the Fraser 
government announced its preparedness. to admit foreign banks without such 
accompanying liberalisation caused deep consternation amongst domestic banking 
interests, mollified only by the defeat of the Coalition at the polls soon after. 
Treasurer Howard knew that Fraser was implacably opposed to a free float of the 
currency and deregulation of banking in general, and so did not pursue those options 
within the Cabinet. However, the issue of foreign bank entry was somewhat less 
vexed. While Fraser's rur&l background made him wary of banks, foreign bank entry 
could be presented as imposing a competitive discipline upon them (Ayres, 1987: 
412-13). Moreover, foreign banks would bring further experience in financing 
international trade and large projects that had appealed to the Prime Minister. An in-
principle decision to issue licenses to up to ten new foreign banking operations was 
56 Perkins (1989:3) judged that: 'In contrast to some industries, therefore, where the regulators have 
been so 'captured' by the institutions they are supposed to be controlling that deregulation is 
politically difficult, the banks had come to realise that any benefits they were deriving from the 
continued controls were on balance being more than offset by the handicaps that the existing system 
was imposing on them.' 
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announced just a week before th..: firime Minister called a federal election. 
Confronted with strong opposition from the ALP, for reasons that will be explored 
in the next chapter, the Fraser government gambled that foreign bank entry would 
not be an electoral liability. This was rea$onable, given the element of antipathy 
towards Australian banks within the national electorate and within the Coalition's 
rural and small business constituencies in particular. A feeling in Cabinet that the 
government needed to demonstr* leadership on a matter of economic policy 
contributed to the foreign bank decision being taken - albeit reluctantly (Pauly 
1987:61; Nevile 1994:19). In the end the foreign bank decision did not feature as an 
issue in the election and would present a significant policy challenge for the new 
Labor government. 
Conclusions 
The Fraser government was always tom between the recognition that FDI might 
boost the economy, enhancing its economic management credentials, and the 
political imperative to force foreign investors into partnerships with local firms. 
Consistent with .the 'growth~oriented' public interest account of FDI policymaking 
explored in Chapter 2, the weaker the economy the more inclined the Fraser 
government was to pragmatic implementation of its 50/50 principle. However, the 
Fraser government's 'flexibility' on FDI policy was still within narrow limits that 
had been defined during the period of the Whitlam government. The perpetuation of 
that policy was the result of a confluence of three interrelated factors. 
One factor was the government's con.cem for the electoral significance of a resilient 
economic nationalism in the community. This popular sentiment was strongest in 
relation to the resources sector as information was scarce and many influential 
voices were raised in criticism of the calibre of public governance of Australia's 
mineral resources. It was principally the ·Federal Opposition's political 
entrepreneurialism in exaggerating the costs of FDI that made latent economic 
nationalism in the community so politically salient. There was little appreciation at 
the time that there were risks entailed in changing the foreign financing mix away 
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from equity to debt. Ironically, Labor would later reap a bitter harvest from the 
seeds of economic nationalism that it helped to sow. Responsibility for restrictive 
FDI policy during the 1975-82 period certainly did not rest solely with the 
Opposition. The Fraser government could have invested more resources in gathering 
and disseminating information on the real nature of FDI, and could have 
endeavoured to 'sell' a more liberal policy to the electorate. 
The second and third factors driving economic nationalism under the Fraser 
government help to explain why it did not do so. Domestic business constituencies 
who had come to benefit from FDI regulation were a natural constituency of the 
Coalition. Consequently their interests could not be easily ignored. !Iowever, they 
attracted more attention than a strictly political calculus suggests. This was because 
the third factor shaping FDI policy outcomes under the Fraser government, the 
personal conceptions of the public interest that its leaders held, happened to accord 
broadly with those private interests. Fraser and some of his senior ministers had 
strongly developmentalist inclinations that, although centred on the private sector 
rather than the state, were tinged with economic nationalism. 
In promoting an FDI policy that promised equal partnerships between local and 
foreign firms in national development, the Fraser govenunent brokered a 
compromise both between competing private interests and contending conceptions 
of the public interest. The administrative architecture of FDI regulation did give the 
government the flexibility to manage the public and private interest politics of 
individual investments, although at some cost to business and community 
confidence in FDI policy. The Frase,~ ~overnment may have optimised the politics of 
FDI policy, but the Hawke government was to be confronted with the economic 
consequences. 
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7 Labor's change of heart, 1983-87 
The Hawke government crune to office in March 1983 with a formal policy of 
commitment to a· more restrictive foreign investment policy. When it faced the July 
1987 Federal Election Labor had delivered three successive FDI liberalisation 
packages and had been pro-active in attracting inward direct investment. This 
drrunatic change in policy orientation surprised many observers and angered some 
ALP supporters. Liberalisation of foreign investment reflected the primacy given to 
economic management by the Hawke government both in securing the electoral 
fortunes of the government and for realising its broader social democratic 
aspirations. How the government came to that strategy, and why FDI policy 
liberalisation had an important place in it, is the subject of this chapter. Labor's 
conversion to a liberal FDI policy was driven by the imperative to manage a balance 
of payments crisis without compromising the growth-centred model of economic 
management enshrined in the Accord with its key trade union constituency. FDI 
liberalisation packages symbolised Labor's determination to internationalise the 
Australian economy. As each decision to liberalise FDI policy brought immediate 
political dividends through boosting confidence in the Hawke government's 
economic management, it pushed liberalisation further. 
Keeping the faith? 
The Hawke government's reticence to implement much of the ALP policy platform 
was apparent soon after its coming to office in March 1983. Labor had been elected 
on the promise of strong economic growth to both the electorate and the trade union 
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movement and party policy would be subordinated to that goal.1 Hawke, Treasurer 
Keating and other senior moderates nonetheless understood this as keeping faith 
with the ALP's core constituencies as a growing economy created jobs and also 
provided growing public revenues with which to realise some of Labor's social 
policy aspirations (Edwards 1996:201-03; Mills 1993:73).2 They also had an acute 
sense of the electoral need to give the goal of growth priority over immediate 
implementation of ALP policy. The Fraser government had become unpopular 
principally because of the deep recession that marked the latter half of its final term 
(Kelly 1984:395-?7). Labor was an alternative only because it had distanced itself 
from the legacy of the Whitlam years and suppressed the radical elements of the 
labour movement (Mills 1993:76-77). Scarred by the experience of the Whitlam 
government, the leadership of the ACTU and the parliamentary ALP concluded an 
agreement in 1982 to deliver union moderation in return for a growing economy and 
improvements in the social wage (Edwards 1996:175-77; Camey 1988; Gardner 
1990).3 The Accord would prove central to Labor's political success because it 
aligned the interests of government's core constituency with its electoral interests4 
(Stilwell 1986; Mills 1993:47). However, the government was locked into a model 
of economic management that gave primacy to maintaining growth (Kelly 
1 The ALP initially promised during the 1983 campaign a 'traditional' Labor approach to a weak 
economy with a much larger government deficit and looser monetary policy. However, the influence 
of economics advisor Ross Gamaut on Hawke and Treasury on Keating, combined with the 
revelation of a larger than expected budget deficit, saw more orthodox policy settings adopted 
(Edwards 1996:171-203). The Hawke government's macro-economic policy settings to 1985 were 
nonetheless strongly growth-oriented and, as the currency crisis of 1986 was to reveal, not without 
considerable risk (Bell 1997:141-43; Walsh 1991:7). 
2 Pragmatists in the ALP sometimes implied that even merely holding office would be serving the 
interests of Labor's core constituencies as it would prevent a Coalition government from 
implementing more hostile policies (Mills 1993:76). While academics and activists on the Left 
frequently conceded the logic is they were highly critical of the Hawke government's lack of 
radicalism (Maddox 1989). 
3 The role of the ACTU in delivering real wage restraint, and consequently a substantial increase in 
both business profitably and aggregate employment through the 1980s, was intensely controversial 
within the union movement, Moderate centrally brokered wages outcomes contributed to a 
substantial decline in union membership throughout Labor's period in office (Gardner 1990). 
4 The initial Accord document promised extensive government intervention in the economy and the 
continuation of protectionism, ostensibly to realise higher economic growth (TUTA 1986:12-14). It 
also stated statement that under a Labor government 'the virtual unfettered actions of transnational 
companies will be regulated via a range of initiatives' and flagged the imposition of 'job protection 
and consultation procedures' on foreign firms (TUTA 1986: 14-15). 
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1992:385).5 While the Hawke government would never waiver from an overriding 
commitment to economic growth and employment creation, the means by which it 
sought to realise these objectives were to change drastically over time and in a 
direction quite profoundly contrary to Labor's ideological traditions. 
Hawke and Keating's backgrounds, though very different, inclined them to 
favouring economic growth, through the private sector in particular, rather than a 
steadfast adherence to the ALP platform.6 Hawke's route to the prime ministership 
had been through the labour movement rather than the Labor Party and his public 
prominence was principally because of his skills as an interlocutor between unions 
and business (d'Alpuget 1982; Pullan 1984; Kelly 1984:447-48). The theme of ( 
'consensus', central to Labor's 1983 election campaign, Hawke's persona and his 
subsequent governing style, helped to legitimate disregard for the specific policy 
agenda contained in the national party platform.7 Keating's past mastery of ALP 
organisational politics made him rather disdainful of the party policymaking process 
and his seven years as shadow resources spokesman had revealed to him the naivety 
of parts of the platform (Gordon 1993).8 The minerals portfolio had also stimulated 
a strong interest in export-oriented enterprises and the role of FDI in their 
development (Edwards 1996:145-50).9 While Keating was independent-minded, he 
s The Accord framework proved more resilient that anybody would have expected in the first tenn of 
the Hawke government, despite considerable political and economic challenges to it (Stilwell 
1993:70-77; Smith and Mahony 1993:40-41; Bell 1997:141-43). 
6 The dominance of the Prime Minister and Treasurer over macro-economic policy was further 
accentuated in the Hawke government. (Bell 1997:28). While many aspects of microeconomic policy 
involved other ministers and departments the Treasurer's direct responsibility for a discretionary FDI 
policy meant that the input from the fonner would be generally limited. 
7 The consensus theme was encapsulated in the 1983 campaign theme 'Bob Hawke - Bringing 
Australia Together' and later in the staging of the National Economic Summit (Kelly 1984:398; 
McEachem 1991:19-39). For Hawke, 'keeping the faith' meant delivering an improved life to 
'working Australians' rather than realisation of an abstract policy agenda brokered through factional 
dealing within the ALP-As Mills {1993:72-73) observed, 'in Hawke's eyes, the ALP, in resisting 
changes to its platfonn, p1oved itself to be part of Australia's problem - but the union movement, 
through embracing the Accord and taking part in the Summit, proved itself part ofth.e solution.' 
8 Keating had been much attracted to, and influenced by, forceful mavericks such as Jack Lang and 
Rex Connor (Edwards 1996:58-63; Carew 1988). The extent to which Keating had shifted from the 
mainstream of ALP thought on FDI and other matters of economic policy at the time of coming to 
office should not be exaggerated (Edwards 1996:154-55). Keating would stand out for his 
preparedness to shift position in response to new circumstances, implying a degree of 
instrumentalism (conscious or otherwise) in the strong positions he did adopt. 
9 In other aspects of the treasury portfolio Keating was initially quite dependent upon the Treasury 
for an und~rstanding of the many policy issues he had to contend with. This was because he had only 
been the shadow treasurer for a short while when Labor was elected (Edwards 1996; Carew 1988). 
185 
certainly could not ignore ALP policy with impunity - especially in the Hawke 
government's first term. 10 Soon after coming to office Keating requested the FIRB 
to review both FDI policy and operations in the light of the ALP's tougher policy 
platform (Bowden, Aust 6 May 1983; Connors 30 August 1983). Despite that, he 
also soon flagged a 'flexible' approach to local equity rules that translated into basic 
continuity of policy from the Fraser-Howard era (SMH 22 March 1983).11 The 
Treasurer's pragmatism led him to retain the current FIRB board, despite their 
preparedness to resign (SMH 22 March 1983). In trying to put foreign investors at 
ease Keating claimed that, despite a clearly more restrictive ALP policy"platfonn, 
'there has been a general agreement bet\veen the parties on foreign investment for 
some time now' (SMH22March1983). 
Contention over FDI policy 
Despite Keating's claim of FDI policy equilibrium, division was evident amongst 
senior Hawke government ministers over FDI policy in the first few months of 
office. Lionel Bowen, trade minister and deputy prime minister, said the 
government wanted only 'intelligent foreign investment in Australia' (AFR 29 
March 1983). Bowen scared foreign investors with public remarks about the dangers 
of MNEs to national sovereignty and that he was initiating an. extensive 
departmental investigation into foreign ownership in the minerals industry (AFR 29 
10 Most other senior Hawke government figures were less imbued with pragmatism in relation to the 
party platform and Keating spent much time in the first year in office consulting them (Edwards 
1996:234-35). There was also a strongly collectivist tradition within the ALP that centred on the 
sovereignty of the parliamentary caucus, with the caucus in turn being accountable to the party 
organisation. In order to avoid the policy paralysis that had beset the Whitlam government Hawke 
demanded acceptance of principle that Cabinet solidr.rity carried over to caucus as well. At the 1982 
national conference of the ALP the parliamentary leadership secured passage of a resolution that 
formally gave them more discretion over the timing of implementation of ALP policy resolutions. 
This would provide the formal justification for considerable policy pragmatism by the Hawke 
· riovernment (Mills 1993:.74). 
1 Acting Treasurer Hurford later said that in the flexible application of local equity requirements the 
government had no intention of 'operating a cyclical foreign investment policy' (PreSs Release 
no.108, 30September1983). 
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March 1983).1z Bowen soon after declared that ' ... so far as the ownership of our 
mineral resources is concerned, Australia is being taken to the cleaners by the 
Japanese' (AFR 19 May 1983). While Hawke secured his deputy's commitment not 
to speak out on FDI issues again, foreign investors and domestic businer-· 
representatives remained deeply wary of the new Labor government's approach to 
FDI. The rejection of several substantial foreign takeovers during their first six 
months in office provoked fears of a tightening of FDI policy. Keating insisted that 
he had not tightened FDI policy and was acting on Treasury advice (SMH 19 Augu1\t 
1983). However contemporary observers detected a more stringent application of 
the existing 'net economic benefits' test, especially in the real estate sector, and 
greater concern with the existing level of foreign ownership in a sector when vetting 
takeover bids. 13 
Soon after coming to office the Hawke government had to contend with several 
disputes over FDI rejections that revealed the potential for conflict with foreign and 
state governments and domestic business interests. A dispute with New Zealand 
arose because of a misunderstanding between the two governments over the 
treatment of FDI under the recently concluded Closer Economic Relations 
agreement. Following the rejection of several New Zealand investments Prime 
Minister Muldoon instructed the Overseas Investment Commission (OIC) to reject 
all pending and future Australian ihvestment applications until the two nations' 
investment policies were 'harmonised' (AFR 28 June 1983). The Australian 
government refused to exempt New Zealand investments from the foreign 
12 Bowen stated he had departmental advice to the effect that some Japanese trading companies had a 
basic conflict of interest as parties to coal price negotiations while also having equity stakes in IPines 
(AFR 19 May 1983). On the other hand, the Minister for Energy and Resources, Senator Peter 
Walsh, was a moderate and influential voi~,~ (SMH 17 June 1983). 
13 The tougher application of the net e(' \k benefits test was seen in rejection ofDayco's bid for 
Cadillac; Plastics, although Keating ultllna"-'i)~ £{'.iproved the takeover bid when the firm promised to 
make Australia its Pacific and Southeast Asfan rc:gional headquarters and main manufacturing base 
(Press Release no.37, 21 June 1983). The fum' also played to ALP idealism about 'industrial 
democracy' with a promise to eventually localise sonl.e 20 per cent of the equity through an employee 
share participation scheme. Coor.em about the existing level of foreign ownership in a sector was 
evidencedJtl the rejection of a plan by American N.W. Ayer Inc advertising and public relations 
group to take a controlling stake in an existing joint venture, Coruiaghan & May-Paton Ayer Pty Ltd 
(CMPA). While the latter was only the fourteenth largest agency in Australia, the government was 
worried that the majority of the top twenty agencies were already owned and/or controlled by 
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investment review process on the grounds that it would constitute discrimination 
and so would be inconsistent with international treaty obligations (Keating, Press 
Release 28 June 1983). 14 A dispute with the Queensland and Korean governments 
arose when the Treasurer blocked the 25 per cent equity participation of a South 
Korean firm in the construction of the Jackson-Moonie oil pipeline in Queensland15• 
The Bjelke-Peters·en government denounced the decision because it had orchestrated 
the involvement of the Korean firm in the consortium as part of a broader effort to 
promote minerals exports to South Korea (SMH 5 May 1983).16 Keating's official 
press release in response to the Queensland Premier's description of hiin as 'the 
abominable no-man' and 'superwrecker' stated, 
The Jackson pipeline can be constructed without the involvement of South Korean finns. 
One can only wonder at the reasons behind Mr Bjelke-Petersen's ranting and raving. Since 
when did foreign corporations have a prior right to get work ahead of our own companies? 
Why does he always attack the Australian government in favour of foreign corporations? ... A 
foreign investment policy can only be administered sensibly with permanent guidelines. 
Under those guidelines there was no way we could have advantaged the Korean corporation 
over Australian companies. (Press Releaseno.15, 4May1983). 
American interests (Press Release no.4, 7 April 1983). A tougher attitude to property investment was 
seen in the case of Sanko Shoji (Press Release no.2, 6 April 1983). 
14 An insight into the bitter tone of the disagreement can be gained from the following quotation from 
one of Treasurer Keating's press releases in relation to Prime Minister Muldoon: 'His remark during 
his meeting with me last week that no agreement regarding the texts of those letters had been reached 
stunned and embarrassed officials from both countries ... Any problems which are deemed to exist in 
investment policies between the two governments would appear to be of Mr Muldoon's making. 
There has been no capricious behaviour by the Australian government. in respect of New Zealand 
investment, nor will there be.' (Press Release 28 June 1983). Mr Muldoon, on the other hand, 
accused Mr Keating of having been captured by Treasury bureaucrats and also singled out then 
departmental secretary John Stone for criticism. (AFR 28 June 1983). 
15 The Treasurer approved a proposal by Pohang Iron and Steel Corp. Ltd and Ssangyong Corp. to 
each take a 20 per cent equity stake in the Cook Colliery, which was being closed down by BHP, and 
to run it as a joint venture with another Australian firm. The two Korean partners pledged to buy 
output over five years equal to its then maximum productive capacity (Press Release no.19, 11 May 
1983). • 
16 Bjelke-Petersen said that the decision took ' ... no account of delicate reciprocal trade negotiations, 
which were subsequently explained to relate to the re-opening of the Cook Colliery with Korean 
financial backing and coal contracts (AFR 5 May 1983). Queensland Treasurer Dr Liew Edwards 
described the rejection as the ' ... most stupid, irresponsible, and callous decision I have heard.' (SMH, 
CMS May 1983). 
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The decision to stop the Queensland government from 'advantaging' the Korean 
firm was made in response to lobbying from Australian businesses who stood to 
gain from the rejection (SMH 5 May 1983).17 
The lobbying by domestic business interests in the pipeline case was far from being 
an isolated event during this period of FDI policymaking. The recession had 
provoked business rationalisations and acquisition opportunities increased; with the 
familiar divergence of interests over FDI policy between buyers and sellers. The 
financial stakes involved gave businesses the incentive to lobby, and the newness of 
the government gave them additional hope. 18 As the business community was not 
Labor's natural constituency, lobbying efforts that presented public interest reasons 
for policy decisions were likely to have more influence19• The Hawke government's 
emphasis upon the existing level of foreign ownership and control in an industry as 
a criterion in the application of the 'net economic benefits' test made the lobbying 
of those who would benefit from the blocking of foreign bids easier.20 Prominent 
instances of such lobbying involved bids by Cadbury Schweppes for Allen's 
Confectionary Ltd and tobacco firms21 • The sharp decline in Allens' share price 
17 Keating met with a special envoy from the South Korean president to ameliorate problems in the 
relationship with South Korea (Press Release I June 1983). 
18 The private interest dimensions Qf controls on foreign takeovers we1:e starkly revealed in the case 
of Unilever's bid for Elders IXL assets. Rival local bidder Allied Mills Ltd successfully lobbied 
Treasury for the bid to be blocked, knowing that it could then secure the assets at a lower price (AFR 
20 April 1983; Treasurer, Press Release no. 9, 19 April 1983). For this reason Elders IXL chief, and 
Liberal Party identity, John Elliott, bitterly denounced Keating's decision (AFR 21 April 1983). 
Although tempting to attribute the decision to party partisanship, it was consistent with a rejection at 
the same time of an American bid for control of the Lane hardware mam.ifor.turing business 
(Treasurer, Press Release no.I I, 20 April 1984). 
19 The foreign tobacco firm R.J. Reynolds actually drew the attention of Treasury officials and the 
Caucus economics committee to loopholes in the foreign takeover provisions. This was motivated by 
a desire to stop a merger in the Australian market of their much larger rivals, Philip Morris and 
Rothmans (Perkin, Aust 5September1983). 
20 This was a position that the government adhered too for some time despite the criticism it attracted, 
claiming - not without foundation - a precedent from the Coalition. Later Acting Treasurer 
Hurford told the American Chamber of Commerce that ' ... where foreign ownership and control in an 
industry is already high or would become so with the implementation of a proposal, such benefits 
would have to be significant' (Hurford, Press Release no. I 08, 30 September 1983). 
21 Cadbury Schweppes Australia was listed in Australia but was 61 per cent owned by the UK finn. 
Allen's already had four major foreign shareholders that together hP.!.d over 40 per cent of the 
company, and a combined Cadbury-Allens-Nelson would have had a lower total percentage of shares 
held by foreigners than tha~ figure (Age 6 May 1983). Keating cited m11.r',;;.~;t power concerns as also 
having been a factor in rejecting the bids, despite the fact that these should have been dealt with 
under the Trade Practices Act (Keating, Press Release no.12, 20 April 1983;,McCrann, Age 23 April 
1983). 
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after rejection of the Cadbury's bid highlighted the distributional consequences of 
FDI restrictions (SMH 23 April 1983). In its first term the Hawke government was 
untroubled by such consequences of FDI controls as long as the goals of economic 
expansion and employment creation were not directly comnromised. It did recognise 
that to tighten FDI policy further in accordance with ALP policy would risk losing 
valuable FDI. 
FDI policy continuity 
In December 1983 the government formally distanced itself from the ALP's policy 
on FDI that had been adopted at the national conference little more than a year 
previously. Treasurer Keating's statement emphasised the continuities with the past 
decade ofFDI regulation and the moderate economic nationalism it embodied, 
The government has decided to continue the broad thrust of foreign investment policy first 
elaborated by the previous Labor government in 1975 and, with some amendments in the 
light of changing circumstances, maintained by the previous government. .. In the future 
administration of policy, the government intends to give more emphasis to the existir:.g 
requirements that Australians be given adequate opportunities to participate as fully and. 
effectively as practicable in the development of Australia's industries and resources. (Press 
Release no.152, 20 December 1983). 
The imposition of 51 per cent local equity requirements, as demanded by ALP 
policy, was ruled out as too much of a deterrent to foreign investors. It would, the 
Treasurer said explicitly, compromise economic growth and hence Labor's other 
goals (SMH 21 December 1983). Pressure from business representatives to reject 
such a policy change was also intense (AFR 16 December 1983). The government 
also dropped Labor's commitment to a national register of foreign-owned land as 
' ... most of the States (who would, necessarily, have had to cooperate in the 
establishment of it) either did not wish to proceed or were not prepared to afford it 
any priority.' (Press Release, no.152, 20 December 1983) On the other hand, the 
government did further tighten guidelines for property investments. The economic 
benefits test and joint venture guidelines were more rigidly enforced for rural 
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properties and additional reportage requirements were imposed on acquisitions of 
residential real estate (Press Release, no.152, 20 December 1983). Keating later 
made a modest concession to the ALP's 1982 policy platform by appointing the 
Secretary of the Victorian Trades Hall Council, Kenneth Stone, as a member of a 
slightly expanded FIRB (Press Release. no. 73, 21 May 1984 ). 22 
Media and business reaction to the FDI policy statement was generally favourable, 
despite widespread recognition that the government was flagrantly breaching ALP 
policy (Aust, AFR 21 December 1983; Age 21, 23 December 1983). Keating sought 
to pre-empt criticism from within the ALP by emphasising the continuities with 
W:1i'd:1II1 government policy and his contribution to it. Keating said that had ' ... been 
.),5 involved as anyone in the Labor Party's foreign investment policy. There was a 
tirp.e ... back in the 1970s when my former colleague Rex Connor was here, we were 
virtually the sole sentries at the gate in the Labor Party on economic nationalism.' 
(SMH 21 December 1983). The greatest political threat to the government's FDI 
policy crune from the Opposition rather than from within the ALP. While the 
centrepiece of the Hawke government's December 1983 st?tement on FDI policy 
was continuity with the policy of the previous government, the Coalition itself 
shifted to a more liberal position. This was a function of changed internal factional 
dynamics with the departure of Malcolm Fraser following the Coalition's electoral 
defeat (Kelly 1992:34-53). This extended to FDI policy, and shadow treasurer 
Howard had been criticising the Hawke government for rejecting investments 
throughout 1983 (for example, see AFR 6 May 1983). In response Keating argued 
the higher rate of rejections under Labor was because the nature of applications had 
changed while, at the same time, he openly criticised the 'undue laxity' of past 
Australian administrations on foreign acquisitions of Australian real estate (Aust 17 
June 1983; Press Release, no.108, 30 September 1983). The preparedness of the 
Coalition to take FDI liberalisation further than the Hawke government was a 
constant of the 1980s, creating a political dynamic where the benchmark applied by 
22 Stone's credentials for position were that he was a director of the Victorian Economic 
Development Corporation and had participated in the previous Victorian government's 1981 
overseas investment mission (Press Release, no. 73, 21 May 1984). 
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media and business observers to the government's policy was nevef Labor's own. 
This was true not only of FDI policy but of most policy areas. When· Labor took 
ste11s to liberalise it legitimated the tougher benchmarks set by the Opposition and 
·' libe~ al policy constituencies. In late 1983 there was one striking e1.:,'.:<'.~Y'irrt to the tale 
of Labor playing catch~up to the Coalition on economic poli0y ~::id it was to 
establish firmly the Hawke government's reputation for economic reform. 
The decisions to float the Australian dollar and abolish capital controls in December 
1983 were significant to the Hawke government and to FDI policy for several 
reasons.
23 Hawke and Keating becan1e convinced of the virtues of a market-based 
solution to a growing economic problem and this provided a precedent for a range 
of pro-market policies. The government, and Keating in particular, acquired a 
reputation for liberal policy and internationalising the Australian economy that had 
to be protected by ongoing reforms (Kelly 1992:94). Secondly, the decision to float 
the currency, despite its magnitude, did not need parliamentary or even Cabinet 
approval (Bell 1997:27; Kelly 1992:85). This was the beginning of a predilection 
for taking significant decisions that were a fait accompli despite disquiet within 
government ranks. The liberalisation of foreign investment policy, of potentially 
great symbolic significance and controversy, likewise did not need parliamentary 
approval because it merely required char>~~s in the guidelines issued by the 
Treasurer. The float decision stamped the ~ :~,: '>rity of Hawke and Keating on the 
gm:rernrnent's economic policymaking; in stark contrast to the ill-discipline that had 
characterised the Whitlam government (Edwards 1996:229-32).24 
23 As short-term capital inflows increased dramatically through 1983 it became increasingly clear that 
Australia's managed exchange rate system was antiquated. Policymakers became increasingly 
worried about the system after markets undid, in several months, the IO per cent devaluation initiated 
by the Hawke government upon coming to office. Speculators were increasingly making money at the 
expense of the Reserve Bank and by October 1983 heavy capital inflow represented a threat to 
monetary policy settings (Kelly 1992:81-88). The Hawke government therefore faced a choice 
between a return to the Variable Deposit Requirement regime or a free float of the currency. As there 
were serious doubts about the efficacy of the former in the more Sophisticated markets of the 1980s, 
the government floated the Australian currency on 9 December. 
24 The .float decision bewildered and infuriated many in the government. Left identity Brian Howe 
wrote to the Caucus economics committee complaining that the float might 'exacerbate the trend 
towards foreign control of the Australian economy.' (cited in Edwards 1996:230). Keating's 
subsequent dominance of economic policy matters stemmed from Hawke's support, the complexity 
and newness of the economic challenges confronting the government, his mastery of the Treasury's 
analysis of the issues, and his own forceful personality. 
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The other major consequence of the float was the discipline it imposed on 'the 
government's.economic management (Bell 1997:146). Kelly (1992:94) concluded, 
The floating rate and exchange control abolition meant that currency and capital markets 
would test every major economic policy decision made by Australia. The nation would be 
under perm,anent examination with severe consequences for failure. The values of the 
' 
markets were far removed from those of the old ALP. During the 1980s the discipline 
imposed by the 111:~rkets through the float and capital movements imposed severe policy 
changes on Australia. It forced Laboi: towards small government, real wage cuts, lower 
taxation and industry deregulation. 
This was not fully appreciated by the Hawke government until 1986, whl!in it then 
had monumental consequences for FDI policy settings. FDI policy became a proxy 
measure amongst market analysts for the level of government commitment to the 
internationalisation of the Australian economy (Kelly 1992:94). This was largely 
because of the precedent the Hawke government created for itself in dealing with 
the foreign bank i4sue inherited from its predecessor. 
Foreign bank entry 
A key recommendation of the Campbell Inquiry into financial market regulation had 
been liberalisation of foreign bank entry (Valentine 1991). Labor had strongly 
opposed that position. Not long after the election Treasurer Keating said publicly 
that foreign banks should understand there was now no longer any poin:t in applying 
to the government for a full banking license because they would not get it (SMH 22 
March 1983). At the same time he suggested that ' ... the question of coihpetition 
will resolve [sic] in some measure around the issuing of licenses, perhaps to 
Australiail institutions, and maybe to some foreign institutions' (SMH 22 March 
1983). Keating then bought time in which to strategise the politics of banking 
refonn, including the foreign batik issue, by commissioning another report. The 
Martin Report was not completed until Mafch 1984, when the restrictions on 
foreign banks looked quite incongruous alongside the open exchange and capital 
regime. The ,Martin Report reiterated the call for the liberalisation of foreign bank 
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entry. As the government commenced deliberations on financial market reform 
Keating stated the basic principle guiding it would Qe to ' ... remove regulations 
when they serve no clear purpose in promoting economic efficiency or social equity' 
(Text of Speech25 14 March 1984). Buoyed by his standing amongst business 
commentators for the float decision, Keating broke with his past opposition to, and 
championed the cause of, foreign bank entry within the government and the ALP 
(Edwards 1996:244). 
The academic attention given to financial sector reform under tlie Hawke 
government often overlooks how FDI policy for financial services was initially 
fumbled in a futile effort to reconcile the liberalisation imperative and economic 
nationalist sensitivities. In August 1983 the government frustrated Citibank in its 
' desire to take full ownership of a merchant bank in which it had a half share. This 
was despite the other shareholders being British and Citibank proposing to later sell 
down 50per cent of the equity to Australians, and to sell a 49 per cent stake in 
another merchant bank to Australian interests.26 The decision attracted strong 
criticism from business commentators and some banking industry figures, although 
others were happy to see the American giant hobbled by regulators.27 Even more 
surprising was the illiberal policy on foreign investment in stockbrqking the 
government adopted after the Martin Report had been handed down. Following the 
adoption of new rules by the Australian Associated Stock Exchanges (AASE) to 
allow stockbrokers to be incorporated, the. responsibility for a policy on foreign 
participation shifted to the Federal 'government. Stockbroking had previously been 
heavily protected by both rules limiting participation by non-residents and uniform 
brokerage fees, both ending in Mai:Gh,1984: Lobbying by domestic broking interests 
25 Speech given to a seminar on the Martin Report sponsored by The Australian Financial Review 
and held in Sydney, 14 March 1984. · 
26 The government's rationale was tpat it wanted the British vendor to sell to Australians in order to 
reduce the already high level of foreign, ownership and control in the Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFI) market. That was a legacy of investor interest prior to 1972 and flexible policy under the 
Fraser government for the NFBI sector (Press Release1 no.77, 16 August 1983). Citibank's target 
was Grindlays Australia and the British vendor was the UK parent, Grindlays Holdings. 
27 The extent to which merchant banks were divided by self interest on FDI policy when the 
Australian Merchant Bankers' Association gave up on a n1aking a submission to the Martin Inquiry 
because of it could not reconcile the contending policy preferences of its members (Mockridge, SMH 
3 September 1983). 
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paid o:ff when the Hawke government limited new foreign investment in 
stockbroking to a 15 per cent single foreign equity stake and 40 per cent in 
aggregate (Gill, Aust 19 April 1984; Press Release 18 April 1984). Australian banks 
also stood to benefit as they had recently been freed of many regulations preventing 
them taking stakes in the stockbroking industry (McCrann, Age 19 June 1984). As 
the stockbroking· community was not a Labor Party constituency its success in 
securing a measure of protection through FDI controls is difficult to accoWlt for. 
Representations from stockbroking interests may have found some influence within 
Treasury.28 These instances of reinforcing restrictive FDI policy show Kelly's 
(1992:87) claim that Hawke and Keating had been 'charting a path towards 
deregulation of Australia's financial system' from soon after coming to office to be 
ex:aggerated. The. government was feeling its way in an area of policy far from 
traditional Labor concerns and so its policy preferences were easily shaped by 
opinion both in and outside official circles. 
Public opinion was no great barrier to liberalisation of FDI in banking as the 
existing banks had few defenders. An ANOP opinion poll of April 1984 found 53 
per cent for foreign bank entry, with party affiliation making no difference (Adv 30 
April 1984).29 This result, moreover, appeared before the case for liberalisation had 
been widely put. Support for liberalisation amongst academic economists and 
business commentators -· and the Opposition's strong advocacy - put pressure 
upon the Labor government to repudiate the restrictive position it had adopted in 
opposition (Aust 4 March 1985). Widespread support for liberalisation amongst 
businesses was a further factor compelling change, while the points of resistance 
within the finance sector had diminished in the several years since reform was first 
seriously discussed (Pauly 1987; Kelly 1992:88-90). The main Australian banks 
had been strongly opposed to foreign bank entry but their unified position 
fragmented as some recognised that market opening could come as a package with 
28 There is evidence to suggest that in several instances the initiative for more restrictive policy came 
from Treasury rather the Treasurer (Carew, AFR 11 May 1983; Age l October 1983; Frith, Aust 27 
April 1984, 28 August 1984). 
29 National telephone poll of 1990 respondents, commisioned by The Advertiser (30 April 1984) and 
conducted by Australian Public Opinion Polls (Gallup). Some 60 per cent of men favoured the entry 
of foreign banks while only 46 per cent of women did. 
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local market liberalisation, presenting them with additional opportunities. Several 
Australian banks were also considering overseas expansion and soon discovered 
access to the important American and Japanese banking sectors could only be on a 
reciprocal basis (Hubbard, AFR 23 January 1985; AFR 29 January 1985). 
Th~ 'politics of foreign bank entry were difficult for the Hawke government because 
of the depth of antipathy to liberalisation within the labour movement; opposition 
that had both private and public interest aspects. The private interest aspect was 
associated with the strong opposition of the 82,000-member Austraiian Bank 
Employees Union (ABEU) to foreign bank entry. The ABEU feared increased 
competition in banking would reduce the profitability of existing banks, creating job 
losses and pressures on employee entitlements. The ABEU was not affiliated with 
the ALP, and had campaigned for Labor for the first time at the 1983 Federal 
Election on the basis of its opposition to banking liberalisation. In the lead-up to the 
1984 national conference of the ALP, where the foreign bank issue would be 
decided, the ABEU appealed to Labor tradition to defend its members' financial 
interests. As the ABEU Federal Secretary said, 
We backed them on the basis that the ALP platform and policy speech spelt out issues that 
were important. But we've disagreed with all of the deregulatory moves to date because the 
government has been jumping to extremes. What ought to have been happening is a national 
debate about the alternatives. We could have had new and innovative controls, But Keating 
has a view of market forces and competition, which we just see as hogwash. What he is 
leading to is the throwing away of Labor Party traditions that this union believes are sound. 
(NT, 18-24 May 1984). 
The ABEU sought the support of the ACTU leadership, with little success~ as well 
as of key faction leaders in the ALP, but Hawke and Keating worked hard to put the 
case for more competition. Keating made much of the arrogance and conservatism 
of the major Australian banks and that they had always been political enemies of the 
ALP (AJ?R, 11 July 1984; Kelly 1992:88-89). In a more positive vein, Keating 
argued that foreign banks would provide enhanced export and investment 
facilitation services that would make a positive contribution to employment in 
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Australia (AFR 11 July 1984). The Left faction of the ALP, includ,ing its senior 
representatives in Cabinet, Stewart West and Brian Howe, strenuously resisted 
foreign bank entry principally on 'public int~rest' ideological grounds (Nfcl8-24 
May 1984; AFR 11 July 1984). Journalist Terry McCrann remarked that it was 
'puzzling, to say the least, that it is the Left which has taken up the cudgels to 
preserve what its members would normally regard as a cosy and highly profitable 
'capitalist' oligarchy' (Aust 29 May 1984). Elements of the Centre Left faction were 
hostile, but its Cabinet members were generally in favour. Hawke and Keating 
worked hard to assemble a winning coalition at the 1984 national conference to 
secure the result (SMH, Age, AFR 16 July 1984).3° Keating enlisted the support of 
state Labor premiers at the conference by promising that a number of the successful 
applicants would be required to locate their headquarters outside Sydney (AFR 11 
July 1984). The final conference resolution stipulated that only a 'limited number' 
of foreign banks would be admitted and every effort would be made to have them 
find local equity partners. 
Having won party approval, the government then had to decide upon the number•c;f • 
licenses awarded, the conditions attached and the pnrticular recipients. It would later 
also have to contend with the 'knock on effects' to FDI policy from other aspects of 
financial services. Keating had foreshadowed the issuance of some 4-6 full licenses 
to foreign banks during the national conference debate but when later announcing 
the successful applicants he quipped 'one is not bound to be frank always' (Aust 4 
March 1985). Sixteen licenses were issued, as a strategy to enhance the 
government's reform credentials. The large number of banks, clearly in defiance of 
the national conference resolution, provcked prolonged debate in the Cabinet and 
Caucus but Keating. ultimately triumphed (Aust 4 March 1985), Shadow treasur1er 
John Howard had supported the entry of eight to ten foreign banks (Aust 4 March 
1985). Keating enjoyed being seen as the treasurer who was ' ... the most financially 
innovative and reformist in Australia ts history' (Bowden, Aust 4 March 1985). 
30 In order to secure the support of the Centre Left faction they traded the support of their rught 
faction, including for a motion on independence for East Timor (AFR 3 July 1984). 
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In hindsight the process of choosing sixteen recipients from a large pool of 
proposals was extraordinary, although this was barely remarked upon at the time by 
observers bedazzled by the number of licenses issued.31 A detailed statement of the 
selection criteria was not put in the public domain. Moreover, Keating selectively 
met with executives of some foreign banks (AFR 1 October 1984). The government 
contended with the reciprocity issue by biasing the selection of banks towards 
countries in which the Australian majors wished to operate (Hubbard, AFR 23 
January 1985; Robins, AFR 29 January 1985).32 The understandings reached about 
the location and f~rm of new foreign banking operations reveal the political nature 
of the selection process33• The final decision on the licenses was taken just one 
week before the State election in Victoria, allo•¥ing Premier Cain to announce that 
five foreign banks would be establishing their Australian headquarters in 
Melbo\lrne.34 Cain had delivered strong support for foreign bank entry at thel 984 
national conference (Goodfellow, AFR 11 July 1984). Labor governments in South 
Australia and Western Australia were also the beneficiaries of bank selection, each 
securing one bank. The Wran government in New South Wales could boast nine 
new banks, although Sydney's pre-eminence in financial services made it a natural 
destination. Yet Coalition-governed Queensland won no bank, despite the 
31 The Bank of China was granted a license by the government separate from the selection process on 
the grounds that it was the logical successor to the license surrendered by the International 
Commercial Bank of China from Taiwan following Australia's recognition of the PRC (AFR 21 
February 84). While the Bank of Tokyo could have again asked the Australian government to issue it 
with the license suspended at the outbreak of WWII, it made a judgment that this entailed political 
risk. The bank was awarded one of the sixteen licenses issued. 
32 The Japanese authorities finally agreed to some qualification to their usual policy of strict 
numerical reciprocity, accepting that the issuance of filll licenses to three Japanese banks Md the 
broad scope for the establishment of merchant banking operations following the Treasurer's 
statement of 10 September 1984, were sufficient grounds for allowing ~he four major Australian 
banks to establish full operations in Japan (Press Release 22 February 1985, cited in full in AFR 23 
February 1985). 
33 The Reserve Bank had expressed a preference for wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign banks, 
incorporated in Australia and subject to the usual capital adequacy requirements, over joint ventures 
with local partners. It feared that in the event of a crisis the latter might have trouble providing 
additional capital (Angly, NT 18-24 May 1984). Political imperatives, however, made some joint 
ventures essential so the RBA instead imposed a 6.5 per cent capital ratio on the new bank entrants, 
compared to the 5 per cent applying to the existing operators (Aust 30 August 1985). The joint 
ventures were central to the deal Hawke and Keating had done with several Labor premiers. 
34 On this aspect of the decision, not noted in either other contemporary accotints or subsequent 
reviews, see Hywood (AFR 28 February 1985). Keating opened his press conference announcing the 
banks with the self-congratulatory remark, 'and they said it couldn't be done' (SMH1 AFR. 28 
February 1985). 
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prominence of foreign resources firms there. The composition of joint ventures was 
equally revealing. The Standard Chartered operation in Adelaide was to be a joint 
venture with the state-owned SGIO, a vehicle of the Bannon government's 
developmentalism, and the Advertiser Newspapers, the main newspaper publisher 
in South Australia with great political influence. In Western Australia, the Industrial 
Bank of Japan was to be only a 50 per cent equity partner in a joint venture .with a 
consortiunl of business interests that also gave the SGIO 10 per cent and the 
Western Australian Development Corporation 30 per cent (Aust 4 March 1985). The 
latter was an important instrument of the Burke Labor government's developmental 
adventurism. Although the IBJ had been involved in financing several Western 
Australia resources projects in the past, the choice of Perth as its base was 
particularly odd in commercial terms because its existing venture-financing 
operations were in Sydney. 
The government's foreign bank decision, and its broader liberalisation of other 
financial activities, bad profound implications for the large non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFis ). Financial liberalisation in 1983 and early 1984 had forced the 
Australian Merchant Bankers' Association (AMBA) to put aside its internal 
differences and call for a temporary liberalisation of FDI policy to facilitate a much-
needed rationalisation of the sector (Frith, Aust 30May1984). Merchant banks were 
the feeling the pinch from the main trading banks that could move into their lines of 
business such as short-term money market operations and faced new competition 
from foreign banks for international operations (Hubbard, AFR 11 September 
1985).35 The government granted a one-year moratorium on local equity 
requirements in merchant banking to facilitate rationalisation, which it then 
35 The decision to grant licences to foreign banks had another and unintended consequence for the 
politics ofFDI policy. Senior Treasury official Tony Cole observed that during the second halfofthe 
l980s incompetent domestic banks took great risks for market share because 'back in 1984 and 1985 
we kept selling the transforming impact of overseas banks. We got the local banks terrified~ 
convinced that they were going to get creamed. Keating was promising that foreign banks would 
unclog the arteries of the financial system' (in Kelly 1992:89). This may have been exacerbated by 
Keating's determination to issue a larger than expected number of licenses in order to earn positive 
reputation as an architect of economic liberalisation and internationalisation. For an assessment of 
financial market liberalisation see Harper and Leslie ( 1993 :84-103). 
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extended indefinitely (SMH, 30 October 1985; FIRB 1992:36; AFR 30 October 
1985). 
\.\ 
Currency crisis and FDI policy liberalisation 
From the earliest days of the Hawke government there were some insiders, such as 
Hawke's chief economic adviser Ross Garnaut, who saw Australia's external 
balances was a policy time bomb (Kelly 1992:81-82).36 Gamaut and many officials 
had hoped a floating exchange rate would bring a devaluation and increased export 
competitiveness; in time lifting the balance of payments constraint on economic 
growth. Yet balance of payment problems were to reappear with a vengeance in the 
mid-1980s and profoundly shape the policy direction for Labor over the next decade 
(Kearney 1993; Smith and Mahony 1993:38-40; Gregory 1991; Walsh 1991:7). 
Australia's domestic economy grew much faster than exports but there was a 
problematic explosion in foreign borrowing following the suspension of capital 
controls. Growth of foreign borrowing and a sharp deterioration in the terms of 
trade were associated with a rapid worsening of the balance of payments deficit, in 
turn triggering a substantial depreciation of the Australian dollar.37 While the 
Hawke government secured the cooperation of the union movement for wage 
restraint through the Accord, and displeased many within the ALP with tighter fiscal 
policy, it was generally seen in the markets and Reserve Bank as insufficient (Gruen 
et al. 1998:213-308; Edwards 1996:291). Kelly (1992:207) wrote of the period, 
The government's late 1985 post-budget mood was fragile because the $A was jittery and 
financial markets had not been comforted by Keating's budgetary and wage restraints. In 
36 Australia experienced a blow-out in the balance of payments deficit to 6 per cent of GDP in 1981-
82, although the Australian currency remained strong with high interest rates, strong capital inflow as 
a result of that and investments in the resources sector, and the managed exchange rate (Oyster and 
Meredith 1990:273-75). 
37 Australia's foreign debt grew dramatically, reflecting the valuation effect of depreciation on 
outstanding borrowings, which had dramatically increased with liberalisation . Net foreign debt grew 
from 6 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 30 per cent in 1986 and the debt-service ratio deteriorated from 
some 14 per cent of export earnings. in 1981-82 to 22 per cent in 1986-87 (Kelly 1992:202; Oyster 
and Meredith 1990:274--78). 
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this period a significant reassessment of Australia's outlook was made by a growing number 
of economists, analysts and institutions developing dire scenarios about Australia's external 
accounts and foreign debt. The economic opinion making elite began to worry of a possible 
national crisis. 
A package of FDI liberalisation measures was then proposed within the government 
to send a positive signal to foreign exchange markets without overly jeopardising 
the growth-oriented model that the Accord embodied.38 Effectively, the government 
would 'keep faith' with its tra~e union constituency by winding back the economic 
nationalism of the ALP. 
There was another reason for looking to FDI policy liberalisation, and for thinking 
that foreign exchange markets would treat it as good news. The growth of 
Australia's foreign debt was, in no small part, a consequence of a decade of 
economic nationalism in the resources sector. As Dyster and Meredith (1990:277) 
stated, 
Foreign investment in natural resources projects in the early 1980s tended to be more i11 the 
form of debt than equity compared with investment in the manufacturing sr,'.;tor where 
traditionally foreign investment took the form of direct 7~1am:"i/subsidia~ investment. 
Foreign equity investment was restricted in natural reset . ·ss ; :--.>_iects under the foreign 
investment guidelines: Australia 'bought back the farm' in m~r 1980s but it did so at the cost 
of creating a massive foreign dtibt. 
Australia had seen a structural shift in the composition of foreign capital inflows 
from FDI to debt in the decade from the end of the Whitlam government. The 
debt/equity split in Australia's gross external liabilities had been roughly even in 
1976 but by 1986 debt accounted for 65 per cent (Dyster and Meredith 1990:277). 
Galligan's (1987) judgment, like many observers, that FDI regulation for the mining 
sector had been effective overlooked the economic risks of greater reliance on debt 
38 The extent to which the Hiiwke government was lockeq into promoting short-term 'growth and 
jobs' by the dual pressures of the Accord and electoral politics is evidenced by Keating's admission 
that he hounded the Reserve Bank's most senior staff about cutting interest rates from early 1986 
(Edwards 1996:291). The RBA did deliver substantial interest rate cuts from March to May 1986 but 
then had to reverse course as a currency crisis told hold. 
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financing. Liberalisation of FDI policy settings would bring greater balance in the 
composition of Australia's foreign capital inflow, with a commensurate increase in 
risk sharing and a reduction in foreign debt servicing obligations, Labor's first 
tentative move in the direction came in October 1985, at a time when the 
government desperately needed to put good policy news in front of both the foreign 
exchange markets.and domestic business communities. 
Policy package of October 1985 
The government sought to arrest growing concern in the business community about 
policy settings with the Prime Minister's announcement of a business deregulation 
package (AFR 15 October 1985). Included in the package were measures to 
liberalise FDI regulation. The so-called 'opportunities test' was dropped because, to 
quote the Treasurer's statement, 
Experience with this aspect of the policy has shown that only very rarely has it resulted in a 
successful Australian bidder coming forward. At the same time, however, the public 
announcement requirement has caused concern to both pro:>r,.~ctive foreign investors and 
Australian vendors because of its possible detrimental effects on their business interests, ln 
this way it may also have been prejudicial to the attraction ofwo11hwhile foreign investment 
to Australia. This change removes an irksome feature of the policy and represents a 
significant act of business regulation. (Press Release no.136 29 October 1985). 
This change was significant because the opportunities test had been a mechanism 
forewarning domestic interests of the entry of a rival foreign firm (Burrell and 
Hartcher, SMH 30 October 1985). The former could then either get organised to buy 
the asset or to lobby for the foreign takeover to be blocked. Although the 
Treasurer's statement suggested this was infrequent there were perceptions to the 
contrary in some foreign business circles (Burrell and Hartcher, SMH 30 October 
1985). Other notable FDI policy changes in th\~ 1985 deregulation package included 
the raising of notification and review thresholds; the effect being many smaller 
investments were effectively no longer subject to regulation. There was a clear 
tension in the Treasurer's formal statement between the desire to be perceived by 
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investors and commentators liberalising policy whilst presenting the changes to the 
electorate as being relatively minor (Press Release no.136 29 October 1985).39 In 
the politically sensitive property sector, despite calls from within the industry 
throughout 1984-85 for change, the restrictive investment regime was not 
significantly liberalised (AFR 17 May 1985). It was made easier for foreign property 
developers to get on with projects without a local equity partner where they planned 
either to sell entirely the building within six months of completion or sell a majority 
ownership stake to locals (AFR 24 October 1985). Long-term foreign ownership, 
however, was still greatly restricted. 
The Federal Opposition and much of the business press demanded further 
liberalisation.40 As Australia's balance of payments and currency problems persisted 
the voices calling for far-reaching libera'lisation of FDI policy grew louder (Frith, 
Aust 13 June 1986). The Opposition, by then under the leadership of John Howard, 
was resolutely liberal. Howard, in stark contrast to his conduct of FDI policy as 
treasurer a fow years earlier, argued that 
Having floated the dollar and irretrievably and for all time become part of the world 
economy, we are deluding ourselves to think we can have some kind of bureaucracy whiclq 
sits in judgment as to what's a good investment and what's a bad investment. I have no 
philo$ophical reservations about getting rid of them [restrictions] all, with the possible 
exception of...what you might call strategic things such as communications. (Age 5 July 
1986). 
39 Consequently, the changes to threshholds were ' ... at least in line with the increase in prices since 
the current threshold levels some years ago but in some instances more than maintaih the real values 
of the thresholds.' There were also the chamcteristic statement that the government was committed 
' ... to keeping the degree of foreign ovmership and control within reasonable bmmds.' (Press Release 
no.136 29 October 1985). 
40 The Sydney Morning Herald noted aptly that a fear of foreign debt had overtaken a fear of 
transnational fums in the public mind so the Labor government could, push liberalisation further 
(SMH 30, 31 October 1985), The Australian Financial Review b!td editorialised in favour of 
abolishing the FIRB and all FOi-specific regulation a week before the government's liberalisation 
measures so was critical of their limited extent. The influential newspaper argued that tax and trade 
practices policies were sufficient to address any concerns about FDI and also argued that FDI policy 
was inconsistent with Australia's promise under the 1961 OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements to progressively abolish restrictions (AFR 21 October 1985). 
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The case for FDI liberalisation was given added credibility by Labor elder statesman 
Neville Wran, a close confidante of Keating. In his final public address as NSW 
Premier, Wran callecJ. for the dismantling of the Foreign Investment Review Board. 
<'·-'Whether you're in London, New 'io•!J:~.9_r any of the other financial capitals; the FIRB is 
regarded as an unnecessary impediment, a bureaucratic impediment, to free investment in 
Australia. No one would deny that one of our problems is the smallness of the capital mass 
available in Australia, and we need to increase investment. I think it would be a sign to the 
rest of the world, if we threw the FIRB overboard. (AFR l July 1986). 
Few voices were raised in defence of FDI policy while many called for change. At 
the same time a profound sense of national economic vulnerability had taken hold in 
the broader community, creating a strong political imperative to be seen to be taking 
economic policy initiatives.41 The unfolding currency crisis of May-July 1986 was 
to exacerbate those insecurities further, 
Mid-1986 crisis 
Australia's balance of payments further deteriorated in April 1986. On May 14 
Keating famously remarked, on radio, that Australia ran the risk of becoming a 
'banana republic' (Edwards 1996:295-96; Mills 1993:88-89; Kelly 1992:196-97). 
From mid-June the Australian dollar started to depreciate in a sustained fashion, 
gaining momentum throughout July.42 On the afternoon of Friday 25 July the 
currency slumped from US61.5c/A$ to US57.lc, forcing the Hawke government to 
formulate a policy response over the weekend to turn around market sentiment. The 
centrepiece of that response was extensive liberalisation of FD! policy. The 
41 A Newspoll of June 1986 found some 64 per cent of respondents agreed 'the Coimtry is in deep 
and serious trouble', compared with 32 per cent in February of the same year (Aust 12 June 1986). 
Party affiliation was a significant determinant of response, with only 48 per cent of those Identifying 
themselves as Labor supporters agreeing with the pessimistic scenario while 82 per cent of Coalition 
voters did (National telephone poll of 1150 respondents). A poll by advertising group Ogilvy and 
Maher found over half of all respondents expected to be economically worse-off in the future, a 
significant rise from 1983 and 1985 (SM20July1986), 
42 Recent analysis has shown that the depreciation of the Australian currency went fur beyond what 
the deterioration in fundamentals suggested it should have done, and the reasons for the overshooting 
included inexperience with the floating exchange rate regime (Gru~n el al. 1998). 
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government's package was designed as, and received by the markets as, a signal the 
government was committed to the maintenance of open capital markets. The Sydney 
Morning Herald's headline read 'Mr Keating's circuit breaker' after the policy 
package contributed to a strong tum-around in the dollar (AFR, Aust, SMH 29 July 
1986).43 It succeeded because it addressed persistent fears in foreign exchange 
markets that the government would respond to the growing currency crisis by re-
introducing capital controls (SMH 29 July 1986). Editorial and business 
commentary on the government's response was universally favourable, reflecting 
both the sense of crisis and the general media support for FDI liberalisa!ion (AFR, 
SMH, CM, Age, WA, CT29, 30 July 1986). This in tum reiterated the message to the 
government that FDI liberalisation was a good way to win plaudits for economic 
management, with seemingly little political pain. 
The 1986 policy package substantially liberalised FDI in manufacturing, tourism, 
and in the non-bank financial sector. The 'economic benefits test' was suspended 
for both new investments and takeovers, local equity partners were no longer 
required and, although investments still had to be notified, ' ... proposals will be 
automatically approved unless they are judged to be contrary to the national interest' 
(Keating, Press Release 28 July 1986).44 The Treasurer stressed the changes, as a 
response to an economic emergency, were a suspension rather than abolition of the 
existing requirements. Business and media observers, however, generally assumed 
the changes would be permanent (Porter, Adv 29 July 1986; AFR, SMH, Age 29 July 
1986). Keating said the policy changes for manufacturing were merely a 
formalisation and administrative streamlining of a liberal policy that had been 
evolving for some time (AFR 30 July 1986). 
43 on·the 28 of July the A$ closed at US61.5c, after having briefly gone to US63c. The Reserve 
Bank, of course, actively intervened in support of the Australian dollar at various. times throughout 
this period of currency weakness (Gruen et al, 1998:209). 
44Abolition of the FIRB was never an option for the government while it wished to retain extensive 
controls on 'sensitive' sectors and while even fully liberalised sectors remained subject to a reserve 
national interest veto prerogative (AFR 30 July 1986). ~~order to avoid any inequities owing to the 
immediately ~ffective nature of the policy changes in liberalised sectors, the government dispensed 
with existing obligations on foreign investors to sell-down their equity stakes to locals (Keating, 
Press Release, 28 July 1986). 
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The 1986 policy package clearly heralded :it decisive break with recent policy for the 
property sector. The Hawke government had been subjected to an intense lobbying 
campaign for several years by property industry figures who stood to benefit from a 
liberal policy but who had been granted only modest concessions in October 1985. 
Australia's worsening external position in mid-1986 led those interests to step up 
their public campaign; claiming huge benefits for liberalisation (AF.R 19 June 1986; 
AFR 11 July 1986).45 In the end the Hawke government delivered them more 
modest, although historically significant, liberalisation. Local equity requirements 
were abolished for FDI in real estate developments, both for on-sale and retention 
and for any investments (including acquisition) in tourism properties. The 
government was clearly focused upon the direct employment generation effects of 
new developments and the infrastructure constraints restricting the growth of the 
inbound tourism industry.46 Acquisitions of established commercial real estate, 
previously effectively prohibited, were allowed but were made subject to a 50 per 
cent local equity guideline or proof this was unavailable (Keating, Press Release 28 
July 1986; FIRB 1994:46). The government was effectively still distinguishing 
between 'new' investments and takeovers; assuming the latter contributed less to 
the economy. The Treasurer's official statement justified liberalisation of FDI in 
property on the grounds the changes would lead to higher direct investment inflows 
and to release Australian funds presently tied up in real estate for investment in 
others sectors of the economy (Keating, Press Release 28 July 1986). Keating 
argued tl1e newly introduced capital gains tax made an outright prohibition on long-
terni holdings of commercial property by foreigners out-of-date, although no 
argument was given for still requiring 50 per cent local equity (AFR 30 July 1986). 
There were reports that Keating had reservations about liberalisation of foreign 
acquisitions of developed property; reports consistent with his later move to restrict 
foreign acquisitions of established residential properties (SMH 29 July 1986). The 
Hawke government may also have been mindful of the divergent FDI policy 
45 The chainnan of estate agent Richard Ellis claimed his agency alone cou.ld bring between $1-2 
billion of Jong-tenn property investment into Australia within a year if restrictions were lifted (AFR 
11 July 1986). Of the FIRB he declared that 'this straggler from the sacred herd of regulation must be 
shot' (WA 9 July 1986). " 
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preferences within the Australian propt;rjy sector. The construction, property 
management and property trust industries had been long divided on foreign 
investment policy, fundamentally along the lines of immediate self-interest (Hurst, 
AFR 26 March 1986). R~al estate intermediaries ~~d the suppliers of construction 
materials and services generally favoured a liberal policy. Domestic construction 
companies did not want foreign competition, but did want foreign-funded projects 
and domestic property managers also feared foreign competition.47 The Hawke 
government was certainly mindful of the political sensitivity of FDI in rural 
industries when liberalising foreign rural property acquisitions. In April 1986, in its 
Economic and Rural Policy Statement, the threshold had been raised (from $Im to 
$3m) for application to projects of a joint t~st of Australian equity participation 
and/or economic 'benefits of. national or regional significance'. That hi;td provoked 
mixed responses from rural interests (AFR, SMH 16, 17 April 1986). In the July 
1986 package outiight foreign ownership of rural properties was permitted, but only 
if the purchaser proposed on-fami development expenditure worth at least one-third 
of the purchase price. Majority foreign equity st~es could still be approved if that 
was the case, if the established benefits test was? satisfied. Such a discretionary 
approach would allow the government to manage FDI policy for rural properties 
with a keen eye to political sensitivities. 
The July 1986 FDI policy package was as rtotable for the sectors that were not 
liberalised as for the ones that were. There was no change to the 50 per cent local 
equity guidelines for the mining industry, or the even stricter policy that applied to. 
tJie media and other sensitive sectors, While some Australian and 'naturalised' 
mining companies retained an immediate interest in a restrictive policy) their 
increasing internationalisation diminished demands for its perpetuation. The mining 
se.ctor as a whole demanded 1iberalis2.tion, and som~ represen~::tives were critical of 
the Hawke government for not delivering it in July 1986 (AFR 29, 30 July 1986) . 
• 
46 This will be discussed in. the following chapter. • 
47 The results. or an e~tet1sive 1986 survey of attitudes in the property industry to ,FDI regulation, 
co.uducted by the Australian Institute of Urban Studies (AiUS) were consistent with that pattern of 
self-interest (Hurst, AFR 26 March 1986). There was strong support for the maintenance of some 
kind of discretionary regulation, such llS the FIRB mechanism, while half the respondents wanted 
some liberalisation to boost the industry at a ditlicult time (Hurst, AF'R,Z..~ March 1986). 
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Foreign investors that missed out in the liberalisation package nonetheless took 
consolation from the fact that policy was clearly moving in a direction of greater 
openness, and they also benefited from changes to tax treatment of foreign firms 
included in the reforms. 48 The positive response to the 1986 reforms soon led the 
government to consider further liberalisation. 
1987 liberalisati011 
With the onset of the balance of payments crisis the Hawke governmenes credibility 
as an economic manager, and hence its electoral fortunes, was gravel~r weakened 
\, 
(Mills 1993:93-95).49 Stabilising the current account deficit and c~encf be~Fe 
the principle policy objecti~e, not least because it would perntit interest ra~ ~uts 
helpful to Labor's re-election. The 1985 and 1986 FDI liberalisation packages had 
been directed at this end; as was renegotiation of the Accord with f -A.CTU ~o 
secure real wage reductions and a significant tightening of fiscal p!Aty ")\ :, 1vm-ds 
1996:301-11). The· nature of the balance of payments shock was ::.(:;._, ;h . 1.he 
'feasibility frontier' of policy responses to it shifted considerably. Kelly (l!..·Y:~.196) 
judged that K~ating's banana republic remark 
.•• facilitated tfte demise of the old order and the advance towards a new ~ne. It is also proof 
that history is made as much by accident as by design. !<eating's remark was inadvenent but 
it became a psychological pivot. lt lifted community consciousness about Australia's 
eco~omic predicament to an unprecedented level and it changed the limits of political 
tolerance. 
The balance of payments crisis cemented the government's commitment to 
champion the internationalisation of the Australian economy and to do so required it 
48 
Prominent in the liberalisation package put together by Keating and his advisers was the 
restoration of interest withholding tax exemptions thnt .had been abolished only a month previously. 
The original dec~ion had elicited a strongly negative reaction from business interests and 
commentators and Keating later conceded that he had always hnd deep reservations about Treasury's 
proposal (Porter, Adv 29 July l 986i Kelly 1992:219-20), 
49 See, fot example, the detailed report of leaked ALP private polling by Gregory Hywood (AFR 4 
June 1986) for a discussion of the negative dimensions and the findings of the Saulwick polls for 
results more favourable to the government (Age 9 June 1986; AFR 16 June 1986). 
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to continue 'culling Labor's sacred cows' (Mills 1993:65), The Hawke government 
would make a decisive break with labourist and statist traditions in favour of a 
pragmatic social democratic model of public governance heavily tinged by 
economic liberalism(Castles 1988; Beilharz and Murphy 1992; Bell 1997:208).50 
Its preparedness to embrace market forces as a fom1dation for realising a social 
democratic vision· was in keeping with the moderate Left in smaller European 
nations but was anathema to many in the labour movement and political Left 
(Katzenstein 1985; Beilharz 1994).51 However the critics were left bewildered by 
the ei;:onomic challenges Australia faced and unable to offer detailed alternatives to 
the Hawke government's approach. 
In April 1987 Treasurer Keating announced a third package of FDI liberalisation 
measures52• A month later the Hawke govemillent called an election that saw it 
commit to further economic reform and win a historic third term in office.53 The 
1987 package abolished the 'economic benefits' test for sectors such as resource 
processing, insurance, stockbroking and mral sectors; leaving only a reserve veto on 
50 Hawke retained considerable sympathy for state interventionism when he came to office - a fact 
which made the subsequent promotion of wide-ranging economic liberalisation so striking (Mills 
1993). Kelly (1992:197) saw 1986 as marking the definitive switch for the Hawke government to a 
'new radical market-orientated direction .. ' In the early 1990s, partly in reaction to deep recession, an 
intense academic debate occurred over 'economic rationalism' under Labor's rule. See, for instance, 
Pusey (1991); Carroll and Manne (1992); Rees, Rodley and Stilwell (1994); King and Lloyd (1993) 
and James, Jones and Norton (1993). A related debate about the role of industry policy continued 
throughout the 1990s. See, forinstance, Probert (1994); Bell (1993, 1994, 1997) and Stewart (1994). 
51 Many critics overlooked the pragmatism of past Labor governments at both federal and state level 
and hence overstated the discontinuities (Johnson 1989). Despite the apparent radicalism of the 
Whitlam government in hindsight, a questionable benchmark against which the Hawke government's 
Labor credentials were judged, it had been subject to considerable cdtici~m from the Left frJr its 
supposed moderation (Catley and Mcfarlane 1974). 
52 The Hawke govemmertt followed up the FDI liberalisation package with a commitment to even 
tighter fiscal policy in its May Statement· ,ind was rewarded with a fall in interest rates. Although the 
government c•mld have stayed in office until early 1988, the boost to the government's reputation 
tempted Labor to election (Edwards 1996:311 ). The Opposition was divided and having difficulties 
1.;;l!lng ii~ intimidating reform agenda to the electorate (Kelly 1992:285, 315-34). 
,
1 ~·i-,t- },'f'$} election campaign revealed just how much Labor had changed in office; its campaign 
t·omn.i~1~1..~~ were sombre and responsible while the Opposition promised massive tax cuts (Kelly 
I 992:t~:.;;,, ·'' ;~Y· A!itonishingly, one newspaper survey found 90 per cent of foreign exchange dealers 
backed tabor (cited in Kelly 1992:349). I<.ellyjudged of the 1987 election that 'Labor had satisfied 
the three necessary requirements for n sound campaign: financial market confidence preventing any 
nm on the currency; the shift from monetary to fiscal policy setting the scene for falling interest rates; 
and an attack on the current account deficit that had avoided recession.' (Kelly 1992:344). 
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'national interest' grounds (Keating, Press Release 30 April 1987; FJRB 1988:31--
33). This effectively shifted the burden of proof about the economic impact of a 
project from the foreign investor to the regulator, although the Federal government 
was still not required to give reasons for rejecting a project. The thresholds for 
exemption from notification requirements of takeovers were raised, to A$5 million 
for most businesses (still A$3 million in the case of rural properties), substantially 
reducing the administrative load upon the Treasury. Residential properties remained 
subject to the existing reporting threshold. The 1987 package also greatly extended 
the benefits of naturalising status. Naturalised firms were allowed to freely establish 
new businesses and. takeover existing Australian firms, subject only to the 
government's reserve 'national interest' veto (Keating, Press Release 30 April 
1987; AFR, Aust 1 May 1987). The government's change of heart on foreign 
investment was symbolised by the lifting of the allowable foreign equity stake in 
stockbroking firms to 100 per cent from the then current 50 per cent (Keating, Press 
Release 30 April 1987; Age, Aust, AFR 1 May 1987). Less than three years earlier 
the government had imposed a ceiling of 15 per cent on such investments. Such 
foreign takeovers were subject only to notification and the reserve 'national interesf 
veto. While business actors and commentators welcomed the lib(eralisation, the 
mining industry was critical for not going further. Subsequent abolition of local 
equity requirements in new oil and gas projects still did not quieten critics such as 
the AMIC (AFR, Age 21January1988).54 
Australia now had a significantly more liberal FDI policy than any observers would 
have predicted two years previously. Despite this, a 1987 OECD survey of FDI 
policy settings in member countries still ranked Australia as third worst in terms of 
instances of sectoral restrictions, after France and Finland (OECD 1987). The result 
attracted attention from the 'quality' press and led the government to defend the 
54 On the other hand, the government's liberalisation measures did not entirely dissuade boards facing 
hostile foreign takeovers bids from lobbying the government for regulatory intervention. Prominent 
examples of such private interest demands, ultimntely resisted, included the boards of Enacon, (B. 
Frith, Aust 3 July 1986); F. H. Faulding (Age 26 April 1987; Aust 3 July 1987) and Goodman Fielder 
Wattie(Aust23 March 1989;26,27April1989;AFR31March1989). 
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liberality of its policy in practice (Aust 14 October 1987).55 This was just one of 
many instances where the Australian government had come to be judged by 
domestic policy communities against international benchmarks that only a few years 
before attracted little attention. Several international precedents in FD! policy 
attracted Australian attention. The contribution of FDI to rapid economic growth in 
some East Asian economies was one; especially with Australia's relative economic 
decline vis-a-vis those economies. At the same time developments in Canada, such 
as its conversion of the Foreign Investment Review Agency into Investment Canada 
in June 1985, pointed in the direction of pro-FD! policy settings (McCrann, Age 29 
June 1985). The international developments suggested not only that Australia 
should liberalise FDI policy settings but also be more pro-active in attra1.:ting FDI. 
Inward investment promotion 
From early in its first term the Hawke government had been, making effort to attract 
inward FDI. Initially this centred on Japan and the resources sector in recognition 
that Japanese equity stakes in mining ventures could secure demand for output 
(Hawke 1983:12-16). A similar logic applied to Korean and Chinese equity stakes 
in resources projects and mineral processing (CM 14 May 1986). Labor, consistent 
with its historical concern for promoting industrialisation and the interests of 
organised labour, also hoped for more FD! in manufacturing (Anderson 1998:3-5). 
The Hawke government's enthusiasm for greenfields FDI in these traditional sectors 
grew too out the economic growth model enshrined in the Accord with the ACTU. 
In fact, the government routinely coopted ACTU officials into marketing abroad and 
hosting inbound investment missions (AFR 6 September 1984; AFR 3 November 
1986; AFR 13 January 1987; AFR, Age 9 February 1987). The objective was to 
showcase the Accord to potential investors because the Hawke government 
recognised Australia's reputation for industrial conflict had worked against FDI 
ss Fourteen sectors in Australia were identified as carrying restrictions on FDI and three as 
completely of limits because of government monopolies. France had restrictions on 19 sectors. 
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inflow in the past (Aust 3 February 1987).56 The Amaya investment mission from 
Japan in early 1987, and its subsequent report, was a focal point for critical public 
discussion about Australia's appeal as an investment destination (AFR 13 January 
1987; 3, 9, 10 and 12 February 1987).57 
The Cabinet put inward FDI promotion on finner organisational and financial 
footing in the lead up to the 1987 election (Anderson 1998:6-7). Target sources 
were identified as Japan, the United States and Europe in the first instance and the 
promotion campaign was to be jointly-run by Austrade and the DepartIDent of 
Industry, Technology and Commerce (DITAC) (Burrell, AFR 22 May 1987).58 The 
ministerial statement announcing the changes was biased towards manufacturing 
FDI, although in late 1987 the tourism minister was despatched to Japan to promote 
investment in tourism infrastructure (Aust 8 June 1987; AFR 13 November 1987). 
By late 1988, investment promotion had moved beyond a simple mission model to 
deploying specialist investment promotion consultants in-country, the first 
appointment being to Austrade's Tok.yo office (AFR 13 December 1988). Merger of 
the departments of trade and foreign affairs after the 1987 election somewhat 
diminished interdepartmental coordination problems. Yet Treasury's continuing 
responsibility for FDI review meant there was scope for conflict and for mixed 
messages to aspiring investors. This was exacerbated by DITAC sharing the 
investment attraction role and the activities of most states in trying to attract FDI.59 
In early 1989 the Commonwealth and the states agreed on a set of guidelines for 
56 In September 1984 Industrial Relations Minister Ralph Willis led a delegation of union and 
business representatives to Japan specifically to allay such concerns (AFR 6 September 1984). An 
investment mission led by Industry Minister John Button in late 1986 became a template for 
subsequent missions to other <;ountries (AFR 3 November 1986; 13 January 1987; Hadler, Aust 8 
June 1987). 
57 The Japanese investment mission, led by prominent MITT advisor Mr Naohiro Amaya, visited 
most state capitals and included representatives of 21 manufacturers, five trading companies and 
eight banks, as well as a number of officials from government departments (AFR 3 February 1987). 
The composition of the Japanese delegation reflected an appreciation amongst its planners that the 
Hawke government was aiming principally for greater investment in high-tech manufacturing. 
58 One million dollars was allocated to a campaign of investment promotion and a data base of 
factors inhibiting direct investment that should be addressed was to be created (Aust 8 June 1987). 
The shadow industry spokesman criticised the FDI promotion plan as 1 ... a kneejerk political 
response in an election atmosphere' that did not address the. root causes of why Australia was not an 
attractive destination for FDI (Aust 8 June 1987). 
59 From interview with Mr Peter Watts, Invest Australia, Sydney, 22 February 2000. 
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cooperation in both FDI attracting and marketing products and services; although 
political incentives for non-cooperation remained strong (AFR 28 February 1989). 
Conclusions 
Labor came to office in March 1983 with a formal commitment to more restrictive 
FDI policy but a strong political imperative to deliver economic recovery and job 
creation. In late 1983 the Hawke government turned its back on the ALP's FDI 
policy and affirmed FDI policy similar to that inherited from its Coalition 
predecessor. The Hawke government was periodically lobbied by domestic 
businesses wanting their private interests protected through the mechanism of the 
Foreign Takeovers Act. However, FDI policy outcomes principally reflected the 
Hawke government's conception of the public interest; patterned by moderate 
economic nationalism and the political imperatives presented by the Accord and the 
electorate. Government leaders were acutely aware that Labor's dismal record in 
earlier periods of government stemmed ftmdamentally from its inability to win 
confidence in its economic management capacities. This Jed to reaction against the 
Whitlam government legacy and disposition towards liberal economic refonn 
agenda being proposed by the broad policy community of Treasury officials, peak 
business groups, commentators and academics. The Hawke government's adoption 
of a floating exchange rate and abolition of capital controls, despite wariness within 
Labor ranks, earned plaudits from quarters historically hostile to Labor and so 
enhanced its electoral standing. The Hawke government's reform credentials were 
further boosted by the decision to issue a large number of licenses to foreign banks, 
regardless of contention within the labour movement. The plaudits won for foreign 
bank liberalisation were despite the allocation of banking licenses having been 
influenced by the political interests of state Labor govemments. 
Both the float and foreign bank decisions had considerable symbolic and practical 
significance and had not required parliamentary approval. Foreign investment policy 
could be broadly liberalised by treasurer's fiat and the trigger for this was a 
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sustained deterioration in Australia's balance of payme1,\ts in the mid·l980s. The 
Hawke government's business deregulation package of 19~?. emergency measures 
in response to the currency crisis of 1986 and its pre·electron FDI liberalisation 
package of 1987 were. central to its efforts to win renewed confidence in its 
economic management capabilities. In loosening FDI policy each time the Labor 
leadership was endeavouring to signal its commitment to internationalising the 
Australian economy. Its audiences were both elite opinion·makers with influence 
over the electorate - media, industry and academic commentators - and the 
business coll1111unity. Business support for a liberal policy was partly a function of 
the internationalisation of Australian business itself. It also stemmed from the desire 
of business for Australia's balance of payments deficit to be managed without a 
painful recession. The Hawke government's trade union constituency did not 
oppose FDI liberalisation for this latter reason, and because of the additional 
employment creation that FDI might deliver. The ACTU's pragmatism on FDI was 
marked by its involvement in official initiatives to attract foreign investment. 
The main political risk for Labor in liberalising FDI policy lay in the arena of public 
opinion. While economic nationalist sentiment in the broader electorate remained 
strong, there were initially greater anxieties about Australia's economic prospects 
that FDI could arneliorate.60 Although increased FDI exacerbated the concerns of 
some AustraHa.11s about Australia's economic future, the Federal Opposition's 
adoption of an even more liberal FDI policy m~ant anti·FDI sentiment did not 
immediately become politically salient. However, in the late 1980s the Hawke 
government was confronted by intense controversy over Japanese investn,"}nt in 
Australia, having both complex public and private interest dimensions. Labor's 
responses revealed the mix of principled defence of liberal policy and. politically 
pragmatic concessions that typified its time in office. The more Labor liberalised 
general FD! policy, the more politically inspired appeared the continuing restrictions 
on FDI in certain 'sensitive' businesses. These restrictions were driven either by 
electoral imperatives or sectorMspecific private interest politics. The following two 
chapters look at those political dynamics .. 
60 See footnote 39. 
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8 Politics of Japanese FDI, 1987-90 
The Hawke government substantially liberalised Australia's FDI policy in response 
to severe balance of payments problems. A more open policy promised both quick 
relief through larger capital inflow and a longer-term boost to exports and 
international competitiveness. Yet despite the support of the Federal Opposition for 
a liberal FDI policy, the Hawke government was soon confronted by public 
controversy over increasing Japanese direct investments in real estate and the 
tourism and beef industries. The Hawke government initially treated public concern 
about FDI in residential real estate as a private interested reaction by Australian 
aspirant buyers. Its politically pragmatic response was to enact restrictions on non-
resident ownership of residential real estate that were at odds with its recent 
liberalisation of FDI policy. However, antipathy to property FDI also reflected deep 
territorial, historical, cultural and racial sensitivities within sections of the 
Australian community. Negative reactions were compounded by a sense of national 
economic vulnerability following the currency crisis of 1985-86 and the Hawke 
government's promotion of economic liberalisation and 'enmeshment with Asia'. 
Contention over Japanese FDI during 1988-89 was made more intense by the 
concurrent and not unrelated public controversy over Asian immigration. 
Latent community disquiet about Japanese FDI was made politically salient by 
elements of the mass media, fringe right and left wing political activist,;:i, and the 
state Labor Opposition in Queensland. The Hawke government feared the public 
controversy over Japanese FDI would damage its economic and related diplomatic 
strategies, It publicly defended the contribution that Japanese FD! could make to the 
economy and to the growth of the export-oriented tourism and beef industries in 
particular, despite popular concerns about 'vertical integration'. Japanese direct 
investors in the beef industry faced strong criticism from domestic industry 
organisations controlled by interests fearful of the rationalisation that such FDI 
might provoke. These producer interests also exercised voice through the National 
Party, provoking tensions within the Federal Coalition over Japanese FDI. While 
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Labor had its own dissenters, the Foreign Investment Review Board again proved to 
be an effective tool for managing the politics of FDI. The Coalition ultimately 
compromised its liberal credentials on foreign investment policy with resort to 
criticism of the Japanese-backed multi-function polis (MFP) concept during the 
tight-fought 1990 federal election. It not only marked the extent to which the major 
parties perceived anti-Japanese sentiment in the electorate to be widespread but also 
the power of elite opinion-makers in the media and business to censure populist 
politics. The challenge to liberal and non··discriminatory FDI policy finally receded 
with the onset of deep recession late in 1990 although deep-seated hostility towards 
FDI from Asia was to persist in some sections of the Australian community. 
Residential real estate FDI and interests 
Rises in urban residential real estate prices in the mid-1980s, in Sydney in 
particular, attracted the attention of the mass media with an increasing number of 
reports about foreign purchasers (Walsh SMff 27 August 1987). It was soon widely 
asserted in the media, especially in tabloid newspapers and talkback radio that 
foreign buyers were driving up prices beyond the reach of many Australian buyers.1 
In September 1987 the Federal government announced a ban on the acquisition of 
urban residential properties by non-residents, with limited exceptions for approved 
migrants and foreign finns buying residences for executives. Australian citizens 
resident overseas were also entangled in the new provisicns and accounted for a 
third of applications to the FIRB in the first eight months of thr,;ir operation (FJRB 
1 The Hawke government's decision to exempt the principal residence frl)m its new er.pita! gains tax, 
a wealth effect froth the stock market, the booming financial services s1~ctor centrl;d on Sydney, a 
cyclical upswing and a large growth in lump sum superannuation ria.v-out.~ were all factors 
contributing to large rises in residential property prices, especially in the higher segments of the 
market (TOS 4-10 October 1987). It has proven difficult to judge the effects Of the restrictions on the 
residential market because a major stock market correction soon after their announcement impacted 
on the market (Bryan 1989:20-21). The deep recession of 1990-92 further clouded the issues. The 
restrictions apparently did have an immediate effect on a limited range of properties on the Gold 
Coast, although the effects in the Sydney market, ironically, appear to have been much more modest 
(TOS 4-10 October 1987; 21-27 February 1988). The consequences for public administration of the 
foreign investment review process were far more dramatic. Applications processed by the FIRB 
increased dramatically, ironically after staff numbers assigned to foreign investment issues in 
Treasury had been sharply reduced following previous policy liberalisation (Cassie, AFR 9 December 
1987). 
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1988:14).2 The ban applied immediately and the government committed to 
introducing amendments to the Foreign Takeovers Act to allow for criminal 
sanctions for non-compliance with the ban or the associated notification 
requirements (Age, SMH, AFR, Aust 30 September 1987). In announcing the 
restrictions Treasurer Keating said that the previous guidelines had been widely 
ignored.3 Keating asserted that the apparept 'surge' in foreign demand for 
residential properties had brought 'little economic benefit' to Australians but also 
conceded that the decision was based on no more than a 'sketchy picture' of the 
scale of foreign acquisitions of residential real estate (Age, SMH 30 September 
1987). 
The decision was at odds with the Hawke government's general liberalisation of 
FDI policy (Bryan 1989:17). Although the Treasurer insisted there would be no 
further tightening of FDI policy, foreign exchange markets reacted very negatively 
to the announcement by selling down the Australian currency (Age 30 September 
1987). The question arises as to why the Hawke government did not make the 
pragmatic move pdor to the Federal election several months earlier. As seen in the 
previous chapter, the overriding concern for the ALP in the lead-up to the 1987 poll 
was to rebuild the confidence of opinion leaders in its economic governance 
following the balance of payment crisis of 1985-86. The Opposition promised an 
even more liberal FDI policy, and so Labor did not risk losing votes on the issue. 
With the residential ban post-election the Hawke government clearly hoped that any 
damage to its reputation within the international investment community would be 
offset by political gains to the ALP from adopting the restrictions. 
The immediate political imperative was to help the faltering Unsworth Labor 
government in New South Wales, especially in the wake of local elections that had 
2 FIRB ( 1988: 14) stated that Australian citizens living abroad were 'readily given approval to buy 
real estate unconditionally'. In 1989 acquisitions by Australian citizens abroad and foreign nationals 
entitled to Australian pennanent residence were exempte<j from the examination requirements 
although notification was still required (FIRB 1989:2). 
3 The FDI policy guidelines inherited from the Fraser government placed no restrictions or reportage 
requirements on acquisition of residential properties by foreigners if the. total historical value of nil 
properties held was less than $600,000. As the tnedian house price even in Sydney was only one.-
third that figure, the rules did not constrain purchases of 'average' properties by non-resident 
foreigners ~ although there was no evidence proffered that such purchases were occurring. 
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been disastrous for the ALP (Age 30 September 1987; TOS 4-10October1987). For 
this reason, and apparently from personal conviction, Treasurer Keating saw the 
government adopt the restrictions (AFR 13 May 1983; 21June1983; Hywood, AFR 
30 September 1987). That they promised politic:al pay-offs is suggested not only by 
the opinion polling of the time, but also by their basic political economy. At any 
time a substantial portion of an urban population aspires to live in more exclusive 
areas of a city. As the supply of new residential properties in desirable inner urban 
areas is limited, especially free standing ones, many may conclude that any 
regulation reducing the pool of bidders will keep prices lower and increase their 
chances of buying there. The constituency for restrictions on acquisitions by 
foreigners is therefore much larger than for a liberal policy as there are many more 
aspiring buyers than there are aspiring sellers who would not want to buy again in 
the same market.4 On the other hand, foreign investment in new apartment and outer 
suburban housing developments might increase the overall stock of residential 
properties and make the ownership aspirations oflocals seem more attainable. 
The Hawke government's restrictions clearly seem to have been crafted with such 
an understanding in mind. Under the new policy foreign developers could still build 
apartment blocks and other residential developments, but remained subject to FIRB 
approval as before. Moreover, up to 50 per cent of the units in a development could 
be sold 'off-the-plan' to non-residents prior to the project's completion (FJRB 
1988:13-14; W. Aust 7 November 1987). Those units, however, could not then be 
on-sold to other non-residents. The evident hope was that foreigners would continue 
to build residential property stock that Australians could then buy more cheaply than 
if ihey had to bid against non-resident purchasers. The major flaw in the logic 
underpinning the restrictions was the fact that investments in new residential 
property projects would be less attractive to foreign investors now that they could 
not be freely sold onto other foreigners. It was on precisely such grounds that the 
4 Support for restrictions on purchases of residential real estate by non-residents is also consistent 
with Caves (1996) account of the asymmetry of economic nationalism. That is, in this instance, the 
costs to domestic buyers through higher prices of competing non-resident bidders attracts greater 
attention than the gains to domestic sellers. Support for such restrictions is also consistent with 
historical concerns about absentee landlords and also with some strands of popular communitarian 
thought. 
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real estate industry attacked the government's restrictions (AFR, SMH, Aust 30 
September 1987). The new restrictions also ignored the potential effects on the 
rental market, where foreign portfolio property investors had contributed to 
increased supply. Following closely upon the Hawke government's capital gains 
tax, and at a time of a large migrant intake, real estate industry observers warned of 
the dangers of a rental squeeze (Age 30 September 1987). The Real Estate Institute's 
New South Wales president accused the Federal Treasurer of a ' ... a gross over-
reaction based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the marketplace' (Aust 30 
September 1987). The distinction between established properties and new projects 
proved inordinately difficult to implement, resulting in intense criticism from the 
property industry and repeated delays in formulating legislation (Aust 14 October 
1987; 1 June 1988; AFR 9 December 1988). The new restrictions also had 
implications for the growing tourism industry as holiday condominium and resort 
developments had been increasingly financed through strata titling and sale to 
portfolio investors.5 This was later acknowledged in one of the Federal 
government's own documents, and by the Tourism Minister, and Labor factional 
powerbroker, Senator Graham Richardson (Richardson 1988; SMH 13 December 
1988). The government eventually sought to address the problem by creating a 
system of block approvals for acquisitions by non~residents in developments granted 
'integrated tourism resort' status (Treasurer, Press Release 25 July 1991; FJRB 
1994:25). 
In straying down the path of economic nationalism the government found it had 
some influential fellow travellers. The Australian Financial Review, perhaps 
playing to the many property aspirants amongst its readership, editorialised in 
favour of the restrictions (AFR 30 September 1987). Melbourne1s The Age declared 
that, 
The only losers are the owners of expensive properties for sale and real estate agents who 
can no longer expect astronomic prices and commissions boosted by foreign money. The 
winners are home buyers who have found themselves outbid by Japanese, Hong Kong 
Chinese and other foreigners to whom Australian real estate prices seemed ridiculously 
3 
Prominent agent Gold Coast Max Christmas forcefully made this point, as did Sydney agent; and 
Labor identity, Christopher Brown of Jones Lang Wootton (AFR 4 April 1989). 
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cheap, given the fall in the value of the Australian dollar and the extraordinarily inflated 
prices in their homelands (Age 30 September 1987). 
The Courier Mail and The West Australian expressed similar sentiments. The 
Advertiser in Adelaide concluded ' ... there can be few objections to the political 
shrewdness which Mr Keating has shown in blocking the sale of the homestead' 
(CM, WA, Adv 1 October 1987). The Democrats called for even tougher restrictions; 
wanting non-citizens limited to leasehold (Age 28 January 1989). However The 
Australian editorialised againS'i the new policy, describing it as ' ... a sacrifice of 
principle for populism' (Aust 1 October 1987) and, notably, the Sydney Morning 
Herald described the restrictions as a 'cheap stunt' (SMH 30 September 1987). 
Western Australian Labor premier Brian Burke expressed similar sentiments (Aust 1 
October 1987). So too did shadow treasurer Andrew Peacock; dismissing the 
restrictions as a 'knee-jerk reaction' that would adversely affect Australia's standing 
as a destination for foreign investment (Age 30 September 1987; Aust 23 November 
1988). The decision ultima~ely risked lending legitimacy to domestic critics of FD! 
and being interpreted abroad as a sign that Australia had not cast off its wariness of 
close ties with East Asia (Walsh, SMH 4 October 1988) .. By the time the necessary 
legislation was prepared in March 1989 the government appeared embarrassed by 
the restrictions (Spruhan, W. Aust 18-19 March 1989).6 
Territory, history, race and culture 
From early 1988 it was clear that public antipathy to FDI in real estate went far 
beyond a private interest concern, however misplaced, with the effects of FDI on tht: 
affordability of residential real_ estate. The Hawke government's residential 
restrictions did little to diminish debate over FDI in real estate. Policy for foreign 
investment in non-residential property remained quite liberal with the most intense 
controversy yet to come. Chapter 2 explain~d that FDI in natural resources and land 
is likely to be most controversial because of the usually intense territorial dimension 
to economic nationalism. Earlier chapters noted how previous governments had 
6 
A reading of Hansard in relation to the passage of the legislation reinforces this judgment. 
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been confront~4 by public antipathy to FDI in natural resources. Now the Hawke 
government was confronted, by public consternation over FDI in real estate. Nor was 
it FDI from traditional sources. Fro~ 1987 Japan, the only country to have 
threatened Australian territory with military fo~ce., became the largest source of FDI 
in Australia. It was also the first time that the largest source ofFDI was a country of 
considera~le 'cultµral distance' from Australia and, moreover, 'non-white'. In short, 
unease over foreign ownersl:up of real estate, hostility towards Japan and general 
artti-Asian prejudice amongst a not insignificant minority of the Australian 
population combined to provide the foundation for public controversy over FDI 
policy. These complexly interdependent attitudinal dynamics are explored in turn. 
FDI i11 property 
The Hawke government's Hberalisation of FDI policy in 1986-87 was soon 
followed by a notable increase in FDI inflow.7 The ABS found inward FDI to have 
risen from $3.3 billion in FY 1985-86, to $4.8 billion in 1986-87, $7 billion in 
1987-88, peaking at $10.6 billion in 1988-89. As usual, FIRB figures at the time 
showed a markedly higher level of planned foreign business activity in Australia 
than the ABS data and this data had the most influence on public perceptions of 
FDI. 8 This was most acute in relation to foreign investment in real estate, the sector 
into which FDI flows were growing at the fastest rate. In FY 1987-88 FIRB report 
total approved FDI to be $25 billion, $9.70 billion of which was associated with 
proposed real estate investments (FIRB 1988:38). FIRB-approved real estate 
investments rose to some $15 billion the following year, with another $5 billion 
1 It is difficult to separate precisely the effect of liberalising FDI policy from the drivers of FDI 
inflaws. These i,ncluded tfte recognition that the Australian dollar had overshot in. 1986 and was 
likely to appreciate notably, hastening FPI inflow, a. strong domestic economy, imprvving terms of 
ttade for primary exports, the growth o( inbound tourism, and the developing 'bubbiG.ecqnomy' in 
Japan that spilled over into real estate investment in Australia. 
8 The value of FIR.a-approved investments are much higher than the ABS figures because they are 
proposed investments and also often financed in Australin (FIRB 1990:1). The hiatus in ABS 
statistics on FDI from 1978 to 1983 resulted In the FIRB figures on expected investment attructing 
much greater attention from the mass media and political actors. 
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eannarked for the tourism sector (FIRB 1989:42).9 The figures for real estate FDI in 
1988-··89 were associated with precisely 2000 proposals, although investments 
worth more than $50 million numbered only 45 and accounted for some $653 
billion (FIRE 1989:43). The Hawke government's Seif.itember 1987 real estate 
decision entailed onerous new notification requirements that had a direct impact on 
FIRB statistics for approved FDI in real estate. The effect was an unintended and 
sharp exaggeration of the extent of such investment to all but the most astute 
observer of the data. 10 This translated into big headlines about a surge of FDI into 
.eal'estate that nonetheless had some foundation (for example SMH 6 Mar~h 1989). 
Those headlines fuelled public concerns that had been smouldering for at least a 
decade. A register of foreign land a-wnership, often demanded by critics, may have 
diminished the scope for wild claims about the extent of foreign ownership of 
property but could not practicably be developed at the federal level (W.. Aust 30-31 
July 1988).11 
The widespread perception that foreign purchasers were a significant factor behind a 
rapid rise in Sydney residential real estate pdces in the 1980s, despite the paucity of 
evidence, suggests there was an established concern about foreign ownershlp of real 
estate. Several foreign investments involving substantial property acquisitions had 
been contentious in the past despite involving substantial additional development 
expenditure. The most prominent example was the Iwasaki tourism development at 
Yeppoon in the late 1970s that had been strongly opposed by the Labor Opposition 
in Queensland (Viviani and Selby 1980; Age 25 July 1972; Aust 28 July 1972; AFR 
9 This marked the highpoint of notified. investments. Total notified and apprdved FDI in real estate 
for 1989-90 fell back to some $10,5 billion and $5.65 billion in 1990-91 (FIRB 1990:42, 1991:38), 
Similarly the figures for approved and notified FDI in tourism fell to $3,89 in 1989-90 and $1.86 
billion in 1990-1. 
10 The FlRB annual report acknowledged that at the time but most media commentary did not (FIRB 
1988:3). The new requirement to notify to FIRB of virtually all FDI in any urban real estate, and a 
mechanism for developers to notity foreign purchases of units up to 50 per cent of the project prior to 
sale, sharply increased overall reported FDT. Much would never be realised, especially as many 
developers habitually notified the full 50 per cent limit. 
11 The Australian Democrats proposed an onerous register of foreign ownership that the government 
and Opposition rejected as deeply flawed (Age 7 March 1988, JO March 1989). All foreign 
corporations owning more than $5000 in Australian assets were to be required to supply an annual 
statement to the Treasurer. (Adv 9 March 1989). Like many proponents of a register, Democrats 
leader Senator Janine Haines was strongly critical of foreign takeovers and freehold land acquisitions 
(Age 7 March 1988). The US congress deliberated on. broader proposal from 1989 for a register of 
foreign interests that was also substantially flawed (Ernst 1991 ). 
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17 Apr~l 1973; AFR 27 April 1978). Although most states had seen property FDI 
arise as a minor issue at some time or another, was particularly contentious in New 
South Wales and Queensland. Controversy was almost inevitable then when the 
FIRB reported in 1988 that total expected FDI in real estate had risen over 70 per 
cent on the previous financial year for both states (FIRB 1988:7). Increases in 
foreign property investments wer.e far more modest in other states. 
An old enemy 
The growing importance of real estate FDI in total inward FDI would probably have 
always been somewhat contentious given, as discussed earlier, the territorial 
orientation of much nationalist sentiment. 12 However, it was the emergc:mce of Japan 
as the major source of such investment that most provoked controversy --- in the 
United Kingdom and the United States as weli (Asian Finance 15 September 
1989:4; Economist 19 March 1988; McMahan 1990; Regan 1990:10-11; Graham 
and Krugman 1995). The legacy of World War Il made inevitable some community 
unease about a rapid increase in Japanese property investment (Broinowski, 
1981:192-96). Over the forty years since WWil Australian government and 
business initiatives to build better relations with Japan had helped to diminish 
community hostility towards close trade and investment links with the former 
enemy (Meaney, Matthews and Ence! 1988; Rix 1986; 1999:98).13 However, 
Japanese FDI until the mid-1980s, with the limited exceptions of the automotive 
indµstry and some financial and trade-related services, was generally not associated 
with a controlling stake (Myer 1978:123-30). Rapid growth in Japanese FDI in real 
12 No more definite statement than this can be made because, as Goot (1990:261) noted, no surveys 
of attitudes towards FDI sought address sectoral differences until the 1989 AGB:McNair study for 
the Gamaut Report. It is impossible to know precisely the extent to which attitudes to FDI in real 
estate are a function of attitudes to Japanese investors that were so prominently associated with the 
sector. The poll for the Garnaut Report did reveal some 60 per cent of respondents said FDI in real 
esta~() should be 'discouraged' or 'not encouraged' (Goot 1990;26li Garnaut 1989;97). This 
contra~ted starkly with a figure of25 per cent for manufacturing, 17 per cent for tourism and 44 per 
cent for,both the traditionally sensitive areas of mining and agriculture. 
13 This ill borne out by the ANOP polls carried out for the Japanese embassy in May 1976, September 
1977 apd March 1985. Survey results accessed by the author at the Consulate-General of Japan in 
Sydney, May 1996, A gradual decline In hostility towards trade and broader relations witll Japan in 
earlier p11riods, although with a resilient antagonism amongst a minority of Australians, can be traced 
through Australian Gallop Polls. See, for instance, the difference between Nos. 382-97 (Sept-Nov 
1946) witl~Nos. 1264-77(Aug-Nov1957) and Nos. 1711-28 (Nov-Dec 1963). 
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estate, and in the tourism and beef industries, in the latter half of the 1980s changed 
that (Drysdale et al. 1989:62-64).14 
Japanese FDI approved by FIRB rose from a figure of $1.9 billion in 1985-86, 
comparable with the United Kingdom, to $9.1 billion in 1988-89. This was 2.5 
times greater than FDI from either the United Kingdom or United States (PIRB 
1989:6, 1990:7). Japanese Ministry of Finance data, the most reliable on actual 
Japanese F.DI flows into Australia, revealed a ten-fold increase in real estate and 
toutism facilities from JFY1986-87 to JFY1988-89 (CEDA 1990:57). The total 
VEtlue for. the latter period was $1.27 billion, nearly ten times greater than the 
amount going to mining. 15 In JFYl 996-97 FDI in real estate and tourism 
infrastructure accounted for only 14 per cent of total Japanese FDI in Australia, 
while the proportion was 52 per cent for 1988-89. The FIRB figures on approved 
and notified Japanese FDI for AFY1987-88 showed a proportion of 58 per cent of 
the total being in real estate - excluding tourism infrastructure (FIRB 1988:6), The 
FIRB figure for total Japanese FDI was nearly $5.4 biHion and figured prominently 
on the front pages of most newspapers. AFYl 988-89 was even more spectacular at 
$9.1 billion; some $5 billion in approved real estate investment and $3.5 billion in 
tourism (FIRB 1989;44). The FIRB statistics also made headlines because it showed 
Japanese FDI in Australia growing rapidly from the mid-1980s relative to that from 
the traditional sources, the United Kingdom and the United States. By FY1987-88 
Japan had become the single largest FDI source country (FIRB 1988:40). Investmet.it 
in real estate accounted for a much greater proportion of total Japanese FDI than it 
did for foreign investment from other sources (FIRB 1988:6). Yet Japan's share of 
total approved FDI never rose above 30 per cent. 
Japanese FDI was certainly less popular than investment from traditional sources 
(Goot 1990:253). A Saulwick poll of August 1988 found many Australians felt 
14 Drysdale et al (1989:63) concluded ' ... the growth of Japanese tourism and associated 
developments in investment presages a change in the urban and political land5cape in Australia not 
dissimilar to some of the effects of !ong-term migration in the past.' 
15 Japanese FDI in banking and insurance was quite strong, being worth $92 million in i986-87 and 
rising to $363 million in 1988-89 (CEDA 1990:57). This reflecting the Hawke government's 
liberalisation of banking and the strong demand from Japanese fim1s investing in Australia for 
Japanese financial services. 
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much greater 'wannth' towards British and American thau Japanese investors. Goot 
(1990:248) concluded t~at ' ... opposition to foreign investment in Australia centres 
on opposition to investment from Japan'. The growth in real estate FPI, especially 
from Japan, distracted attention from a substantial increase in foreign takeover 
activity in the manufacturing sector in the wake of FDI policy liberalisation (FIRB 
1988:11).16 This general indifference may have been in part because some half of 
the foreign acquisitions involved British firms (FIRE 1988:12). Senior Hawke 
government ministers and media commentators did not doubt the intensity of 
animosity towards Japanese FDI in some sections of the Australian community. 
Federal Primary Industries Minister John Kerin, for instance, noted on national 
television there was ' ... a lot of anti-Japanese feeling about at present' (CT 27 March 
1989). An editorialist for The Australian newspaper concluded that Japanese FDI 
had' ... stimulated concern and debate in the homes of Australia' (14 June 1988). 
A survey and focus group study of attitudes in Queensland towards Japanese 
investment commissioned by the Japanese investor Daikyo in 1988 concluded that 
the attitudes of almost half of respondents and. interviewees could be fairly labelled 
hatred of Japanese (CT 11 March 1989). Overall, some 90 per cent of those 
surveyed were at least very uncomfortable with Japanese investment (CT 11 March 
1989). Japanese diplomatic posts in Australia took seriously the apparent reaction 
against Japanese FDI, especially as they commissioned good quantitative data on 
Australian attitudes from ANOP Research Services. The April 1988 survey found 
that some 75 per cent of respondents wanted no further increase in Japanese 
investment, with the figure for New South Wales respondents being 80 per cent and 
86 per cent for Queensland.17 Yet respondents were clearly selective in their anti-
Japanese sentiment and economic nationalism. Some 61 per cent of respondents 
16 Total approved expected investment in manufacturing was $1571 million in 1985-86, $3879m in 
1986-87, and $5222m in 1987-88; the FIRB noting that most proposed expenditure was ass()ciated 
with acquisition of established enterprises (FJRB 1988:11). However, one-quarter of the 1987-88 
figure was associated with Australian.controlled firms that had foreign equity stakes in excess of 10 
per cent and were therefore required. to report the transactions to the FIRB (FJRB 1987-88;12). The 
acquisition trend continued in 1988-89 and 1989-901 although the total value of expected 
expenditure declined to $4353m and $3085m respectively). New Zealand firms emerged as the main 
foreign investors (FJRB 1990: 17). 
11 Comparing with the 1985 poll, there was greater recognition that Japan was Australia's largest 
trading partner but 38 per cent of people thought that Australia was not always fairly treated in this 
trade. Increased cultural exchange was widely favoured. 
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supported increased trade between Australia and Japan and 70 per cent wanted to 
see more Japanese tourists visiting18• A Business Review Weekly survey that found 
72 per cent of Brisbane respondents, and 63 per cent nationally, were concerned 
about increasing Japanese investment (CM23 April 1988). Goot (1990:248)judged 
that opposition to Japanese FDI in Queensland was not 'not necessarily more 
widespread' but 'better mobilised' and more intensely felt in some quarters. 19 
Politicisation of Japanese FDI in Queensland does appear to have increased the 
level of hostility towards Japanese people relative to other states whil~ overall 
attitudes to the costs and benefits of Japanese FDI appeared little different.20 This 
accords with survey evidence that a majority of locals in areas where Japanese FDI 
in the tourism industry was concentrated had an appreciation of its economic 
benefits (Queensland Treasury 1991a:15-21). Ultimately it is impossible to separate 
clearly the specific antagonism towards Japanese FDI associated with the war legacy 
either from the concern about foreign ownership of real estate or from hostility 
towards FDI from Asia more generally.21 However it is clear that the FDI issue 
increased the negative element in Australian public opinion towards Japan (Goot 
1990:253).22 
18 The survey was the sixth commissioned by the Embassy since 1973 and had a sample sfai.~ of 1500. 
The findings of the April 1988 survey were deliberated released to the media because it was hoped 
that the rather disconcerting results would further resolve Australian politicians to talce the initiative 
in selling the benefits of Japanese FDI to a sceptical public (SAJH 24 April 1988; Age 25 August 
1988; AFR 25 August 1988). A Japanese diplomat later said that attitudes in, Queensland were of 
particular concern (AFR 16 June 1988). Original survey results accessed at the Consulate General of 
Japan at Sydney, May 1996. 
19 The Saulwick poll of August 1988 reveals that attitudes amongst Queensland respondents towards 
Japanese investment did not differ significantly from other states (Age 12 August 1988). The AGB: 
McNair poll for the Garnaut Report found higher support in Queensland for FDI from all major 
sources than in any other state (Goot 1990:255). This may reflect the strong promotion of the benefits 
ofFDI conducted by the Bjelke-Petersen government over many years. 
20 The August 1988 Saulwick poll found Queensland respondents espressing 'warm' feelings towards 
Japanese people to be some I 0 per cent fewer, at 31 per cent, than other states except South Australia 
(Age 12 August 1988; Goot 1990:257). In the latter case that IO per cent feU into the 'neutral' range 
but in Queensland those expressing 'cool' feelings towards Japanese were 10 per cent higher than 
elsewhere, 
21 A 1990 Newspoll found that of tlie 57 per cent of respondents who favoured restrictions on FDI 
from particular countries some three-quarters identified Asian countries. Japan figured prominently 
but other East Asian countries were also frequently identified, despite some not being significant 
sources ofFDl flows to Australia (Goot 1990:254). 
22 The 1988 ANOP poll for the Japanese Embassy found that, by comparison with a similar poll three 
years earlier, more people said that they could not forget th!} war (39 per cent from 30 per cent). 
There was also a decrease of l 0 per cent to 54 per cent who said that Australia should be friendly 
towards Japan, as opposed to 'neutral' or 'cautiousi. Goot compared the findings of the survey 
administered by AGB: 'McNnir for DFAT and the Gamaut Report (1989:61) with the findings fort11e 
same question posed in an ASRB survey in August 1971 (Goot 1990:253; Age. 27 September 1971). 
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Fears of 'Asianisati01t' 
Controversy over Japanese FDI in the late 1980s was made more intense by its 
coincidence, and increasing confusion, with a renewed 'debate' about Asian 
migration. The history of past anti-Asian sentiment in Australia is well knov~n 
(Tweedie 1994; Broinowski 1992; McNamara and Coughlan 1997; Viviani 1992). 
Subsequent promotion by both Coalition and Labor governments of the principle of 
non-discrimination in both immigration policy and Australian life in general did 
much to help break down anti-Asian prejudice (Mackie 1997). Yet Asian 
ill1llligration became a public issue again in 1984 when the Federal Coalition leant 
weight to prominent historian Geoffrey Blruney's criticism of the Hawke 
government for presiding over the 'Asianisation' of Australia (Kelly 1992:125). 
Despite considerable public support, the Coalition ultimately heeded 'elite' calls for 
the reaffirmation of a non-discriminatory immigration policy (Mackie 1997 :29-31 ). 
In early 1988 Opposition leader John Howard reignited that issue with the 
suggestion that a Coalition government might manage the racial composition of the 
migrant intake in response to community sensitivities (Mackie 1997:31-36; Kelly 
1992:421-32). It was a step away from the core principle of non-discrimination, 
provoking intense controversy, just at a time when Japanese FDI was also becoming 
an issue. 
Opinion polls on immigration policy revealed a similar residual antipathy in the 
Australian community to Asian migration as was detected towards Asian FDI.23 In 
Support within Sydney and Melbourne samples for Japanese investment (with or without limits and 
controls) declined from 64 per cent to 49 per cent while support for American FDI, already at higher 
levels in 1971, barely declined at all. 
23 A Saulwick poll of early 1988 on attitudes to immigration found results that a majority of 
respondents felt Asian migrants were less preferable to those from Europe, and from the United 
Kingdom in a 'particular (Age 9 February 1988). Some 27 per cent of respondents who thought that 
some migrants should be accepted actually said that Asians should be prevented from migrating to 
Australia. A majority of respondents thought that the overall intake was too large (Age 9 February 
1988). Other studies lent support to the interpretation that at least a quarter of Australians were 
strongly antagonistic to even moderate levels of Asian migration. A poll commissioned by the 
Federal government's Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet reported that more than 25 per cent of Australians resent Asians and Middle Eastern 
migrants being all()wed to settle in Australia, with particular objection to Vietnamese, Japanese, 
Lebanese, Turks and Jews (SMH, WA 19 June 1989). A series of quantitative surveys by the Roy 
Morgan Research Centre highlighted a rise in opposition to any Asian immigration in the two years 
to early 1988 (Herl l March 1988). 
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response there was strong support from within media, academic and business elites 
for non~discriminatory policy towards both foreign investment and immigrants24 
(Walsh, EMH 12 February 1987; Robinson, AFR 17 February 1987; Costigan, CT 
21 August 1988; McGuiness, AFR 5 July 1988).25 Some contemporary 
commentators judged that hostility to Asian FDI and Asian migrants flowe~ from 
the same wellspring of intolerance. Gittins wrote that: 'We seem to be witnessing a 
.replay of the old argument about foreign investment and multinationals, but with the 
added spice of racial intolerance' (SMH 22 June 1988). In a similar vein H~nderson 
said on the growing controversy over FDI policy that there was ',. . an unpleasant 
smell ofracial intolerance in the Australian air' (Aust 11 July 1988). 
For some critics Asian FDI and Asian migration became entangled issues (Rix 
1999:107). Returned Servicemen's League leader Bruce Rux.ton, for instance, 
declared that ' ... no other issue has bugged Australians so much as Asian buying-up 
and Asian immigration' (ST 21 August 1988). Even the Democrats' immigration 
spokesperson, Senator Jean Jenkins, made a number of critical, confused and 
anecdotal public statements on Japanese investment (Her 16 August 1988).26 
Private Liberal Party polling in early 1988 revealed how confused the Asian 
migration and FDI issues had become (Her 11 March 1988). The main concerns 
were the impact of wealthy Asians buying housing - despite the recent restrictions 
- and so driving up prices, the success of Asian children in schools, and the 
concentration of Asian migrants in certain suburbs. These concerns were all 
particularly apparent in Sydney (Her 11 March 1988). It was ironic then that the 
Howard-led Coalition contributed to the public controversy over Asian migration 
while opposing the Hawke government's legislation to incorporate the restrictions 
~4 Howard's view that the rate of Asian migration could be slowed in response to public conc.e~ri 
attracted 77 per cent support in a Newspoll survey (National sample, 1150 respondents; Her 11 
March 1988). 
25 Howard's clumsy management of elite reaction to his stance on immigration on Asian immigration 
gravely weakened his leadership, ultimately being displaced by Andrew Peacock in May 198.9 (Kelly 
1992:467-86). Peacock's own record on support for a non-discriminatory immigration policy was 
tarnished by the Coalition's flirtation with the Blainey critique in 1984 under his leadership (Kelly 
1992:128-34). On the elite, mass opinion dichotomy in Australian attitudes to Japan and the 
theoretical issues entailed see Meaney, Matthews and Ence! (1988:15-·16). 
26 Given the popular blurring of issues of Asian migration and Japanese FDI, ironically Japanese 
migrants to Australia totalled only 873 in the 1987-88 financial year, although up from 331 in 1982--
83 (SMH 24 April 1988). . 
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on non-resident acquisitions of residential real estate. While the Coalition stood 
accused of having strayed from the non-discrimination principle on immigration, it 
remained committed to a more liberal FDI policy than Labor. Some Liberal 
:frontbenchers actively defended the benefits of Japanese FDI as doubts in the 
community grew through 1988 and 1989 (Hewson, HR Hansard 24 November 
1988:3281; Do"Wner, HR Hansard 5 September 1989:981; Short, Sen. Hansard 7 
March 1989:575). Some government actors nonetheless blamed the Coalition for 
racist elements in public antipathy towards Japanese FDI (McKiernan, Sen. Hansard 
7 March 1989:584). Some National Party parliamentarians, notably Senator John 
Stone and Peter McGauran, did in fact raise the two issn'.')s of Asian immigration 
and Japanese FDI together (Sen. Hansard 23 November 1989:3161; HR Hansard 28 
October 1987:1579). The Opposition under Howard's leadership was being 
confronted by the tensions between their economic liberalism and social 
conservatism. 
One did not need to single out Asian, or Japanese investors to make political 
mileage from public antipathy towards them. As Japanese FDI was such a 
prominent share of total inflow one needed only to criticise existing FDI policy to 
tap such community hostility. By doing so one could resort to populist politics while 
nominally not breaking with an elite consensus on non-discrimination. This was the 
deliberate strategy of new Queensland Opposition leader Wayne Goss who made 
controls on FDI in real estate central to Labor's campaign in the lead-up to the 1989 
state election (CM 29 April 1985, 4 September 1985, 21 July 1986, 22 April 
1988).27 John Howard accused the Hawke government of hypocrisy in attacking him 
over Asian immigration while ignoring Gol!s' appeal to racist impulses in the state 
27 The Queensland ALP committed to banning non-residents from holding freehold land (CM, 23 
April 88, CT, l August 1988). Deputy Opposition leader Tom Bums called for reintroduction of the 
old Aliens Act, repealed in 1965, that banned foreign investment in land without a state dispensation 
(SMH, 28May 1988). Senior Labor strategists understood how general criticisms of FDI resonated 
with the electorate because of widespread awareness of the growing significance of Japanese FDI. 
This was confinncd in interviews with a former adviser to Deimty Opposition Leader Tom Bums, Dr 
Gary Chittick (Brisbane, June 1997). and with fooner staff member of Opposition Leader Wayne 
Goss, Mr Tim Grau (Canberra, I l September 1995). 
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electorate (HR Hansard 25 August 1988:405).28 The National Party government in 
Qi,eensland became quite panicked by the apparent electoral appeal of the state 
opposition's anti-FDI platform (SMH28 May 1988; CT 1August1988). Under new 
leader Mike Ahem it implemented a register of foreign-owned land that had been 
long resisted by his predecessor, Bjelke-Petersen (CM 22, 28 May 1988, 8 June 
1988; Aust 24-25 July 1982, 28 October 1982; Fitzgerald 1984:433). The 
Queensland government's comments on the benefits of Japanese investment became 
heavily qualified as it sought to block some projects and also flagged a stamp duty 
surcharge on foreign acquisitions ofreal estate (CM3 January 1989, 28 June 1989; 
AFR 4 July 1989; CM, AFR 28 August 1989; Aust 8 September 1989). The major 
print media in Queensland did not present a counterweight to anti-Japanese 
sentiment, as in the case of the southern broadsheets, and The Courier Mail in fact 
did much to promote public unease.29 
Controversy in Queensland o ~m,.: to national and international prominence as a 
consequence of the political entrepreneurialism of a Gold Coast fringe right wing 
activist and the mass media attention he attracted. Bruce Whiteside and his 'Heart 
of the Nation' group organised rallies on the Gold Coast to protest against freehold 
ownership of land by foreigners and Japanese FDI in general (Whiteside 1990:153-
59). Whiteside found in Australia's recent liberalisation of FDI policy clear 
evidence that Australians were ' ... a pack of gutless apathetic crawlers who have no 
pride or sense of shame'. He not only denounced Japanese investment but also 
28 Howard declared that: 'I say particularly to members of the Labor Party from Queensland that the 
anti-Japanese foreign investment policy of Wayne Goss in Queensland has done more to damage our 
reputation in Japan than anything I have said over the past two or three weeks. We have a completely 
open and liberal foreign investment policy and we will not be adopting any foreign investment policy 
which is clothed as a non-discriminatory prohibition but it nakedly directed towards the prejudice 
that has developed in Queensland to Japanese investment.• (HR Hansard 25 August 1988:405). 
However, the state Liberal Party, in the unusual position of sitting on the cross benches after the 
Coalition collapsed before the 1986 state election, also broke with the liberalism of its federal 
counterparts. State Liberal leader Angus Innes said ' ••• the foreign investment tap in Queensland 
should not be turned off completely, but neither should the bucket be allowed to overflow.' (AFR 10 
June 1988). 
29 The Courier Mail and its stablemate The Sunday Mail, the dominant newspapers in the state, leant 
mu.;:h support to critics through the extensive reportage devoted to them and explicit editorial 
support. Sensationalist and parochial sub-editing practices also contributed to public disquiet. One 
front-page headline declared 'Rising sun land grab slows (SM 19 February 1.989) while 'l'he Courier 
Mail used a standardised typographical Icon whenever the Japanese investment issue arose that read 
'Japanese invasion' ar<d showed the Japanese flag. 
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Japanese migration and the teaching of Japanese in schools (CM 23 May 1988; 
SMH28 May 1988, 13 June 1988). At Whiteside's biggest rally, in May 1988, some 
1300 people gathered in what one journalist described as resembling an 'anti-
Japanese lynching party' (Nelson, CM 25 May 1988). Whiteside called for a 
constitutional change to allow only Australian citizens to own land.30 His group 
organised another rally to coincide with the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Noboru 
Takeshita to Australia that also attracted the attention of the Japanese media (CM 5 
July 1988). This event left no doubt that the Hawke government needed. to manage 
the domestic politics of FDI more actively. 
Defending enmeshment with Asia 
The Hawke government had begun emphasising the benefits to Australia from 
'enmeshment with Asia', as Hawke later termed it, from early in its first term 
(Hawke 1983; Mills 1993:107; Hawke 1988). In part this reflected a general trend in 
Australian foreign policy that had been established since the late 1960s (McDonald 
1993). The Hawke govermnent's approach was distinguished by the emphasis on 
economic opportunities and challenges presented by East Asia. This message gained 
much greater prominence in government discourses following the balan~e of 
payment crisis of 1985-86; at a time when the strength of the Japanese and other 
Northeast Asian economies was becoming even more apparent (McDonald 
1993:145). Asia could present much-needed economic good news, but only if 
Australians were prepared to accept regJlllatory, economic and social change31• The 
Garnaut Report (1989), commissioned by the Hawke Government, offered the 
clearest statement of this view,32 
30 Whiteside diminished his own credibility by saying that his proposed ban on foreigners holding 
freehold land should be retrospective to 1900. He declared 'the cost of resumption would be 
enonnous, but if we must mortgage ourselves for the next 200 years, the compensating peace of mind 
will liave been well worthwhile' (CM25 May 1988). 
~· In essence Asia represented both carrot and stick for the Hawke government. It promised economic 
prosperity for Australia if necessary domestic reforms were achieved. It also represented the main 
threat to Australia's lliefficient industries and business practices. As there was marked community 
uncertainty about Australia's economic future Labor wished to present Asia to the electorate as 
entailing more carrot than stick. Critics of Japanese FDI focused attention upon the. pain of 
enmeshment with Asia with scant regard for lhe gain .. 
32 Although the Hawke government baulked at the some of the more ambitiou$ refonns recommended 
by Garnaut, such as the effective abolition of tariffs by 2000, its broad policy direction was consistent 
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The three FDI liberalisation packages adopted between 1985-87 were intended to 
signal to the Australian business community, economic policy community and 
international investors that Labor was committed to taking tough decisions to 
liberalise the economy and face new international realities. Following the illiberal 
residential real estate decision the Hawke government struggled to restore that 
reputation.33 However, the Coalition's woes on the Asian immigration issue 
presented the Hawke government with the opportunity to restore its authori,ty, and 
on an issue dear to many senior government leaders ( d' Alpuget 1982; Mill 1993 :70; 
Hawke 1994).34 There was recurrent concern with government ranks at how 
domestic debate over Asian migration and investment was perceived in the Asian 
region (Kelly 1992:.127-34),35 The government's Asia focus, including a regional 
economic cooperation initiative it was developing, was under threat if a strong 
defence of Japanese FDI was not mounted.36 At risk too was Labor's high growth 
model of economic management. Japanese FD! could help deliver the economic 
growth that was central to the political fonnula of Labor's Accord with the union 
movement, and at a time when fiscal expansion was made impossible by the risk of 
another balance of payment crisis.37 
with the report. In fact the major 1991 policy statement Building a competitive Australia explicitly 
acknowledged the influence of Garnaut (Hawke 1991: 17). The Gamaut Report provoked 
considerable debate amongst academics, as evidenced in works such as that edit<id by Richardson 
{1991). The Garnaut Report was quite circumspect in making FDI policy recommendations 
(1989:100-01). 
33 The 1-lawke government was also frustrated by the ALP party organisation in its desire to initiate 
privatisations but embraced a micro-reform agenda in its May 1988 industry statement (Kelly 
1992:387-98}. On the Hawke government's determination to re-establish its credentials for economic 
management in th!: wake of the currency crisis and how this was reflected in the 1987 federal election 
campaign see Milis (1993:88-107; Kelly 1992:224). 
34 The battle to end the White Australia Policy had played an important role in forming the political 
consciousness of Hawke, Evans, Hayden and other Labor identities such as Don Dunstan and Lionel 
Murphy(Kelly 1992:127-28, 426). 
35 It is not clear whether the Hawke cabinet appreciated that the residential real estate ban was likely 
to be perceived in some parts of Asia as government pandering to a resilient Australian racism. Such 
Eerceptions were certainly later reported (AFR 8 January 1988). 
6 On the close cooperation between Australia and Japan that was central to the launching of APEC 
see Terada (1998), Funabashi (1995) For early official Australian rationales for APEC see Evans 
(1989), Hawke (1989). On earlier regional cooperation initiatives see Drysdale (1988) and Terada 
,Cl999). Former Hawke speechwriter Stephen Mills wrote of APEC: '. .. the Hawke government 
pursued an international agenda that was substantially driven by its program of domestic economic 
reform.' (Mills 1993:195). 
37 The Hawke government presided over a historical tightening of fiscal policy in response to the 
balance of payment crisis and secured, with great difficulty, a commitment from the ACTU for 
significant wage restraint through the centralised bargaining mechanism. The qufd pro quo was that 
Labor deliver job-creating economic growth and improvements in the 'social wage' (Kelly 
1992:212-18, 283-87). 
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From mid-1988 senior Hawke government ministers actively sought to manage the 
Japanese FDI issue38• The easier part of the challenge entailed dealing with critics 
within the government. Several federal MPs from Queensland were openly critical 
of Japanese FDI and the liberal policy regime. The leadership of the Hawke 
government could contain this dissent because the MPs motives were principally to 
enhance their standing in their electorate or party faction (CM 30 January 1989).39 
The leadership addressed broader Caucus unease over FDI policy by promising that 
the FIRB's enforcement and monitoring capacities would be better resourced (W. 
Aust 28-29 January 1989; CM 13 March 1989). Hawke emphasised the need, 
ethical and no doubt political, for the Federal government to preserve its reputation 
on engagement with Asia while the Opposition struggled With the immigration 
issue. The decision on residential restrictions also helped to placate critics. On the 
other hand, the Federal Labor leadership could do little to restrain the anti~FDI 
campaign of the Labor Opposition in Queensland. An even greater challenge for the 
government in managing the domestic politics of FDI was the enormous media 
attention that critics of Japanese investment were attracting. Views hostile to 
Japanese FDI from even minor public identities and war veterans attracted attention, 
as did negative reactions against Japanese investments in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. American author Daniel Berstein, for instance, attracted 
considerable media attention when he made the wild assertion that Japanese loans 
and portfolio investments in Australia would lead to 'land swaps' that would see 
Queensland become a major location for solving Japan's overcrowding problems 
(Aust 10 April 1989). Controversy over Australia's representation at the funeral of 
Emperor Hirohito in January 1989 provided another reminder of the intensity of 
anti-Japanese sentiment (Rix 1999:106-07; CM 25 February 1989). Hawke and 
38 Analysis by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in October 1988 concluded inward FDI 
from Asia was being adversely affected by perceptions that anti-Asian feeling was rife (CM 3 January 
1989). O!l the broader perception management challenge in Asia that the Australian government 
confronted in the late 1980s and early 1990s see Broinowski (1993). For a lengthier and somewhat 
idiosyncratic account see Byrnes (1994:168-203). 
39 Keith. Wright raised the issue of vertical integration in the beef industry while Con Sciacca was 
drawn to the Japanese FDI issue by reports of a pfonncd Japanese retirement village planned for his 
electorate (HR Hansard 24October1989:1750; private discussion with Mr Sciacca, July 1999). As a 
new MHR Sciacca used the FDI issue to build Ii profile for himself hut as he also saught to position 
himself as a specialist on immigration and ethnic affairs he was careful to criticise the racist element 
in the FD! debate (CT30 January 1989; HR Hansard 28 October 1987). 
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Keating both actively used talkback radio and other media sessions to sell the 
benefits of a non-discriminatory and liberal foreign investment polfoy (SM 5 June 
1988; AFR 19 July 1988; Her 16 August 1988; W. Aust 28-29 January 1989). At the 
same time the controversy over Japanese FDI had to be managed as a bilateral issue 
between Australia and Japan. rux (1999: 105) judges that 'the political relationship 
was severely tested by the public expression of feeling about the role of Japanese in 
Australia'. 
Managing tlte relationship witll Japan 
The extent of government concern over the potential damage to the Australia-Japan 
relationship, and Australia's (economic interests in particular, was revealed by 
Hawke's public apology to Prime Minister Takeshita for the recent protests against 
Japanese FDI (CM 5 July 1988; Rix 1999:105). While enraging domestic critics of 
FDI, it was consistent with the determination of the Hawke government to continue 
the active promotion of Australia as an investment destination for Japan (AFR 19 
July 1988). Mindful oftb_~intensity of the community reaction to Japanese property 
acquisitions, the government did endeavour to communicate its preference for FDI 
in other areas, although not always with great finesse.4° Following Prime Minister 
Takeshita's visit to Ai;stralia in mid:-1988 Ministry of Finance officials said they 
would use 'administrative guidance' with banks, urging them to reduce lending for 
investments in Australian real estate (Hartcher, SMH 18,19 August 1988; Age 25 
August 1988).41 Australian officials in Tokyo denied that the Australian 
government had officially requested these actions (Hartcher, SMH 14 March 1989). 
The. Hawke government's efforts to manage public concern about Japanese FDI 
were boosted by some Japanese firms long established in Australia that stepped up 
40 In July 1988 Keating, before a Japanese audience, remarked that: 'We have to get the price right, 
we have to get a better balance. The notion that a handful of yen can buy anything is notion that I 
think must disappear.' (Aust 12 July 1988). Foreign Minister Evans was reported to have expressed 
greater reservations during bilateral talks about Japanese property investment than Hawke had done 
(Hartcrur, Age 8 February 1989), The Democrats queried the investment promotion efforts of the 
Hawke government in Japan as part of its criticism of FD! policy (Macklin, Senate Htmsard 23 
March 87:1184). 
41 
In early 1989 new Japanese Prime Minister Uno ruled out fonnal regulations on Japanese direct 
investments in Australian property but said the government would monitor investment outflow and 
endeavour to make sure that it was 'orderly' (Age 28 January 1989). 
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their corporate sponsorship and other goodwill activities and the efforts of Japanese 
diplomatic missions42 (AFR 25 August 1988; W. Aust 1-2 April 1989; CEDA 1990; 
Access 1991). On the other hand, some new Japanese property investors could have 
done more to minimise the reactio1:i to their presence. Their lack of regard for either 
the politics or economics of their investments reflected their ir.; ;' .perience abroad 
(Farrell 1997:16-23, 1998:31-41). Ironically, this incaution exacerbated community 
antipathy to Japanese FDI while compounding the windfall gains to the Australian 
economy from excessive prices paid for assets and overMinvestment in new projects. 
EIE International, conspicuously expanding its presence in Australia througb 
acquisition and attracting the attention of critics for its executives' remarks about 
the cheapness of Australian real estate, provides the quintessential example (Farrell 
1998:38-40; Hartcher,AFR 3 March 1995). 
Japan's diplomatic efforts on the ground were also diminished by certain policy 
initiatives from Tokyo, especially emanating from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (MITI). In the mid-1980s MITI proposed several grandiose development 
schemes that were eventually to prove controversial in Australia. MIT.I's Silver 
Columbus 1992 plan suggested the establishment of retirement villages abroad for 
Japanese, and identifie.d Australia as offering promising locations (Inkster 1991:24-
25).43. In early 1987 immigration minister Chris Hurford effectively ruled out such a 
project in response to reports of a proposed integrated Japanese retirement village~ 
resort and technology business park west of Brisbane (CM 7 February 1987). 
Hurford issued a specific warning that the government did not want to see 
'enclaves' develop (CM 7 February 1987). Debate about foreign enclave$ became 
common in discusr;ions of FDI policy, in no small part because it drew on imagery 
similar· to that featuring in popular antagonism towards Asian migration (?vfoNamara 
42 It is difficult to establish just how· seriously Japanese efforts were made to slow down Japanese 
FDI in real estate. Some Japanese t>roperty investors in Australia had good connections with 
Japanese legislators and officials, as ths s11bse.quent scandal involving EIE Jntemational revealed 
(Himcher; AFR 3 March 1995; McGregor, Ausil8 February 1995). On the other hand, the political 
controversy in Australia over Japanese investment in real estate. increasingly annoyed large Japanese 
finns with actual and/or pll!llncd equity stakes in minerals projects and in the beef industry (Sargent, 
AFR 16 June 1988), 
43 The 'Silver Columbia' plau was so-named to reflect the: use of the word 'silver' in Japanese to refer 
to the aged and Columbia pertained to the SOOlh anniversary of the arrival of Christopher Columbus 
in the Americas in 1992. The MITI officials who devised the plan envisaged the first integrated resort 
and retirement village ~omplexes opening in that year. 
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and Coughlan 1997:4; Huxley andBeny 1990:127). The Courier Mail, forinstance, 
editorialised against 'enclaves' in both tourist and residential areas (CM 30 January 
1989). The Japanese embassy responded to criticism of the proposed project near 
Brisbane with a statement that its government had ' ..• no intention of introducing a 
policy to send Japanese pensioners overseas, nor to encourage them to live 
overseas' (CM7February1987). However, there were subsequent rumours of other 
such projects and the connection was made in the public mind, especially in 
Queensland, between Japanese migration and FDI in tourist infrastructure and 
property. 44 
The Hawke government was forced to deal directly with MITI's penchant for 
futuristic schemes when the Japanese government proposed the creation of a new 
city in Australia - a 'multifunction polis' (MFP) - during bilateral talks in 1987 
(Inkster 1991:18-37).45 MITI's vision of the MFP had the potential to be hugely 
controversial because it entailed the creation of a new city of 50,000 to 100,000 
people, a majority of whom would be foreign businesspeople, researchers, students 
and tourists (MITI 1987).46 Yet several factors led the Hawke government to 
cooperate in the creation of a joint Australia-Japan steering committee and the 
commissioning of a feasibility study. The Hawke government was actively courting 
Japanese FDI in cemerging' industries and the MFP proposal, vague though it was, 
promised plenty of that. Japan appeared to many at the time as the most dynamic 
economy in the 
44 This compounded the well-recognised problem that the exclusivity of internationally oriented 
tourism resorts. can provoke resenuncnt in host communities. Proposals of the Silver Columbia type 
were particularly unhelpful as they' alienated even very 'progressive' Australians from some aspects 
of Japanese FPI. This was so because people with an appreciation of Japanese society rightly queried 
whether older Japanese could possibly be content in retirement so far from all that had been central to •. 
their lives. At the other extreme of public opinion, Japanese retirees were identified as the generation 
that had been enemies of Australia (McConnack 1991:29). 
45 A number of authors have examined the development of the MFP issue so they do not need ti,irther 
detailed elaboration. For a history of the project and a range of views see Mouer and Sugimoto 
{1990), Inkster (1991) and McConnack (1991). Fora very critical view see James (1990). the Silver 
Columbia and MFP schemes emanated from the same basic Japanese political econotny: the 
interaction of 11. common futuristic ideational element in Japanese society and. the political clout of 
rent-seeking construction firms (Morris-Suzuki 1990). , 
46 The initial MITI proposal also listed a wide range of industries and economic activities, some of 
which were incompatible with each other and it:l environmentally friendly vision (MITI 1987:7-10). 
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world.47 At a time of deep angst about the prospects for Australian industry, the 
internationalist and high tech vision found supporters in sections of the federal 
bureaucracy, academe and the media, (McGuiness, AFR 5 July 1988).48 Industry 
minister John Button and his department, along with science minister Barry Jones, 
became the driving forces for the project within the Federal government (Hallinan 
1990:79-80; MoITis-Suzuki 1990:67-68).49 
In December 1987 the Hawke government, in an agreement with interested states, 
enunciated nine principles against which the final MFP concept would be judged, 
These revealed its concern to have a truly international project rather than a 
Japanese enclave, for the project to be commercially viable without substantial 
government help, that it entail leading edge infrastructure and boost net capital 
inflow (Hallinan 1990:83; CT, AFR 6 January 1988). The Hawke government hoped 
to allay public concerns with these quite onerous principles. State governments, 
attracted by the proposed scale of the project and the promise of 'smart' industries, 
vied to have their preferred site chosen (Inkster 1991 :41-67). The prolonged process 
of conducting feasibility and impact studies - all ultimately flawed - helped to 
contain controversy until late 1989 (Arthur Anderson-Kinhill 1989; Yencken 
1990:93-97; Neustupny 1990:161-63; Mitchell, SMH I February 1990). The main 
exception was again Queensland, where the state Labor opposition criticised the 
MFP as threatening the creation of a Japanese enclave (CM 16 Au~;!t 1988). 
Controversy over the concept grew rapidly following the release of a feasibility 
... 
study in late 1989. Critics ranged from left-wing academics, construction workers 
and environmentalists to the Returned Services League and Gold Coast activist 
47 The head of MFP Australia Research Ltd, a senior Westpac banking executive on secondment, 
referred to Japan as 'currently the world's major economic power' (Berthold 1990:87). The Hawke 
government also saw a deeper and more wide-ranging bilateral relationship with Japan as central to 
Asia initiatives (Evans, Hansard, Estimates Committee B 11 September 1990:2). 
48 Others, suspicious of its origins in the Leisure Development Office of MITI, the likely level of 
state action required to mak~ it viable, and of its naively futuristic tone, urged caution (Yencken 
1990). Growing controversy over the MFP concept,. and the belie( that it would distract government 
attention from the cause of economic. refonn led business groups, including CEDA, to reserve 
judgement (CEDA 1990; AFR 19 July 1990). 
49 The justification of the MFP by the head of DITA C's Innovation and International Division is a 
good example of such sentiment~ 'There are tough times ahead for the next 15 years and there will be 
two shifts. First, Asia will take over as centre of the industrial world and second, we will move 
towards more technology intensive industries.' (AFR 6 January 1988) On llie Hawke government's 
aspirations for a national technology strategy from its second term see DITAC (1985). 
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Bruce Whiteside (Her 1 February 1990). They attracted considerable attention from 
the mass media hl\t so too did defenders of the MFP concept (Mouer and Sugimoto 
1990). The Hawke governm~';1t deployed its nine principles as a shield against 
criticism and allocated more resources to promoting the benefits of the concept 
while emphasising that no final decision had been made (SMH25 January 1990).50 
The government's overriding imperative to reform the Australian economy made it 
prepared to risk disquiet in the electorate over the MFP. Its first principle against 
which the final MFP proposal would be judged neatly encapsulated this. 
The development of an MFP based around internationally traded information, education and 
training, leisure and tourism, and research and development activities should be in 
Australia's inti:rest, with particular emphasis on the pursuit of scientific and technological 
excellence. It should be developed as a way of assisting structural change in the Australi~ 
economy geared towards the development of an internationally competitive and export 
oriented industry structure (Hallinan 1990:83). 
The MFP would ultimately figure as an issue at the 1990 feQeral election. In the 
meantime the Hawke government was con.fronted by controversy over Japanese FDI 
in the tourism and beef industries. Its hope that such investment would deliver 
internationally competitive and export oriented industries was to be challenged by 
critics who claimed that significant national welfar~ losses would result from a 
liberal FDI policy. 
The Spectre of vertical integration 
By mid-1988 concerns were being ef(pressed about potential losses to Australian 
businesses and the national economy if Japanese investors realised 'vertical 
integration' in the tourism and beef industries. It is a measure of the intensity of 
public debate over Japanese FDI in both. industries that an issue of corporate 
organisation would attract considerable attention in the popular mass media. As 
50 
However it was clear that the Hawke government would see the process through to the site 
selection stage as a precursor to making a final judgement on its merit. The Japanese government 
apparently pushed for early selection of a site and would not formally approach investors until that 
was done (Sun Her 4 March 1990). 
238 
with debate over real estate, much of the mass media reportage skewed attention 
towards the potential costs rather than direct benefits of Japanese FDI. Yet Japanese 
FDI in tourism and the beef industries promised export growth at a time when the 
Australia's weak external balance was the pre-eminent economic policy challenge. 
This created a strong bias towards liberal policy for the Hawke government. On the 
other hand, the very export potential of the tourism and beef industries fuelled 
concerns about national welfare losses from FDI, as earlier had been the case with 
mineral resources. Such attitudes could become a political force for restrictive 
policy but were offset by a policy community of officials and academics 
understanding the potential benefits ~f Japanese FDI. The tourism and beef 
industries were long estabEshed but needed substantial capital investment, better 
management and international corporate linkages if they were to realise their full 
export potential. FDI promised to effect the needed evolution in both industries but 
would also create losers, although much more so in beef than in tourism. Potential 
losers, mindful of their private interests, swelled the ranks of those in both 
industries expressing concern about Japanese FDI. 
Tourism 
'D1e sharp depreciation of the Australian dollar helped to stimulate rapid growth of 
the inbound tourism industry. This came at a time when Japanese outbound tourism 
was expanding rapidly following the yen's appreciation after the Plaza Accord (JTB 
1998:1-2). Japanese tourist arrivals ih Australia grew from 72, 000 in 1983, to 145, 
600 in 1986, and to 479, 900 in 1990 (DSRT 1985:70; Healey 1994:220; Stimson et 
al. 1996:51).51 This was a welcome contribution to Australia's external balances but 
the growth of the industry was constrained by infrastructure and skills shortages 
(Richardson 1988:5; AJRC 1992; Richardson 1995; ATIA 1987j, Growing FDI into 
the tourism sector helped to address these problems, and also became :fundamental 
to the further expansion of the Japanese market for Australia (Richardson 1988:9-
51 Official Japanese figures show total departures from J\lpan to Australia rising from 322,000 in 
1987 to 1,081,000 in 1992 and then 1,409,000 in 1997 (JTB 1998:10). However, official Australian 
figures on Japanese tourist arrivals in Australia in the latter year are only some 60 per cent of that 
figure (DISR 1998:4). 
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10). According to FIRB statistics, overall approved FDI in tourism grew from $440 
million in 1985-86 to $2091 million in 1987-88, an astonishing $4997 million in 
1988-89 and then fell back to $1970 million in 1989-90 (FIRB 1988:10; 1989:16; 
1990:15). Japanese FDI accounted for some two-thirds of the total in each year from 
1987 to 1991, with a substantial proportion of the value of proposed investments 
representing development expenditures (FIRB 1988:6). As a consequence in 1988-
89, for instance, less than $1400 million of the proposed $5 billion of FDI from all 
sources in tourism involved the purchase of existing assets (FIRB 1989: 17). 
The Hawke government made a strong commitment to supporting the growth of the 
tourism industry. Support was provided via generous depreciation allowances for 
investment in infrastructure,. international marketing campaigns, development of 
Asia-specific tourism skills, somewhat flexible administration of working visa rules 
and FDI attraction efforts abroad, especially in Japan (Hof R SCIST 1993; Healey 
1994:220-26).52 The Federal govemment soon recognised that the outbound 
tourism market in Japan was such that corporate linkages through FDI promised 
further development of the Australian industry.53 The predominance of package 
group tours, along with intense competition and complex tie-ups in the Japanese 
market between package retailers, wholesalers and providers, all made active 
involvement of major Japanese finns in the Australian tourism industry desirable 
(ATC 1998; EAAU 1997:451-52). A number of tourism industry figures, media 
commentators and academics made these observations and broadened public 
understanding of the potential benefits of Japanese FDI (Dwyer, Forsyth and 
Findlay 1990; Forsyth and Dwyer 1991; Grey, Edelmann and Dwyer 1991; 
McKenzie, SMH 14 June 1988; Tisdell 1991). 
sz In 1987 the Hawke government reconstituted the Australian Tourism Cornm'.ssion under new 
legislation following review by the Kennedy Committee (Healey 1994:222-25!: The Bureau of 
Tourism Research and the National Tourism Industry Training Committee (NTITC), positioned 
publicly as Tourism Training Australia, were to address information and skills developments 
respectively. The ACTU was critical of the numbers of temporary working visas given to foreign 
staff, principally Japanese, in the tourism industry and called for greater public and private 
investments in training for Australians (CM26 April 1995). On. the temporary resident issue see Bell 
and Carr (1994). 
53 The ,Hawke government's acceptance of FDI as a means for rapidly growing the inbound tourism 
industry accorded with the similar reaction of the Greek government (Buckley and Papadopoulos 
1988). 
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At the same time there were a number of critics within the tourism industry, 
academe, the mass media and the broader community. It was asserted that 
substantial Japanese FDI, especially if resulting in vertical integration, would see 
Australians denied a fair return on the growth of a promising new industry54 (Bull, 
1988; Stimson, et al, 1996: 164; Forsyth & Dwyer, 1994: 535-6). Such sentiments 
were similar to past concerns about FDI in the resources sector, with the added 
dimension of finns from the most promising foreign market being the main direct 
investors. The imagery of Japanese coming to Australia on Japanese-owned planes, 
staying in Japanese-owned hotels, served by Japanese staff and shopping in 
Japanese-owned duty free stores became a widespread one (Williams 1991; David 
and Wheelright 1989:44-45; CM 17 March 1990).55 The lack of detailed 
information about the real extent and nature of FDI in the tourism sector allowed 
these concerns to flourish (Dwyer and Forsyth 1993:2-3). Concerns about vertical 
integration were often difficult to distinguish from antipathy to Japanese 
acquisitions of real estate. Japanese acquisitions of established tourism 
infrastructure frequently became contentious even when it involved plans for a 
capital injection. The purchase of the Lone Pine koala sanctuary in Brisbane, 
Dreamworld near the Gold Coast, Green Island and the Mirage resorts in 
Queensland all were controversial (CM 25 April 1990, 4 May 1990; Aust 26 June 
1990; Aust 8 March 1989; CM7, 8, 9 March 1989; AFR 9 March 1989). 
Popular concerns about Japanese FDI in tourism frequently went beyond a loss of 
national economic welfare. The growth of inbound Japanese tourism, and the FDI 
that underpinned it, was a stark reminder Australia either would have to 'engage' 
with East Asia socially and culturally - as elite discourse held - or pay a heavy 
economic price. Unlike minerals exports, Japanese customers visited Australia in 
large numbers, interacted with Australians, and sometimes expected Australians to 
understand their language and culture-specific wants (Platt et al, 1991). Some 
54 The Courier Mail's senior political correspondent Peter Morley wrote that 'the Pacific Rim 
invasion' was 1 ... being repeated in large dollops along the Queensland coastline and in the beef 
industry, where the policy of the overseas investors was for vertical integration that moved profits 
offshore.' (CM 17 March 1990). 
55 The ACTU was critical of the numbers of temporary working visas given to foreign staff, 
principally Japanese, in the tow:ism industry, and called for· greater public and private investments in 
training for Australians (CM26 April 1995). 
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Australians simply found it difficult to accept tourism as a significant industry 
(Stimson et al. 1996:51, 162-63). For some fringe critics - and perhaps many 
more Australians - the spectacular increase in Japanese tourist arrivals symbolised 
Australia's relative national decline vis-a-vis its former enemy (Whiteside 
1990:153-55).56 Some views from the Left on Japanese FDI in tourism effectively 
implied national economic servitude and forecast increasing social ills (David and 
Wheelright 1989: 144-53). Elements of the mass media, driven by the commercial 
imperative, seemed to actively cultivate concerns. Tales of corrupt business 
practices and even penetration of the tourism industry by Japanese crime gangs were 
common, with elements of the mass media playing upon older Australian anxieties 
about Asian crime gangs and corruption (David and Wheelright 1989:149-50; CM 
13 June 1990, 12 September l'~u, 9 March 1991, 23 April 1992; AFR 13 
September 1990; SMH22 February 1991). 
Much of the controversy over Japanese direct investment in the tourism industry 
centred upon Daikyo Corporation. Its investment was concentrated around Cairns 
and the Gold Coast and by late 1987 the reported value of its actual and planned 
investments was already A$500 million. 57 Daikyo expanded through both 
acquisitions and new developments. Daikyo was distinguished not only by its size 
but also its determination to bargain hard with host governments, and to strengthen 
its hand by appealing directly to the host community. In doing so it revealed that 
Japanese firms did not necessarily become passive victims of anti-Japanese 
sentiment. Chairman Shuji Yokoyama appointed former senior Queensland state 
officials, Sir Sydney Schubert and John Kenny, to run Daikyo's Australian 
operations and they implemented an active political strategy (CM 25 April 1990; 
Aust 4 May 1990, 26 June 1990). Daikyo actively cultivated personal relationships 
with politicians whenever possible, including local Labor politicians, Prime 
56 Japanese tourists were also readily mistaken for recent migrants, further exacerbating debate over 
Asian immigration and the supposed 'Asianisation of Australia'. 
57 These included the Palm Cove site, bought for $24m, half ownership of the $80m Cairns Hilton~ 90 
per cent of the equity in the Brisbane Sheraton (bought for $85m), the $65m Gold Coast International 
Hotel, the $30m Palm Meadows golf course and. 20 per cent of the giant Jupiters Trust (AFR 19 
November 1987). 
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Minister Hawke and successive Federal tourism ministers.58 The firm's 
representatives directly engaged with the arguments of Australian critics of Japanese 
FDI, and invested considerable resources in fostering community goodwill. The 
success of this strategy was evidenced when over 1000 people attended a public 
meeting in Cairns in support of Daikyo during a dispute between the firm and the 
Que~nsland government (CM 5 June 1990; AFR 6 August 1990). Daikyo also 
threatened to withdraw planned investments on several occasions if it did not secure 
the regulatory outcomes it wanted (AFR 19 November 1987; SMH 13. June 1988; 
Aust 6 July 1990, 30 July 1990; CM 16 May 1991). 
Strong support from tourism industry bodies for a liberal FDI policy and the broader 
economic challenges confronting the Hawke and Keating governments led it to 
uphold a liberal FDI policy for the sector. In doing so it incurred the wrath of the 
Goss Labor govermnent in Queensland for refusing to block certain foreign 
acquisitions of existing tourism properties (CM 4 July 1990). There was too little 
export-oriented FDI entering Australia at a time when the government had to 
address weak external balances to afford the luxury of pragmatic political 
concessions to economic nationalism.59 This was reflected in the 1988 statement by 
federal tourism minister Graham Richardson (1988:1) that: 'With the decline in the 
relative importance of the rural and manufacturing sectors, tourism is now seen as a 
major catalyst for economic growth and a significant element in structural change 
within the Australian economy'. The exception to government pessimism was the 
beef industry, which was also experiencing a large inflow of Japanese FDI in 
response to new opportunities in the Japanese market. This investment was to prove 
even more controversial than FDI in the tourism sector. 
58 From discussions with former Daikyo employees Ms Tomomi Ryan (Brisbane 6, 9 June l 999) and 
Mrs Noriko Wood (Brisbane 9 June 1999). Local MHR John Gaylor was a strong public defender of 
Daikyo and Japanese FDI in general (Aust 30 July 1990; CM3 I July 1990). 
59 The store placed on tourism as a growth industry by the Hawke and Keating governments is 
evidenced in the creation of a distinct Department of Tourism in 1991 and its deliberations on a 
national tourism strategy (DT 1992; Healey 1994:233). In 1997-98 Australian export earnings from 
tourism were estimated to be some $16 billion, more than SO per cent greater than the value of coal 
exports and four times the contribution of wool (DlSR 1998:8). Stimson et al. (1996:68) also came to 
the conclusion that macroeconomic factors were significant in the welcome given to substantial 
Japanese FDI in the tourism sector, 
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Beef industry 
The Hawke government would uphold liberal FDI policy for the beef hdustry 
despite strong support within domestic beef industry associations for a restrictive 
FDI policy. Rising demand for beef in Japan and liberalisation of imports led major 
Japanese meat .i1rms to take strategic' stakes in foreign sources of supply (Morison 
and Officer 1992; Morison 1993). Investments were made in properties, feedlots 
and processing facilities that led to concerns about vertical integration even though 
the investing firms were often unrelated. In 1988, however, partly or fully Japanese-
owned processors slaughtered only some 9 per cent of cattle and calves nationally 
and other foreign-owned establishme.11ts accounted for an additional 4 per cent 
(AMLIPC 1989: 16). They did nonetheless account for a much higher proportion of 
beef exported to the Japanese market. As in the cases of FDI in real estate and 
tourism, lack of detailed information about the extent of Japanese and other foreign 
ownership and control allowed scope for considerable scare-mongering within the 
industry.60 By the late 1980s there was widespread complaint about the risks of 
Japanese investment and the spectre of vertical integration was often raised. 
Disquiet amongst domestic producers about Japanese FDI was exacerbated by rural 
conservatism, low cattle prices, and reports of bribery and collusive auction bidding 
in the Japanese beef industry. Producers held understandable concerns about the 
monopsony power of processing interests (CM 12 January 1989; Cribb, Aust 14 
February 1989; SMH 20 August 1988; Aust 13 March 1989). Yet the defence of 
private interest was also an important driver of calls for a restrictive policy. 
Japanese FDI went into both cattle production and processing and in both areas it 
threatened existing domestic interests. Japanese investments in grazing properties, 
while no doubt welcomed by those wishing to sell out of the industry, presented 
competition for domestic grazing interests (CM 8 June 1988) .. Direct Japanese 
investments in grazing properties Queensland brought the United Graziers' 
6~ The Hawke government's 1987 decision to no longer el(amine acquisitions of rural properties 
worth less thnn $3 million and subject those above it only to a reserve national interest veto 
(Treasurer, Press Release 30 April 1987) made Japanese FDI in the beefindustry more controversial. 
Statistics for smaller acquisitions were no longer produced, although FIRB' 1987-88 report noted 
eight Japanese purchases of beef properties (FIRS 1988:14). 
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Association and the Australian Cattlemen's Union to call for their blocking (CM 8 
June 1988; AFR 18 July 1988).61 A concern about vertical integration by Japanese 
meat industry interests clearly was not the sole driver of the graziers' position. 
Successful foreign bids for freehold or leased grazing properties had drawn criticism 
regardless of the foreign investor's country of origin. Local producers wanted less 
competition when bidding for productive assets. In mid-1988, for instance, graziers 
in Western Queensland complained so vociferously about being outbid by Belgian 
investors for several adjacent leases that the Queensland Lands Ministe~ made a trip 
to the region. to reassure them that the State government would resist further such 
foreign investments (W. Aust 8-9 June 1988). 
Japanese acquisitions of processing facilities were followed by additional 
investments to lift the quality and productivity of the operations to the level needed 
to service the Japanese market (Industry Commission 1994:229). While this 
promised substantial export growth, it also threatened the viability of some domestic 
processors - including those operations owned by the Queensland government 
(Industry Commission 1994:220).62 The executive director of then locally owned 
Australian Meat Holdings called for strict controls on FDI in meat processing (AFR 
25 March 1988; Her 16 August 1988). In mid-1988 the president of the Cattle 
Council of Australia declared that if Japanese ownership of Australian abattoirs was 
to go to 25 per cent, from the supposed 10 per cent at the time, then the industry 
'would be in serious trouble' (CM 8 June 1988). Later its executive director argued 
that, through vertical integration, Japanese firms ' .•. could exercise dominant power 
and transfer profits from Australia' (AFR 22 February 1989). 
While the interest of domestic graziers in a restrictive FDI policy for properties is 
readily apparent, the calls by their organisations for controls on Japanese FDI in 
processing takes more explaining. That investment, after all, would provide the 
quality processing and linkages necessary to secure a strong position in the 
61 Media reports at the time carried wildly inaccurate claims about the. extent of foreign ownership 
and control of rural land, especially in Queensland (CMS June 1988). To some degree these reports 
exaderbated unease in the sector but were also a mask for private interests in the industry~ 
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promising Japanese market (Morison and Officer 1991). Yet in 1989 the president 
of the Australian Cattlemen's Union called for a freeze on all further Japanese 
investnient in capital properties, feedlots and meatworks until a. more restrictive FDI 
policy regime was devised (Aust 14 February 1989). The United Graziers 
Association's Queensland president expressed concern over the acquisition by 
Japanese trading company Itoman of a 40 per cent equity stake in one of Australia's 
largest meat exporters, R. J. Gilbertson (CM 20 January 1989). In keeping with a 
long history of regulatory capture by Australian rural producer interes~s, the main 
beef grower organisations demanded formal input into the FDI review process. The 
Australian Cattlemen's Union wanted industry representatives appointed to the 
FIRB to address its supposed liberal bias (CM 6 July 1990). The United Graziers' 
Association went further, demanding that all foreign investments in processing, 
handling and feedlot facilities in the cattle, wool, and sheep meat industries were to 
be subject to a 51 per cent Australian equity requirement, ', .. except if the proposed 
purchase has the full support of the national commodity council concerned' (Towns. 
Bull. 2 June 1988). 
Graziers feared that substantial rationalisation of processors might result in major 
players with a degree of monopsony power (Industry Commision 1994:211-14). 
There were clearly perceptions that Japanese meat firms might collude to fix prices 
paid for livestock, and that the Trade Practices Commission would be um~ble or 
unwilling to address such behaviour.63 Long held concerns about Japanese buyer 
collaboration in the minerals trade may have contributed to this perception within 
the beef industry and broader community. Yet grazier opposition to FDI in 
processing clearly went beyond concerns about Japanese buyer collusion or the 
wider costs of vertical integration. Rationalisation of processing facilities through 
FDI had negative implications for some graziers. Australian abattoirs were 
62 This point, and discussion below of the prfvate interest dimensions of oppositiM to Japanese FDI 
in the beef industry, is informed by discussions with two Queensland beef industry identities 
requesting anonymity (Brisbane August 1999). 
63 That these fears took on a particularly anti-Japanese bent is ironic as Australia's then largest 
processor, while controlled by Australian fi11t1 Elders-lXL, had. been forced to divest processing 
asset') in North Queensland following legal action by the Trade Practices Commission. The case 
(AMH v. TPC (1989) 40,932 ATPR 50,082) established an important precedent for defming regional 
market$ when measuring the degree of market power likely to ensue from a takeover (Industry 
Commission 1994:212). 
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notoriously small-scale, undercapitalised, technologically backward, and widely 
geographically dispersed (Industry Commission 1994:7-48). While rationalisation 
was essential to Australia developing a sustainable competitive advantage in the 
industry, many equally small-scale and undercapitalised graziets - geared only to 
the domestic market- relied on the local abattoir (Industry Commission 1994:220-
22). Rationalisation of processing facilities would also impose new costs on many 
producers, making some non-viable, and the potential 'losers' were a vocal 
constituency within the industry opposing change. This fear of industry r~structuring 
was evidenced in trenchant opposition to the plans of American giant Consolidated 
Agriculture Inc (ConAgra) to take control of Australian Meat Holdings.64 
The Goss government backed industry calls for the blocking of foreign acquisitions 
of processors and was critical of the Hawke government when they were ignored 
(CM 6 July 1990; W. Aust 11-12 August 1990). The Queensland ALP went to the 
1989 state election with a pledge to do all in its power to block 'vertical 
integration', and in its first few years in office in particular it repeatedly backed the 
policy demands of domestic rural producers upon the Federal goverrupent (Goss 
1989:9-10).65 The Queensland branch of the ALP had long been staunchly 
economic nationalist, was influenced by the private interests of unionised 
meatworkers, and also gave more attention to rural issues in its bid for power in the 
late 1980s (CM 12 August 1988).66 The Hawke government's political calculus 
favoured defending its positive reputation for internationalising the Australian 
64 Although AMH management had been vocal in demanding restrictions on FDt on processing, its 
debt-burdened parent, Elders IXL, had no qualms about selling the operation to foreigners (fV. A11st 
11-12 August 1990). · 
65 The Goss government continued to oppose. foreign takeovers in the rural sector when confronted 
by resistance from local finns, although it claimed it judged the worth of investmen~ on the basis of 
the extent to which it would bring further Investment and industry expansion, It also came to 
explicitly recognise that the Commonwealth, via the FIRB, was ql!ite prepared to ignore its concerns. 
In April 1991 the Queensland government made a long submission to FIRB opposing a $320 million 
takeover bid for Bundaberg Sugar by British finn Tate and Lyle (CM 25 April 1991). They had 
argued that they would bring international expertise to the sugar industry, a position the government 
rejected after representations from local sugar industry representatives (Aust 26 April 1991). The 
Queensland Treasurer knew however that the Federal government would not reject the takeover 
through the FIRB mechanism (CM29 May 1991). 
66 Queensland Labor also had its own private interest constituency favourirtg restrictions on FDI in 
meat processors. Unionised meat workers feared changes to work practices and industry 
rationalisation that would leave them worse off (Industry Commission 1994:173-207). The Labor 
Party in Queensland, already staunchly economic nationalist, had further cause to criticise foreign 
takeovers of meat processors. 
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economy. Federal primary industries minister John Kerin defended the positive 
contribution Japanese FDI could make to the beef industry but promised the 
industry a coordinated approach with Treasurer Keating in reviewing investment 
proposals (CM 17 March 1989; 11 3:·.lJ.Uary 1989). The emphasis remained squarely 
on boosting the export perfonnance of the industry.67 At the same time the Hawke 
government took delight in the internal division that the Japanese FDI issue was 
provoking within the Coalition as National Party identities revolted against the very 
liberal FDI policy contained in the Future Directions policy platform. 
Political pragmatism and its ~imits 
National Party dissent from the FDI policy in Future Directions became open and 
embarrassing for tii:~ Coalition leadership. In July 1988 the New South Wales State 
Council resolved t1J ' -J,11 for a public inquiry into foreign investment in the rural 
sector and Coalition divisions were evident within the Federal Parliament (Kitney, 
AFR 1 August 1988).68 Within the Liberal Party voices of dissent had also been 
rais~d. Shadow Defence spokesperson Peter White, from the Gold Coast advocated 
more restrictive policy and limiting non-citizens to lease-holdings of real estate in 
particular (SMH 28 May 1988; CM 16 June 1988). Yet Opposition leader John 
Howard refused to revisit FDI policy for fear of compromising the integrity of the 
Future Directions policy package at a time when his leadership was being 
questioned. Strong criticism of Howard for apparently qualifying his commitment to 
a non-discri1ninatory immigration policy also made it more difficult for him to 
qualify his liberalism on FDI policy in spite of specific public concern about 
61 Kerin spelt out four criteria for judging investments that he said he had put to Keating in a 
submission. They were: a clear preference for joint-ventures, enhancing of local processing plants, 
reciprocal access to Japanese marketing and distribution chains and parallel initiatives by the 
Australian party to gain that access (Age 17 March 1989). Treasury officials serving the FIRB 
apparently resisted pressures to consult with officials in K;erin's department on beef industry 
proposals, claiming that their DPIE counterparts had been incautious with conunercial-in-confidence 
infonnation (Hoare, AFR 22 February 1989). Policy was ultimately more liberal in practice than 
Kerin favoured. 
6& For: instances of the open disregard for the liberal policy contained in Future Directions shown by 
some National Party MPs in Federal Parliament see Powell (Sen Hansard 7 March 1989:580), 
Watson (Sen Hansard9 March 1989:723) and Cowan (HR Hansard23 May 1989:2626). The revolt 
was not limited to National Party MPs. Liberal MP I. Wilson criticised both foreign debt and equity 
and presented a petition signed by over 5000 people criticising FDI policy and calling for a statutory 
45 per cent limit on foreign ownership of any asset (HR Hansard 17 August 1989:338). 
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Japanese investment.69 Keating mocked the Opposition for their disunity on FDI 
policy (SMH. Aust 10 March 1989). 
As Howard's grip on the leadership weakened in early 1989 his main rival and 
shadow treasurer, Andrew Peacock, started to qualify publicly the Coalition's 
commitment to an essentially open regime. Peacock's motivations were two-fold-
electoral and internal to the Opposition. The Coalition's policy had been a good one 
for the politics of the currency crisis but had been overtaken by the rapid growth in 
Japanese FDI. Peacock was keen to demonstratG to potential supporters within the 
Liberal Party that he would be a more politically astute leader than Howard and 
provide real prospects for a return to government. after seven years. Coalition 
divisions came to a head at a joint party room meeting of the Federal Coalition in 
April 1989 when eighteen members called for policy change (AFR, SMH, Age 12 
April 1989), 70 They could point to the views of former Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser for support.71 Peacock managed the revolt by promising he would produce 
and circulate an issues paper for feedback. Three weeks later he deposed Howard. 
As ieader he continued to reposition the Coalition's FDI policy within the 
constraints of an ongoing commitment to the Future Directions policy document. 
Despite being determined to manage the domestic politics of Japanese FDI, the 
Hawke government could not resist the temptation to periodically score political 
points off the Opposition during 1988-89 for its commitment to abolish the FIRB 
(for example Tickner, HR Hansard 26 October 1989:1918). Treasurer Keating 
declared during one parliamentary Question Time 
69 Industry Minister Senator John Button sought to blame Howard;s stance on Asian migration for 
community antagonism towards Japanese FDI (Sen Hansard2S August 1988:224). 
70 Rather ironically, wealthy shopping centre developer Geoffrey Prosser sought to have the Coalition 
commit to limiting foreign investors to leasehold and a stricter review of proposals because, he later 
explained, ' •• , Japanese investment is in non-productive areas such as the property market, and this is 
not in the best national interest.' (Age 12 Aprll 19S9). By mid 1988 there were vocal critics o01DI 
policy within the broad r.inks of the Coalition parties. Some of the views expressed were extreme, as 
Liberal backbencher Ian Wilson's public declaration that he feared Australians would bccome-
'sweated labourers' for overseas, especially Japanese, imperialists (Adv, AFR 13 October 1988). 
71 In April 1988 Fraser wrote that while he was not a chauvinist in relation to foreign investment he 
' ... would have preferred the floodgates to be opened when the AustmHan dollar was strong so that 
foreigners could not buy Australian assets at bargain-basement prices.' He argued • ... we have invited 
foreigners to buy more and more Australian assets, enabling us to subsidise current living standards 
at the expense of our childt'en.' (Age 11 April 1988). 
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... the Labor government reje\i.~s. the policy of the. Liberal and National parties, which is to 
abolish the Foreign Investment Review Board and have no controls on foreign investment 
whatsoever. The Labor government believes such a policy would be a scandalous abdication 
of Australia's national sovereignty. It is the proper role of the government to assess and 
evaluate foreign investment proposals, and the existing policy allows us to do that on a basis 
widely-recognised as fair and reasonable. (Her 16 August 1988). 
While still shadow treasurer Peacock said that although a Coalition government 
would abolish the FIRB it would retain the discretionary authority over FDI 
provided by the Foreign Takeovers Act. He asserted, 'If you wanted to act in 
particular areas following information that the Treasury put to you, you have got the 
framework to do that' (AFR 20 March 1989). Such a model ofFDI regulation was 
likely to diminish rather than enhance investor confidence. Without a fom1al 
notification requirement imposed upon investments above a certain threshold, such 
prerogatives were likely to be only exercised when investments became, for 
whatever reason, politically salient. The Opposition's policy position was even more 
confusing when Peacock said that there needed to be greater attention to the 
principle of 'reciprocity' in the application of foreign investment policy (AFR 20 
March 1989). This implied a Coalition government would give differential 
treatment to investments on the basis of country of origin - a departure from the 
principle of non-discrimination over which there was a clear elite if not popular 
consensus.
72 When pressed Peacock did stress the Coalition's support for the non-
discriminatory and liberal policy. The Coalitions' new found pragmatism on FDI 
policy was evidenced by its tentative endorsement of Labor's restrictions on the 
acquisition of established residential real estate by non"resident foreigners (ff~ Aust 
28-29October1989). This was in stark contrast to Peacock's criticism of the ban at 
the time of its announcement in September 1987. Through 1989 the Coalition was 
trying to subtly minimise FDI policy as a potential electoral negative in the lead-up 
to the next election. 
72 A 1990 Newspoll found 58 per cent support Within the Australian community for applying 
restrictions on FDI from particular countries (Goot 1990:255; W. Aust 1-8 July 1990). The acturu 
questions posed by Newspoll were not made public so it is not clear if respondents were given a 
direct choiee of non-discriminatory policy or country-specific restrictions. 
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The political risks in a sudden pragmatic concession to popular hostility to Japanese 
FDI- that is, any attempt to make FDI policy an electoral positive - were brought 
home to the Coalition during the 1990 federal election. Under Peacock's leadership 
it tried to breathe life into a flagging campaign by opposing the MFP project on the 
grounds that it would lead. to the creation of a Japanese enclave.73 Senior campaign 
strategists believed that widespread antipathy to Japanese investment could be 
tapped for electoral gain with such a position (Kelly 1992:581). This was despite the 
fact that the responsible shadow minister, John Howard, had already said publicly 
during the election campaign that people should not ' ... bury the concept in a sea of 
hostility before we know anything about it' (Sun Her 18 March 1990; Kelly 
1992:581). Peacock's about-face on the MFP was widely denounced a,s a shameless 
and desperate appeal to anti-Japanese sentiment by elite opinion-makers.74 
Government leaders, political commentators, quality newspaper editorialists, senior 
businesspeople, and even New South Wales Liberal Premier Nick Greiner were 
openly critical (Age 18 March 1990; AFR, SMH 19 March 1990).75 An emotional 
Hawke ignored the advice of ALP pollsters and repeatedly attacked Peacock (Mills 
1993:135).76 
Deep recession in both Australia and Japan ultimately took much of the political 
heat out of the FDI issue, although there were initiaBy concerns that Japanese 
investors were securing Australian property at 'firesale prices' (W. Aust 23-24 June 
73 There was already evident antagonism within the National Party towards the concept and Coalition 
science spokesman Peter Mi; Ch;J!nn had been publicly critical (CM 30 January 1990; Su11 Her 18 
March 1990). One Coat'.~iq;; M~R circulated campaign materials warning that Labor's re-election 
would result in thousanr~' ¥.::ljnese arriving in the electorate (Woods, Beazley, HR Hansard 10 
October 1990:2544), 
74 Liberal Party F~Ld1l l'.iri'eQ -ur Tony Eggleton nonetheless insisted in the official post-election 
party campaign report tb'lt '.~.inete were some Liberal votes won on the MFP1 (quoted in Kelly 
1992:583; Mills 1993:55, 134-35), The Coalition's position appears to have been in reaction to the 
frequency of 'swinging voters' in private polling to nominate Japanese investment as a concern 
(Burton and Lagan, SMH 19March1990). 
75 The Sunday Herald's headline read 'High tech city plan rekindles migration row' while the Sunday 
Telegraph's said 'Peacock 'insulted Japanese" (18 March 1990). The latter referred to Keating's 
denunciation of Peacock's remarks as an insult to Australia's largest trading partner and damaging of 
national interests. The headline over commentator Paul Kelly's response to the Liberal position read 
'Peacock disqualified from Lodge' (Aust 19 March 1990). The Australian's editorialist (19 March 
1990) judged Peacoc!<'s 'appeal is to the fearful gut instincts of racism, to that minority of voters who 
rieam for the bygone days of when Australia was white .. ' 
6 However, there was considerable disquiet about the MFP within the Left wing of the labor caucus 
in particular (Aust 12 July 1990). New science minister Simon Crean was also openly critical of how 
the MFP concept and site selection had been managed (Adv 2 August 1990). 
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1990).77 The Courier Mail, for instance, editorialised against Keating's 'tight 
monetarism' for ' ... abandoning the field to monied foreigners' (CM 5 July 1990). 
However, as the depth of the recession came to be widely understood there was a 
greater appreciation of foreign investment flows. The Goss government in 
Queensland, despite having waged a very public war with the Hawke government 
over its liberal .FDI policy, was forced by the recession to a position more accepting 
of FDI (CM 13 June 1990; 1 September 1990).78 Ironically, deep recession and a 
sharp decline in Japanese FDI inflow coincided with the release of substantial 
information on the real extent of foreign ownership and control in sensitive sectors. 
As Rix (1999:113) noted, a shortage of information about the real extent of 
Japanese FDI had been a major factor in its politicisation. The Queensland register 
of foreign ownership of land, forced on a reluctant government by the Labor 
opposition, ultimately revealed the latter's claims about the extent of foreign 
ownership to have been grossly exaggerated (Queensland Treasury 1991c; CM, 
AFR, Aust 26 June 1990). The Queensland register leant weight to the argument by 
Garnaut (19g9:105) and Drysdale et al. (1989:64) that registers of foreign land 
ownership could advance the cause of liberal FDI policy. 
The Bureau of Tourism Research (BTR 1990,1991) found substantial net benefits 
from foreign investment in tourism and dismissed claims of substantial loss of 
profits overseas or underemployment of Australians. 1be BTR's 1991 report 
estimated that only 4 per cent of money spent by tourists was lost from Australia to 
overseas investors. Most importantly for the politics of PDI policy, the report 
attracted widespread media attention (Aust 14 August 1990; CM 18 August 1990, 
23 July 1991). The Goss government's own Foreign Investment Secretariat within 
the Treasury found that claims of vertical integration and corrupt business practices 
77 Japan entered recession later than Australia, although the bursting ofits bubble economy entailed a 
much more painful and prolonged correction than Australia experienced. The basic institutional and 
regulatory problems that had helped to create the bubbly economy also delayed the impact of its 
ending on ind' ':lted investors in foreign property (Horiuchi 1998). Consequently finns such as BIB 
International and Daikyo remained active in Australia for longer than one might have expected given 
their precarious balance sheets. 
78 The Goss government nonetheless produced and circulated foreign investment guideltnes 
(Queensland Treasury 1992). These suggested several areas where state authority might be deployed 
to restrict foreign acquisitions; the most prominent one being offshore island leases. There had 
already been several disputes over foreign acquisitions of the finns holding the leases - the most 
prominent involving Daikyo's control of Green Island (CM25 April 1990; Aust 6 July 1990). 
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in the Queensland tourism industry were 'markedly exaggerated' (Queensland 
Treasury 199la, 1991b; CM 15 March 1990; W. Aust 13-14 April 1991).79 The 
political significance of these reports is that they made it much more difficult for 
political actors to make popular appeals to economic nationalism. Coupled with the 
deep recession, it cemented a commitment of the major parties at the federal level 
and state governments to a liberal FDI policy regime throughout the 1990s-albeit 
with limited but significant exceptions. The following chapter examines what those 
exceptions were and why they emerged. 
Conclusions 
The.Hawke government initially responded to growing popular concerns about FDI 
in real estate in the mid-l 980s with a pragmatic political decision to enact tight new 
controls on acquisition of existing residential properties by non-residents. In doing 
so it was assuming that community concerns were principally a private interested 
reaction by Australian aspirant buyers. By early 1988 it was clear that the new 
restrictions had done little to contain a growing controversy over foreign investment 
in real estate. Deeper territorial, historical, cultural and even racial sensitivities were 
also in play. Public contention became intense because of the rapid increase in FDI 
in real estate, because former enemy Japan became the single largest investor and 
because FD! issues became entangled in a broader controversy about Asian 
migration. The Hawke government made no further political concessions to illiberal 
critics of FD! policy as it was concerned with repairing its reputation for economic 
management and with championing closer ties with East Asia. The government 
could maintain a quite open FD! regime despite widespread antipathy to Japanese 
FD! as the Opposition was committed to even more liberal policy. Nonetheless, the 
strength of controversy in the mass media - provoked by a range of societal actors 
and the media itself - presented a significant political management challenge to the 
Hawke government. As Japan was seen as ar: economic powerhouse and the single 
largest source of FDI there was a heightened imperative for the Labor government 
72 Senior Queensland Labor ministers then used the Secretariat's reports to reject the very claims that 
they had themselves made whilst in opposition and the early days of government (CM 23 October 
1991). 
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to promote understanding of the benefits of Japanese FDI in. the Australian 
electorate. Japanese, firms and diplomats helped in this but Japanese official 
proposals for a multifunction polis and other schemes fuelled further controversy. 
The Hawke government during the late 1980s was largely managing the politics of 
contending conceptions of the public interest in relation to FDI. Elite. opinion was 
overwhelmingly liberal while popular opinion was much more divided. Some critics 
asserted that Japanese FDI in the promising tourism and beef industries entailed the 
risk of vertical integration and long-term national welfare losses from the Australian 
economy. These ideas were also promoted by some domestic businesses who feared 
" 
rationalisation in the wake of substantial Japanese and other foreign direct 
investments. The Hawke government was not swayed by these private interest 
concerns from maintaining a liberal FDI policy it had adopted under pressure of 
economic circumstances several years previously. Labor's political fortunes 
ultimately depended on its capacity to preserve its historically improbable reputation 
for good economic management. 
9 Qualified liberalism, 1990-96 
Labor's FDI policy in the 1990s reflected both the recognition that foreign 
investment had an important role to play in revitalising the Australian economy and 
that economic nationalist sentiment in the electorate was surprisingly resilient. In 
1992 the Keating government delivered further liberalisation in its One Nation 
package in response to deep recession and its damaged reputation for economic 
management. The Coalition, despite its reformist Fightback! manifesto, moderated 
its thoroughly liberal position on FDI policy. This brought about near bipartisanship 
on the broad principles of FDI policy although disagreements arose over its 
administration. Foreign acquisitions of prominent Australian businesses and the 
government's own privatisation agenda provoked public controversy, causing Labor 
to qualify its liberalism. Approval of some foreign takeovers was made conditional 
upon expanding exports and privatisations came with the condition of majority 
Australian ownership. At the same time the Keating government's conviction that 
FDI could help revitalise the Australian ec(momy led to a.u increased commitment to 
attract investment and facilitate the activities of foreign firms. The promotion of 
Australia as a location for RHQs dovetailed with the Keating government's 
championing of closer ties with East Asia. Investment issues became a central 
object of Keating's diplomacy within APEC. During its last two terms Labor's FDI 
policy came to be associated publicly with scandal as well as statesmanship. The 
Opposition alleged that FDI policy had favoured the prime minister personally and 
Labor politically. The claims centred upon a piggery and the Fairfax newspaper 
company, respectively. FDI policy for the media became a liability for Labor, 
despite efforts to optimise politically its policy response to a plethora of contending 
private and public interest demands. Labor's FDI policy towards the mass media is 
of particular interest because the sector remained a significant exception to a 
generally liberal FDI policy. Influential private interests lobbied for restrictive 
policy, although an even more powerful consideration for the Labor leadership was 
hostility towards foreign ownership of the media within ALP ranks, public opinion 
leaders and the wider electorate. 
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FDI policy and economic reform 
-
Deep recession, a decline in FDI from Japan and better information about the real 
extent and character of inward FDI all contributed to a lessening of controversy over 
FDI policy in the early 1990s. Opinion polls nonetheless revealed a continuing of 
nationalist sentiment within the electorate against FDI throughout the Labor's time 
in office. 1 The Coalition, under new opposition leader John Hewson, dropped its 
formal commitment to further liberalisation of FDI policy. It did so discretely for 
fear of being censured by elite liberal opinion, as had happened when the Coalition 
pragmatically opposed the MFP project during the 1990 federal election. The 
determination of the Coalition to lie low on FDI policy was evidenced by the 
absence of a position on FDI in the Fightback! policy package that became the 
hallmark of Hewson's leadership (Henderson 1994:301-08). Fightback! was a 
comprehensive blueprint for radical liberalisation of the Australian economy, and 
the absence of a commitment to a more open FDI policy regime was a stark 
omission (Hewson and Fischer 199la, 199lb). In fact Fightback raised the spectre 
of foreign domination to sell its free market reform agenda.2 
At this time the Labor government, weakened politically by deep recession, 
leadership rivalry and a resurgent opposition, embraced further economic reform in 
an attempt to repair its damaged reputation for economic management (Kelly 
1 A Newspoll talcen over l 9-21 January 1996 found 56 per cent of respondents thought the level of 
foreign invest.nent in Australia was too high, I 9 per cent chose 'about right' and only 1 per cent said 
it was too low (W.Aust 27-28 January 1996). Similar responses were found amongst supporters of 
both main political groupings. Some business constituencies for a liberal FDI policy - such as real 
estate interests and the CEO of BHP- explicitly warned the Coalition off the FDI issue in the run-
up to the 1996 election (Aust 31 January 1996). 
2 
Fightback! read ' ... we need to look to our own failures. We have never wanted to be a British farm. 
We have never wanted to be an American mine. We don't want to. be a giant Japanese hotel. Our 
children, the children of the Lucky Colllltry - those lucky enough to have jobs - don't want to 
become a nation of bellhops and shoeshines. We want to be a diversified, dynamic economy with a . 
shared sense of national identity.' (Hewson and Fischer 199Ia:12). Fightback! did contain a 
commitment to freer entry for foreign banks as part of its vision of Sydney becoming a major 
international financial centre (Hewson and Fischer l991a:50). Nowhere else in the voluminous 
documents did FDI policy rate a mention and even the banking instance was not presented as a 
foreign investment issue (199Ib). Hewson also surprised many with open criticism of Japanese real 
estate investment and advocacy for making FDI approvals conditional upon the openness of 
investors' home countries to Austra!ian exports (SMlf 2 l June 1990; Age 4 July 1990). 
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1992:607, 648-52; Gruen and Grattan 1993:269; Morgan Polls 23,30 June 1990-
97,14 March 1992).3 The Opposition criticised decline. in inward FDI as evidence of 
Labor's mismanagement of the economy (Panizza, Sen, Hansard 26 February 1992, 
145:2017). Following the ascendancy of Paul Keating to the prime ministership, the 
government produced the One Nation policy document in response to Fightback!. 4 It 
featured further liberalisation of FDI policy, in keeping with Labor's practice during 
the 1980s of using FDI policy change to signal its commitment to further reform of 
the Australian economy. The most significant change - a stark contrast to the 
Whitlarn years - was the abolition of local equity requirements for the mining 
industry (Dawkins, Treasurer's Press Release No. 25 26 February 1992). Full 
foreign ownership of mining operations was to be allowed, subject only to the 
reserve veto power included in the national interest test. Domestic constituencies for 
local equity requirements had diminished as the major Australian-controlled mining 
firms became more internationally oriented.5 The Keating government nonetheless 
later placed. a number of conditions on the effective merger of British RTZ Corp 
with its Australian offshoot CRA that created Rio Tinto (Willis, Press Release 20 
December 1995; Henderson, Aust 29 January 1996; Stevens, Aust 29 May 1996). 
With the One Nation package the Keating government also opened the way to 
further licenses for foreign banks that met Reserve Bank prudential requirements. 
Foreign banks would also be allowed to acquire Australian banks, with the 
exception of the 'four majors' (FIRB 1993:48). The government also foreshadowed 
raising no objections to foreign investments with a value less than $50 million 
(FI~ 1993:48). Several sectors, most no~ably the mass media, remained as special 
3 For instance, the Hawke government was emboldened to ad<>pt a schedule of significant tariff 
liberalisation in early 1991 after the Coalition committed in principle to the abolition of all tariffs by 
the ye!U' 2000 (Kelly 1992:606). 
4 The One Nation policy offered more qualified economic refonn than Fightback! and held there to 
be an ongoing and important role for government in making Australia a 'clever country'. It sought to 
address- criticisms that Labor was bereft of ideas after four tenns in office while positioning Labor as 
more moderate than the Coalition (Henderson 1994:301-08). Ironically this strategy was made more 
attractive by a popular, and to some degree elite, backlash against Labor's 'economic rationalism' 
during the recession. For debates over economic mtionnlism see Pusey (1991), Carroll and Manne 
(1992), Rees, Rodley and Stilweli (1994), King and Lloyd (1993) and. James, Jones and Norton 
(1993). 
5 Resources Minister David Beddall welcomed the expansion of Australian mining firms abroad 
(Press Release 95/43, 5 July 1995; HR Hansard 10 May 1994). Beddnll adviser Doug Capp 
confirmed that the expansion of Australian mining finns abroad was a significant factor in the 
considerable decline in support for FDI restrictions amongst both industry players and the relevant 
state and federal bureaucrats (Conversation with author, Canberra 9 May 1995). 
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cases. The Opposition endorsed the FDI liberalisation measures contained in the 
One Nation package, signalling effective bipartisanship on most aspects of FDI 
policy (Short, Sen Hansard 27 February 1992:406). Despite this, FDI was by no 
means dead as a political issue. 
Selling Aussie icons 
During the early and mid-1990s a number of foreign acquisitions of Australian 
businesses attracted media attention and critif;ism. Campbell's acquisition of a 
controlling interest in Arnotts' biscuits w~s the most controversial, with the 
Australian Democrats ieading opp0sidon (Coulter, Sen Hansard 14 October 
:1:992:1751, 1787; Lees, Sen Hansard 9 December 1992:4529). Questions were 
raised as to whether Campbell's had deliv1~red on commitments made to help 
Arnotts' export when permitted to take up 40 p1<;!r cent of the firm in July 19866 (Age 
5 July 1986).7 The 'loss' of other established brands to foreign ownership such as 
Castlemaine Perkins' XX.XX beer and Aeroplane jelly attracted mass media 
attention, as did approval of the takeover by French insurance giant AXA of 
National Mutual (Willis, Press Release 31 January 1995, AS320; McCrann, DT 8 
June 1995). The government's concern for export gTOwth was also evident in the 
conditions imposed on AXA '... transferring its existing Asian life insurance 
interests to National Mutual Holdings, and pursuing its Asia Pacific life insurance 
business strategy through that company' (Willis, Press Release 31 January 1995, 
AS320). Sale of Pacific Dunlop's large food industry holdings to Nestle and 
Simp1ot provoked consternation amongst even moderate b·osiness commentators and 
policymakers (Willis, Press Release 8 September 1995, 7WG20; Westfield, W. Aust 
6 A 700-strong group called Shareholders' Action Association (SAO - after an Amotts' biscuit) 
campaigned against the Campbell bid, heightening the controversy (Gluyas, Aust 30 January 1996). 
Incidentally, in late 1986 the Trade Practices Commission had dismissed a complaint that Amotts' 
was engaging in false advertising with reference to being Australian when 20 per cent, and later 40 
per cent of its equity was held by Campbells of the United States (Age 14 November 1986). The 
rationale for the dismissal was that both labour and materials utilised in the manufacture of:Amotts' 
rroducts_ were Australian. 
Treasurer Dawkins said that the conditions imposed on Amotts were 'designed to ensure that 
Arnotts activities remain centred in Australia as it undertakes its proposed export drive into Asia' 
(Aust 15 October 1994). Campbells appeared to be quite serious about using Amotts as a foundation 
for its Asian expansion plans (Aust 1 March 1995). As FIRB did virtually no follow-up work with 
firms the Keating government was hoping that a concern for public reputation and future regulatory 
approvals would be sufficient to secure compliance by foreign firms (Hewett and Ellis, AFR 27 June 
199$). 
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5-6 August 1995). This was because the food processing industry was widely touted 
as a promising example of 'value-adding' exports with great future potential in 
Asian markets (EAAU 1997:354-57). While giving his approval, Treasurer Willis 
publicly expressed disappointment at the sale and exhorted enterprises to be more 
export-orietlted. 8 
The Coalition did not criticise approval of the acquisiti<~ns, but spokespersons 
frequently asserted that the foreign takeovers were a consequence of poor economic 
management by Labor. This was a politically astute response to the duat forces of 
nationalist sentiment within the electorate and elite liberal economic orthodoxy. The 
Australian Democrats showed little concern for elite opinion, being forthright critics 
of particular foreign takeovers and advocating a more restrictive FDI policy regime.9 
The strength of elite liberal opinion did ensure fewer brazen demands by rent-
seeking domestic interests in relation to FDI policy, although there was still some 
lobbying for selective rejections of takeover bids. Contentious instances included 
the hostile bid by Tate and Lyle for Bundaberg Sugar and the sale of the 
Dreamworld amusement park (Aust 29 January 1996); 10 While the main Australian 
business peak bodies accepted a liberal FDI policy the calls of the marginal 
8 Australian business critics of the Pacific Dunlop sell-off included Woolworths chief Reg Clair, CSR 
chairman Alan Coates, and wealthy agribusiness entrepreneur Doug Shears - who took out a full 
page in a national newspaper to call for majority local equity requirements before the 1996 Federal 
election (JV. Aust 5-6 August 1995; Aust 26 January 1996; SMH 13 July 1996). Many commentators 
and business identities expressed dismay at the foreign acquisitions but did not go so far as to call for 
more restrictive FDI policy (Gastin, Aust 22 August 1995). Some of the 'national icon' brands that 
were sold were Peters, Edgell-Bird's Eye, Herbert Adams Bakeries, Big Sister, Nanna's, Leggo, 
Four'n Twenty and Wedgewood. One Edgells/Simplot source pointed out that despite their ostensible 
1iconic' status, some of the brands were doing relatively poorly in their product segments at the time 
of the takeover (William Ryan, personal conversation, Brisbane IO August 1999). 
9 The Democrats were advocates of economic nationalism while strongly defending a cosmopolitan 
and internationally oriented conception of modem Australian society, Although rather idiosyncratic it 
had much in common with elements of common attitudes on the Left of the ALP (Personal 
conversation with John Cherry, Senior Advisor to Senator Cheryl Kemot 15 October 1995). Until the 
emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation party in 1996 there was no political entrepreneur 
offering a populist policy mix of economic nationalism, cultural parochialism and a restrictive 
immigration policy. On debates over the drivers of Hanson's popularity see Grant (1997), Gray and 
Winter (1997) and Davidoff(l998), 
10 On the complex corporate and political machinations surrounding the hostile Tate and Lyle PLC 
bid for Bundaberg Sugar see Dixon (SMH 27 April 1991) and Bartholomeusz (Age 20 March 1991). 
The benefits to Bundaberg shareholders from the bid were noted at the time (Westfield, SMH 30 
April 1991). 
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Australian Owned Companies Association (AOCA) for more restrictive policy 
attracted some media attention.11 
Privatisations and FD/ policy 
Reform of the Australian economy raised the issue of foreign ownership and control 
in new ways. With a spate of privatisations the Labor government was compelled to 
develop FDI policy for industries that had previously been the exclusive preserve of 
govemment.. Each privatisation decision taken by the Hawke and Keating 
governments was painful because of the centrality of state ownership in the old 
ideology of the ALP, the opposition of unions fearful of the implications for their 
members, and initial wariness within sections of the electorate (Gruen and Grattan 
1993:156; Kelly 1992:238-41; King and Maddock 1996; ABM May 1995:35-37). 
This was particularly so in the case of the Commonwealth Bank (Kelly 1992:672). 
In order to secure Party agreement for a partial float in 1990 the Hawke government 
limited shares in the initial float to Australian residents (Spindler, Sen Hansard 13 
December 1990:5678; Dixon, SMH 27 April 1991).12 Labor identities denounced 
the Opposition's criticism of the restrictions and its support for full privatisation 
~eith, Press Release 13 November 1990).13 In fact, as Keating made clear, there 
was nothing in Labor's legislation for a partial float to stop Australian residents on-
selling shares to foreigners (HR Hansard 8 November 1990:3676). This would help 
to guarantee the tsuccess' of the float with the Australian share-buying public but at 
.1 
the expense of go'7i~ment revenur, from the sale.14 
11 A strong press supporter of more restrictive FDI policy was Bruce Stannard, editor of the 
Australian Business Monthly (ABM). The last edition of the magazine before its demise in 1995 was 
devoted to an attack on the government's liberal position on foreign takeovers (ABM May 1995:35). 
12 The initial float of 30 per cent of the Commonwealth Bank occurred when Keating made a deal 
with the leftwing Victorian Labor premier, Joan Kirner, for the bank to acquire the troubled State 
Bank of Victoria in the process (Kelly 1992:672). 
13 Government rising star Michael Lee (HR Hansard 14 November 1990:3987) said 'I do not want 
some share owner in Japan, the United States or Switzerland to decide whether the Commonwealth 
Bank will continue to offer concessionary rates of charges and fees for pensioners and !ow income 
earners in Australia', 
14 Keating told the House of Representatives that: 'Foreigners will be prohibited from subscribing to 
the first public issue of shares in the Commonwealth Bank. The aim of this restriction is to give 
priority to Australian residents in sub~cribing to shares in the bank. However, foreigners will not be 
prevented from buying shares from subscribers and holding them thereat\er. The wish of foreign 
persons to buy some of these shares in trading after the issue will add substantially to the effective 
demand for the shares, and hence to the prospects of success of the issue nild to the market value of 
the new shares.' (HR Hansard 8 November 1990:3676) 
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When the Keating government privatised Qantas it was acutely aware of the 
political trade-off between maximising the sale price, and therefore its capacity to 
deliver public and private goods, and the political benefits from selling shares to 
more affluent voters at a lower price while simultaneously appeasing popular 
nationalist sentiment. With an initial partial privatisation, Labor went for a 
substantial trade sale component that saw British Airways take a 25 per cent stake 
and the government retain majority ownership (Kelly 1992:672), The subsequent 
decision to sell the government stake was controversial within Labor rank~ and so 
delayed for several years. The initial float plans favoured small domestic investors 
and limited foreign equity holdings to only a further 10 per cent (Falvey, Aust 16 
February 1996). However, the government subsequently revised the limit to 49 per 
cent to boost the ultimate sale price by an expected $300 million through greater 
foreign institutional investor participation (Aust 9 June 1995; Taylor, Aust 10 May 
1995). The consequence of this convoluted decision-making was that overall foreign 
ownership of Qantas was limited to 49 per cent but British Airways ended up being 
by far the largest single investor (Falvey, Aust 11 May 1995).15 
At the same time as its back flip on foreign equity for Qantas, the Keating 
government announced full privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank. Treasurer 
Ralph Willis announced simply that the government had 'changed its mind' because 
it was 'psychologically significant' to return the budget to surplus (Taylor, Aust 10 
May 1995). Labor needed to boost its reputation for economic management as it 
faced a resurgent opposition under the leadership of John Howard (Milne, Aust 15 
ME.ly 1995). Willis promised that the bank would remain majority Australian-owned 
but, unlike the Qantas Sale Act 1992, did no~ cement this in legislation (Bailey 
1995:1; Taylor, Aus( 10 May 1995).16 Foreign equity caps were the political price of 
15 Foreign investment in Ansett was fonnally limited to 49 per cent but it was widely expected that 
the Keating government would allow a higher level because of the prime minister's belief that an 
Ansett·Air New Zealand alliance was a desirable rationalisation of the industry in both countries 
(Falvey, Aust 3 April 1995). Bris.liane's Labor Lord Mayor, Cr Jim Soorley, expressed concern 
publicly about a consortium with a significant Dutch presence exercising influence over Brisbane's 
privatised airport even though the Keating government was imposing a 49 per cent cap on foreign 
eCJ,uity (CM22 December 1994). 
16 In the final Commonwealth float, as in the sale of an earlier tranche of 19 per cent in September 
1993, there were no restrictions placed specifically on foreign participation in the float as foreign 
investors could already freely buy shares through the stock market (Willis, HR Hansard 25 October 
1995:2853). Willis noted that foreign participation would expand the market for shares and benefit 
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both federal and state privatisations. 17 In the telecommunications sector Labor was 
unable to privatise Telstra because of political constraints largely internal to the 
labour movement, but did subject it to constrained competition. Foreign investors 
were limited to a minority stake in Optus, the new competitor during a transitional 
oligopoly phase (Willis, Press Release 1 August 1995; AFR 30 May 1996). Third 
carrier Vodaphone, limited to the mobile telephony market, was required to achieve 
majority Australian ownership by 1 July 2003 (Willis, Press Release 1 August 
1995). 
Luring FD/ 
With the One Nation policy statement in 1992 the Keating government boosted 
federal investment attraction and facilitation efforts. Under a new Major Projects 
Facilitation (MPF) mechanism it promised to review regulatory barriers in general 
and expedite regulatory approval for particular projects. 18 The MPF was packaged 
in One Nation with a 'suite of measures in support of major projects' that included 
all shareholders, including the Commonwealth. However, majority Australian ownership would be 
retained through the usual FDI guidelines. 
17 Privatisation of the electricity industry in Victoria and water services in Sotlth Australia provoked 
public controversy over the participation of foreign finns (Aust 11 January 1995, 24 January 1995, 
29 March 1995, 6 April 1995). State Labor oppositions were strongly critical in both instam;es - the 
Victorian Labor leadership threatening to force foreign equity sell-downs if elected (Aust 7 March 
1995). One opinion poll revealed 92 per cent of Victorians opposed foreign control of privatised 
electricity generation assets (Aust 10 February 1995). The Federal government did not have to 
confront the Victorian issue directly because the Kennett government reacted to the controversy by 
requiring bidders to be in cl'.lHsortia with a substantial domestic interest (Aust 10February1995). The 
South Australian water privatisation remained contentious but the Keating government did not 
intervene through thei provisions of the FTA. The Western Australia Labor opposition opposed the 
sale of Bank West to the Bank of Scotland, despite the fact that such a trade sale promised a much 
bigger sale price than a local float (Wilson1 Aust 21 September 1995). In accordance with its 
liberalisation measures in the One Nation package, the Keating government raised no objections. 
ts Coordination problems between tiers of govemment had been long identified by both domestic and 
foreign finns as hampering investment and the recession of the early 1990s brought added urgency to 
addressing them (Interviews with Peter Watts, Investment Specialist, and Bernd Neubauer, General 
Manager, Invest Australia, Sydney 23 February 2000 and Ross Buchanan, General Manager, 
Investment Attraction, Department of State Development, Queensland, Brisbane 25 May 2000). In 
practice, it was often Austrade officials and state representatives abroad who were the initial driving 
force for cooperation between various government agencies on new foreign investments (interviews 
in Tokyo with Ian Wing, Minister-Counsellor, Australian Embassy 9 Decernbcr 1997, Tony Hogg, 
Comrriissiorter, Queensland government Office 9 December 1997, Michael Walker, Official 
Representative, government of Western Australia 9 December 1997, Craig P~acock, Assistant 
Representative, New South Wales government 12 December 1997). Australia's consul in Nagoya 
also reported as much (interview with Ian Brazier 18 November 1997). The Vfotorian government's 
official representative in Tokyo reported that he had been fonnally tasked primarily to FDl attraction 
and facilitation rather than the thore usual export promotion (interview with Kevin Knowles, Tokyo 
10 December 1997), 
262 
accelerated depreciation and large project investment t ·- ''wru1ces, federal 
expenditure on project-related infrastructure and the FDI U.bei'ci.JSation discussed 
earlier (Keating 1992:~1-84). Additional resources were allocated to the overall 
Investment Promotion Program, which was delivered by Austrade and administered 
by the Department of Industry, Science and Technology (DIST) (Evans 1993:35).19 
In September 1993 the Keating government initiated a campaign to market Australia 
as a location for the Asia Pacific regional headquarters (RHQs) of European and 
American finns (Cook, Press Release 1 July 1994: VPRlO; DIST 1995n, 1995b; 
Price Waterhouse.1995). This dnvetailed with the government's emphasis upon the 
economic prospects of the Asia Pacific, its championing of' enmeshment with Asia' 
and a strand of thought within the government that Australia was uniquely 
positioned to serve as an interlocutor between West and East,20 The establishment 
of prominent RHQs in Australia might also enhance the reputation of the Keating 
government for economic management; a reputation still tarnished by the deep 
recession of the early 1990s. 
This political imperative was evidenced by the inclusion of additional RHQ-specific 
investment attraction measures in the government's main economic policy initiative 
of its last term (Garran and Mega!ogenis, W. Aust 16-17 April 1994). The White 
Paper on Employment and Growth: Working Nation was largely aimed at 
diminishing unemployment as an electoral negative for the government. The RHQ 
initiatives within Working Nation included favourable tax treatment of RHQ start-
up costs, exemptions from dividend withholding tax, acc:ess to feasibility study 
grants and streamlining of immigration procedures for expatriate executives (Cook, 
Press Release 1 July 1994; Willis, Press Release 30 November 19942 A major 
com:ultants' report on attracting RHQs lent legitimacy to the governments' 
'~ 11\ its 19$13 election material the Keating government identified the priorities of its Investment 
t'fon.tli<ITT 'Program as • .. , processed food, mineral and chemical based industries, waste and 
environmental management, textiles and tanning, iufonnation technology and teiecov.•munications' 
(Evans 1993:35). 
20 Industry minister Sen. Peter Cook (Press Release 24 May 1994, STPIO) made tM theme of his 
1994 nddrnss to the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Australia 'an Australian base for 
an Asian future'. He detnili:d the cost and other advantages that a consultants' report had identified 
for Australia over locations such as Singapore and Hong Kong for finns wishing to 'participate in the 
Asian growth miracle' (The Allen Consulting Group 1994). The Keating government made much of 
the fact that its RHQ promotion campaign won an award from the Euromoney publication (Cook, 
Sen. Hansard22September1994:1215). 
263 
initiatives but also showed Australia to have only some 65 Asia Pacific RHQs by 
comparison with Hong Kong's 500-odd (The Allen Consulting Group 1994).21 
Several state governments quickly embraced the RHQ concept, largely in 
competition with each other,22 With the Working Nation package the Investment 
Promotion Program was also relabelled as the Investment Promotion and 
Facilitation Program (IFPF) and given additional resources to support more staff 
overseas working specifically on investment attraction (Anderson 1998:13-15). 
Former treasurer John Dawkins was later appointed as a part-time special 
investment representative supplementing the work of Australia's eight investment 
commissioners and Austrade network abroad (Megalogenis, W. Aust 2-3 July 
1994).23 
In the run-up to the 1996 federal election the Keating government credited the IFPF 
with bringing to fruition a very large volume of FDI, especially in the 'major 
projects' category. Claimed successes included Anaconda Nickel's $650 million 
investment in Western Australia, Korea Zinc's $1 billion smelter project in 
Queensland, and another 40 minerals processing projects worth some $20 billion 
that were 'in the pipeline' (Cook 420/95, 22 November 1995; 524/95, 19 December 
21 The National Investment Council (NIC), an advisory body revamped as part of the Working Nation 
package, commissioned the report, The NIC's fourteen members of the National Investment Council 
were drawn from the private sector, trade unions and academe and were charged by the industry 
minister 'to undertake an RHQ initiative (Cook, Press Release 13 May 1994, 4 October 1994; SMH 
19 February 1994). The Keating government issued multiple public statements celebrating the 
decisions of foreign firms to establish RHQs in Australia under the aegis of its scheme. However, it 
was caught out when Cathay Pacific, described publicly as the 'genesis of the government's highly 
successful RHQ campaign' by the industry minister, changed its mind about locating its training 
school in Australia (Cook, News Release 322195, 13 September 1995 and 001/96, 3January1996). 
22 There was considerable enthusiasm in the business press for Australia's official efforts to attract 
RHQs. Sec, for instance, Thomas (SMH 9 September 1994). In Queensland, however, a confidential 
consultants' report cautioned against excessive optimism about the prospects for RHQs and the 
extent of the immediate economic benefits associated with them (personal conversation with Matthew 
Strassberg, senior advisor to the Queensland Minister for Business, Industry and Regional 
Development Jim Elder, Brisbane 12 May 1995). Queensland officials insisted that, unlike other 
states, the Treasury te~t.ed the net economic benefits of all incentive packages with 'a model' but 
conceded that was not particularly precise (interviews with Mr Russell Kennedy, Investment 
Coordination Unit, Department of Business, Industry and Regional Development, Queensland 12 
May 1995 and l\<Ir Ray Garrant, Senior economic advisor to Premier Wayne Goss 19 April 1995). 
Requests to make 'the model' public were declined. 
23 The role mirrored that carried out by former industry minister John Button as part-time special 
trade and industry representative. For a detailed discussion of the roles and how they fitted into 
Austrade's operations see transcripts ofthcn industry minister Sen. Cook and DIST secretary Sandy 
Hollway during the 1994 estimates committee hearings (Sen. Hansard, Economics Legislation 
Committee 15 November 1994:5). 
264 
·' 
1995). While the Keating government was courting FDI it remained mindful of the 
new elite policy orthodoxy that frowned on expensive government market 
interventions. In 1995 it commissioned a review of the IPFP from the Bureau of 
Industry Economics. The BIE report (BIB 1996), delivered after Labor's electoral 
defeat, credited the $12.6 million program with having been a significant factor in 
the attraction of up to $235 million in new investment in the previous year. The BIB 
supported continuation of the IPFP at its existing level of funding on certain market 
failure grounds.24 It reflected the view of peak Australian business organisations and 
the Federal Treasury that the government should concentrate o;u economic refonn 
rather than develop a large program of selective incenti:ves fo:t foreign finns (BIB 
1996; Kitney and Bernase~~ SMH 19February1994;AFR"27t April 1996).25 
The attraction and retention of FDI also figured prominently in deliberations over 
industry policy. As seen in Chapter 3, tariffs had been a significant factor driving 
much past inward FDI in manufacturing. By the early 1990s Australian markets 
were much more open and the future of some manufacturing operations was in 
question. This was particularly the case for the automotive industry but the scale of 
the industry presented a strong political imperative to the Federal government for 
active investment facilitation. The Keating government courted Toyota and other 
foreign auto manufacturers to make further investments in Australian production 
despite tariff reform. In Toyota's case the ACTU leadership was enlisted to secure a 
new single union plant (AFR 12 February 1991).26 The Keating government 
reaffirmed the established practice of offering incentives for foreign suppliers to the 
public sector, especially in pharmaceuticals and IT, to make investments in. 
24 Namely, the program helped to address the problem of limited infonnation in FDI source countries 
about the contemporary reality of the Australian business environment. It also provided a second best 
solution to inefficiencies in bureaucratic processes that could inhibit valuable inward FDl. 
25 State governments had few doubts about the political benefits of aggressively pursuing certain 
types of foreign investment with incentive packages, despite the periodic controversy over the non-
transparency of incentive packages (Coulton, SMH 6 June 1994; Kerin, W. Aust 11-12 June 1994; 
Lyall, Time 10 July 1995). Regardless of criticisms of 'incentive wars' between states there was little 
the Federal government could do to secure a truce (interview with Mt Ross Buchanan, General 
Manager, Investment Attraction, Department of State Development, Queensland 25 May 2000; 
Kitney, AFR 19 April 1996; Bradley, W. Aust 24-25 June 1995i Skully and Coultan, SMH 24 June 
1995). NSW Premier Bob Carr did call for the then Industry Commission to druft a code of state 
conduct on incentives to minimise na~ional welfare losses (Aust 30 June 1995). 
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Australian production facilities (USTR 1995; Cook, News Release 460/95, 1 
December 1995). This was particularly effective in the former industry because of 
the monopsony power that the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme gave to the 
Australian government (Lofgren 1994; BIB 1991). The Keating government.fout~d 
to investments as evidence that its policies were helping to create new c~~petjtive 
advantages for the Australian economy. Eye-catching corporations cl~mecr~~. 
successes under the 'Partnerships for Development Program' in the run-up to the 
1996 election included 3Com, Dell, Oce, Computer Associates, and Sharp.27 
Ultimately the Keating government paid higher prices for goods and services in 
return for FDI. The Keating government also balked at abolishing restrictions on 
parallel imports of books and CDs because of concern that major foreign firms 
would wind back their Australian operations, with supposed negative consequences 
for Australian writers and artists (Aust 10 February 1995). The Labor government 
was subjected to intense lobbying by coalitions of domestic and foreign interests 
and who 'took advantage of Keating's promotion of a 'Creative Nation' (Keating, 
Press Release 18 October 1994). Consumers of books and compact disks paid 
directly (Industry Commission 1996; PSA 1995; ORR 1995). 
Statesma11s/1ip a11d sca11dal 
By the time of the Keating government's electoral defeat in March 1996 the Prime 
Minister had been lauded as a visionary statesman and decried as of a self-serving 
venal politician. FDI policy was associated with both the high and low points of the 
Keating prime ministership. APEC was the centrepiece of the Keating government's 
foreign diplomacy and foreign investment issues figured prominently in its 
26 The ACTU's role in reassuring Toyota about the industrial relations in a new plant symbolised the 
maturity of the organisation's attitudes towards foreign investors during this period (interview with 
Tim Harcourt, Research Officer, ACTU, Melbourne 2 October 1995), 
27 The sums involved under 'Fixed Term Arrangements' and 'Partnerships for Development' with the 
Commonwealth were typically modest. Calcomp (a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin) committed to 
only art extra $1 mlllion in 'new activities' {Cook 327/95, 15 September 1995) while Dell promised 
investments and exports totalling $39 million and additional employment ('f 46 staff over four years 
(Cook 290/95, 30 August 1995), Olivetti committed to a figure of $19 million in new activity over 
the same period, although it already had revenues of $60 million in 1994 in Australia and 250 
employees (Cook 291/95, 30 August 1995). See also the press releases of Cook (319/95, 11 
September 1995; 338/95, 22 September 1995~ 281/95, 22 August 1995) and Moore (3/96, 26 March 
1996). 
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evolution. 28 Keating claimed personal credit for the adoption of a set of non-binding 
investment principles at the APEC leaders meeting in Bogor that he had proposed 
the previous year in Seattle (Keating, Press Release 6 December 1994; Bora, Aust 2 
February 1996; Bora 1995, Bora and Graham 1995).29 The actual Declaration of 
Common Resolve by leaders at Bogor raised bigger questions about the future 
direction of Australian FDI policy. Member economies pledged that they would 
realise free trade and investment by 2010 or 2020, depending upon whether they 
were a developed or developing economy (BIE 1995a).3° Keating declared the 
Bogar Declaration had ' ... permanently changed the nature of our region and the 
future of Australia' and that Australia had much to g~in from Bogar because 'a great 
deal of our adjustment has already happened' (Keating, Press Release 6 December 
1994). 
Although the Bogor vision called on member economies to commence concerted 
liberalisation immediately, and bring action plans to the next meeting, the Keating 
government made no subsequent moves to further liberalise FDI policy. Indeed, in 
multilateral negotiations the Australian government acted to preserve fully its 
discretionary controls over FDI. To the disappointment of the US government, 
Australia notified sufficient exemptions in its GATS schedule of commitments to 
maintain the integrity of its remaining FDI restrictions and review mechanism 
(USTR 1995; Brenchley, AFR 26 June 1995; Aust 28 February 1996). Thr;~ 
Australian government was spared from weighting its commitment to existing FD! 
policy against its strong support for trade liberalisation by widespread opposition to 
the American push in services negotiations for investment-related 'free access' 
provisions (Trebilcock and Howse 1999:351-66; Drake and Nicolaidis 1992:45; 
28 The Opposition welcomed the development of APEC but was scathing about Keating's hyperbole 
and initial failure to con(um that the APEC vision of liberalisation was on an MFN basis (Downer, 
HR Hansard 6 December 1994:3934). 
29 Trade minister McMuilan (Press Release 21 November 1994) said that the 'The non-binding 
investment code will build. a predictable and secure investment environment in APEC ••. it represents 
a basis on which we can build more liberal investment rules throughout APEC'. 30 While the Bogor Declaration won strong support from some Australian commentators and 
academics there were also doubters. These divided into those critics wary of such liberalisation and 
those libernl critics who thought that the prospects of APEC delivering substantial outcomes were 
being substantially over-estimated (Ravenhill 1996). For instances of the optimism in official circles 
about the economic opportunities presented by East Asia see (EEAU 1992, BIE 1995c). 
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Hoekman 1996; Dwyer, AFR 25 April 1996).31 When the loci of international 
negotiations over specifically investment~rell!ted matters shifted to the OECD in 
1995, the Australian government's (publicly undisclosed) bargaining objective was 
the preservation of existing restrictions and controls.32 
The seeming inconsistency in the Keating government's positions on foreign 
investment at the regional and multilateral levels was a fr,mction of several 
contending forces. The Bogor Declaration did not promise an open investment 
regime for fifteen years and so presented few domestic political difficulties. 
However it did satisfy Keating's need - electoral and personal - for a visionaty 
act of statesmanship that brought together Labor's hallmark commitments to 
internationalising the Australian economy and engaging with East Asia,33 The 
investment principles adopted at Bogor, even if only partially realised in East Asian 
economies, might benefit the increasing number of Australian businesses seeking to 
establish operations in the region (BIE 1995b; Howe 1994; Lowe 1996).34 The 
strong preference of the Keating government for international agreements on FDI 
31 The Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement was the only FDI~related aspect of 
the final settlement of the Uruguay Round other than GATS. Negotiations for the 
telecommunications and financial services sectors continued after the fonnal ending of the Uruguay 
Round. As many services require an actual commercial presence in a host economy for their delivery 
it was inevitable that essentially FOi policy issues would arise when service trade became an object 
of negotiations (Hoekman 1992; Daniels 1993; Hardin and Holmes 1997i Warren and Findlay 
2000: 1). The acute sensitivity of many developing economies to ceding autonomy over matters that 
were previously understood as foreign investment related was made clear at this time (Brenchley, 
AFR 9 April 1996). 
n From interviews with Janine Murphy (General Manager, Foreign Investment Policy Division, 
Treasury, Canberra 25 February 2000) and Grahame Crough (Manager, Tertiary Industries Unit, 
Foreign Investment Policy Division, Treasury, Canberra 25 February 2000) and Ms .Tane Madden 
(Director, New Trade Issues Section, DFAT, Canberra 24 February 2000). As seen in previous 
chapters, th~ OECD had been the forum for the first tentative steps towards multilateral cooperation 
on FDI issu~s, and maintained a monitoring and research capacity (OECD 1991). Although the 
antipathy of developing countries to a binding investment agreement was initially a reason for 
negotiations occurring under the aegis of the OECD, deep divisions amongst developed economies 
on foreign investment were soon evident. Most members adopted a similar strategy to that of 
Australia and consequently there was little scope for meaningful bargaining (Trebilcock and Howse 
1999:364-65). 
33 On the political difficulties that Labor faced after the recession and n decade in office see Kelly 
(1992:615-60). On Keating's personality> leadership style and legacy see Edwards (1991, 1996). 
Gordon (1993, 1996), Carew {1988, 1992) and Ryan (1995). The government's 'Australia in Asia' 
policy statement delivered just before the 1993 Federal Election is a good example of its thinking and 
rhetoric (Evans 1993). On the strategic context of APEC see Dibb ( 1995). 
34 Previous Australian FD! in the 1980s had been mainly to the UK and USA where the foreign 
investment regimes were both liberal and transparent (Korpornal 1986; Tucker and Wolanowski 
1991). As seen in Chapter 7, reciprocity had become an issue with the USA for financial services, as 
itdid with Japan. 
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that allowed a discretionary review mechanism went beyond lingering economic 
nationalism within government rankS:, 
The government gave close consideration to the utility of the FIRB when confronted 
by calls from both the Coalition and the US government for its abolition (USTR 
1995; Dwyer, AFR 3 April 1996). As previous chapters revealed, the FIRB provided 
a convenient vehicle to manage the politics of economic nationalism. It allowed the 
appearance of vigilantly guarding the national interest, while in practice delivering a 
quite liberal FDI policy for most sectors of the economy. A non-discretionary and 
transparent FDI policy was likely to be a more restrictive FDI policy given the 
resilience of economic nationalist sentiment in the community. This was a view that 
found support within the Treasury.35 The problem with a non-transparent and 
discretionary FDI review regime is that the good intentions of the government of the 
day must be taken on trust. The Keating government was dogged by claims that it 
had misused the discretionary authority bestowed upon it by the Foreign 
Acquisitions and Takeovers Act. 
In the run.-up to the 1993 election Keating contended with claims from the 
Opposition that the liberalisation of FDI policy iu One Nation was drl.ven by his 
own immediate, and undeclared, pecuniary interests, Keating had a substantial stake 
in a business that entered into a joint venture with the Danish firm Danpork to 
develop a piggery enterprise. Danpork had notified the FIRB of its investment, but 
f 
under established procedures Keating was not revealed as an ultimate beneficiary 
nor was the Danpork investment ultimately subjected to actual review, During 1992 
government figures argued strenuously, and with some success, that the investment 
hacl been dealt with as any other would have been - not least because Treasury 
officials were ostensibly unaware of Keating's interest.36 Keating's version of his 
involvement in the business, and the sale of his stake to Indonesian investors. for a 
3
.
5 Frorn interviews with Janine Murphy and Grahame Crough (as in footnote 13). 36 The alleged link between tho One Nation liberalisation measures and the Danpork decision wa~ 
quite improbable. As seen already, there were other strong drivers of FDI policy liberalisation. The 
Danpork approval was granted by new tr~asurcr John Kerin, following Keating's move to the 
backbench after his failed leadership challenge. Senior government figures argued that as Kerin was a 
H'awke supporter it was highly improbable that he would have done a regulatory favour for Keating. 
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large profit while he was Prime Minister, came under repeated scrutiny from the 
Opposition and media thimughout Labor's remai,ning time in office.37 While the 
facts of the case are much contested, it appears to be clear that the Prime Minister 
sought to conceal from the public the fact that he was selling to Indonesian investors 
(Bawne, Sen Hansard 30 August 1995:644).38 The sale risked offending lingering 
economic nationalist sensitivities in the electorate. It also contributed to popular 
perceptions of procedural impropriety in the Keating government's conduct ofFDI 
policy.39 Labor's conduct of FDI policy toward the mass media was even more 
controversial in this, and other, respects, 
Media firms and FDI policy 
Labor was confronted with claims during its last term in office that it had sought 
inappropriate political advantage in applying the Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Act to proposed investments in the Fairfax media group. Non-Labor 
parties cooperated in subjecting the Keating government to a Senate inquiry that 
judged harshly particular decisions in relation to Fairfax and the foreign investment 
review mechanism in general (Senate 1994). Inquiry chairman Senator Richard 
37 There wer~ repented bitter pnrlinmentary exchanges over the issue, usually in the Senate as Senator 
Michael Baume led the Opposition attack on the issue (Sen Hansard 17 June 1992:3812; 18 June 
1992:4045; 19 June 1992:4115; 22 June 1992:4156; 24 June 1992:4457; 14 October 1992:1789; IS 
October 1992:1984; 9 November 1992:2480; l February 1994:26; HR Hansard 4 November 
1992:2657). The most disconcerting subsequent assertion of the Opposition was that Kenting's use of 
an Australian intermediary in the safo of his stake in the piggery was aimed at avoiding FIRB scrutiny 
of the sale (Baume, Sen Hansard 9 May 1996), This account was inherently improbable because 
established FDI policy practice meant that rejection of the sale by the FIRB would have been 
extremely unlikely. If Keating had sought to avoid the sale going to FIRB, it would probably have 
been to avoid the perception that his government was doing him n favour. Treasurer Ralph Willis, in 
September 1975, provided a statement suggesting that all FIRB procedures had been complied with, 
and detailing dates and some parties (Cook, Sen Hansard 15 November 1995:3086). The piggery 
issue was also politicnll.y damaging to Keating because oHhe negative image of the piggery business, 
the large profit he made, nnd consequently that it was unbecoming for the Prime Minister to be 
involved. · 
38 There was another practical political reason. for Keating concealing the fact that the piggery stake 
wns being sold to Indonesian interests. Keating was also championing closer relations with Indonesia 
and had sought to build n close relationship with President Suharto: attracting criticism from 
supporters of independence for East Timer. 
3? Keating also had been accused of withholding approval of a large investment in the Fosters' group, 
by Japanese brewer Asahi, until Elders chief John Elliott dropped a defamation action against him. 
Elliott, a former Liberal Party national president, had himself implied as much in a public speech 
(W:Aust 3-4 December 1994). 
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Alston prefaced the interim report with the statement that, under Labor's conduct of 
FDI policy for the media, 
... the rules are frequently changing, and the public is faced with the spectacle of constantly 
manoeuvering players who are watching for every possible opening and talcing advantage of 
it. When the Prime Minister chose to enter the field as a rule maker and umpire with a 
vested interest in the outcomes, then the game Jacked propriety as well as onler. (Senate 
1994: preface 2).40 
Claims about media policy under Labor being driven by private interest politics 
were hardly new (Bowman 1988; Chadwick 1988; Craik, James, Bailey and Moran 
1995; Wheelwright and Buckley 1987). Indeed, by the early 1990s that view became 
quite orthodox among academic and media commentators. Such views were almost 
inevitable given the implications for the broadcasting and print media under Labor's 
new cross media rules and its FDI decisions (Brown and Cave 1992; Brown 1989a; 
Tiffen 1988). The high stakes involved for media entrepreneurs, and their potential 
influence over the scarce political resource of good publicity, guaranteed that there 
would be intense lobbying for preferred policy outcomes. However, criticism of 
such private interest politics became so widespread that it constituted a significant 
factor in its own right in the politics of FDI policy for the media. Policy was 
intensely contested and public interest ideas - mainly illiberal towards FDI -
became as integral to Labor's political calculus as private interest considerations. 
Controversy over Keating's alleged making of FIRB approval for an investment in 
the Fairfax newspaper group dependent. on 'balanced coverage', and the special 
status of Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd, obscured the fact that Labor maintained a 
restrictive FDI policy for the mass media. Labor reaffirmed the prohibition on 
foreign interests controlling a broadcasting license and limited individual 
investments in established metropolitan print media to 25 per cent. The mass media 
40 The dissenting report of tne Labor members of the Senate Committee of Inquiry (Senate 1994, 
Dissent:3} declared that: 'The committee's work has been marred by the persistent party-political 
abuse of Senate procedures through disrespectful and often contemptuous treatment of witnesses, 
threats against and grotesque attempts at intimidation of public servants, preconceived presumptions 
of guilt against political opponents, prejudgement and misrepresentation of events under 
investigation, and attempted interference in the free press.' 
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was a striking exception to a generally liberal FDI policy, and one keenly noted by 
the US government (USTR 1995). The particular political saliency of public interest 
ideas favouring a restrictive FDI policy for the media was partly a function of 
reactions to policy decisions taken by the Hawke government in the mid-1980s. FDI 
policy for the media ceased being a •,::Jeeper issue' because of Rupert Murdoch's 
takeover bid for the Herald and Weekly Times group in 1986-87, and the debt 
crises of Warwick Fairfax's newspaper empire and all three of the commercial 
television networks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It order to understand why 
Labor shied away from extending FDI liberalisation to the media it is· necessary to 
examine those past controversies. 
Television 
Foreign investors were limited to a 20 per cent equity interest in a broadcasting 
license and expressly prohibited from exercising control ever since the Menzies 
government legislated in the mid-1950s to establish television in Australia (Flint 
1985). In 1990 the Hawke government was confronted with a stark choice in FDI 
policy outcomes for television broadcasting: watch foreign investors take large 
equity stakes in existing networks through a loophole in the existing restrictive 
legislation or rewrite the law.41 More coherent and liberal regulation of foreign 
investment would have been in keeping with the general trend of Labor's FDI 
policy. Instead the government ultimately chose to reinforce the old restrictive 
policy with legislative amendments to close off the legal loophole. It did so after 
being confronted by intense lobbying from media actors with conflicting private 
interests, divided 'elite' opinion, strong ALP opposition to liberalisation and 
evidence of community antipathy to foreign ownership of the mass media. 
Debates over foreign ownership of television broadcasters, and the private 
preferences of media industry players. were patterned by existing media regulation 
and the particular industry structure that it created. Australian governments have 
regulated the structure and content of the television industry and also directly 
participated in it through the ABC and SBS networks. This has been because of 
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both the perceived social significance of the medium and its complex economics.42 
Such extensive government intervention should ameliorate concerns about the 
consequences of foreign control.43 However, long-established structural regulation 
of Australian broadcasting engendered its own rationale for excluding foreigners 
from controlling stakes. Television and radio broadcasters have been always limited 
to a number far fewer than was technically feasible. This was justified on the basis 
that the content requirements constituted a considerable cost impost on the 
commercial broadcasters and so a restrictive license system, generating considerable 
rents, was fair compensation (Brown 1986, 1989a; BTCE 1991). While the Labor 
government moved to a more market-based mechanism for managing the radio 
spectrum, it did not seriously consider issuing additional television broadcasting 
licenses.44 Consequently, as the private and supposedly public interest politics of 
television licenses favoured the status quo, FDI in television became an issue of 
whether not to pem1it foreign ownership stakes in an existing broadcaster.45 
41 Radio was also covered by the provisions of the Broadcasting Act on foreign investment but did 
not become a publicly contested issue. 
42 While there is a substantial international literature on the economics of broadcasting the issues 
have attracted less analytical attention in Australia, Brown (1986, I989a, 1989b, Brown and Caves 
1992), Withers (1980, 1982, 1985) and the BTCE (1991) are notable exceptions. 
43 Arguments against allowing foreign control of broadcasting outlets typically posit 'social' rather 
than 'economic' motives. A theoretical justification of the prohibition Qf foreign control of 
broadcasting would require that one first makes certain assumptions about tlte potential behaviour of 
a foreign proprietor in relation to content provision. Almost all governments appear to assume that 
foreign control brings the risk that some programming might not be in the national interest. The most 
commonly argued risks are misrepresentation of national interests to the advantage of the proprietor's 
country of origin. and a lack of understanding and sympathy to the culture and aspirations of the 
audience, Secondly, it must also be argued that such problems associated with foreign ownership and 
control will not adequately be dealt with either by market forces or the existing regulatory structure 
as it applies to all broadcasters in the particular country. Thirdly, it must be demonstrated that the 
costs entailed in foregoing foreign investment in broadcasting are more thim offset by the costs, 
discounted by the probability of their being incurred, of such foreign control. This is developed at 
length in Pokarier (1996). 
44 Prime Minister Keating was not averse to threatening the existing commercial stations with the 
issuance ofa new commercial license for a 'family channel'. 
45 Given the high rents. generated by the system there would conceivably be a risk of a loss of excess 
profits abroad but, as Brown and Caves (1992:384) suggest, those rents should he fully priced into 
the sale 'because of the restricted number of commercial television licenses and the relatively low 
resource rent tax extracted by government high profits have been earned by licensees and, 
consequenUy, large economic rents have attached to licenses. However, when television licenses are 
sold by the original licensee, in addition to the value of the net tangible assets the selling price 
includes the discounted value of the economic rents.' Any loss of rents abroad that did occur with n 
foreign acquisition of a broadcaster could be addressed through partial or full liberalisation of entry 
to the broadcasting market. 
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The Australian televisio~ business changed dramatically in the mid-1980s with the 
sale of the commercial networks to highly leveraged entrepreneurs at substantial 
prices, in anti'cipation of further growth in television rents (Brown 1989a). Two of 
the personalities involved, Christopher Skase at Channel Seven and Alan Bond at 
Channel Nine, ultimately became the most notorious symbols of debt~financed 
excess in the 1980s. Tight monetary policy in the late 1980s pushed all the new 
owners to the edge of bankruptcy, exacerbated by lower network revenues as the 
Australian economy slid into recession. The owners sought to stave off bankruptcy 
by partial sales to foreign dr1vestors, making the restrictive FDI policy for 
- ' 
broadcasting politically CD!ltentious. A 'loophole' in the existing Broadcasti'ng Act 
allowed foreigners to hold up to 50 per cent equity in a holding company controlling 
a broadcasting licensee but no more than 20 per cent in the licensee itself.46 Facing 
criticism from the opposition parties and media commentators, the government · 
committed to a legislative amendment subjecting holding companies to the same 
foreign investment limits that applied to licensees.47 However, it did not reaffirm 
the existing 20 per cent limit and so provoked intense controversy.48 
The Labor government was confronted by well-organised constituencies both for 
and against liberalisation of FDI in broadcasting. The desperate existing television 
owners devoted considerable resources to lobbying for liberalisation. Although 
Bond had past association with Hawke, his reputation was much diminished by an 
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal finding that he was not of sufficiently good 
46 The government had been aware of the situation for some time but inaction hacl proven to be 
politically expedient (Burton, SMH 3 February 1990; Kingston, SMH 14 February 1990). In fact, the 
loophole was no accident but a deliberate legislative change made by the Fraser government, 
opposed by Labor, that came to be referred to as the 'Murdoch amendment' (Powell, Sen Hansard 22 
May 1990:719). 
41 Communications ~mister Ralph Willis wrote in a published letter to the Sydney Morning Herald 
that '. .. an Act which purports to limit foreign ownership ~o 20 per cent, but effectively allows up to 
49 per cent, is grossly deficient. Whatever the degree of foreign ownership to be allowed it should 
surely be clearly established in the Act and not allowed by l,Jse of legal subterfuge' (SMH 19 January 
1990). ' 
48 The political management of the issue was not helped whcm a member of Communications Minister 
Ralph Willis' staff mistakenly issued a press release committing the government to the 20 per cent 
limit (SMH 19 January 1990, 1 February 1990; Burton, SMH 3 February 1990, 19 May 1990; 
Kingston, SMH 14 February 1990), · 
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character to be in control of a broadcasting Iicense.49 Hawke government leaders 
placated the proprietors in the run-up to the tight-fought March 1990 election. The 
propiietors (and later Qintex' s receivers) came to hope for the general foreign equity 
limit to be lifted to 40 per cent. Hawke and communications minister Ralph Willis 
discussed this with Bond Media chief Sam Chisholm, although after the election 
they denied Chisholm's assertion that he had earlier been given a clear commitment 
to that outcome (Burton, SMH 3 February 1990, 19 May 1990). so 
Post-election, the Hawke government gave close attention to the representations of 
an influential private interest constituency for tight restriction:; on FDI in 
broadcasters. Kerry Packer's Consolidated Press Ltd, a substantial magazine 
publisher and former owner of Channel Nine, was waiting to buy th<t network back 
if Bond went into receivership.51 The exclusion of foreign bidders at a time of 
deepening domestic recession would deliver the enterprise to him at a fire-sale 
price. Packer invested considerable resources in lobbying for the strengthening of 
the 20 per cent foreign ownership limit (Burton, SMH 17,l.9 May 1990).52 Also 
supporting existing restiictions on foreign investment was Kerry Stokes, proprietor 
of the Canberra Times. Although Stokes couched his public comments on FDI 
policy in terms of the national interest, he was to benefit directly from the exclusion 
of foreign bids for control of the Channel Seven television network.53 These 
49 Bond mounted a successful legal challenge to the ABT ntling but the damage to his reputation was 
profound. The substance of the ABT investigation was a large payment to then Queensland premier 
Sir Joh Bjelke Petersen ostensibly to settle a defamation case (Henderson, Aust 3 July 1989; SMH 13 
September 1989). It did not endear Bond to the ALP (Aubin, Aust 11 Ju!y 1989). Skase ofQintex 
had earlier shown that his lobbying strategies were as poor as his commercial sense; public, clumsy 
and ultimately making any policy concession to the finn more difficult politically (Burton, SMH 29 
April 1988), 
50 Bond media chief Sam Chisholm had a prominent law finn produce a document that was, in effect, 
a draft new foreign investment policy and a statement rationalising the straight 40 per cent limit it 
contained. It was then circulated to senior gcvemment ministers (SMH 3 February 1990). 
51 On the history of the Packer media empire see Griffen-Foley (1999). 
52 In addition to having Hawke's fonner senior adviser Peter Barron on staff and lobbying, Packer 
benefited from established connections with some senior government members. This was symbolised 
by Right faction powerbroker Graham Richardson going to work f'or Packer following his retirement 
from politics during the final tenn of the Keating government. Bond Media, on the other hand, 
deployed former se~ior Hawke adviser Bob Sorby as a lobbyist (Burton, SMH 3 Feb1u11~"Y 1990). 
53 In early 1990, for instance, Stokes argued that: 'To allow someone else foreign to our own way of 
life ... to be In a position of controlling th.e destiny of our television and our culture, l think is 
appalling' (Aust, 12Februaryl990). In November 1994 Stokes nrgued in tile ABC's Boyer Lectures 
that the government's basic philosophical commitment to Australian owner.:1hip ufthe media had been 
lost in an unduly legalisHc approach to media ownership (Aust 3 November 1994)', This was a veiled 
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constituencies for r~strictive policy did not have a hard time making their ca\:;\J to the 
public at large and the Labor backbench.54 Opinion polls revealed widespread 
antipathy towards foreign ownership of newspapers and television.55 Unlike all other 
' 
sectors of the economy, there were few international precedents for a liberal FDI 
policy on broadcasting. Australian critics made much of American rules banning 
non-citizens from controlling a television licence (AFR, Age 2 February 1990). 
Broadcasting was particularly vulnerable to claims that a restrictive policy was 
essential on cultural and national security grounds. While not dismissing the 
influence of these ideas on the restrictive policy outcame, they masked the private 
interest concerns of some in the broadcasting industry opposing liberalisation of 
foreign ownership. The Australian Journalists' Association, Actors Equity and the 
Writers' Guild conducted a coordinated lobbying campaign against liberalisation of 
foreign investment and enlisted the support of the ACTU (SMH 1 February 1990).56 
Also opposing liberalisation were the Screen Producers Association, the Screen 
Directors Association and Australian Film Commission chairman Phillip Adams 
(Age 3, 7 February 1990; SMH, AFR 2, 3 February 1990). These industry 
representatives feared that foreign-controlled television stations would wake or buy 
less programming in Australia, despite the onerous local content regime enforced by 
fue ABT. They evidently were worried that permitting more FDI would be a 
reference to the Canadian,media firm Canwest's influence over the management' of Channel Ten 
through its holdings of a large number of formally non-voting shares. At the same time he argued that 
Murdoch should not be treated as a foreigner1 perhaps because Murdoch's 5per cent holding in 
Channel Seven helped secure control of the Board for Stokes (Aust 3November1994). 
54 ACP's m0naging director Trevor Kennedy was open about how popular prejudice could serve the 
Packer cause, saying that: 'It is fine while you talk of these friendly Americans coming and buying 20 
per cent or 25 per cent or 30 per cent. But what if the Iraqis tum up and want to buy 30 per cent, or 
the Israelis for that matter or the Japanese. The government has political considerations there which 
has always made it difficult for foreigners to own more than 20 per cent.' (SMH 18 May 1990). 
ss Saulwick polls of March 1988 and October 1990 put the figure at some 70 per cent opposed to 
foreign ownership of newspapers, while a Newspoll of 1995 found that 82 per cent of respondents 
considered it important that the media in general be owned only by Australians (Age 16 November 
l990;Aust 1March1995). 
56 The views of Anne Britton of Actors Equity were typical. She claimed that 'foreign ownership will 
open the door to editorial deciSions'being made in Los Angeles, London or Tokyo', that the ABT 
would be 'forced to bow before the economic pressure exerted by the networks' foreign owners', and 
that Australians did not want television broadcasters to be. 'slave stations of an American network'. 
News, she claimed, would be more often imported rather than home made and would be tailored so 
as not to offend foreign interests (Age 2 February 1990). 
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beachhead for further liberalisation57, Dissenting voices in the industzy against this 
view were rare.58 
Industry opposition to FDI ,'5>ralisation resonated with many members of the 
Hawke government, especially backbench MPs. Members of the Caucus 
communications committee from all factions warned of a backbench revolt if the 
leadership sought to raise foreign equity · Jimits (SMH 5 February 1990; Age 7 
February 1990; Burton, SMH 19 May 1990). After the 1990 election, the new 
communications minister Kim Beazley secured Cabinet endorsement of a 
reaffinnation of the existing limits and their extension to holding companies (AFR 
17,18 May 1990; SMH, Age, Aust 18,19 May 1990). The only concession to existing 
proprietors was the granting of a three-year grace period to any licensees currently 
in breach of the rules (Aust 23 May 1990).59 By that stage it was clear that all the 
networks would change bands, especially if the restrictive FDI policy was 
reaffirmed. Beazley said that any ownership 'shake-out' would be ' ... 99.9 per cent a 
product of investment and management decisions taken by networks over the past 
three or four years' (Aust 23May1990). There was little political downside with the 
decision taken by the Hawke government. The bankruptcies of Skase and Bond 
effectively took care of private interest critics. The restrictive limit placated a Labor 
backbench and labour movement that had, unusually for such a tightly run 
government, been provoked into revolt by previous decisions on print media policy. 
51 From an interview with Paul Chadwick, Victorian director of the Communications Law Centre and 
founder of the Free the Media coalition, Melbourne 2 October 1995. 
58 Prominent television industry figure David Morgan, a fonner executive of the Federation of 
Australian Commercial Television Stations (FACTS), dismissed the argument that Australian content 
would suffer with higher foreign mmership as a 'load of garbage' and accused fonner colleagues of 
being too 'timid to say so (Aust 14 February 1990). 
s9 Beazley admitted that the 20 per cent figure was an essentially arbitrary one, chosen because it had 
been in the Broadcasting Act since 1956 and had 15 per cent or 25 per cent been the norm then that 
would have been imposed (SMH, Aust 23 May 1990). Beazley justified the restrictive position by 
simply saying that: 'the government believes it is vital d!at Australia's radio and television stations 
are owned and controlled by Australians because they are major outlets for political debate and the 
exploration of cultural identity' (Aust 23 May 1990). Restrictions on the number of foreign directors 
of a broadcast licensee and collusive practices that might result in de facto foreign control were also 
later incorporated (SMH 4 September 1991). 
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Print media 
The newspaper industry, like broadcasting, is characterised by extremely high fixed 
costs that constitute a significant barrier to market entry. Very few newspapers have 
been established in recent decades in English-speaking countries and many have 
closed down. or merged with rivals.6° Consequently, the Australian debate over FDI 
policy for the print media from 1986 was effectively about foreign takeovers of 
existing newspapers. Labor soo:ai signalled that its attitude to a foreign investor 
proposing to start a new paper would be more liberal than towards one proposing to 
buy an existing one (Age 9 April 1988). This reflected the widespread aspiration for 
diversity of media ownership. FD! policy in Anglo-American countries has 
generally been more liberal towards foreign ownership of newspapers than 
broadcasters.61 This is despite the fact that, unlike broadcasting, there is no industry 
specWc structure or conduct regulation for the print media.62 The Hawke and 
Keating governments were to maintain a more restrictive policy on foreign 
ownership of the print media than maintained by the United Kingdom or the United 
States, with the somewhat ironi.~ exception of News Ltd, in recognition of its 
Australian origins. The unique circumstances of Rupert Murdoch confused the 
politics of Australian FD! policy for the print media. The troubling personalities of 
two foreign media entrepreneurs who aspired to control of Australian newspapers, 
Robert Maxwell and Conrad Black, also obscured the core issues at stake. Labor's 
media policy, and foreign proprietors in general, attracted disproportionate 
notoriety. 
60 Rupert Murdoch's The Australian is the only substantial newspaper to have been established here 
in the post-war period and survived for any length of time, despite News Ltd losing money with it for 
many years. Initial costs of market entry arc;: not an absolute barrier, however the successful launch of 
The Independent in Britain testifies to the existence of unmet niche markets in some countries. 
Nonetheless, in Australia and in many other developed nations the last thirty years have seen a very 
substantial reduction in both the number of publications and proprietors, afternoon papers being the 
most obvious casualty. 
61 The history ofNews Ltd's expansion overseas is testimony to this (Shawcross 1992). 
62 The principle of 11. 'free press', deeply rooted in Anglo-American political culture, has usually been 
understood to entail not only freedom of comment but also of ownership although this does not 
readily extend to foreign proprietors. 
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News Ltd 
Backbench hostility to liberalisation of FDI in broadcasting, and the controversy 
over Labor's FDI policy for the print media in the early 1990s, have their roots in 
Labor's handling of the bid by Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd for the large Herald and 
Weekly Times (HWT) group in the mid-1980s. While News Ltd's bid for the HWT 
raised significant competition policy issues, Murdoch's recent switch to American 
citizenship brought News Ltd under the purview of the Foreign Takeovers Act 
(FTA) and the Broadcasting Act. The firm was forced by the provisions of the latter 
to divest itself of the television interests inherited from HWT because Murdoch was 
clearly in control of the company.63 However, News Ltd remained an Australian 
listed company with a majority of shares being held by Australian interests and 
made strong representations to the Federal government to that effect (Age 14 
January 1~&7).64 The foreign investment guidelines were silent on the print media 
because FDI had not previously arisen as an issue in this sector. News Ltd's cause 
was helped by astute lobbying and by the hostility of senior Hawke government 
ministers towards HWT and Fairfax.65 Following public disclosure of News Ltd's 
bid for the HWT, the Hawke government promptly announced it would raise no 
objections under the FTA. Murdoch's long established presence in Australian 
63 As the HWT had some television assets Murdoch went to considerable pains to technically 
extricate himself from control of News Corporation Ltd to avoid problems with the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal. Murdoch proved to be his own worst enemy in this prolonged endeavour 
because he could not desist from making public statements about what he wished to do with the firm. 
When a Federal Court took a broad interpretation of the bar on foreign control in the Broadcasting 
Act it explicitly referred to Murdoch's statements (AFR 21 January 1987). 
64 In May 1988 Keating made remarks to the effect that News Ltd was an Australian company with a 
majority Australian shareholding that just l;r.appened to have an American citizen as chief executive 
(AFR 13 June 1990). Hawke stated that M~adoch's takeover of the Herald and Weekly Times group 
was a special case as he had been an Australian citizen when he first acquired media assets in 
Australia (Age 9 April 1988). 
65 There was little love lost between Victorian Labor MPs of all factional persuasions and the HWT 
management in that statei the former generally believing that HWT publications had long been anti-
Labor. Hawke and Keating also never forgave the editorial campaign of a HWT newspaper against 
its pension assets test reform (Kelly 1992:142). Likewise, Queensland Labor MPs disliked the 
management of The Courier Mail which, through Queensland Newspapers, was predominantly 
owned by the HWT group. The most celebrated hatred of a media organisation within the 
government was that held by prominent New South Wales Right identities for the Fairfax operations 
in that state. Keating in particular was of the view that the Fairfax publications The Sydney Morning 
Herald and The National Times had both waged vendettas against identities on the Right such as 
himself. Many commentators had posited that an element of personal vengeance was at work in 
Keating's advocacy of the cross media rules that ultimately had a heavy negative impact on Fairfax's 
plans (Kelly 1992:242-43), 
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newspapers not only gave the government a pretext but also a good political reason 
for approval. The bid still had to be reviewed by the Trade Practices Commission 
(TPC), which gave approval with only mild conditions despite the substantial 
market share being delivered to News Ltd. 66 
The government's decision to leave the issue to the TPC made sense given the 
Australian origins of News Ltd and its substantial existing Australian media 
interests. 67 Nonetheless, the different outcomes under the Broadcasting Act and the 
FTA were profoundly incongruous and this shaped the subsequent debate over FDI 
policy for the print media. The News Ltd decision also drew attention to the nature 
of FIRB recommendations made to the Treasurer and the non-transparency of the 
process. The government flatly refused to divulge what the FIRB' s advice to 
Treasurer Keating had been (Macphee and Keating, HR Hansard 21 December 
1989:3390). Opposition communications spokesperson Ian Macphee said that he 
had it on good sources that FIRB had advised against approving Murdoch's takeover 
of the HWT. He later made application for the relevant documents under the 
Freedom of Infonnation Act, without success (Age 29 November 1988). Keating 
would later write that the FIRB advice had been 'entirely non-committal' but still 
refused to authorise its public release on the grounds that it would create a difficult 
precedent (SMH24December1990). 
Refusal to use the provisions of the FTA to block the expansion of News Ltd 
attracted intense criticism within the labour movement, the print media industry 
66 The net result of Murdoch's successful takeover was that News Ltd increased its share of the daily 
metropolitan and national newspaper market from 28 per cent to 58 per cent of daily sales (Age 17 
January 1987). While the number of publishers increased from three to four, two of them were small 
and heavily indebted, notably the Bell Group and Northern Star. Hawke said that the government had 
' ... taken the view from the beginning that this is a matter for the market place' (Age 17 January 
1987). 
67 News Ltd executives had been calling for a liberal foreign investment policy for the media over a 
number of years pr!or to the HWT bid. As a firm rapidly expanding abroad, News Ltd may have been 
concerned with policy reciprocity in addition to minimising the consequences in Australia of 
. Murdoch's change of citizenship. In October 1983 the Chainnan of News Corporation Ltd, Richard 
Searby, called for a general review of Australia's foreign investment regulations and a recognition in 
particular that as Australian firms expanded abroad the issue of reciprocity was likely to arise (Aust 
28 October 1983), In 1988 News Ltd's Australian managing director~ l<en Cowley, strongly criticised 
restrictions on foreign investment in the print media, along with those advocating them, at the Pacific 
Area Newspaper Publishers Association conference (Aust 21 April 1988). 
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itself and from a range of public figures. One prominent journalist judged that the 
debate over Murdoch's bid had been sharply coloured by perceptions that he was 
interventionist, right wing, anti-union and prone to taking his newspapers 
dowmnarket (Grattan, Age 17 January 1987).68 Antagonism towards Murdoch within 
the ALP was intense because of the way he had recently taken on British unions 
with the establishment of the Wapping printing plant (Shawcross 1992; Tuccille 
1990). The upshot was considerable unease throughout the Hawke government 
when News Ltd was allowed to pass the FTA hurdle unheeded.69 Backbenchers 
were provoked by the FTA approval of the News Ltd bid for HVlf without any 
reference to the caucus. Antipathy within the print media to the News Ltd takeover 
of HWT was reflected in the establishment of the 'Free the Media' coalition and the 
support it attracted from the Australian Journalists' Association. Founded by HWT 
journalist Paul Chadwick, it attracted considerable support from non-media 
identities including Malcolm Fraser and Democrats founder Don Chipp.70 The Free 
the Media coalition made five demands: government intervention to stop Murdoch's 
takeover of the HWT, an inquiry into media ownership and control, legislation to 
prevent concentration of ownership, better funding for the ABC and SBS, and for 
the government to ' .. ,act to stop foreign ownership of Australian media' (Free the 
Media 1987). 71 
Such diverse opposition to the HWT outcome emboldened critics within the Labor 
Caucus to act on media policy. In July 1987 the Caucus resolved, against the wishes 
68 Grattan argued that the use of foreign investment controls by a government to vet media. owners 
would be an unwelcome development. She also argued that Murdoch's 'foreignness' was of a 
'special, somewhat technical nature' and therefore his bid should not be blocked under the Foreign 
Takeovers Act (Age 19 January 1987). Given Grattan's liberal stance on FDI in the media it was quite 
ironic that she was later the signatory, as convenor of the staff committee, of the letter from The Age's 
editorial employees to Paul Keating calling for him to use the provisions of the Foreign Takeovers 
Act to block Robert Maxwell's bid for the paper (Age 6 April 1988), 
69 Foreign Minister Bill Hayden broke Cabinet ranks to express his concern about Murdoch's bid; 
reputedly even referring to Rupert Murdoch as a 'carpetbagging foreigner' in one supposedly off-the-
record discussion (Age 31 December 1987). 
70 Others included writers David Williamson and Patrick White, businessman Dick Smith and a 
number of senior academic and church identities (Free the Media 1987). The New South Wales 
convenor, Philippa Smith, was also a representative of the Australian Consumers Association. A 
prominent member was Hal Wootten QC, who resigned from the chairmanship of the Press Council 
over its failure to adopt a motion expressing opposition to Murdoch's takeover bid. 
71 The coalition's publication declared that 'Murdoch is now a loyal American citizen, having sworn 
to 'renounce and abjure' all allegiance. to Australia. How can someone who has done that try to 
influence public affairs in Austmlia?' (Free the Media 1987). 
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of government leaders, in favour of a parliamentary inquiry into media ownership 
and 
fu order to clarify the meaning of the statement contained within the paper Australia's 
Foreign Investment Policy - namely that foreign investment in mass-circulation 
newspapers is restricted - Caucus resolves that an amendment be introduced into the 
Foreign Takeovers Act introducing the same provisions as contained in the Broadcasting 
Act relating to foreign ownership of television and radio broadcasting (cited, Aust 24 
February 1988). 
Caucus communications committee chairman John Saunderson was l~ter to publicly 
make much of the fact that under ALP rules a Labor government is bound to 
implement a Caucus resolution (Age 26 March 1988; 7 April 1988). The Caucus 
revolt against media policy came at a time when many on the backbench, and even 
in ministerial roles, were disoriented by the pro-business direction that the 
leadership had steered the government towards. Media policy became a 'matter of 
principle' for many government members over which Caucus should assert its 
authority. At the same time the Coalition was deeply divided over the Murdoch 
takeover of HWT. Leader John Howard supported the Hawke government's actions 
while senior moderates such as Ian Macphee and Chris Puplick were critical (Kelly 
1992:243). 
In December 1987 Treasurer Keating took two decisions under the FTA that 
underlined the confusion over the status of News Ltd, the objectives of FDI policy 
for the print media, and the relationship between the FIRB process and the TPC. 
Keating blocked the acquisition by News Ltd of Fairfax's stake in AAP Information 
Services Pty Ltd (AAf)IS), the news services operation.72 This, he said, was 'on 
national grounds' as a News Ltd takeover had the potential to reduce ' ... AAPIS's 
independence as an impartial news gathering and distribution service' (AFR 30 
December 1987).73 In effect he used the foreign investment provisions to ensure a 
competition policy outcome, despite the TPC having signalled an intention to act. 
72 News Ltd was not prevented from buying shares in Australian Associated Press Pty Ltd, which was 
effectively a holding company for the AAPIS shares in Reuters that Murdoch coveted (Age 30 
December 1987). 
73 The AAPIS news service had traditionally been owned jointly by the major newspaper firms in 
Australia. 
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At the same time Keating raised no objection to News Ltd's purchase of Fairfax's 
share of Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM). By blocking an acquisition by News 
Ltd under the FTA the government was emphasising the 'foreignness' of a firm that 
recently had been allowed to amass under its control some two-thirds of national 
daily metropolitan newspaper circulation. In doing so, it became very difficult to 
justify restrictions on acquisitions of Australian media assets by foreign media 
entrepreneurs who were also competing against News Ltd in other markets such as 
the UK. That is exactly the position that the Hawke and Keating governments soon 
ended up in. 
Fairfax 
Treasurer Keating only came to deliberate upon News Ltd's plans to buy additional 
shares in AAPIS and ANM in late 1987 because of a financial disaster at Fairfax 
caused by recklessness on a par with that of Bond and Skase.74 There were 
persistent rumours ofi:isset sales to foreign media interests at Fairfax as young CEO 
Warwick Fairfax struggled to get debt levels under control. These rumours centred 
upon The Age in Melbourne. Staff on The Age organised an editorial independence 
committee that became the basis of a public campaign for a local owner of the paper 
(Age 26 March 1988). The 'Maintain your Age' campaign won support from a wide 
range of public figures; many of whom had first been drawn to media policy issues 
by the HWT decision. The issues of editorial independence and foreign ownership 
became entangled when the notoriously interventionist British proprietor Robert 
Maxwell declared an intention to bid for The Age. 15 The foreign investment controls 
offered an -immediate means by which he could be stopped and AJA members at 
74 Young Warwick Fairfax had inherited a substantial equity stake in the finn which gave him 
effective control in alliance wi~ other Fairfax family members and other investors. Not content with 
that situation, he borrowed an enormous sum of money to buy out all other shareholders and delist 
the company (Carroll 1991). Having paid too much for the shares, he then sought to get debt levels to 
manageable proportions by selling off Fairfax assets. For the history of the Fairfax media empire see 
Souter (1981, 1990). 
15 Editorial staff on The Age had long enjoyed minimal proprietorial interference in their work. 
Robert Maxwell did his case no good by replying when asked by an Australian journalist whether he 
would be an interventionist proprietor: 'Absolutely. You'd better believe it. .. unlike the Fairfax 
management, if we won a newspaper and we own it we have a say in the policy of that paper.' 
(Preston, Age 13 February 1988) Only after staff at The Age unanimously resolved to campaign for 
his bid to be blocked did he say that he would change his style and respect their charter of editorial 
independence (Age 2 April 1988). Maxwell also managed to alienate Keating at a meeting with him 
in London (Burton, SMH 14 June 1990). 
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The Age unanimously endorsed a letter sent to Keating and all members of the 
Federal parliament calling for such action (Age 6 April 1988).76 Prominent public 
identities also lent public weight to this call, and to general opposition to foreign 
ownership of the media. 77 In response a number of business commentators, alre~d:/ 
actively defending Japanese investment from criticism, supported more liberal HA 
policy for the media.78 They identified the trade off between media diversity and 
national ownership and the dangers of having governments vet potential owners; 
significant points surprisingly neglected by many media identities. 
The politics of FDI policy for Fairfax differed in several crucial respects from the 
concurrent contention over Japanese FDI. Firstly, a Maxwell takeover of The Age 
offered little in the way of immediate economic benefits to the broader community. 
Secondly, there was little risk of damage to bilateral ties with the United Kingdom 
over knocking back an investment by Robert Maxwell, who had long been hostile to 
the government of Margaret Thatcher. Thirdly, the Maxwell bids had provoked a 
sudden about-face by then Opposition leader John Howard on FDI policy for the 
media. Despite having previously supported a liberal policy, he promptly declared 
Maxwell to be an inappropriate proprietor for The Age. Maxwell's allegiance to the 
British Labour Party, which he had once represented in Parliament, was admitted as 
a reason for Howard's change of heart (Age 4 April 1988).79 The emergence of a 
76 The secretary of The Age's editorial independence committee, Claude Forren, s.aid later that the 
foreign control issue was of less concern to many journalists on The Age than editorial independence 
but the FTA presented a convenient mechanism for blocking Maxwell. Forrell was personally in 
favour of foreign investment for new publications but opposed to foreign takeovers and this was the 
position adopted by the committee during the Fairfax receivership in 1990-91 (interview, Melbourne 
2 October 1995; Age 11 September 1991). 
71 Public figures who opposed foreign ownership of The Age or any other media outlet included 
Malcolm Fraser, Frank Costigan QC, the1 Lord Mayor of Melbourne, business identity and Liberal 
Party president John Elliott, academics. Stuart Macintyre and Ken Inglis, media identities Ranald 
Macdonald and David Bowman, and r" 'dian Max Gillies (Age 15 February 1988, 29 March 1988; 
SMH 17 February 1988). 
78 Proponents of more liberal policy inch1deli Peter Robinson (AFR 20 January 1987), Gerard 
Henderson (Aust 18 April 1988), Max Walsh (Age 11 April 1988), Greg Sheridan (Aust 12 
December 1990) and Paddy McGuiness (Aust 13 February 1990). 
79 Howard earlier suggested a laissez-faire stance on FDI when he said that 'not all takeovers are 
good, but I would hate to have the situation where it was left to the government to decide who could 
be taken over and who couldn't' (SMH 11 March 1988). Several weeks later he decla{ed of Maxwell 
that '. .. he's a 'hands-on' owner, he;s had discussions with Mr Keating and talked about political 
deals, and he's Labor. Those three things should disqualify him immediately.' (Age 4 April 1988) 
Howard's position brought into question his whole commitment in the Future Directions document 
to abolishing the FIRB. 
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rival local consortium with links to the Coalition may also have been a factor. In 
fact, Keating sought support within the government for a higher foreign investment 
limit because he feared the conservative Victorian group might otherwise win 
control of The Age by default (Age 26 March 1988; 4 April 1988). While attracting 
some sympathy amongst Victorian MPs, there was deeper discontent within the 
government over Keating's blatant disregard for the 1987 Caucus resolution for a 20 
per cent limit for the print media and subsequent calls for legislation to that effect 
(Aust 24 February 1988; Age 16 March 1988; AFR 13,14 June 1990; Age 30 May 
1990). Reading the mood of the Labor backbench and journalists, Hawke signalled 
an intention to block any bid by Maxwell for The Age, and later for the West 
Australian (AFR, Age 29 March 1988).80 
Fairfax's entry into receivership in 1990 reignited debate over an appropriate limit 
for foreign investment in the print media. In November 1990 some 1500 people 
attended a 'Media in peril' meeting at the Sydney Opera House where calls for a 
restrictive FDI policy for the print media figured prominently.81 Opposition 
communications spokesperson Neil Brown was a lone voice arguing for a more 
liberai policy towards foreign investment in the media (SMH 19 November 1990, 26 
November 1990).82 A similar rally in Melbourne the following year drew some 
2000 people against both concentration of ownership and foreign control (Age 26 
80 In June 1990 Bond Corp Holdings Ltd informally agreed to sell Maxwell a 49 per cent stake in the 
West Australian for the princely sum of $250 million; a price only slightly less than auditors had 
valued the whole enterprise (Aust 12 June 1990). The West Australian was wholly-owned by Bell 
Group which in turn was owned by Bond Corp Holdings Ltd. Hawke later signalled his hostility 
towards a Maxwell bid for Fairfax when the firm went into receivership (Age 12 December 1990). In 
the end it was Maxwell's own growing debt crisis that made any move on Fairfax impossible, quite 
aside from the formidable political hurdles that he would face in making such a bid. Just after Fairfax 
went into receivership, for example, Maxwell was carrying debt of some £1.7 billion and had been 
downgraded to a BB credit rating (Age 19December1990). 
81 Speakers included writers Thomas Keneally and David Williamson, broadcast journalists Jennifer 
Byrne, Jane Singleton and Quentin Dempster, and independent federal MP Ted Mack (SMH, AFR 19 
November 1990). 
82 The deep recession nonetheless appeared to provoke greater pragmatism towards FDI. Press 
Council chairman David Flint and prominent political scientist Henry Mayer argued that quality 
management was more important than nationality (Age 12, 13 December 1990). Representatives of 
the Friends of Fairfax group reportedly told the Federal government that a foreign equity holding of 
more than 20 per cent could be desirable if it brought a high-quality proprietor like that of the 
Financial Times or the New York Times (AFR ,.}'.il September 1991). 
285 
October 1991).83 In October 1991 a number of prominent former politicians issued a 
statement opposing not only further concentration of media ownership but also 
foreign control of print media outlets.84 The statement said that 'many respected 
countries protect their media, not only from market dominance but also from foreign 
control' and that even a 20 per cent limit risked such control (Age, SMH 16 October 
1991). There was also a long line of media industry identities publicly opposing 
foreign ownership of Fairfax, as did The Communications Law Centre (AFR 12 
December 1990; Sun. Age 8 September 1991; 1994).85 Newspaper unions won 
strong ACTU support for a campaign against foreign ownership -of Fairfax, its 
national congress calling for a strict 20 per cent limit in September 1991 (Age 19 
December 1990; SMH 21 October 1991). ACTU assistant secretary Bill Mansfield 
went so far as to suggest that the government could directly subsidise newspapers as 
a way of securing greater diversity of ownership without resorting to foreign 
ownership (Jv. Aust 9-10 January 1991). The Independence Committee of The Age 
announced that it did absolutely oppose foreign investment in the media but further 
argued it was unnecessary for Fairfax as an Australian consortium was making a bid 
(Age 20 September 1991; Age 11 September 1991). 
Claim and counterclaim 
The presence of the Australian consortium, Australian Independent Newspapers 
(AIN), complicated the politics of the Fairfax case and contributed to subsequent 
confusion surrounding the Federal government's actions. AIN faced two competing 
bids for Fairfax that both had a significant foreign participant. AIN lobbied the 
Labor government, and the backbench in particular, to block its competitors under 
foreign investment controls (Grattan, Age 13 September 1991). In an effort to 
diminish the stigma of key members' links with the Coalition in Victoria AIN 
enlisted as lobbyist John Saunderson, the former Left wing Labor MP and chair of 
83 In the mid-1990s Whitlam remained opposed to foreign control of the media but conceded that ifa 
choice had to be made between nationalism and diversity of ownership then the latter should take 
precedence (personal conversation, Canberra 19 March 1995). 
84 Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser, Frank Crean, Lance Barnard, Margaret Guilfoyle, Peter Nixon 
and Janine Haines all sigr.ed (Age, SMH 16October1991). 
85 Opponents of foreign ownership included Rural Press head John B. Fairfax, fonner HWT CEO Sir 
Keith Macpherson, and fonner Fairfax editors Creighton Bums and Vic Carroll (fV. Aust 1-9 
February 1991; Age 12 December 1991). 
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the caucus communications committee (Age 20 September 1991).86 Having been the 
leading caucus opponent of foreign investment in the media, he was well positioned 
to promote the AIN cause.87 AIN needed regulatory intervention to block rival 
consortia as it was unlikely to outbid them in a free market for Fairfax. The Hawke 
government did not do AIN this favour and ultin'1utely the Fairfax receivers 
determined who was the successful bidder. 3& 
When assembling their bids for Fairfax the foreign finns soon realised that the 
Labor caucus would be implacable on the 20 per cent limit on foreign equity (Age 
19 December 1990, 18 July 1991). Internal party constraints were exacerbated by 
the bitter leadership struggle between Hawke and Keating that beset the government 
at the time (Kelly 1992:637-59). Caucus support was vital to both protagonists. The 
constraints were evidenced by how the 1991 ALP national conference of the ALP 
forced the government to establish a parliamentary inquiry into the print media (Lee 
1992).89 Independent Newspapers Plc, under the chairmanship of Irish entrepreneur 
Dr Tony O'Reilly, simply designed its bid around a 20 per cent foreign equity limit 
(Eiurton, SMH 4 September 1991; Senate 1994:62-63). The Tourang consortium, 
centred on Conrad Black's Telegraph Pie, lobbied hard for foreign holdings of non-
86 AIN head John D'Arcy wrote a letter to Hawke denying that he had been responsible for editorial 
bias against the ALP during his time with the HWT (Aust 13 September 1991). 
87 AIN's appeal to nationalism was shown to be rather disingenuous as D'Arcy previously dismissed 
national interest concerns about FDI in the print media (Korporaal, Age 26 July 1991). 
88 AIN's specific criticisms of FIRB processes and the Labor government's decision making were a 
red herring. Much was made of a leaked Treasury briefing on the AIN that apparently contained 
inaccuracies about the extent of AIN's media experience and financing (Senate 1994:50-60). That 
obscured the point that the government merely decided to not raise objections to the final proposals 
on ownership structures from the rival consortia and were not deliberately on an AIN application. 
Hawke made that point clear before the Senate Inquiry but the implications were lost or ignored by 
the Coalition and Australian Democrat authors of the majority report (Senate 1994:56). Essentially, 
AIN's complaint was that the government should have given closer consideration to doing it a favour 
in. the 'national interest'. 
89 The government nonetheless carefully managed its establishment and the findings. There had been 
repeated calls from the Labor backbench for the establishment of an inquiry since 1987 (SMH 30 
June 1990, 2 November 1990). By constituting the inquiry as a House of Representatives exercise the 
government guaranteed majority control and also excluded some of its most vociferous critics, both 
from the Australian Democrats and its own ranks (Aust 7 August 1991; Adv 8 August 1991). The 
Committee gave support to a 20 per cent foreign equity guideline but noted it was an arbitrary figure 
and might be higher if the national interest dictated (Lee 1992; Aust 26 March 1992). 
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voting equity to be excluded from the calculation of the 20 per cent limit.90 Black 
concluded after meetings with Hawke, Treasurer John Kerin and Communications 
minister Kim Beazley that an additional 15 per cent foreign equity in the form of 
non-voting shares would be acceptable. These were to be held by San Fransisco-
based investment firm Hellman and Friedman. Kerin, Beazley and Hawke 
subsequently denied having giving Tourang principals any undertaking on non-
voting equity (Senate 1994:64-69).91 They had nonetheless battled within caucus to 
head off a resolution applying the 20 per cent limit to non-voting equity as well; 
preserving the Treasurer's discretion on the matter (Age 11September1991; Kitney 
and Gray, AFR 12 September 1991; Age 13, 14 September 1991, Ramsey, SMH28 
St;>~tember 1991; Aust 11 October 1991). Kerin subsequently approved the O'Reilly 
INP bid with 20 per cent voting and 5 per cent non-voting foreign (AFR 10 
December 1991). He rejected the Tourang bid without explanation; provoking an 
enraged Black to declare publicly that the decision was 'sleazy, venal and 
despicable' and that 'something rather sinister happened between FIRB and 
... Kerin's office~ (Senate 1994:70; SMH 12 December 1991).92 It appears that 
rejection wm, the personal decision of Kerin (Senate 1994:76). New Treasurer Ralph 
Willis approved a revised Tourang bid with total foreign equity at 25 per cent and 
soon after the receiver for Fairfax accepted the Tourang bid93• 
90 There v>'as initially considerable antagonism with the Labor federal caucus toward the Tourang 
consortium because Kerry Packer's Consolidated Press Holdings was to take some 14.9 per cent of 
voting equity. Packer withdrew in late 1991 in reaction to this and to an inquiry by the Australian 
Broadcasting Authority into his compliance with the newly tightened provisions of the cross media 
rules (Senate 1994:49; SMH 4 September 1991). Tourang's proposed CEO for Fairfax was Packer's 
long time managing director Trevor Kennedy, until his falling our with Conrad Black (Burton, SMH 
20 July 1991). 
91 Black's insistence that he had been assured that a 35 per cent limit would be acceptable does not 
accord with his FlRB applications of 1 November 1991 and 26 November 1991 that actually 
amounted to 40 per cent when the 5 per cent stake designated fur US junk bondholders was 
considered (FIRB 1994:68-69). 
92 Black accused accused Federal ministers of 'gross political interference', saying that 'we have 
been the victim of sleazy political lobbying. I'm sure the ,'i.ustralian public are shocked an appalled 
by these tactics.' The government, he alleged, favoured rival bidder 'O'Reilly and his pimps' (SMH 
12 December 1991). Black also denounced journalists, later referring to some reporters covering 
Fairfax as having ' ... made themselves the slavish and unthinking dupes of various other factions' 
(Aust 26 November 1992). 
93 The proposed new foreign ownership shares were Telegraph Pie with 15 per cent of voting equity 
and 10 per cent of non-voting debentures that were to be divided equally between Hellman and 
Friedman and the US bondholders who had lost a fortune as unsecured creditors to Fairfax (Willis, 
Press Release No. 133 13 December 1991). 
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While these events cast a shadow over Labor's management of FDI policy the real 
controversy surrounding Fairfax arose from a subsequent decision arid claims about 
the circumstances in which it was taken. When Willis approved the revized Tourang 
bid he stated that 
The Tqurang consortium has stated its intention to subsequently request approval to lift their 
stakes as r.lqsely as possible to the levels proposed in the Tourang application which Mr 
Kerin reJ-.-octed last week. The consortium has been informed that such a proposition will 
continue to be rejected. (Willis, Press Release No. 133 13 Decembel' 1991). 
Black's Telegraph Plc nonetheless applied for approval to lift its stake from 15 to 25 
per cent in late 1992 and in the run-up to a close-fought federal election. Black later 
claimed that he had received encouragement from new Prime Minister Paul Keating 
and there were other corroborating accounts (Senate 1994:94-99; B111ton, SMH 24 
October 1992). Keating and Treasurer Jolm Dawkins deferred a decision until after 
tht; March 1993 election and then, against criticism from within the government, 
approved the application.94 Keating easily contained caucus unease over the decision 
as the ALP was humbled by his delivery of an improbable election victory. 
Treasurer Daw!-..L11s said the decision reflected the ' ... valid need of foreign investors 
to safeguard their financial and managerial commitment to their newspapers.' 
(Dawkins, Press Release No. 32, 20 April 1993). While i,t was acknowledgement 
that Conrad Black C<lntrolled Fairfax on t~ '·,r-to-day basis, Dawkins made the valid 
point that the majority of Fairfax remained in Australian hands, although in 
fragmented holdings. He was also careful to specify that the 25 per cent limit 
represented a general guideline for mass circulation newspapers rather than being 
merely Fairfax-specific (Dawkins, Press Release No. 32, 20 April 1993). 
Controversy arose when Conrad Black, in his autobiography and then in a television 
interview, suggested that Keating had made approval of the new limit conditional on 
94 :in April 1992 the Keating government had already permitted small foreign portfolio holdings of up 
to 5 per cent in Fairfax as long as the parties were unrelated to The Telegraph Pie (Dawkins, Press 
Release 23 April 1992). 
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'balanced coverage' by tbe Fairfax press."95 Keating himself effectively affirmed that 
account, saying that he did not want Black, a self-styled Thatcherite, to ' ... barrack 
for the Coalition, on the basis of...conservative proclivities in other places ... ' 
(Senate 1994:107). This saw the Coalition and Australian Democrats combine 
forces in the Senate to establish a committee of inquiry that :further damaged the 
credibility of Labor's FDI and media policies. Black staunchly defended Keating's 
account that he had not sought partisan reportage (Senate 1994:103-12). 
Government leadern made much of the fact that the Fairfax press had uniformly 
editorialised against the ALP at the 1993 election (Evans, Sen Hansard 22 
November 1993:3321; Senate 1994, Dissent:47-51). Representatives of Fairfax 
staff also affirmed that there had been no discemable editorial interference, althol:lgh 
that did not preclude the possibility that Keating had sought it (Senate 1994, 
Dissent:43-48).96 While the actual events surrounding the 1993 Fairfax!felegraph 
Plc decision remained contested, the controversy revealed the inherent problems 
entailed in a discretionary FI)l policy towards the mass media.97 
The Keating government directed Treasury official~ to refuse to release information 
on FIRB deliberations in relation to Fairfax e;n public interest immunity grounds98• 
While inevitable, this lent apparent weight to the majority committee finding that 
administration of foreign investment policy lacked transparency, accountability, and 
was susceptible to political manipulation (Senate 1994:193-221). It recommended 
95 Black said that Keating had not been seeking to influence the editorial position of Fairfax 
publications but had been concerned that management would assert 'a discipline in favour of fairness 
- not partisanship' on some journalists who Keating perceived had been gratuitously hostile towards 
him. (Lateline 18 Nvvember 1993, cited in Senate l994:104). • 
96 Editorial reaction to the Inquiry's pursuit of the 'balance' issue was equivocal. 1ne scenario of 
approval for a foreign investment being made conditional upon a government's assessment of the 
quality of reportage was deeply disconcerting. However, inquiry chairman Senator Richard Alston's 
dwelling upon supposed instances of pro-Labor bias, despite accounts of his own overtures to 
journalists for 'balance', antagonised some editors (CM, SMH, Aust, AFR IO March 1994). 
97 Ironically, the Liberal/National opposition had adopted a policy of case-by-case review since the 
1990 election in order to avoid internal and public contention over the setting of foreign equity limits 
for specific sectors. Conrad Black testified at the Senate Inquiry that Opposition leader Dr John 
Hewson had told him in 1992 that would no object to majority foreign equity in Fairfax (Senate 
1994:243; Black 1993:453). In 1993 Hewson and shadow communications spokesman demanded a 
fuller account from the Keating government as to how the 25 per cent limit was ln the national 
inrerest (Alston, Press Release 20 April 1993). 
98
· Although consistent with past practice on FOi requests, the committee of inquiry controversially 
raised the spe<:~ of punishment under the provisions of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 for 
non-cooperation (Senate 1994:23). 
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complete overhaul, with the FDI-vetting function assigned to an independent 
statutory authority called the Foreign Investment Commission (Senate 1994:232). 
This was quite a Faustian deal for the Coalition. A statutory body would have 
-
required explicit legislative direction and hence revealed the profound differences 
between the Coalition and the economic nationalist Australian Democrats. It almost 
inevitably would have delivered less liberal policy than the current arrangements. 
The Fraser, Hawke and Keating governments had all found the FIRB model to be a 
good mechanism for managing the politics of popular economic nationalism while 
delivering relatively liberal FDI policy. It was for precisely that .reason that the 
Australian Democrats sought the reform of FIRB.99 Labor committee members 
recommended, in their dissenting report, modest reforms to FIRB's consultation, 
reporting and monitoring mechanisms that were eventually adopted in a modified 
fonn by Treasuter Willis (Senate 1994, Dissent:25-26; SMH 15 July 1994; Aust 28 
September 1995; Willis, -Press Release 26 September 1995).100 The Keating 
government's direct response to the Senate Inquiry nonetheless was brazen 
contempt. 101 
The Coalition's pragmatism on FDI policy did not end with its efforts to embarrass 
Keating through the Senate Inquiry into Fairfax. In February 1994 shadow treasurer 
Alexander Downer suggested that the mass media should be off-limits to FDI 
because was a 'strategic industry' (Age 7 February 1994). In June, several weeks 
after becoming opposition leader, he launched into clumsy criticism of Labor's 
foreign investment policy (AF«. 9 April 1994; Downer, HR Hansard 9 Jun;,~ 
19~4:1855). This was despite having been a strong advocate of a liberal FDI regime 
in the late 1980s (Willis, HR.Hansard 9 June 1994:1841). Downernot only failed to 
appreciate that the politics of FDI policy for the mass media had a dynamic different 
from general FDI policy but also forgot the lessons of recent Coalition history. 
Andrew Peacock had been widely censured by elite opinion for flirting with anti-
99 Frolll a conversation with John Cherry, Economic Advisor to Australian Democrats leader Senator 
Cheryl Kemot, Canberra 9 May 1995. 
10
° For the formal response, much delayed, from the government to \he majority report from the 
Senate Inquiry see the document tabled in the Senate by Senator Crowley (~~n Hansard 21 
September 1995:1580). ,, 
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Japanese sentiment when he suddenly opposed the MFP during the 1990 federal 
election. The response of business and political commentators, business identities 
and the government leadership to Downer's remarks was equally swift and 
politically damaging. Downer's stature as alternative prime minister, was sharply 
diminished. The return of John Howard to the leadership of the Liberal Party put the 
embarrassment behind the Coalition. The new leader was to benefit during Labor's 
last year in office when Kerry Packer reignited controversy over FDI policy for the 
media (Dore, W. Aust 11-12 March 1995). 
Packer tested the government's commitment to enforcing the cross media rules by 
increasing his stake in Fairfax, leading Conrad Black to make a bold request to be 
allowed to lift his holdings in the finn to 35 per cent from 25 per cent. Both Packer 
and Black were rebuffed, the former through legislative amendments to buttress the 
cross media rules (ABA 1995; Lee, Press Release 27 June 1995). Packer also came 
to be convinced that the Keating government had generally favoured News Ltd at 
his expense (Aust 20 February 1995; SMH 25 February 1995).1°2 Packer publicly 
attacked the Keating government's media policy, demanding to know why a 
foreigner was allowed control of Fairfax when he was not (Aust 17 February 
1995).103 Howard, sensing the popular appeal of Packer's disingenuous appeal to 
nationalism, accused Keating of pursuing a vendetta against the entrepreneur (Aust 5 
May 1995; 29 June 1995). Keating reacted poorly by accusing Howard and Packer 
of having entered into a deal exchanging favourable media coverage for abolition ~f 
the cross media rules but did not offer any evidence (Aust 20 February 1995; SMH 
25 February 1995). An opinion poll at the time revealed that many Australians were 
more concerned to secure Australian ownership of the media than diversity of media 
ownership and some 60 per cent would favour Packer over Black as owner of 
101 When asked by Opposition leader Dr John Hewson whether he would appear before the inquiry, 
Keating remarked 'Listen, brother, I know my place in the world. I do not slum it before Senate 
committees' (HR Hansard24 November 1993:3545), 
102 In response Keating said that Packer, with a pay TV consortium partr.er Oprus, had lobbied the 
government to give it exclusive regional agreements for the roll out of cable (Sunday, Channel Nine 
19 February 1995; SMH25 February 1995). 
103 In a interview on his own network Packer remarked that: 'I'm not entitled to go to Canada and buy 
his newspapers - why is he entitled to come to Australia and buy newspapets that Australians want 
to buy?' (Aust 17 February 1995). This was in stark contrast to his 1991 remarks before a Senate 
Inquiry in favour of a liberal policy; made while he was still involved in a bid with Conrad Black for 
Fairfax. Jn the same interview he praised Opposition leader John Howard (Aust 17 February 1995). 
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Fairfax (Aust 1 March 1995).104 By strenuously opposing foreign ownership, many 
media industry figures and political actors may have primed the electorate for 
further concentration of local media ownership behind barriers to FDI. 105 News Ltd 
lobbied for liberalisation of all aspects of media regulation on the grounds that Pay-
TV and other new information technologies made them redundant. 106 In fact the 
Keating government's foreign investment regime for pay TV symbolised its heavily 
qualified liberalism towards politically sensitive sectors.107 Foreign investors were 
limited to less than 50 per cent of the equity of broadband cable and satellite 
infrastructure providers.108 Foreign investment in pay TV licensees were limited to 
under 20 per cent under the terms of the amended Broadcasting Act 1991, 
complicating the corporate structure of Optus (Willis, Press Release 24 July 1995). 
Foreign investment policy for the media did not reflect the technological 
convergence that was a defining feature of developments in the media industry in 
the 1990s. It reflected the resilience and political power of nationalist ideas and, to a 
lesser r~xtent, the private interests those popular ideas happened to cloak. 
104 The Newspoll had a sample size of 1200 (Aust 1 March 1995). A Saulwick poll in late October 
1990 found that, contrary to the cross media laws, half of respondents thought that newspaper owners 
should be allowed to also own television stations in the same city (Age 16 November 1990). 
105 A recent report by the Productivity Commission ( 1999) into broadcasting recommended that there 
should be no liberalisation of the cross media rules until barriers to market entry, especially foreign 
investment restrictions, are substantially reduced. 
106 News Ltd's Australian chief, Ken Cowley, was a consistent critic of both restrictions on foreign 
ownership of the media and the cross ownership rules. In 1995 he provoked Keating to respond 
publicly that while media ownership mies would never be perfect the government could achieve 
something better ' ... than open slather and a gross concentration of media assets' (Aust 13,14 March 
1995). Cowley, in the 1995 instance, argued that the developmeht of pay television obviated the need 
for strict media ownership mies. Murdoch himself told an audience that included communications 
minister Michael Lee that the foreign investment and cross ownership laws were hopelessly out of 
date (AllSt 21 July 1995). 
107 Some 'culture industry' identities, such as Phillip Adams and the Australia Council's Hilary 
McPhee, claimed that new infonnation technologies create new imperatives, ostensibly of a public 
interest kind, for strict restrictions on foreign ownership (Aust 3 March 1995; Adams, W, Aust 4-5 
March 1995). 
108 In September 1995 the Keating government lifted the foreign equity limit for provincial and 
suburban newspapers to a maximum of49.99 per cent but the limit at 25 per cent for metropolitan 
mass circulation publications (Willis, Press Release 27 October 1995), Independent Newspapers Pie, 
already involved in Australian Provincial Newspapers, requested this during the Senate inquiry 
appearance of its representative Cameron O'Reilly and through subsequent lobbying (Senate 
1994:64; Brewster, Aust 7 November I 995). 
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Conclusions 
Labor's latitude on FDI policy was limited during its fourth and fifth terms in office. 
Labor's overriding political imperative was to repair the damage done to its 
reputation for economic management by the deep recession and persistent problems 
with Australia's external balances. A consensus on the need for further liberalisation 
and internationalisation of the Australian economy prevailed amongst the 'elite' 
economic policy community of government agencies, peak business organizations, 
market economists and . business commentators. This created a strqng impetus for 
further liberalisation ofFDI policy, as the Keating government delivered in its One 
Nation statement of 1992. Labor did not tum a completely blind-eye to rent-seeking 
on FDI policy but it had an overriding electoral imperative to deliver policy that the 
shapers of public opinion considered to be in the public interest. In general; this 
meant liberal policy. In the case of privatisations, opinion leaders in the media and 
business were not unduly perturbed by majority Australian equity requirements 
because they saw them as the political price of valuable reform. Accepted too was 
the Keating government's pra~tice of approving controversial foreign acquisitions 
of Australian businesses with an exhortation to the new owners that they use 
Australia as an export platfonn. Labor's official efforts to lure export-oriented FDI, 
especially RHQs to Australia, were generally well received while they remained 
modest in scale. These initiatives dovetailed neatly with the Keating government's 
championing of economic 'enmeshment' with East Asia and its promotion of 
APEC. 
Labor's conviction that the FIRB provided a convenient mechanism for politically 
managing economic nationalism in the community, while delivering liberal FDI 
policy outcomes, was much less appreciated at home and abroad. The Keating 
government's determination to retain the FIRB mechanism, although somewhat 
incongruous alongside its support for the APEC Bogar Declaration, was reflected. in 
the policy position it took to bargaining in the OECD over the MAI. The Keating 
government's own actions in relation to the Prime Minister's piggery investment 
and Conrad Black's investment in Fairfax did much to raise distrust of the FIRB at 
home. The Coalition, having become much more pragmatic about the politics of 
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FDI in the 1990s, worked with the economic nationalist Australian Democrats to 
further Labor's political pain over Fairfax through the creation of a Senate inquiry. 
The sensational events surrounding that inquiry obscured the fact that the media 
remained the main exception to Labor's liberalisation ofFDI policy. 
In the case. of the mass media, there was no elite consensus that a liberal policy 
towards foreign ownership and control would be in the public interest. Although a 
more liberal FDI policy for the media would have further cemented Labor's 
reputation for internationalising the Australian economy, attitudes towards FDI 
liberalisation for the media became entangled with judgements about the 
management style of particular foreign en.trepreneurs who sought to invest in the 
Australian media. Those attitudes were almost unifonnally negative in relation to 
Ropert Maxwell and Conrad Black. Opinion on FDI policy for the media was also 
complicated by attitudes to Rupert Murdoch who was now an American citizen. The 
upshot of this focus on the personalities of foreign media identities was widespread 
wariness towards liberalisation of FDI policy for the media and imminent 
backbench revolt. There were certainly public interest voices raised in support of a 
more liberal policy but these were not as great in number, as vocal or as politically 
well organised. This compounded popular antipathy in the electorate to foreign 
ownership of the mass media. The Federal Opposition's liberalism on FDI policy 
also wavered when it came to the case of the media, increasing the political risks to 
Labor of pushing liberalisation. The Hawke and Keating governments may have 
braved internal ALP disquiet and an electoral backlash on liberalisation if there had 
been substantial payMoffs either in terms of higher economic growth or private 
political returns from making the changes. Neither was clearly apparent to the Labor 
leadership. As foreign investment in the mass media involved the acquisition of 
existing businesses it held little promise of immediate additional employment or 
national wealth creation. In this respect the media differed from other sectors 
liberalised by Labor. Neither did Labor stand to gain significant net private political 
goods from liberalising FDI policy for the media. Although a change of policy in 
this direction would have endeared Labor to several media entrepreneurs, there were 
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equally powerful constituencies against liberalisation. In this environment; illiberal 
but popular ideas held sway. 
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10 Conclusions 
Australia long maintained an 'open door' policy towards FDI, with the limited 
exceptions of the banking, broadcasting and airline industries. From the late 1960s 
FDI .was subjected to more general control and by the mid-1970s policy had been 
tightened considerably. From the mid-1980s the tightening of control over FDI was 
reversed and a period of sustained liberalisation followed. This history suggests two 
things to explain. Why did Australia turn away from its longstanding open door 
policy only to later reverse course. How can varying restrictiveness of FDI policy 
across industry sectors be accounted for. Recent literature on FDI policies and the 
political economy of protectionism suggest that variations in FDI policy across time 
and sectors might be either the consequence of differing understandings of the 
public interest by policymakers or, alternatively, a reflection of the varying 
demands of influential private vested interests. This study concludes that Australia's 
FDI policy during 1960-96 principally reflected government attempts to make 
politically optimal compromises between competing conceptions of the public 
interest in relation to FDI. Yet rent seeking was rife and, to some degree, influenced 
popular and elite perceptions of the public interest. Liberal business constituencies 
and the imperative of growth-oriented policy strategies usually outweighed private 
interest supporters of restrictive FDI policy although periodically the latter did find 
some influence. Private interests seeking restrictive policy were helped by shortages 
of information about the real .costs and benefits of FDI, in the case of the mining 
industry in particular, and by popular concern about the cultural consequences of 
FDI in the case of the mass media. 
The argument 
Although scholars in the political science and international business disciplines 
have taken an interest in the relationships between host governments and foreign 
firms, there has been little attention given to the domestic political determinants of 
governments' FDI policies, International business scholars such as Brewer (1992), 
Kobrin (1993) and Jacobsen, Lenway and Ring (1993) have recognised that gap in 
the literature and suggested that the political science discipline might help to close 
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it. To date such initiatives remain limited, notably so in relation to Australian FDI 
policy. This is a striking gap in the Australian political economy literature given the 
historical and continuing importance of FDI to the Australian economy and 
recurrent controversy over it since the. early 1960s. This thesis represents an attempt 
to redress that deficiency in the academic literature. Limited attention in Australia 
and abroad to the domestic politics ofFDI meant there were few precedents for this 
study and no complete framework was at hand to tum to the question. In conducting 
a study of the historical determinants of Australian protectionism Anderson and 
Gamaut (1987) tested the explanatory power of both private int~rest and public 
interest theories of economic policymaking. They found (1987:115-16) that both 
public interest ideas and private interests had been significant determinants of 
protectionism; an account consistent with the intuition of some international 
business scholars about the determinants of FDI policy in a number of countries 
(Lenway and Murtha 1994:515-20; Safarian 1993). Caves (1996:249-54) proffered 
a tentative interpretation of how both private interests and ideas about the national 
interest could become politically influential on FDI policy outcomes. Caves' 
conception draws upon the theory of political markets and the rational choice 
theoretical approach that underpins it. 
In Chapter 2 the key features of political markets Ir itl rational chriice theory were 
surveyed briefly. The objective was to develop Ca ,;/ interpietation of the political 
determinants of FDI policy into a fuller analytical approach. The political markets 
approach has two interrelated strengths. It offers a theoretical conception of political 
agency with which to explain how both private interests and ideas become 
politically salient. Secondly, it offers a convenient means by which one can 
conceptualise the demand for, and supply of, public policy. Demand for public and 
private goods emanates from the electorate, organised interest groups and particular 
businesses. The supply of regulation is the consequence of competing political 
actors, usually heavily constrained by institutions, the state of the economy and 
informational limitations, offering mixes of public and private goods in return for 
support. Such political entrepreneurs - those aspiring to government or a 
legislative role as a minor party representative - may seek to make latent demands 
in the community politically salient. They may shape voters' perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of FDI and existing policy because information is in limited 
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supply and unevenly distributed. Political· entrepreneurs can tap veins \~f economic 
nationalism and xenophobia in the electorate. On the other hand, they may criticise 
governments for failing to attract sufficient FDI to enhance economic growth and 
job creation. Caves (1996) provided a sound starting point for conceptualising 
voters' sentiments in a rational choice theoretical framework that was further 
developed in Chapter 2. 
Australian findings 
From the framework developed for the study a number of tentative hypotheses were 
drawn about the varied and complex determinants of Australian FDI policy over 
time. These centred upon the interplay of material interests - private and public-· 
and ideas shaping understandings of them. 
Private and public interests 
Chapter 2 drew upon rational actor theory and analysis of the impact of FDI upon 
host economies to posit domestic constituencies for and against a liberal FDI policy 
under particular circumstances. In the historical narrative of Chapters 3 through to 
Chapter 9 a degree of fit between hypothesised FD~. policy preferences and the 
Australian case was observed. This section briefly pulls together these insights on a 
thematic basis, to emphasise again that, although private interests favouring 
selective restrictions on FDI policy were always present, there were usually also 
counter-veiling interests. 
Chapter 3 observed how Australia's heavy protectionism of the manufacturing 
sector in the past attracted British and American FDI. Some domestic manufacturers 
sheltering from foreign competition behind quotas and tariffs certainly hoped for 
the exclusion of barrier•hopping overseas competitors. Yet this proved much more 
difficult to justify restrictions on FDI than on foreign goods - because foreign 
investment boosted domestic employment. and general economic activity. The 
Menzies and Holt governments explicitly held that the FD I-inducing nature of tariff 
protection was one of its chief benefits. FDI helped to underpin economically a 
large-scale migration program. Late entrants through FDI into protected Australian 
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markets were also often competing against full or partially owned foreign 
businesses, making the case for excluding the new investors harder. 
Demands from private interests for restrictions on FDI in the manufacturing sector 
centred therefore not on new investments but principally on foreign takeovers of 
existing Australian enterprises. By the mid-1960s heavy protectionism had resulted 
in a large number of small-scale manufacturers producing solely for the domestic 
market. Acquisition of an existing firm became an increasingly preferred mode of 
market entry or expansion for foreign firms. As Chapter 4 sho~ed, support for 
controls on foreign takeovers increased among domestic manufacturing interests. 
This reflected general fears of more efficient foreign-owned rivals and/or 
management fears of being displaced by a hostile takeover bid. Trade unions, 
fearing less union-friendly foreign managements, sometimes leant weight to the 
calls for government intervention from management facing hostile foreign takeover 
bids. The private interest motivation of managers was evident in the MLC case in 
1968 that marked the first time a federal government intervened to block foreign 
investors taking a substantial stake in the equity of a particular Australian 
enterprise. 
When the Coalition eventually made a pragmatic concession to popular ecoaomic 
nation~Jism under pressure from the Labor opposition, it was to enact discretionary 
contro\1,s on foreign takeovers. Hastily introduced before the 1972 Federal Election, 
it was aimed as minimising FDI as an electoral negative for the McMahon 
government but also bore the imprint of domestic manufacturers, and their 
management, who were natural constituencies of the Liberal Party. Discretionary 
controls would allow the government to maintain quite liberal policy, as was the 
inclination of McMahon, while appearing to keep a watchful eye on foreign 
takeovers. The controls would also allow intervention whf.)te Coalition 
constituencies sought it. The Fraser government was principally concerned with 
striking a political compromise between the conflicting public interest ideas of 
developmentalism and economic nationalism but its FDI policy still reflected the 
interests of core Coalition constituencies. Reflecting the Liberal Part:t's traditional 
support among professionals and businesspeople, it placed greater emphasis on joint 
ventures having a majority of Australian directors than did the Whitlam or Hawke 
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governments. This is consistent with Breton's (1964:378) conclusion from 
Canadian experience that restrictions on FDI tended to favour middle-class white-
collar employees, with the wider community and blue-collar workers in particul~ 
bearing the ~.:;ono111ic costs of restrictions. Yet public opinion data suggests thaf 
there •:•as solid blue-cG!!m'~&upport for those restrictions. 
:Domestic businesses, or individuals for that matter, may have sharply diverging 
interests on FDI policy depending on whether they are a buyer or seller of an asset 
in demand by foreigners. As discussed in Chapter 2, would-be buy~rs have a strong 
interest in the pool of bidders being as small as possible. This logic was evident in 
the representations of domestic firms to federal governments seeking the blocking 
of foreign bids for assets they sought to acquire. The distributional consequences of 
rejections of foreign takeover bids were exemplified by subsequent share price falls 
despite the presence of rival domestic bidders. Domestic mining companies' 
staunch resistance to the Fraser government's naturalisation provisions for foreign 
firms in 1978, explored in Chapter 6, evidenced their economic interest in local 
equity requirements. The more liberal policy environment from the mid-1980s did 
not stop such representations from domestic bidders. Prominent instances 
highlighted in previous chapters include Queensland holders of pastoral leases, an 
under-financed domestic bid for the Dreamworld amusement park, AIWs bid for 
Fairfax newspapers and Kerry Packer's bid for Channel Nine. The popular appeal 
of the Hawke government's heavy restrictions on foreign purchases of residential 
real estate stemmed from the belief that prices would not rise as quickly. The 
interest of sellers in a liberal FDI policy was often revealed in their intense 
frustration at the blocking of foreign bids. Domestic vendors of businesses often 
carried as much political weight as local interests favouring restrictions on foreign 
purchasers, leading governments to desist from blocking foreign bids, 
Domestic constituencies for liberal policy towards FD! in new ventures were even 
stronger. This is in keeping with the hypothesis that FDI generates its own 
constituencies for liberal FDI policy because it generally lifts the return to factors of 
production it utilises in a host economy. For this and other reasons the Australian 
case offers only limited support for Caves' hypothesis (1996) that government 
policies to redistribute wealth away from foreign equity holders were likely because 
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they did not vote. Australian providers of legal, financial, real estate and other 
business services were frequently trenchant defenders of liberal FDI policy from the 
late 1960s. Yet, as predicted in Chapter 2, the liberalism of suppliers to MNEs did 
not always extend to their own sector. Insurance firms, merchant and trading banks 
and stockbrokers were supporters of restrictions on the entry of foreign competitors 
through FDI. The growing internationalisation of some Australian businesses, 
especially the large trading banks and mining firms, strengthened their support for 
liberal FDI policy in the 1980s as they crune to be more concerned with policy 
reciprocity. 
Export-oriented FDI is widely considered by scholars of international business to 
beget less local opposition than FDI primarily aimed at serving the host market 
(Poynter 1986:57; Encamation and Vachani 1985). Here it is. posited that, in 
defence of locational advantages local firms might oppose the entry of foreign f1,rms 
who are actual or potential rivals in export markets. Chapter 9 validates this point 
through the experience of resistance by domestic firms in the Australian beef 
industry to Japanese and American FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, 
the government recognised that, as in the tourism industry, FDI would bring new 
corporate linkages into promising foreign markets even if it provoked some 
domestic. structural adjustment. Australia's external balances were in such a parlous 
state, and elite opinion so resolutely liberal, that the Hawke and Keating 
govemments felt little compunction in ignoring the conGems of domestic interests 
who had never been a Labor constituency. 
As predicted in Chapter 2, Australian constituencies for and against liberal FDI 
policy were rarely stable or clear-cut. Peak business bodies were often divided over 
what FDI policy they should enunciate, not least because foreign firms were 
frequently members. Foreign and domestic firms often had much more th~"" united 
than divided them. In the 1960s Australian mining firms had been strong atri"ocates 
of the importance of FDI to the growth of the resources sector because they lacked 
both the capital base and technological know how to devel~p projects themselves. 
Although they later acquired considerable technical proficiency, they still looked to 
foreign partners to spread the huge capi~al costs and risk associated with mining 
projects. Domestic and foreign mining firms maintained a common front against the 
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state developmentalism of the Whl1Jam government. It was only when the Fraser 
government adopted policy more favourable to mining companies that domestic 
mining interests actively sought to defend their vested interests in local equity 
requirements. Foreign firms were for from passive in the face of lobbying by 
domestic firms for restrictions on FDI or economic nationalist sentiment within the 
Australian. electorate. Many foreign firms employed prominent locals in senior 
management roles and pursued active campaigns to promote community goodwill. 
Notable instances include foreign mining firms such as RTZ CRA, Toyota Motor 
Corporation, and the Japanese tourism and property enterprise Daikyo. 
Throughout the period of this study most lobbying on FDI was on behalf of 
individual finns in relation to specific proposals. The discretionary FDI controls 
created under the Foreign Takeovers Act were both the cause and effect of this. A 
discretionary FDI review mechanism is ideal from the point of a politically 
optimising government as it presents the opportunity to weight the significance of 
each constituency on a per investment basis. This is a much more politically precise 
instrument than a tariff. The Australian experience strongly suggests that this 
consideration was not lost on governments. Discretionary controls on FDI accorded 
also with the policy preferences that might be expected of many domestic 
businesses. The capacity for FDI to generate higher overall economic growth and 
generate positive spillover effects was widely recognised. Yet, some businesses 
coveted protection from foreign competitors entering their industry through FDI, 
perhaps involving a hostile takeover of their own enterprise. Consequently support 
was frequently evidenced, across time and industries, for a discretionary FDI policy 
that was for the most part administered liberally but - and this was not usu1:1Jly said 
openly - presented scope for protecting domestic business interests upon 
representation to the government of the day. This accords with the hypothesis, 
developed in Chapter 2 that even when there was a general consensus on the 
benefits of liberal policy, incentives remained for individual firms to cheat on a 
'rent-seeking moratorium'. Yet domestic businesses themselves were a check on 
government too often selectively blocking proposed investments precisely because 
they appreciated the broader benefits ofFDI. 
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Domestic firms, like foreign inve~tors, also had an interest in predictable FDI 
policy. Murtha (1991, 1993) examines theoretically and empirically how the failure 
of governments to make credible policy commitments increased the transaction 
. 
costs of exchange between domestic firms and foreign direct inv~stors. This study 
. argued that both domestic and foreign firms, although sometimes having diverging 
immediate interests in FDI policy, would have a strong preference for predictable 
policy. This was evident in business reactions to Prime Minister Gorton's varying 
pronouncements on FDi. The Whitlam government's erratic FDI policymaking 
clearly contributed to a sense of shared interests among, domestic and foreign 
mining firms. On the other hand, the simplicity and predictability of the Fraser 
government's policy of an equal partnership between dome~tic and foreign capital 
won grudging acceptance from firms that would either have preferred more or less 
liberal policy. The Fraser government, and. the subsequent Hawke and Keating 
governments, learnt that on many specific investment proposals the private interest 
constituencies for and against approval were equally weighted. In such 
circumstances the greater political challenge was to reconcile the contending 
aspirations in the electorate for economic growth and economic nationalism. 
As domestic businesses and voters alike benefit from economic growth, 
governments have a powerful political incentive to adopt growth-oriented policy 
settings. Chapter 2 noted that weak economies in a number of developed countri,es 
had seen governments initiate pro-market reforms, against the opposition of private 
vested interests. Globerman (1988:41-49) found that short run economic conditions 
had a significant influence on FDI policies, with pro-FDI polices more likely in 
downturns. This study argued that, on that bas~s, a weak economy would incline 
Australian governments to liberal FOi policy. This was by and large the case, 
although the Whitlam and Fraser governments' under-estimated the fragility of the 
national economy in pursuing more restrictive FDI r.!icy. As Chapter 7 revealed, 
economic difficulties led the Hawke government to turn its back on the traditional 
economic natiohalfam of the ALP. In addition to the immediate electoral need to 
manage the economy more effectively than the Whitlam government had done, 
Labor's Accord with the union movement in the 1980s locked it into growth~ 
oriented policies. When severe balance of payments precluded loose monetary and 
fiscal policy, liberalisation of FDI became a more attractive means for the Hawke 
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government to fulfil its employment growth commitment to the ACTU. This 
accords with Kotabe's . (1993:135-38) finding that high unemployment is a 
significant c!eteiminant of governments' pro-FDI orientation. While the Australian 
union movement had to overcome wariness about the industrial relations practices 
of foreign firms, especially from Japan, the Hawke government was able to enlist 
the ACTU leadership in the cause of FDI attraction. As noted at the beginning of 
the study, faster economic growth resulting from FDI provides a larger revenue 
base .to govemmep.ts that can be used to deliver poth mo.re public and private goods 
(Bacchett.a and Espinosa 1995). The leadership of the Hawke government was 
convinced that economic growth could provide the foundation for realising the 
ALP's social democratic policy agenda; creating a bias towuiid~ a liberal FDI 
policy. 
Growth-oriented policies driven by the shorMerm eiectoral imperative are not 
necessarily optimal polfcy in the long-tenn. Chapter 3 noted how Australian 
governments once were active importers of overseas capital ,·, . ~ ~ ., w.m account; 
creating state debt-servicing burdens and encoural~Jt~r '" ~ulture of 
developmentalism. After World War II the emphasis ~~h'.~1,~ ':J 'private 
developmentalism' where the state nonetheless intervened in markets in ways that 
induced increased FDI flows. The Menzies government frequently rationalised tariff 
barriers as making Australia more attractive for foreign investment in 
manufacturing. Despite presiding over substantial liberalisation of the Australian 
economy i.n the early 1990s, Labor still made iP:Justry policy and public 
procurement policy decisions with a view to the incentives they created for FDI. 
This was most evident in the automotive~ pharmaceuticals and IT areas. State 
governments also actively courted FDI through offering incentive packages because 
csf the boost prominent foreign investments could provide to their reputations for 
economic management. 
A government's need for economic growth is likely to promote a concern for the 
nation's reputation as an investment destination. The study posited that this in turn 
would attenuate the tendency of host governments to enforce 'obsolescing bargains' 
- namely more onerous performance or local equity requirements over time -' ..i:irn 
foreign firms. Even when Australian governments imposed substantial local equity 
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requirements and other restrictions on foreign investors, they generally still paid 
close heed to promoting Australia's reputation as an FDI destination in the 
international investment community. The main exception to this was the Whitlam 
government, although it also became more concerned with Australia's reputation in 
its fmal year in office. The policy of equal partnership for the minerals sector 
imposed from 1975 was the closest thing to an obsolescing bargain in the Australian 
case but still does not lend much weight to the concept.. Although the Fraser 
government's naturalisation provisions of 1978 required complying foreign firms to 
sell down equity to Australians, it was in return for a more liberal operating 
environment. 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that poor regulatory settings allowing businesses to 
extract additional rents from consumers provide at least an a priori second best 
justification for controls on foreign ownership or at least profit repatriation if the 
first best solution of regulatory refonn is impossible. The perceived high 
profitability of American auto manufacturers in Australia in the late 1950s resulted 
in the Federal Opposition calling for FDI controls. Labor, then still heavily inclined 
to protectfonjsm, did not appreciate that it was advocating a second rather than first 
best solution to the alleged national welfare loss. Popular support for restrictions on 
FDI in the mining sector in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s was inseparable from 
the perception that state and federal governments were failing to secure sufficient 
return in assigning the exploitation rights to national resources. The Fraser 
government inadvertently exacerbated these popular suspicions when it backed 
away from a planned resource rent tax in the face of intense resistance from both 
domestic and foreign mining interests. 
Information and ideas 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that scarcity and asymmetry of information characterise 
the political market for regulation. Limited information about the extent and nature 
·\)f FDI exacerbated popular concerns in the Australian electorate about the balance 
1,:f:;osts and benefits of FDI. This was particularly the case for FDI in the resources 
sector in the late 1960s, again in the late 1970s' after the Fraser government had the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics cease collecting information on FDI, for foreign 
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ownership of real estate, and FDI in the tourism and beef industries. Better 
information and analysis in the early 1990s helped to diminish controversy over 
FDI in the latter three industries. It was hypothesised early in t{•,~s study that limited 
info1mation about the real extent and character of FDI would allow more 
entrepreneurial behaviour by political, media and social actors to tap latent fears in 
the electorate about foreign ownership and control. This was borne out in relation to 
FDI in mining and Japanese investment in real estate. Both of these sectors were 
acutely politically sensitive despite the lack of evident problems arising from FDI. 
This was partly because of the territorial impulse in much nationalist sentiment -
as examined in Chapter 2, Mining was prone to controversy because the remoteness 
of the industry from major urban centres and its modest direct employment creation 
made the economic benefits of FDI less immediately apparent. Unlike 
manufacturing, it did not engender its own large constituency of voters that could 
constitute a political counterweight against economic nationalist ideas. 
Changing ideas of what constituted the public interest in relation to FDI changed 
the policy choices available to Australian governments. Until the early 1960s there 
was widespread acceptance of a liberal policy towards British and American 
investment; except in narrow radical Left-wing circles. Then the rapid growth of the 
minerals sector, international political and academic reactions against American 
MNEs, and the precedent of restrictive policy measures in similar economies like 
Canada and New Zealand all resulted in Australia's liberal policy being more hotly-
debated. This amplified differences of opinion within the Federal bureaucracy, 
namely between the Trade Department and the more liberal Treasury, and within 
the Coalition government. Domestic businesses that might benefit from FDI 
restrictions were emboldened to ask for them~ especially with the passing of liberal 
Prime Ministers Menzies and Holt. Growing differences of opinion over the costs 
and benefits of FDI came to be reflected in newspaper editorials, with sorne 
publications such as The Australian and The Age becoming staunch advocates of 
FDI controls by the late 1960s. This inevitably had an impact on public opinion, and 
made the Labor opposition's economic nationalism more respectable - to the point 
where the McMahon government was driven by electoral concerns to enact controls 
on foreign takeovers in 1972. 
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Labor's championing of economic nationalism, in opposition and then in 
government during 1972-75, revealed the potency of ideology. While FDI should 
increase the return to labour as a whole, elements of the trade union movement an<l 
ALP bore certain historical antipathies to private foreign investment. As Chapter 3 
examined, the ALP was virtually as pro-development as the Coalition but its class 
ideology inclined it to supplanting private overseas investment with overseas 
borrowings by the state. Despite the experience of the heavy debt-servicing burden 
exacerbating the 1930s depression as a consequen.ce of heavy state borrowing 
overseas in the 1920s, strong strands of radical nation.alism and state 
developmentalism remained in the ideology of the labour movement. The latter 
found its last expression in the Whitlam government1• culminating in the 
embarrassment of the 'loans affair'. Whitlam's intense economic nationalism 
centred upon the resources sector because of its growth potential and the public 
ownership of mineral resources while there was little interest shown in the 
manufacturing. The faith of Labor leadership in its nationalistic vision, buttressed 
by an initially favourable reaction from the media and the electorate, blinded it to 
the economic and political dangers entailed. Labor's attempt to implement its model 
of state developmentalism provoked formidable opposition from both domestic and 
foreign mining interests, and providers of financial and other services to them. They 
in turn contributed to voters' loss of faith in the capacity of the Whitlam 
government to manage the economy in a responsible manner. By contrast, the 
Fraser government's policy of 50/50 local equity guidelines represented a pragmatic 
compromise between still-popular economic nationalism and its inclination to 
'private developmentalism'. 
While considerable wariness towards liberal FDI policy has persisted in the 
Australian community, by the mid-1980s there was near consensus within the 
economic policy community about the benefits of liberal policy. This was a 
function of better understanding of FDI, significant liberalisation in other countries, 
the growing influence of 'economic rationalist' ideas in response to structural 
economic problems, and the sharp deterioration in Australia's external balances. As 
Chapter 7 examined in detail, the balance of payments crisis of the mid-1980s 
required policy innovation from the Hawke government ifit was to have any chance 
of being re-elected. Economic fundamentals suggested FDI liberalisation. This 
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response was certainly not inevitable given Labor's ideological background. 
Nonetheless, FDI liberalisation packages became the principal means by which 
Labor signalled its commitment to internationalising the Australian economy. 
Labor's target audience was 'elite opinion' - business leaders and media 
commentators - because of their capacity to influence voters' perceptions of the 
government's capacity in economic management. That FDI liberalisation was a 
means to impress opinion-makers was ironic given the extent of community 
wariness about FDI. Liberalisation was politically sustainable because the 
Opposition did not seek to tap that community wariness for p~litical gain. This 
restraint reflected a mixture of the influence of its business constituencies and the 
free market philosophy of its leadership. Elite opinion-makers heavily censured the 
Opposition when it did impulsively adopt positions critical of the existing FDI 
policy, in relation to the MFP during the 1990 Federal election and under Downer's 
leadership in 1994. Opinion-makers had come to expect mainstream politicians to 
lead public opinion on internationalising the Australian economy rather than 
pandering to economic nationalist sentiment in the electorate. 
In discussing the influence of ideas on FDI politics in Chapter 2, attention was 
directed to specifically cultural issues because of their place in the international 
business literature. Given the deep inte1Telationship between nationalism and 
cultural identity, it was predicted early in the study that the restrictiveness of 
Australian FDI policy would be partly a function of the degree of cultural distance 
between Australian policymakers, and/or domestic constituencies, and the major 
sources of FDI at any particular time. As seen in Chapter 2, Vachani (1995:164-65) 
forecast that host governments were less likely to subject 'multinationals with 
positive historical or cultural ties with the host country' to onerous regulation. The 
deep commitment of the Menzies government to the UK-Australia relationship, and 
of the Holt government to that with the United States of America, was a factor in 
the determination of both governments to niaintain an 'open door' policy at a time 
when those countries predominated as sources of FDI. Official policy documents 
habitually referred only to 'overseas investment' until the early 1970s. 
Opinion poll data clearly revealed that, even recently, many Australians felt greater 
'warmth' towards British and American direct investors than those from Japan and 
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other Asian countries. Yet this did not find expression in Australia's FDI policy as 
the sources of FDI became more diverse. Formally and in implementation, policy 
remained resolutely non-discriminatory in terms of cmmtry-of-origin. This reflected 
consensus within the policy community about the importance of a non-
discriminatory policy; mirroring a similar conviction in relation to immigration 
policy from the early 1970s. Moreover, rapid growth in the share of total inward 
FDI originating from Japan in the mid-1980s was associated with the main period 
of FDI policy liberalisation. The Hawke government was unmoved by public 
disquiet over the rapid increase in Japanese FDI. This wa~ the result of a 
combination of an overriding electoral need to refonn the economy, the critical 
scrutiny of a policy community supportive of closer economic ties with East Asia, 
and the personal philosophical commitment of government leaders to non-
discriminatory policy. 
Yet cultural considerations were reflected in the decisions of the Hawke and 
Keating governments that kept the mass media as the main exception to its 
liberalisation of FDI policy. This was despite the fact that the proposed foreign 
investments that brought the issue to a head in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
from the culturally proximate United Kingdom, United States and Canada. The key 
role played by the mass media in the workings of the national polity, and its 
apparent cultural influence, were major reasons why there was no elite consensus 
on a liberal FDI policy for the media. The economic benefits to be had from 
permitting foreign acquisitions appeared minimal to many, while the particular 
foreign proprietors involved attracted considerable antipathy for reasons other than 
their foreignness. In the case of broadcasting, domestic media interests also feared 
that FDI liberalisation would be a precursor to wider-ranging changes to regulatory 
regimes in which they had a vested interest. All these factors, and the concern of the 
Labor government both to avoid party room revolt and alienating influential 
domestic media proprietors, saw it confinn the mass media as the main exception to 
a now liberal FDI policy. 
It remains to proffer some brief classification of the main ideas influencing 
restrictive FDI policy in Australia. Caves (1996:250-51) drew a theoretical 
distinction between economic nationalism and xenophobia, the fonner being a 
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collective consumption good of national self-detc;1nrtination while the latter entailed 
individuals experiencing disutility from personal dealings with foreigners. 
Australian FDI policy outcomes from 1972 were, in Caves' terms, nationalistic 
rather than xenophobic because they have not sought to exclude foreigners entirely 
but share ownership with locals - for the most part equally. Yet Qpinion polls and 
other evidence suggest that a not insignificant minority of Australians exhibit 
xenophobic tendencies on FDI policy. This is reflected in the entanglement,. in 
popular commentary and public debates, of immigration, race and FDI issues in the 
late 1980s. Although there was ultimately no direct impact on FDI policy outcomes, 
. . 
it presented a considerable challenge to the Australian government's management 
of relations with East Asia and its promotion at home of economic engagement with 
the region. It also deeply disconcerted more liberal Australians. 
Implications 
Studies such !-IS t1Us one are important given that investment issues now figure 
prominently in rnultilateral negotiations. The findings of the study have certain 
implications for what national governments should expect from international 
negotiations on binding investment measures, and which accord with the recent 
failure of deliberations on the MAI in the OECD. Few governments are likely to 
have a free hand in international bargaining over FDI policy. A long and benign 
histoty of FDI in an economy is no guarantee of popular support for a liberal policy. 
Many Australians reveal antipathy to FDI in opinion polls and moderate controls on 
FDI have been quite popular. Even when an FDI policy regime is quite open there 
are likely to be sectors which are politically sensitive. Cultural concerns and private 
interest dynamics make binding commitments to an open investment regime for the 
mass media rather improbable. This was reflected in the draft MAI that provided a 
mechanism (or governments to list exceptions to its schedule of commitments; 
Australia proposing to maintain all its existing qualifications to liberal policy. This 
does not bode well for negotiations on a binding multilateral agreement. 
The failure to realise the MAI or a like agreement through the WfO is unlikely to 
greatly hamper international FDI flows. The Australian case strongly suggests that 
the economic costs of economic nationalism engender their own political 
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momentum for the liberalisation of FDI policy. The Australian experience is 
mirrored in the many unilateral FDI liberalisation measures of other countries. over 
the last decade (UN 1998). Incr~asing competition. between countries to market 
themselves as attractive destinations for FDI creates checks against the worst abuses 
of discretionary government controls over FDI. The concern for national reputation 
in the international investment community may also be an impulse to more prudent 
macro and microeconomic policy settings. The Australian case lends some weight 
to thfa. If anything, recent experience suggests that some domestic policies may be 
distorted in favour of foreign firms because of the short-term political payoffs to 
governments of attracting investments. 
The Australian case suggests that allowing national governments to administer FDI 
policy pragmatically may create at least as many business opportunities for foreign 
firms as it diminishes. More transparent policy is not necessarily more liberal 
policy. Indeed, the Australian case suggests that successive governments have used 
the discretionary and non-transparent administrative mechanism of the FIRB to 
manage a resilient strain of economic nationalism in the electorate effectively. It is 
quite likely that if an Australian government were forced to specify national interest 
tests and sectoral limits on FDI in legislation, for administration by an independent 
statutory body, then policy outcomes would be less liberal. Limits on foreign 
ownership may also be a necessary poUtical price for the privatisation of state 
businesses that can create new business opportunities for foreign firms. 
Foreign firms and host citizens alike do have good grounds for complaint about the 
workings of FDI controls. The Australian case reveals that governments frequently 
face demands to utilise FOi controls to realise a range of public interest aspirations 
that would be more appropriately addressed through domestic regulation. FDI 
controls were used to address concerns about the impact on the natural and built 
environment of projects in the mining, pulp and paper, tourism and real estate 
sectors. Frequently, relevant local and state governments had granted approval 
already, although they were often duly criticised. FDI controls were used to pursue 
competition policy objectives in the print media, although the Hawke government 
was widely criticised for not going further in relation to Rupert Murdoch's News 
Ltd. The use of FDI controls in this way implies tougher regulatory standards are 
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being imposed on foreign firms than on domestic businesses. The politics of FDI 
policy are inseparable from the use of restrictions on FDI as a second best solution 
to poor regulatory design. FDI may further exacerbate the national welfare loss 
from regulatory settings, such as high tariff barriers, that allow businesses to capture 
rents at the expense of consumers. Foreign firms niay repatriate a substantial share 
of those rents. Good domestic regulation should make most controls on FDI 
redundant. 
A clear lesson from the Australian case is that the defence of ,liberal FDI policy 
depends upon detailed information and analysis of its extent and nature. In an 
information void, c.ompetition between political actors will tend to drive public 
opinion on FDI in an illiberal direction because of nationalist sentiment within the 
electorate. The position of the main opposition parties on FDI policy in 'policy 
space' will be a significant determinant of a government's scope for showing 
leadership on defending liberal FDI policy. The policy positions of opposition 
parties will in turn depend on a combination of their inherited ideological baggage 
and the presence or otherwise of an influential policy community committed to 
liberal FDI policy. Finally, the Australian experience shows that foreign firms can 
strategise their interactions with at least some host governments and communities 
so as to increase their latitude on ownership decisions and other aspects of corporate 
strategy. 
Limitations and scope for further research 
The main limitations of this study derive from incomplete inforn1ation about certain 
aspects of both the demand and supply sides of the political market for Australian 
FDI policy. On the demand side, more research is needed into the formulation of 
FDI policy preferences within peak business organizations. The membership of 
foreign firms, and the diverse interests of domestic firms in relation to FDI policy, 
present challenges for the leaders of those organizations. Just .how they were 
managed was the beyond the scope of the study. Also needed is detailed study of 
the strategies foreign firms deploy to minimise the points of political resistance to 
their expansion in Australia. This would provide valul'.b!c insights into the politics 
of FDI. It would also make a further contribution fo the international business 
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literature and might be useful to foreign firms planning to operate in Australia. 
More understanding is needed of public opinion in relation to FDI, and the real 
opportunity costs people are prepared to bear to secure national ownership and 
control. The study shows that political actors have taken seriously evidence of both 
economic nationalist and pro-development proclivities in the electorate. However, 
even government and opposition strategists find it difficult to reconcile fully the 
existing opinion poll data suggesting deep community antipathy towards FDI, and 
the positive reactions that large new foreign investments generally beget. The main 
limitation of the analysis on the supply side of the political m~ket for Australian 
FDI policy is that it provides little insight into the bureaucratic politics of FDI. A 
rational choice methodology certainly can accommodate such analysis. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, gaining information from bureaucratic insiders was 
intractable. Moreover, as Chapter 9 showed, the conduct ofFDI policy was a source 
of keen political contention when initial data collection for this study was being 
carried out. Yet the accessibility of the new head of the FIRB to the author in the 
closing stages of this study bodes well for ongoing study of Australian policy-
making on FDI. The findings of the study also provide a starting point for 
comparisons across countries of the political determinants ofFDI policy. 
Conclusion 
The openness of Australia to FDI from 1966-96 was principally a function of 
pragmatic government compromises between contending public interest ideas. Rent 
seeking by private vested interests was nonetheless prevalent. This did have 
influence on popular understandings of the public interest, and on FD! policy 
outcomes for specific sectors such as mining and the mass media. More challenging 
to governments than private interest demands was. the electoral need to deliver 
sound economic management, implying liberal FDI policy, while being mindful of 
economic nationalist sentiment in the electorate. Australia's experience of FDI 
politics suggests that when confronted by a weak economy most governments will 
deliver quite liberal policy in practice for all but the most politically sensitive 
sectors. The Australian experience also suggests that governments will be very 
hesitant to give up discretionary controls on FDI. This is becr.mse they provide a 
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mechanism for managing inevitable debate over particular foreign investments and 
for providing the odd favour to an influential private interest. 
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